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The results of previous survey research have
suggested that the reasons why over 600,000 UK
pensioners do not claim their entitlement to
supplementary pensions (a means-tested benefit
administered by the DHSS) are so complex and
interrelated that it is unlikely that a clear
understanding of the take-up problem will ever emerge.
However, a critical review of the research would
suggest that this complexity is much less an inherent
quality of the problem than the product of conceptual
and methodological inadequacies in research design. In
particular, previous research has been completely
atheoretical in its orientation, and researchers have
attempted to draw inferences from post-hoc surveys of
non-claimants and to apply them to understanding a
dynamic motivational process which accounts for the
behaviour of both claimants and non-claimants. This
thesis describes two studies designed to overcome these
theoretical and methodological problems. In the
feasibility study, the author constructed a conceptual
model of the process by which pensioners decide whether
or not to apply for benefit which implied that, in
order to apply, a pensioner would have to achieve a
series of cognitive thresholds in a particular order.
This "threshold" model was validated by using it to
predict the benefit claiming behaviour of 25 eligible
non-claimants within a longitudinal research design.
The empirical validity of the model was confirmed in a
full longitudinal study involving 123 eligible
non-claimants. The main substantive findings were: (i)
that informing pensioners of their entitlement had no
significant effect upon their claiming behaviour; (ii)
that because thinking about the issue of applying was
not salient to a substantial minority, only just over
half the sample actively made decisions about applying;
and (iii) that of those who made decisions about
applying, the most important determinants of their
choice were their expectations and feelings about
having their needs met, about their significant
referent finding out if they applied, about direct
involvement with the DHSS, and about having to give up
the housing benefit they were receiving in order to
receive their supplementary pension entitlement. A
number of policy options arising from these findings




This thesis describes the results of two studies
into the motivation of low income pensioners to claim
their entitlement to supplementary pensions. Although
the thesis begins and ends with discussions of a social
problem, it is not a thesis in sociology or social
administration. By the same token, although the
intermediate chapters dwell in considerable detail upon
determining the influence of various forces upon the
motivation of pensioners to apply for benefit, it is
not a thesis in experimental social psychology, as the
term "motivation" might lead one to expect. Instead, it
is a thesis which attempts to apply a series of
psychological constructs originating in the laboratory
of the experimental psychologist to a real life
problem, in order to understand that social problem and
to propose solutions to it. Thus, this is a thesis in
applied psychology.
A Short History of the Research
Unlike many theses, the research reported herein
spans a period of six years. It was begun in 1976 when
the author came to Edinburgh from the United States,
having received a scholarship from the Saint Andrew's
Society of the State of New York to pursue graduate
study in psychology. While an undergraduate in the US,
he had developed a strong interest in the psychological
and social welfare of the elderly; therefore, in
retrospect, it comes as no real surprise to find that
the thesis topic eventually chosen combined both sets
of interests. However, although the topic was settled
on in November 1976, the methodology employed underwent
a rather prolonged period of development.
The initial review of the literature on
non-claiming research (Chapter 1) suggested that
pensioners' values were of cardinal importance in
understanding non-claiming. Thus, the first research
methodology (Chapter 2) was heavily based on the
Rokeach Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973), a standardised
survey tool which measures the relative importance
which people attach to each of eighteen instrumental
and eighteen terminal values. Exploring the suitability
of this methodology occupied the author from November
1976 to April 1977. However, since this technique was
thought to be too structured, it was rejected in favour
of one which would be more flexible in terms of
allowing pensioners' unique perceptions of the world to
emerge. Therefore, it was a natural step to explore the
feasibility of using Kelly's repertory grid technique
(Kelly, 1955). A modest pilot study using the "rep
grid" was undertaken during the summer of 1977.
However, by November 1977, it was clear that this
approach went to the other extreme; it was too
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flexible, and its correct use demanded a level of
expertise which the author did not have. The third
phase of development of the research methodology began
in December 1977, when the expectancy-valence theory of
motivation (Vroom, 1964) was explored for its
suitability. Applied in this context, the theory
suggested that any pensioner's motivation to apply
would be a function of some combination of the strength
of his expectations that applying would lead to certain
outcomes and his potential feelings about those
outcomes. For a variety of reasons specified in Chapter
2, this approach was chosen as the mainstay of the
research.
However, by December 1977, two very important
issues had emerged. The first of these was that the
author would run out of money by the summer of 1978.
The second was that direct funding for the research by
the DHSS was prerequisite for obtaining a
representative sample of pensioners. As a result, the
period between January and May 1978 was spent drafting
proposals for a three-year full study of the problem.
In August 1978, after meeting with the author and David
Nelson, the DHSS rejected these proposals, and
requested that new ones for a much more modest
feasibility study be submitted. These were prepared and
submitted in December 1978. In April 1979, the DHSS
agreed to support a year-long study of the feasibility
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of finding a sample and of conducting the research
using the proposed methodology. Backdated to 1 February
1979, the study actually took fourteen months (until 31
March 1980) to complete. Thus, for Ph.D. purposes, the
author was nearly into injury time before appearing on
the field.
The sampling procedure and methodology used in the
feasibility study are described in Chapter 3. The
findings of that study appear as Chapter 4. Parts of
both of these chapters have appeared previously in
reports written for the DHSS (Nelson and Kerr, 1980a;
1980b), and three papers describing the methodological
and substantive findings have either been published or
been accepted for publication (Kerr, 1981; 1982b;
1982c).
As can be imagined, it was never the wish of the
author or his supervisors that he conduct a
fourteen-month feasibility study as a preliminary to a
two-year full study; this situation was imposed upon
him entirely by the requirements of the DHSS. As a
consequence, the feasibility study was so thorough
that, in substance at least, it would be more
appropriate to consider it as a first full study and
not as a pilot study. Thus, the nomenclature of
'feasibility' study is retained to indicate that its
stature was much greater than that of the average pilot
study.
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The results of the feasibility study were
promising, and therefore the author and David Nelson
were encouraged to apply to the DHSS for funding for a
full study. In the hope of making funding continuous
from 1 April 1980, an interim report fully evaluating
the feasibility of the research (Nelson and Kerr,
1980a) plus very detailed proposals for a full study
were sent to the DHSS in February 1980. These were
eventually approved in May 1980, and so began the full
study, of which the methods are reported in Chapter 5,
and the findings in Chapters 6 and 7.
The full study was financed from 1 April 1980 to
31 March 1982, although the work on it spanned the
period from July 1980 to May 1982. This is because
April to June 1980 were spent writing the obligatory
final report on the feasibility study (Nelson and Kerr,
1980b).
In late April of 1982, the author completed the
final report on the full study prepared for the DHSS
(Kerr, 1982a). Although this thesis shares a data base
with that report, and sometimes draws heavily from it,
the emphases of the two works are rather different. The
main emphasis of the final report was to inform
policy-makers about pensioners' decision-making
processes, and to use the findings to propose solutions
to the non-claiming problem. In contrast, the main
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emphasis of this thesis is much more upon the
construction, validation and meaning of a model of the
process by which pensioners decide about benefits,
although considerable emphasis is also placed upon the
relevance of the research findings to the social
problem.
Some Problems of Applied Research
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the research
reported here is that it was actually carried out.
Although all applied research has its problems (such as
obtaining representative samples or identifying
appropriate criteria), this particular research had a
host of special problems, outlined below, which had to
be overcome while it was being carried out.
First, there is the naive observation that applied
social research usually involves working with and
talking with other people. As simple-minded as such an
observation might appear, this presented more of a
barrier than might be imagined. The main problem was
the very considerable discrepancy in language between
that used by working-class lowland Scots and that used
by a middle-class Yank from Pennsylvania. In addition,
the very fact that the author was American prompted
many pensioners to discuss at great length, and
potentially to the detriment of the research, what
little they knew about America. However, these
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disadvantages were probably balanced by the advantages
of the author not being identifiable within the British
class structure.
Second, a variety of problems were encountered
trying to conduct research in conjunction with a
government department. This research could not have
been conducted without the very considerable
co-operation of a wide range of individuals within the
DHSS, some of whom were very interested in the
research, and others who were actively opposed to it.
For instance, it was paradoxical that although the
Chief Scientist's Office of the DHSS funded the two
studies, their own local office staff refused to
provide essential criterion information in the first
study. The local offices were using the research as a
weapon in their industrial relations conflict,
threatening to go on strike if forced to collect this
information. Another paradox concerns the form which
the research was to take. Throughout the project there
was some pressure to present research findings in the
same form as other studies into non-claiming, using a
traditional post-hoc survey design. However, what this
research had to offer stemmed essentially from looking
at the problem afresh, with a new methodology, and to
have conformed to the traditional approach would have
limited the usefulness of the findings.
A third paradox was that although the DHSS
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required that the sample comprise only pensioners
eligible for, yet not claiming, supplementary pensions,
the author was never once allowed access to the
official and authoritative documentation which stated
the official assessment criteria. Indeed, he was not
even given the active assistance of the DHSS. The
assessment interviews were constructed by sending draft
questionnaires to the DHSS, awaiting their comments,
sending another draft, and so on. Their comments rarely
explained why a detail was wrong, and clarification was
only given when the author persisted in asking for it.
In the event, five drafts of the questionnaire were
submitted before it was approved. The fourth paradox
was that Edinburgh District and Lothian Regional
Councils, who had absolutely no vested interest in the
research, were much more co-operative than some
sections within the DHSS, who commissioned the
research.
The third and final category of problems
encountered by the author concerns aspects of the
environment over which he had no control. A sampling of
these problems would include: (1) the DHSS computer
staff going on strike just as the sample for the first
study was about to be drawn from computer records; (2)
the author, at 10:00 a.m. on the first day of
interviewing in the first study, having to rescue one
of his respondents who had fallen and knocked herself
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unconscious (see Appendix A6); (3) one of Edinburgh's
worst snowfalls for years on the first day of
interviewing in the second study; (4) half the civil
service (including the DHSS local offices) going on
strike, and Lothian Regional Council announcing
increases in rates of nearly 50% (thus requiring the
re-calculation of levels of entitlement of nearly 300
pensioners) in the midst of a field experiment in the
second study; (5) the relocation from Edinburgh
District to Lothian Regional Council offices of a
portion of the records necessary for a follow-up check
on the representativeness of the sample in the midst of
the second study, thus requiring further agreement for
record access thought already to have been obtained.
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1.1 Means-Tested Benefits and the Elderly: An
Introduction
About three-quarters of all British pensioners are
eligible for at least one means-tested benefit (SBC,
1979; Matthews, 1980). The two main types of
means-tested benefits for which they are eligible are
supplementary benefit (SB) and housing subsidies
including rent rebates and allowances and rate rebates
(hereafter known collectively as "rebates"). Since
eligibility for benefit implies a low income and
probably also a relatively basic standard of living,
one might expect that nearly all pensioners would be
claiming the benefits that they are due. However, this
is not the case; the most reliable government estimates
indicate that only 73% of those eligible are claiming
their supplementary pension entitlement (SBC,1979). The
comparable percentages of pensioners claiming their
entitlement to rent rebates, rent allowances and rate
rebates are 75-80%, 55-60% and 70-75% respectively
(Matthews, 1980).
The general aim of the research reported in this
thesis is to ascertain why some pensioners do not while
others do claim their entitlement to one specific
means-tested benefit, supplementary pension. The
reasons for non-claiming are no doubt very complex;
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nowhere is the complexity of the problem better
expressed than by the late Supplementary Benefits
Commission:
the results of research studies have been
inconclusive in establishing the reasons why
particular groups do not claim. All we can
say is that this reluctance to claim appears
to come from some mixture of pride,
ignorance, a sense of stigma, reluctance to
make the efforts which a claim calls for, a
desire for self-sufficiency on the part of an
individual or family, an unwillingness to
become involved with a government agency and
a feeling that the whole business is not
worthwhile. As the National Consumer Council
[NCC, 1976, p.33] put it, "given the overlap
between the different factors and the
vagueness and confusion of the motives of the
non-claimant, we doubt if a complete picture
will ever emerge" (SBC, 1978a, pp. 7-8).
In addition to the attitudinal and volitional
factors outlined above, the most recent survey of the
non-claiming of supplementary pensions (Broad, 1977)
indicated that many of these eligible non-claiming
pensioners are already receiving rebates, but would be
financially better off on supplementary pensions if
they applied for them. Thus, understanding the
non-claiming of these individuals requires
understanding their perceptions of rebates and why they
chose them in preference to supplementary pensions, if
indeed they made a conscious evaluation and choice at
all.
Many of the reasons for non-claiming cited above
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are founded on pensioners' expectations and feelings
about the application procedure, which are, in turn,
probably partly based upon the reputations which
supplementary pensions have acquired by virtue of their
centuries long pedigree. Thus, prior to discussing the
findings of previous research into the non-claiming of
supplementary pensions, it is essential to describe in
detail what supplementary pensions and rebates are, how
eligibility to them is assessed, their application
procedures, their respective pedigrees, and how the
"better off" problem alluded to can arise.
1.11 Supplementary Pensions
Supplementary pensions are benefits payable to
individuals or couples in which the head of the
household (HOH) is over pensionable age (60 for a woman
and 65 for a man), whose expenses exceed their net
income, and who are not in full-time employment.
Supplementary allowances are the equivalent benefit for
persons under pensionable age; the generic term for
referring to both benefits is supplementary benefit.
Throughout this thesis the terms "supplementary
benefit" and "supplementary pensions" will be used
interchangeably; the abbreviation for both will be
"SB". The benefit is administered by the Department of
Health and Social Security (DHSS). The amount of
benefit due is determined by the difference between the
pensioners' requirements and resources, subject to
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certain restrictions on capital.
Resources comprise the sum of an individual1s or
couple's National Insurance, occupational, war and
industrial disability pensions plus their net weekly
earnings from any part-time employment. However, the
earnings of any dependent children are disregarded
altogether, and a certain amount (currently £4) is
disregarded from weekly earnings and from certain types
of pension, subject to a maximum disregard on all
pensions (currently £4). Occassional payments from
friends and relatives are totally disregarded (contrary
to popular wisdom), as are gifts in cash not exceeding
£20, and gifts in kind (such as TV licenses, food or
clothing). The value of any Attendance or Mobility
Allowance received is entirely disregarded.
Since November 1980, if savings and other forms of
capital exceed £2,000, the pensioner is automatically
disqualified from eligibility to a supplementary
pension. Forms of capital included are "land and house
property owned but not occupied by the
claimant... valued at the price it might be expected to
fetch in the open market, less any outstanding mortgage
and after a standard deduction" (DHSS, 1981a, p.36),
but not the value of the owner-occupied home. [1]
Requirements - Against total weekly resources are
set total weekly requirements. For pensioners, these
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comprise long-term scale rates (or personal allowances)
as set out annually by Parliament. These rates vary
depending on the marital status of the claiming unit
and on whether or not the claimant is a householder
(any person who is either the owner, or is generally
responsible for the payment of the rent and/or rates).
A typical non-householder would be a widow living in
one or more rooms in her married son's home. (However,
if she has completely self-contained facilities and
lives amongst her family but independent of them, she
might be considered a householder.) The long-term rates
which apply to all pensioners from November 1981 are
£47.35 for married couples, £29.60 for single persons,
and £23.65 for single non-householders.
To these personal allowances are added additional
requirements (based on scale rates) to meet expenses
"which are either abnormally high and so are not met in
full by the scale rates (eg laundry) or which the scale
rates do not cover at all (eg domestic help)" (DHSS,
1981a, p.42). A sample of the items for which
additional requirements can be awarded includes extra
heating on health, age or housing grounds, central
heating, blindness, special diets, laundry costs,
domestic help, fares to visit patients in hospital,
etc.
One of the largest expenses for many low-income
pensioners is the cost of their housing, in terms of
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repairs and insurance for owner-occupiers, rent for
tenants, and rates for both groups. In the simplest
cases, housing requirements will be the amount the
pensioner is actually spending on housing. For
owner-occupiers this "reflects the outgoings on the
property and is made up of mortgage interest, rates,
water and sewerage charges, ground rent (feu duty in
Scotland) and an annual allowance [currently £1.25 per
week] towards repairs and insurance" (DHSS, 1981a,
p.50). Calculating housing requirements for tenants is
less straightforward. Where rent does not include a
payment to the landlord for amenities such as lighting
and heating, and there are no non-dependents living in,
the full rent and rates paid, averaged out over 52
weeks, constitute the "net rent". If amenities such as
lighting and heating are included in the rent payment,
a fixed amount determined by scale rates is deducted to
arrive at the "net rent" figure since payment for these
expenses is included in the personal requirements. A
fixed charge, again determined by scale rates, is
deducted for each non-dependent unit in the household,
for example, a son and his family living in his
mother's home.
Thus, assessing the amount of entitlement requires
determining the sum of the applicant's personal,
additional and housing requirements, and subtracting
from this sum the total weekly value of his resources.
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Table 1.11 gives examples of how the amount of
entitlement would be determined for a council tenant
widow, an owner-occupier married couple, and a
non-householder. In each case, the weekly requirements
and resources are calculated, and their total resources
subtracted from their total requirements to determine
potential entitlement. Potential entitlement becomes
actual entitlement only where the value of capital is
less than £2,000 (but see Footnote 2).
Applying for a supplementary pension is a fairly
straightforward procedure comprising up to four stages.
The first is to initiate a claim in writing, over the
'phone, or in person. To claim means to declare oneself
willing to apply for a supplementary pension and to
undergo a means-test interview. A claim in writing may
comprise an informal letter, or a formal claim using
either a supplementary benefits leaflet (SB1) or the
pro forma in the back of every pensioner's National
Insurance Pension book. The date of claiming for
payment purposes is the date of the first contact
between the individual and the social security office,
even if this precedes the official receipt of a signed
declaration that the individual is claiming. Although
another individual, such as the pensioner's doctor,
solicitor, daughter or friend may initiate the claim on
the pensioner's behalf, the pensioner must be the
actual claimant.
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The second step is to undergo the means-test
interview. This is traditionally held in the claimant's
home, and usually takes about 20 minutes, but
pensioners (unlike those under pensionable age) have
the option of being interviewed at the local DHSS
office if they wish. The interview is conducted not
only to collect the information necessary to assess
entitlement, but also to verify this information.
The third step is to await the outcome of the
claim. Since November 1980, all claimants have
automatically received a written notice of how their
entitlement was assessed, independent of the outcome of
the claim. Prior to that date, claimants were merely
informed of the outcome. If the claim is successful,
payment is usually made through a book of orders cashed
weekly at a post-office; in nine-tenths of cases, the
supplementary pension is paid jointly with the National
Insurance Pension, but some pensioners (many of whom
are recent claimants) retain two separate order books
(which were, at one time, of two different colours).
Since SB is what is called a "passport" benefit,
recipients are automatically entitled to free National
Health Service medicines on prescription, to free
dental treatment, dentures and spectacles, and to the
refund of fares incurred when receiving hospital
treatment.
For an unsucessful claimant, the fourth step might
be to exercise his or her right to appeal against the
decision. These appeals are heard by Supplementary
Benefit Appeals Tribunals.
Although the effort required of pensioners to
apply and the complexity of the means-test interview
may be off-putting to some prospective claimants, to
understand the strength of the negative feelings which
many pensioners harbour towards supplementary pensions
a brief review of the long and chequered history of the
benefit is necessary. [3]
George (1973) suggests that the problem of poverty
has been seen in four different ways during different
stages of history:
poverty as an ascribed status in feudal
societies? poverty as vagabondage in the
immediate aftermath of the collapse of
feudalism; as an individual problem of
physical subsistence attributable to the
individual's personal failings from the
mid-seventeenth to the beginning of the
present century; and finally as a social
problem of physical subsistence and social
inequality during this century (George, 1973,
p. 1) .
In the feudal society (pre-1350), poverty was seen
to be an unalterable condition into which one was born
and in which one died. However, economic and social
changes in the fourteenth century led to the collapse
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of the feudal system, which resulted in massive
unemployment and in large numbers of individuals moving
from the countryside to the towns in search of work, or
failing that, alms. This movement was perceived as a
threat to the existing social order by a government
that "saw its role as keeping the peace [and]
preserving the status quo rather than providing
employment or relieving poverty" (George, 1973, p. 5).
It was during this stage of history that poverty was
equated with vagrancy. Jordon (1959) notes that the
legislation of the period (the Vagrancy Acts of 1531
and 1536) tended:
to assume that poverty and vagrancy were
synonymous. The notion persisted that hungry
men were invincibly idle men, that poverty
was a consequence of moral fault (p. 80).
The extent of poverty was exacerbated during this
period by Henry VIII confiscating the property of the
main poverty relief organisations -- the monasteries
and the Church. George (1973) suggests that because the
problem of poverty grew rather than went away, this
allowed a new view to emerge that poverty was an
individual's problem. This is George's third stage, and
extends from 1601 (with the implementation of the
Elizabethan Poor Law) to 1834 (with the implementation
of the New Poor Law). The roots of the "poverty equals
idleness" equation lay in the relative prosperity of
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the period; the expanding economy and industrial growth
led many to believe that work was available for all who
wanted it, and, therefore, that those out of work were
lazy. This view was apparently reinforced by the
Calvinist doctrine of the day that idleness equalled
sinfulness, and thus poverty was seen not only as a
flaw in one's moral character, but also as a threat to
one's eternal life.
It was during this period that a distinction was
drawn between the deserving and the undeserving poor,
and official attempts were made (embodied in the
Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601) to establish and to
monitor closely the administration of a parish-based
relief system. However, due to the collapse of central
and local government during the Civil War, there was no
proper enforcement of the Act's requirements, and
indiscriminate repression of the poor "became once
again the dominant feature of the poor law system"
(George, 1973, p. 6).
During the years which followed, larger and larger
sums were spent on poor relief; however, the
impoverished continued to increase in number, and these
two facts formed the basis of an extremely potent and
widely believed inference -- that people's willingness
to work was being eroded by their receipt of poor
relief money. It was in response to this belief that
workhouses, as a means of deterring dependency upon
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poor relief, came into widespread existence in the
early eighteenth century.
Workhouses were a repressive means of dealing with
poverty. The authorities had the right to refuse relief
to anyone who was unwilling to enter the workhouse;
this resulted in the choice for the working class
between:
refusing to go into the workhouse and
therefore starve, or entering the workhouse
and leading a life of semi-starvation and
humiliation (George, 1973, p. 9).
Yet, unemployment continued to grow, especially in
the rural areas. In the late eighteenth century, the
extent and intensity of* rural poverty increased
dramatically, due to industrialisation and to the
"enclosures" — the consolidation and absorption by
land-owners of smallholdings, formerly farmed by tenant
farmers, into large estates with the intention of
increasing productivity by allowing experimentation
with new methods of farming. The Reverend David Davies
provides a contemporary account, stating that "the
practice of enlargening and engrossing of farms, and
especially that of depriving the peasantry of all
landed property, have contributed greatly to increase
the number of dependent poor" (Davies, 1795). Davies
further notes that as a result:
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thousands of families, which formerly gained
an independent livelihood on those separate
farms, have gradually been reduced to the
class of day labourers. But day-labourers are
sometimes in want of work and sometimes
unable to work; and in either case their sole
resource is the parish. Thus an amazing
number of people have been reduced from a
comfortable state of partial independence to
the precarious position of hirelings, who,
when out of work, must immediately come to
their parish.
This resulted in considerable vagrancy, with displaced
tenants moving to other parishes in search of work or
alms.
Partly as a result of the disproportionate
unemployment and corresponding decline in wages in
rural areas, a new system was adopted in the Hampshire
village of Speenhamland (and more widely thereafter)
whereby wages below a certain level were supplemented
by funds from the poor rate. The unintended effects of
income supplementation provoked a crisis for the system
of poor relief which offered:
no incentive to farmers to pay decent wages,
it undermined the workers' pay, and by
extending relief to the working population,
narrowed the distinction between pauper and
labourer, a bitterly resented trend (NCC,
1976, p. 10).
Employers exploited the situation, knowing that if
they reduced the workers' wages, these would be made up
to a minimum level by contributions from the parish.
The result was yet further increased spending on poor
relief; this, again, was cited as evidence that
people's willingness to work was being undermined by
their receipt of poor relief. This resulted in
increased pressure from the wealthy to increase yet
again the punitiveness of the workhouses; the mechanism
used was the New Poor Law of 1834, which abolished
direct cash subsidies to the low-income employed and
replaced them with payments made in return for work
carried out:
in well-regulated work houses (i.e. places
were they may be set to work according to the
spirit and intention of the 43rd of Elizabeth
[the Poor Law of 1601] (Poor Law, 1834).
As the National Consumer Council put it, "the effects
of the Act are all too well known, and the memory of
the workhouse goes someway to explaining the continued
stigma and resentment associated with public welfare"
(NCC, 1976, p.11).
From 1834 to the early twentieth century, the use
of the workhouse test was gradually diminished. The
government's concern over the financial circumstances
of the working class was considerably increased by the
enfranchisement of working class men between 1867 and
1885, and generally speaking, there was talk of reform
in provision for the poor throughout Britain and Europe
from this point onwards. The turn of the present
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century marks the beginning of George's fourth stage,
during which time poverty had gradually come to be seen
as a social problem due to social inequality. As an
reflection of this change of attitude, non-contributory
Old Age Pensions were introduced in 1908 by the Liberal
Government, and in 1922 "uncovenanted" benefits,
discretionary in nature, were introduced for the relief
of individuals whose "covenanted" benefit (paid
automatically as an insurance benefit) had been
exhausted. In 1929 the Local Authority Public
Assistance Committees replaced the Poor Law Guardians,
and administered a family means-tested benefit from
1931-1934 as a payment to insured workers whose rights
to a limited term of unemployment benefit had been
exhausted. From 1934 to 1939, these payments were made
by the Unemployment Assistance Board, which, in 1939,
became the Assistance Board "with the authority to pay
supplementary pensions to old people and widows who
were in receipt of benefits but who found them
inadequate" (COI, 1977, p. 3).
In 1948, Public Assistance was replaced by
National Assistance, which was replaced by
Supplementary Benefit in 1966. Thus, supplementary
benefit is a direct descendent of the benefits paid out
under the old poor laws.
Although applying for financial assistance and the
outcomes of applying would appear to be markedly
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different from what they were in the days when "the
evicted ploughman wandered off to swell the ranks of
the 'sturdy beggars', 'staff-strikers', and 'rogues
forlorn'" (Trevelyan, 1946, p. 283), some have remarked
that these changes are merely cosmetic (Briggs and
Rees, 1980). But from the viewpoint of prospective
claimants, one issue is clear. Although the objective
facts of financial assistance may have changed,
people's expectations, based upon this long and
notorious social history, and their fears, based upon
tales of the workhouse handed down from generation to
generation, have not changed. It would appear from even
a cursory examination of contemporary research that the
concerns about being deserving or undeserving,
able-bodied or non able-bodied, and fears of
humiliation, embarrassment and personal degradation
unintentionally encouraged by the poor laws of
yesterday are still very much with us today (c.f.
Macarov, 1980).
Prior to describing briefly the nature, assessment
of entitlement to and origins of rebates, it is worth
commenting that the significant aspects of the previous
description are: (1) that the assessment of entitlement
to supplementary pensions requires an extensive amount
of questioning about what can be very personal issues
of amount of savings, health and family affairs, and
verification of amounts of resources; and (2) that
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supplementary pensions have a very long and chequered
past upon which current generations of pensioners may
base their expectations and feelings about applying,
about other applicants, about the social security
"officers" themselves, and about the outcomes of
applying.
1.12 Housing Subsidies: Rent Rebates and Allowances and
Rate Rebates
Unlike supplementary pensions, which are concerned
with the amount of disposable income an individual
needs to deal with his expenses, rebates are designed
specifically and solely for helping low-income families
to pay their rent and rates. [4]
Rent rebates are payable to council and New Town
tenants, rent allowances to private tenants, and rate
rebates to any domestic occupier paying rates. Rebates
are payable to individuals in full-time work as well as
to pensioners, part-time workers, the sick, the
disabled and the unemployed. Generally speaking, the
information needed to assess entitlement to rebates is
the same as that required for assessing entitlement to
SB. However, resources are treated differently, and the
basic principles used to calculate entitlement are
different. The main stages in determining entitlement
are outlined below.
Weekly Income - In the jargon of the DHSS, this is
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the equivalent of "resources". Weekly income includes
the gross earnings of the householder (and partner)
from all sources less prescribed deductions such as
£9.60 of the applicant's earnings, £5 of the partner's
earnings, the full value of Mobility and Attendance
Allowances, up to £4 in total of a war or industrial
disablement or widow's pension, etc. The value of
capital is not considered, but the interest it earns is
averaged out over 52 weeks and added to weekly income.
Needs Allowance - This is the equivalent of
"requirements" in SB jargon. Needs allowances are
determined by reference to set scale rates uprated
annually. For the year from November 1980 to November
1981, they were £34.90 for a single person per week and
£51.70 per week for a married couple, with additions
for dependent children. As with supplementary pensions,
there are increases for the presence of blindness and
other disabilities in the household.
Weekly Rent and Rates - These are the equivalent
of "housing requirements" in SB terms. Rebates are
normally paid as a proportion of the total rent and/or
rates averaged out over 52 weeks, but as was the case
with supplementary pensions, deductions are sometimes
made. Considering the most common cases, all the rent
money received from a sub-tenant is deducted prior to
determining the amount of entitlement; fixed amounts
for non-dependants living in are deducted after
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determining the amount of entitlement in accordance
with scale rates based on the age and employment status
of the non-dependants. The rate rebate is payable on
the full general rates charged for the home, but these
do not include water rates or sewerage charges.
Amount of entitlement is calculated by comparing
income and needs allowances. If a pensioner's income
exactly matches his allowances, he will have 60% of his
rent and 60% of his rates rebated. For every pound by
which the pensioner's income exceeds the allowance, the
rent rebate/allowance is reduced by 17 pence and the
rate rebate by 6 pence. For every pound by which the
allowances exceed the pensioner's income, the rent
rebate/allowance is increased by 25 pence and the rate
rebate by 8 pence. After the value of the rebates are
determined, charges for non-dependants are deducted.
All rebates are subject to ceilings; thus a pensioner
with a high rateable value property may be due a rebate
worth three-quarters of her rates, but because this
amount exceeds the statutory ceiling, she will receive
only the maximum rebate. This is especially true in
regions like Lothian, where the growth in rates has
been disproportionate in comparison to growth in both
rent charges within the District, and rates in other
parts of the country.
Table 1.12A presents worked examples using the
same fictitious data presented in Table 1.11. In these
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examples, the needs allowances are determined first,
then compared with the total weekly income. Where the
difference between allowances and income is positive,
the minimum rebates are 60% of the rent and rates;
where the difference is negative, 60% represents the
maximum proportion to be rebated.
It is worth while to compare the results of Tables
1.11 and 1.12A. Mrs. A would be best advised to claim a
supplementary pension, while Mr. and Mrs. B would be
better off on a rate rebate. But prior to the
introduction of the absolute savings threshold to SB
eligibility, Mr. and Mrs. B would have been entitled to
£2.09 per week in supplementary pension. Although still
worth less than the rate rebate, it might have been
more valuable for them to be on a supplementary pension
because it would have given them automatic entitlement
to other benefits whose values combined would have been
substantially greater than £0.97. Considering that
scale rates and the assessment procedures are always
changing and that the hidden value of some passport
benefits cannot be assessed, it is no wonder that many
pensioners (and indeed professionals working with the
elderly) are often mystified as to which would be the
better buy for any individual.
The rebate application procedure is usually very
straightforward. Since rate rebates are the
responsibility of the rating authority (e.g. regional
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councils) and rent rebates the responsibility of
district councils, a tenant may have to apply
separately to both councils, but this is extremely rare
since most local governments are now operating joint
schemes for dual applications. In the vast majority of
cases, applying comprises the two simple stages of (1)
completing the application form with details of income,
expenses and interest on capital, attaching supporting
evidence of earnings, and posting it to the appropriate
rebate office; and (2) awaiting the reply. Although any
claimant can apply and be interviewed in person at the
office, this is not at all essential.
If the application is unsuccessful, the pensioner
may appeal in writing to the council, and his case will
then be looked at again by the officials concerned. If
the claim is successful, the rebates are "paid" in the
following ways: rent and rate rebates in the form of
reduced rent and rates; rent allowances in the form of
cash grants at intervals corresponding to the intervals
between payments.
Unlike supplementary pensions, rebates do not have
a long history but originated in the mid-1960s and
early 1970s. The rate rebate system was established in
1966 as a temporary measure as a result of the Allen
Report (1965) which indicated that the rating system
was regressive. Although rent rebate schemes were
operated by some local authorities prior to the early
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1970s, the mandatory national rent rebate and rent
allowance (for unfurnished lettings) schemes were first
set out in the Housing Finance Act 1972. A comparable
scheme of rent allowances for tenants in furnished
accommodation was established by the Furnished Lettings
(Rent Allowances) Act 1973. Thus, partly because they
are so recent, and partly because of their different
application procedures, rebates have not acquired the
same reputation as supplementary pensions. It might be
more accurate to say that they have no reputation at
all.
A summary of the differences between the two types
of benefits in terms of history, application procedure,
and eligibility will prove useful at a later stage;
such a summary is presented in Table 1.12B.
1.13 The Better Off Problem
The "better off" problem results from the overlap
in coverage between two welfare benefit systems
described above, where for large numbers of people who
are not in full-time work "it is far from obvious
whether they would be better off foregoing their
entitlement to supplementary benefit and claiming a
rebate, or vice versa. Changes in circumstances or in
the details of either scheme can change the relative
advantage" (Department of the Environment, 1977, p.4).
The problem arises because both systems attempt to
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Table 1.12B. Contrasting Characteristics of Supplementary
Pensions and Rebates
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provide assistance with housing costs, because many
pensioners would be eligible for either benefit but
cannot receive both, and because many pensioners apply
for the benefit which turns out to be of lesser
monetary value.
The problem has two sides: pensioners in receipt
of supplementary pensions who are potentially better
off on rebates, and those on rebates who are
potentially better off on supplementary pensions. In
1975, the DHSS, in conjunction with local authorities
across the country, undertook to transfer to rebates
all supplementary benefit recipients potentially better
off on rebates (Scottish Development Department, 1974).
Between 80 and 85% were transferred, and until 1981,
the DHSS had an ongoing arrangement to notify the local
authority housing departments of such cases when they
arose. This unilateral transfer was possible since the
extent of entitlement to rebates could be determined
with considerable accuracy from information collected
to assess entitlement to supplementary pensions, but
not vice versa. Since then, due to the cuts in civil
service manpower and to the increasing difficulty in
making a "better off" comparison, DHSS officers no
longer directly advise the local authority, and provide
minimal advice to the prospective claimant, thus
leaving to the claimant the responsibility of deciding
which benefit constitutes the better buy (DHSS, 1981b).
However, the lack of sufficient information to
determine the entitlement of rebate recipients to
supplementary pensions has prevented transfer in the
reverse direction. It was estimated that, before 1978,
there were at least 300,000 persons potentially better
off on supplementary benefit, and at least 200,000 of
these were pensioners (SBC, 1979, p.53; SBC, 1978,
p.3). Thus, for many pensioners, the problem is not one
of non-claiming, but of switching from one benefit to
the other in order to maximise income.
The confusion caused by the existence of two
systems is clearly illustrated by Mr. Ratchford, a
participant in Syson and Young's (1974) first survey of
Bethnal Green pensioners. Describing the treatment he
received at the hands of officialdom, he stated:
I'm on the Assistance and the Assistance sent
me like a rebate — the Assistance stopped
the rebate and the council gave me a rebate.
They stopped at one end and gave this to me
at the other like (p. 115).
Considering again the calculations in Tables 1.11
and 1.12A, it is clear that Mrs. A's best buy would be
a supplementary pension. However, if she were already
in receipt of a rebate, she would be potentially better
off by £4.15. However, assuming that she knows of the
existence of SB, both the process by which she decides
and the substantive input to her decision whether to
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switch to SB are bound to be different from those of an
individual eligible for only SB and not claiming it.
Therefore, any study which aims to clarify differential
claiming must be able to explain three types of
decisions, the decisions: (1) whether or not to apply
for SB; (2) whether to apply for SB or for rebates; and
(3) whether to switch from rebates to SB.
1.2 The Substantive Problem of Incomplete Take-Up
The previous section has served as a general
introduction to the problem and also to introduce in
some detail both supplementary pensions and rebates. It
will later be seen that this level of attention to
detail is a necessary foundation for constructing a
research design; if anything, the previous discussion
considerably oversimplifies the complexity of the
problems caused by the existence of two overlapping
schemes. The aim of this section is to present briefly
a picture of what is known about the characteristics of
eligible non-claimants of supplementary pensions
(ENCs), the magnitude of their unclaimed entitlement,
and the reasons given for non-claiming derived from
previous survey research into the problem.
1.21 Magnitude of the Problem
In 1977, 610,000 pensioner households failed to
claim their average weekly entitlement to supplementary
pensions of £3.10. This group excludes pensioners who
are entitled to both SB and rebates, but whose rebate
entitlement either is or would be greater than their SB
entitlement. Three-quarters of these non-claiming
pensioners were single persons, and the average amount
unclaimed was the same for both married and single
persons (SBC, 1979, p.104). These estimates of
non-claiming are based upon secondary analysis of
Family Expenditure Survey (FES) data which do not
contain enough information to assess eligibility to
additional requirements; thus the total number of ENCs
and the average amount due to these 610,000 are
understated. By region of the country in 1976, take-up
tended to be highest in Northern England at 81% (where
the average weekly amount unclaimed was £2.10), lowest
in the South East of England (excluding London) at 69%
(£2.70), and about average at 74% in Scotland (£2.90)
(SBC, 1979, p.105). By housing tenure in 1976, when the
percentage claiming was estimated to be 76% and the
number of non-claimants to be 580,000, the largest
single group of ENCs was owner-occupiers without
mortgages; 280,000 failed to claim, their take-up rate
was 46%, and they were due an average weekly amount of
£1.90. The second largest group comprised 180,000
council tenants (with an 83% take-up rate and due, on
average, £3.10), followed by 90,000 private tenants
(80%, £3.70), 10,000 owner-occupiers with mortages
(82%, £3.10), and 10,000 living "rent free" (65%,
£2.00) (SBC, 1979, p.106). Estimates for
47.
non-householders were not provided, presumably because
the sample of non-householders in the FES was too
small. However, since they are the only outstanding
category and estimates of total amounts unclaimed and
numbers of non-claimants are known, statistics for
non-householders can be inferred; some 10,000
non-householders are not claiming their average weekly
entitlement of £6.56 (and their take-up rate is 89%).
As mentioned above, it would appear that at least a
third of these ENCs are already in receipt of rebates.
As useful as these statistics might be in
providing a context, they provide no basis for
understanding the causes of pensioners' behaviour. It
is unclear to what extent these people are ignorant of
their entitlement, or by the same token, how far they
are inhibited by their expectations of how they would
feel and how others would regard them if they applied
for, and subsequently received, supplementary pensions.
The problem is complicated by the "better off"
situation. It is not known if these pensioners think
that they are not entitled to apply for supplementary
pensions because they are receiving rebates, or if they
have made a conscious choice to claim rebates in spite
of their lower monetary value. The answers to these
types of questions cannot be inferred from statistics,
but must be elicited in detailed studies of the
attitudes of pensioners towards benefits.
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1.22 Reasons Given for Not Claiming Supplementary-
Pensions
There has been very little research into the
non-claiming of supplementary pensions by the elderly,
and much of this has comprised anecdotal accounts
derived from a few questions appended to surveys
designed for other purposes. The dearth of research is
due to two main reasons. The first is that
policy-makers within the DHSS have been consistently
more interested in how many fail to claim and how much
they fail to claim than with why they fail to claim.
The governments1 reaction when the problem of
incomplete take-up was re-discovered and substantiated
by independent researchers in the early 1960s (Cole and
Utting, 1962; Townsend and Wedderburn, 1965) was to
mount their own survey (MPNI, 1966) to provide more
reliable estimates of the numbers of non-claimants and
their ranges of entitlement. Of secondary importance
was an assessment of the causes of non-claiming. This
conflict between head-counting and understanding human
behaviour has never been fully resolved. Pat Broad, the
author of the most recent study of non-claiming,
implies that the obsession with reliable estimates can
even prejudice fully examining pensioners' attitudes
and feelings (Broad, 1977). In her discussion of her
questionnaire she wrote:
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One fundamental problem was the conflict
between the two broad objectives of the
study. On the one hand an estimate of non
take-up based upon formal assessments [i.e.
by DHSS officials] was needed which could
only be achieved by a high response to the
invitation to claim supplementary pension; a
prerequisite of this was that neither the
design of the questionnaire nor its
subject-matter should actively discourage
informants from claiming. On the other hand
the pursuit of the other main objective, that
of exploring the reasons for non take-up,
could have resulted in a form of questioning
that might have acted as a deterrant to
claiming. Because of the paramount importance
of the estimating objective, the
questionnaire was designed so that this would
not be prejudiced in any way (p. 6).
Thus, relatively less interest in explanations of
non-claiming may be one reason for why so little
research into the problem has been undertaken.
Second, and by far the greater problem, is the
enormous difficulty in obtaining a sample of eligible
non-claimants. Five general categories of problems can
be identified.
Representative Samples - In order to assess why
any individual will not apply, a representative sample
is not vital. But in order to state, about eligible
non-claimants as a group, what factors are most
important in preventing them from applying, a
representative sample of pensioners on the dimension of
"attitudes to applying" must be obtained. Past research
(Broad, 1977) has attempted to locate "notionally
eligible" non-claimants from the General Household
Survey, but this proved to be unsuitable because the
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selection technique used was not random, the cumulative
response rate was low, and sufficiently precise,
financial data was not available. With response rates
to main government surveys involving financial
questioning being generally incomplete, and especially
so for pensioners, representative samples of pensioners
are very difficult to obtain. [5]
Accuracy of Assessment - Researchers have also been
daunted by the task of validating their results in
light of the fact that they have not been able to
verify their claim to have found a sample of eligible
non-claimants. Short of conducting a full assessment on
each potential eligible non-claimant, the only way of
proving that all members of the sample are actually
entitled is to compare the notional assessment of their
entitlement with the official assessment of their
entitlement, if and when the pensioner claims. Broad's
(1977) research highlighted the significance of this
problem.
Efficiency of the Sampling Frame - It is very
inefficient to satisfy the criterion of representation
by selecting eligible non-claimants from a much larger,
randomly selected sample. A random sample of 120
pensioners would produce only about 10 ENCs, an
efficiency rate of about 8%.
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Expediency of the Sampling Frame - Along the same line
of thought, to satisfy the criterion of representation,
the sampling frame would not only be very inefficient,
but it would also require an exceptionally long period
of field work to find the sample. This issue is
especially important in the case of pensioners since,
although their entitlement is likely to remain
relatively stable over a long period, they tend to
become unavailable for further interviews because of
illness, loss of interest in the research, moving to
stay with family, or death.
The Paradox of Participation - Researchers are
constantly reminded of and vexed by this issue, the
"paradox of participation" is an assumption which can
be phrased as:
It is very unlikely that pensioners will
agree to having an interview to discuss
finances since it is this very issue which
puts them off applying for a supplementary
pension.
with the corollary that:
A true estimate of pensioners' resistance to
applying can never be obtained since the most
resistant people refuse to be interviewed.
In other words, a person who agrees to be interviewed
is very likely to be a person who is not resistant to
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applying.
As can be appreciated from this brief description,
sampling concerns have been a major stumbling block
deterring research into non-claiming.
What empirical information is available on the
attitudes of pensioners towards supplementary benefit
and its predecessor, national assistance, comes from
four studies. Financial and Other Circumstances of
Retirement Pensioners (MPNI, 1966), undertaken by the
Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance in 1965,
and Pensioners and Their Needs (Broad, 1977),
undertaken in 1975 by the Office of Population,
Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) at the request of the DHSS,
focused directly on the non-claiming problem. The two
remaining surveys were both concerned with the general
needs of the elderly, and both were conducted by Age
Concern England. These were Housing and Related
Benefits (Age Concern England, 1974a) conducted in
Colchester, and The Attitudes of the Retired and the
Elderly (Age Concern England, 1974b) conducted
nationally.
The MPNI study was a national survey comprising
10,593 pensioner households in receipt of national
insurance pensions and conducted during May and June of
1965. The aims of the study were to estimate the
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magnitude of the non-claiming problem and to examine
why pensioners with some "notional" entitlement did not
claim. The design embraced two interviews, the first a
"fact-finding" interview about the financial, health,
and housing circumstances of the entire sample, and the
second a deeper interview about reasons for
non-claiming with only those identified from the first
interview as having "provisional" entitlement to
national assistance. In the second interview, these
notionally eligible pensioners were informed of their
provisional entitlement, and although it was known
which pensioners did and which did not subsequently
claim, the pensioners' claiming behaviour was never
used as a criterion.
The OPCS study (Broad, 1977) was a pilot study
comprising 46 pensioner households drawn from five
areas of England and Wales on the basis of their
"notional" entitlement to supplementary pensions as
deduced from financial information they provided in the
annual General Household Survey. Conducted during late
1975, the aims of this study were similar to those of
the MPNI study, to test the feasibility of devising
better estimates of the magnitude of the problem and to
explore in some detail pensioners' reasons for not
claiming. As mentioned above, the emphasis was on the
former rather than the latter. Pensioners were informed
of their provisional entitlement to benefit and their
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claiming behaviour was recorded; again, however,
claiming behaviour was not used as a criterion against
which to assess the importance of their attitudes.
Neither of the Age Concern studies primarily aimed
to study attitudes towards claiming supplementary
pensions, although this topic was researched. The Age
Concern (Colchester) study involved 208 pensioner
households from the East Anglian town of Colchester,
investigating both the proportions eligible and not
claiming and these pensioners' reasons for not
claiming. The total number of eligible non-claimants in
the sample was 22.
The Age Concern (National) study surveyed a random
sample of 2700 pensioners, and aimed to provide a
wide-ranging overview of pensioners' attitudes to
health, income, services, and many other issues. A
sub-group of these pensioners who had never applied for
SB, numbering 341, were asked several questions about
why they had never applied.
A review of these studies suggests that
pensioners' reasons for not claiming can be divided
into eight general categories. Since these categories
were not used by the original authors, but are applied
here as a convenient way of summarising the data, the
interpretations which follow are made with caution. The
eight general categories are pensioners':
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(1) perceptions that they are having no
difficulty managing and thus do not need any
help;
(2) low levels of awareness of the
availability of the benefit;
(3) perceptions that they are not eligible;
(4) perceptions that the amount of
supplementary pension they might receive
would be inadequate to meet their expenses or
be of low utility;
(5) expectations that the application
procedure has negatively valued outcomes
including going to the office to apply;
(6) expectations that applying has negative
implications (e.g. that it is equivalent to
asking for charity) and/or that it leads to
negative social outcomes (e.g. other people
finding out about the application);
(7) preferences for rebates;
(8) other attitudes.
It is noteworthy that most of these reasons for not
claiming are also given in research into the
non-claiming of other means-tested benefits such as
rebates and allowances, and Family Income Supplement
(DHSS, 1976; Wicks, 1975; Lewis, 1975; Bradshaw, et.
al., 1976; Taylor-Gooby, 1976a; McDonagh and Matthews,
1980; Corden, 1981; Lister, 1974; Lister, 1976). A
categorisation of the main reasons given by the
frequency with which they were given in the four
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studies under consideration appears in Table 1.2A.
Several qualifications must be stated before
interpreting these data. First, some studies
categorised responses by the single most important
reason given by each individual, whereas others
categorised by the frequency with which certain
responses were given. Thus the percentages in columns 1
and 3 in Table 1.2A do not sum to 100 as respondents
often gave more than one reason. Second, this
information reveals only the frequency with which
reasons were given by individuals, and does not reveal
their importance to individuals. Any real attempt to
understand the take-up problem must locate the most
potent reasons, which are not necessarily those most
frequently given. Third, there is considerable
variation across studies in the percentage who
attributed their failure to claim to their low
awareness of the benefit. However, this variation may
be caused by different researchers assuming that
different levels of awareness are necessary to claim.
Briggs and Rees (1980), for instance, have implied that
full knowledge of the application and assessment
procedure is necessary, but the effect of this has been
to inflate the proportion of pensioners with "low
awareness". Page (1980) has implied the same with
regard to non-claimants of rent allowances. However,
the work of Briggs and Rees themselves, and that of
Table 1.2A. Reasons Given for Not Claiming
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Bond (1972) in assessing the knowledge of SB
recipients, directly proves that very little knowledge
is necessary to make a claim. Fourth, the extent to
which variations in percentages across studies was
caused by differences in interview structure and
interviewer style (i.e. open-ended elicitation as
opposed to prompting) cannot be assessed, but these
issues are bound to be important considerations. And
fifth, when interpreting the responses of pensioners
who have never thought about applying but feel that the
researcher is implying that they ought to have done so,
it is important to remember that individuals may need
to legitimate their "irrational" non-claiming
behaviour, and that any of the reasons suggested for
non-claiming could be post-hoc rationalisations
(Reddin, 1980).
Table 1.2A clearly shows that the most frequently
given reasons for non-claiming are perceptions of no
need, very low awareness and expectations of negative
implications and outcomes. These reasons are discussed,
as are those of lesser importance, in detail below.
Perceptions of No Need - It is a common characteristic
of these studies that large proportions of pensioners
state that they simply have no difficulty making ends
meet or that they don't need any help, although the
authors of the MPNI (1966) report astutely observed
59.
that the distinction between "managing OK" and "pride
prevented me" was not clear cut. In the Broad (1977)
study, 13% stated that they were having absolutely no
difficulty managing or were managing better than they
had ever done before, but 41%, when asked if they found
it difficult to meet any of their expenses, stated that
they did not. The MPNI study also indicated that those
eligible for yet not claiming national assistance had
disregarded sources of income, savings and retirement
pensions above the standard rate, leaving one to infer
that these objective circumstances could have led to
their perceiving no difficulty managing. To a certain
extent, the concept of "low need" may account for the
inertia implied by 26% of the pensioners in the Age
Concern (National) study, who replied that they simply
"had not got round to it [applying]" (Age Concern
England, 1974b, p.63).
Low Awareness and Perceptions of Ineligibility - In the
MPNI study, no distinction was drawn between awareness
of the existence of the benefit and of eligibility for
it, thus the figure of 33% responding that low
awareness prevented them from claiming represents
perceptions of ineligibility as well as limited
knowledge and misconceptions about the scheme. About
41% of Broad's (1977) respondents thought that
pensioners could not get extra money from the DHSS, and
she also noted several other types of common
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misperceptions, including:
- that people with any savings are not eligible
- that people need to be in specific situations
before they become eligible (to be
ill/disabled/widowed)
- that supplementary pension is for specific
purposes (such as heating bills, rent/rates,
etc) rather than for general financial need
that specific circumstances make people
ineligible regardless of need (if they're
getting another pension/living with their
family other than their spouse) (Broad, 1977,
p. S2).
Lack of knowledge of the benefit and perceptions of
being ineligible are two distinct issues which require
different types of solutions; the failure to
distinguish between these two types of awareness has
been one of the major conceptual shortcomings of
previous research.
Regardless of this conceptual distinction, a more
important observation must be recorded. Although
Taylor-Gooby (1976b) states that "survey evidence
indicates that simply not knowing what one can claim is
the biggest single obstacle to claiming" (p.17), the
simple fact is that even when informed of their
potential eligibility and of how to apply, large
proportions still do not apply.
Traditionally, there have been four approaches to
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improving the take-up of welfare benefits. Three of
these have been informational approaches, including (1)
providing further general publicity, (2) providing
information to a well-defined target population, and
(3) combined assessment schemes in which individuals
are simultaneously assessed for their entitlement to
several benefits. A fourth approach has been to use
direct intervention techniques.
The first approach has not been very successful.
For instance, an evaluation of the effects of further
general publicity about Family Income Supplement showed
that "publicity with no real news to carry in its
creative message does not achieve a significant
increase in take-up from new claimants" (DHSS, 1977b,
p. 4; DHSS, 1977f); two studies evaluating a wide range
of attempts to provide information to the general
public about rent allowances also demonstrated a lack
of effect (McDonagh, 1977; Walker, 1978).
In the second approach, researchers have attempted
to direct information to the specific sub-population
for which it is most appropriate -- the eligible
non-claimants. A study of 113 pensioners thought to be
potentially entitled to supplementary pensions showed
that, when informed of their provisional entitlement,
only 25% claimed (DHSS, 1977c). Similarly, in Broad's
(1977) study, only 11 of 46 claimed, or 24% of those
informed. In the second stage of the MPNI (1966) study,
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the sub-sample of approximately 1630 pensioners
entitled to national assistance but not claiming it
were offered application forms. The proportion who
applied was never published, but at most it could have
been about half, judging from the Ministry's statement
(para. 90) that "58 percent, of the married couples, 54
percent, of the single men and 55 percent. of the
single women accepted application forms for
supplementary assistance, though not all sent them in."
The experience of later researchers and the very
conspicuous absence of this key percentage lead one to
infer that the actual proportion who did submit
application forms was markedly less than half.
The third approach, using combined assessment
schemes, has long been seriously considered as a
partial solution to the non-claiming problem (Adler and
du Feu, 1973; Taylor-Gooby, 1976b; DHSS, 1977a).
However, two notable tests were not very successful. A
computer-based welfare benefits information system
piloted by Adler and du Feu in Inverclyde (Adler and du
Feu, 1975; DHSS, 1977d) was of limited success; a
follow-up by Macdonald (1975) showed that only 9 of 25
recipients of the information output by the system put
it to use, and a follow-up by Redpath (1976a) indicated
that only 14% of people living in the areas under study
had ever heard of the facility, despite extensive
publicity. The Multi-Purpose Claim Form (MPCF) piloted
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by the DHSS in Salop (DHSS, 1977e) and Brighton (Graham
and Brasier, 1979) was also limited in its success.
Both schemes caused enormous administrative problems,
and in both cases the evidence for success was small.
In contrast, the fourth, and only effective,
approach to catalysing claiming has been to use direct
intervention strategies, where individuals have been
informed of their eligibility, but the researchers have
taken on the responsibility of initiating the
application procedure on behalf of the potential
claimant. In a study of a low-income area in Edinburgh,
du Feu (1974) found that a very high proportion of
pensioners willingly claimed SB when applications were
initiated by the project's leaders; Gearing and Sharp
(1973) found that over 90% of their sample of
pensioners in the rural midlands claimed Exceptional
Needs Payments when the researchers initiated their
claims for them; a Coventry Social Services Department
(CSSD, 1973) had results nearly identical to those of
Gearing and Sharp.
These findings suggest that the problem is more
one of volition than of lack of information; although
lack of knowledge may be an important barrier to
claiming, possession of knowledge does not guarantee
claiming. In short, a certain level of awareness would
appear to be necessary yet not sufficient to catalyse
claiming.
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Perceptions of Low Utility - The belief that the amount
of supplementary pension due would be of little use may
be an important deterrant to claiming, although to what
exent such a reason is a post-hoc rationalisation
offered to an interviewer rather than admitting
uncertainty of entitlement is unknown. In the MPNI
survey, about 10% fell into the category of "past
approach unsuccessful, award terminated, or amount
considered inadequate" (MPNI, 1966, Table III. 21). The
Schlackman Report (1978, p. xvi), in particular, bore
out the importance of individuals1 estimations and
valuations of the amount of their entitlement.
Expectations about the Application Procedure - This
category comprises pensioners' feelings about what they
believe will happen as a consequence of initiating an
application. It includes their feelings about having an
interview with a social security officer, going to the
social security office, revealing savings and income,
and the like. Despite the distressing treatment some
pensioners have described as having undergone during
the course of a national assistance or supplementary
benefit interview, the actual proportions anticipating
difficulty are rather small. For instance, in the MPNI
study, only 5% reported dislike of going to the
National Assistance Board office as a reason for not
applying; in Broad's sample, 10% expected that the
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social security officer would "pry into all our
affairs" (p.45, Table 26); in the Age Concern
(Colchester) study, a quarter of the 22 ENCs stated
that they either couldn't stand all the questioning or
that they anticipated "difficulties with the office"
(Age Concern England, 1974a, p.26). The low proportion
of individuals indicating negative feelings about
applying may have been due to the simple fact that few
pensioners have any idea what applying and the
means-test interview actually involve. For instance,
only 23% of Broad's sample "showed an understanding of
the basic principles" of assessment (p.28, Table 7); a
contemporaneous study of the knowledge of SB recipients
indicated that nearly half had absolutely no idea how
their entitlement had been worked out (Briggs and Rees,
1980, pp. 126-127). On the other hand, it may be that
the intensity and incidence of negatively valued
expectations about applying are being confused; the
authors of the Age Concern (National) survey found that
"there is a high degree of satisfaction with the
treatment received at the hands of officials. Most
elderly who apply for Supplementary Benefit, whether
their application is successful or not, feel that they
have been well treated" (Age Concern England, 1974b,
p.62). Redpath (1976b) notes that the Southampton
University Study (later published as Briggs and Rees
(1980)) of SB recipients demonstrated conclusively that
pensioners were considerably more satisfied with being
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on SB than were other groups of claimants.
Expectations of Negative Social Outcomes and
Implications - Consistently one of the most popular
reasons given for the non-claiming of means-tested
benefits is the fear that applying for and/or receiving
the benefit would be stigmatising to the individual.
Stigma in this context has been variously defined as
being "that which reinforces difficulties associated
with acquiring, understanding, and completing
application forms" (Lister, 1976) or that which
"prevents potential claimants from absorbing the
information which is presented to them about
means-tested benefits" (Page and Weinberger, 1975, p.
7). Both of these implicit definitions define stigma in
terms of its behavioural outcomes, assume a linear and
direct relationship between stigma and behaviour, and
do not provide a clear conceptual definition of it
which would allow a test of its validity as a
construct. Stigma has also been used as an umbrella
term, encompassing the notions of invasion of privacy,
independence, feelings of charity, pride, etc.
(Meacher, 1972; Kay, 1972; Williamson, 1975;
Taylor-Gooby, 1976b; Wicks, 1975; Briggs and Rees,
1980). Having been expanded and twisted from its
original definition, [6] and being turned into a
slagheap for all negative attitudes, its use as a
construct is extremely limited. Indeed, Klein (1975,
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p.5) aptly states that "Stigma is the phlogiston of
social theory: a label attached to an imperfectly
understood phenomenon...". Thus, rather than add to
this conceptual dustbin, in may be wiser to avoid the
problem altogether. The category of expectations about
negative social outcomes and negative implications
includes pensioners' negative feelings about the
possibilities that family, friends, or neighbours might
find out of their application and the implication that
applying is tantamount to asking for charity, that
one's pride is damaged or that one is somehow less
independent, without elevating these ideas to and
concretising them in the formal concept of "stigma".
In the MPNI study, 30% indicated pride or dislike
of charity as one of the reasons why they didn't claim.
In the Broad study, all pensioners were not directly
asked why they didn't claim, but were asked why they
thought other pensioners who knew they were entitled
did not claim. This was done to avoid deterring
respondents from claiming by raising too many barriers.
Since many pensioners gave more than one answer, an
exact proportion cannot be determined. However, at
least 32% and probably at most 50% believed that most
other pensioners did not apply because they were too
proud to claim (32%), they thought it was charity
(26%), they would rather remain independent (20%), they
didn't want other people to know (5%), and they thought
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it was a bit of stigma (9%) (Broad, 1977, Table 23, p.
42). Three of the sample of 22 in the Age Concern
(Colchester) study expressed the sentiment that "you
can't live off other people"; 23% of the National Age
Concern study respondents stated that they disliked
asking for charity (Age Concern England, 1974b).
However, in the latter study, it was unclear to what
extent the respondents believed that supplementary
pensions were charity.
Preference for Rebates - Since the rebate systems are
relatively new, it is not surprising that only two
studies (Broad, 1977; Schlackman Report, 1978) have
concentrated on the importance of considering
preferences for rebates as barriers to the claiming of
supplementary pensions. In Broad's study,
three-quarters of those notionally entitled to SB were
already receiving rebates. When informed of their SB
entitlement, only 11% spontaneously stated that their
reason for not wanting to claim was because they
preferred being on rebates. However, when asked
directly which benefit they preferred, 96% stated that
they preferred rebates. Of the total sample (including
those who did decide to apply for SB), this proportion
is 52% (Tables 26 and 27, pp. 45-46). Of those
preferring rebates, the reasons for their preference
were: (a) the relative simplicity of the rebate
application procedure (27%); (b) the relative privacy
of the procedure (14-27%); (c) the form of payment was
more convenient (10-20%); and (d) rebates are not
"charity" and more people get them (10-20%). This last
observation about the perceptions of the status of
rebates and SB is important. Sinfield (1977) writes
that "the conventional wisdom ... is that ... rent and
rate rebates seem to be even more acceptable,
especially among older people. Many owner-occupiers
appear very willing to claim a rate rebate although
often quite reluctant to apply for SB." Burgess (1974,
p.7) suggests that this is due to supplementary
pensions being more stigmatising, and that the
different connotations surrounding applying for and/ or
receiving the two benefits are all the more important
in light of the fact that "it is the elderly more than
any group in our society...who are the most conscious
of that stigma" (Burgess, 1974, p.7). The Schlackman
Report (1978) clarifies the difference even further by
noting that rebates are more acceptable since they come
from a local source, the point of claiming for the
majority of claimants (council tenants) is familiar and
doesn't separate the claimants from others, the form in
which the benefit is paid is more convenient, and many
neighbours will be in the same position of having
claimed. The report elucidates the important principle
that "the benefit becomes less acceptable as claiming
it separates the individual more clearly from the
community at large" (Schlackman Report, 1978, p. xvii).
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Other Reasons - Other reasons for not claiming are
spelled out only in Broad's study. One of the more
interesting reasons given was individuals' uncertainty
about their situations. The two pensioners who were
uncertain were a woman whose husband had just died, and
an individual who was about to move house and who did
not know what her new expenses would be. Although these
uncertainties would seem to be representing the
inabilites of these individuals to claim, they may
merely be reflecting pensioners' unwillingness to
claim. It is not clear from the data provided which
interpretation is merited.
1.3 Limitations of Previous Research: A Critical
Analysis
The adequacy of a research design and methodology
is probably best judged by the extent to which it
answers the questions being asked by the researcher.
For instance, if a researcher is interested in a
post-hoc description of the attitudes, finances, or
opinions of a group or groups, a retrospective survey
design may be wholly adequate. In this research
setting, such an ex_ post facto design would be capable
of answering the question of "what reasons do
pensioners give for having failed to claim or having
claimed in the past?" However, running throughout
nearly all take-up research is a concern for
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understanding the causes of claiming behaviour, a type
of question which cannot be answered by the traditional
post-hoc design, but which requires at least a
prospective and possibly an experimental design. The
aim of this section is to analyse why previous research
designs have been inadequate, to discuss the results of
using these designs, and to outline the minimal
requirements of an "adequate" research approach in this
context.
1.31 Inadequacies of Previous Designs
The two previous studies of non-claiming
pensioners (MPNI, 1966; Broad, 1977) took the same
form. Both used post-hoc research designs in which
eligible non-claimants were asked why they had not
claimed. In both, pensioners were informed of their
probable entitlement and their claiming behaviour was
monitored, and in neither was any effort made to link
the reasons they gave for not claiming to their actual
claiming behaviour after being informed of their
probable eligibility. There are numerous problems with
this general methodology.
First, and perhaps foremost, is that the implicit
design is not criterion-related. Criterion-related
research usually involves testing the strength of the
relationship between a scale score and an external
standard, or criterion, both of which purport to
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measure the same phenomenon (Kerlinger, 1973, Ch. 27).
In this research problem, the criterion could be, say,
the strength of pensioners' intentions to claim or
their actual claiming behaviour. Under certain
circumstances, correlations between various attitudes
and intentions or behaviour could be interpreted as
indicating the causal links between the two; at the
very least one could be confident that between some
variables and the criterion there were strong
associations. Such an approach could be used in either
retrospective or prospective designs; in either case,
there must be some variation in the criterion. In the
former, this could be attained by selecting samples of
claimants and non-claimants and comparing the two, and
in the latter possibly by catalysing some variation in
the criterion (through the provision of knowledge about
eligibility, for instance). Without engaging a
criterion against which to compare variations in
attitude, the best that any analysis can provide is a
description of the range, frequency and intensity of
the attitudes. It is a most extraordinary shortcoming
of both the previous studies that although criterion
data was collected -- thus laying the foundation for a
prospective criterion-related study — the link between
pensioners' attitudes and their behaviour was never
made.
Second, from a strict experimentalist's point of
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view, the test of the impact upon claiming of knowledge
of entitlement is not valid. Because there were no
control groups against whose behaviour the behaviour of
those interviewed and informed of their entitlement
could be compared, it is truly impossible to assess the
extent to which claiming was catalysed by knowledge of
entitlement as opposed to the contributions of the
first and second interviews towards making salient the
issue of claiming.
Third, the research designs were retrospective,
asking non-claimants why they had not claimed. The
responses yielded by the question "why didn't you
claim?" are subject to post-hoc rationalisation, the
extent of which it is difficult to gauge. With the
elderly in particular, answers to such retrospective
questions are difficult to obtain due to the loss of
memory as well as to the simple and obvious fact that
many may have never even thought seriously about
applying for benefit.
Fourth, the surveys lacked any theoretical
foundation. The researchers utilised no theoretical
paradigm; this brute empiricist approach meant that
there were no clear hypotheses to be tested, no
operational definitions, that the level of measurement
was very low, and that there was no framework within
which to interpret the findings. [7]
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1.32 Results of Inadequate Methodologies
As a result of these inadequate methodologies and
atheoretical approaches, a number of problems have
arisen. The lack of a criterion-related approach (1)
made it impossible to assess which variables were
important in influencing behaviour and how important
they were and (2) inhibited the use of any theoretical
model as a basis for operationalising variables and
constructing measures, generating and testing
hypotheses, and interpreting findings. As a result, our
understanding of why pensioners claim or don't claim
can be likened to a thousand-piece jigsaw puzzle which
is' only partly assembled. Some of the few pieces that
are available are more puzzling than helpful. For
instance:
(1) it would seem likely that people will not
claim benefit without at least perceiving
some need and having at least some knowledge
of the benefit and the application procedure,
but previous research has indicated that many
who are fully aware of the benefit and/or who
are struggling to make ends meet do not
apply.
(2) some pensioners who appear to be intending to
apply do not actually do so.
(3) some pensioners state that they simply "can't
be bothered" to claim, but it is uncertain
what this statement means.
(4) both low awareness of and negative attitudes
towards the application procedure are
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important deterrants, but it is unclear
whether or not these types of variables are
theoretically or empirically separable.
Evaluating the independent effects of both
types of variables is important since
different means of catalysing claiming are
implied depending upon which is of greater
importance.
(5) it is unclear how much knowledge is necessary
for a claim to occur.
(6) when informed of their entitlement to
benefits, pensioners respond inconsistently -
some seem to reject it immediately, whereas
others seem to absorb and to integrate it
(c.f. McDonagh and Matthews, 1980).
(7) there is a sense in which some pensioners
seem not to apply by default whereas others
actively decide not to apply, but there are
no conceptual grounds for distinguishing the
two groups.
1.4 Aims of This Thesis
One of the best approaches to redressing the
methodological shortcomings mentioned above would be to
change the focus from explaining why pensioners do not
claim to determining what factors differentiate those
who do and those who do not claim within a prospective
design. Thus, instead of attempting to infer a "process
of claiming" from the accounts of non-claimants as
others have done, it might be more profitable to study
the generic "process of deciding" whether or not to
claim.
From the above discussion
further research into the problem
it is clear that any
should (1) involve
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the development of an a^ priori account or model of
differential claiming, and (2) use a research design
which is both criterion-related and prospective.
Therefore, the explicit aims of this thesis are to
present an account (1) of the construction, validation
and confirmation of a theoretical model of the process
of deciding whether to apply for supplementary
pensions, and (2) of the application of this model to
explaining the differential take-up of supplementary
pensions by the elderly.
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2.0 Constructing a Provisional Model
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter the limitations of non
criterion-related and post-hoc designs were discussed.
One of the main consequences of these approaches was
that researchers were tempted to infer a "process of
claiming" from descriptive and cross-sectional data on
non-claimants. It was noted that such inferences were
not justifiable, and it is also worth mentioning here
that even the term "process" shows a lack of clear
thinking about the interpretative limitations of such
designs. Process can only be studied longitudinally; in
addition, the process under study should be the generic
process, the process of deciding whether or not to
claim. The aim of this chapter is to use the constructs
culled from the literature on non-claiming to construct
a provisional model of the process underlying
differential claiming in such a form that it can be
operationalised and tested for its criterion-related
and construct validity.
An appropriate starting point for this description
is the point at which various psychological theories
and techniques were being considered for use in
understanding pensioners' attitudes towards
supplementary pensions. Since the previous research
into the problem had indicated that it was more one of
78.
volition or motivation than one of ability, the
starting point was to study theories which emphasised
the importance of people's attitudes, beliefs, values
and perceptions in determining their behaviour. During
the planning stages of the research, three cognitive
approaches were contemplated, the Rokeach Value Survey
(Rokeach, 1973), Personal Construct Theory (Kelly,
1955; 1958a), and Expectancy-Valence Theory (Vroom,
1964).
2.11 The Rokeach Value Survey
It would appear from the review of reasons given
for non-claiming in the previous chapter that certain
of pensioners' values, such as independence, pride,
self-esteem and family security, are very important in
influencing their claiming behaviour. Thus, the first
psychological approach considered was to study directly
pensioners' values using the paradigm put forward by
Rokeach (1973) in his book The Nature of Human Values.
To Rokeach:
a value is an enduring belief that a specific
mode of conduct or end-state of existence is
personally or socially preferable to an
opposite or converse mode of conduct or
end-state of existence. A value system is an
enduring organization of beliefs concerning
preferable modes of conduct or end-states of
existence along a continuum of relative
importance (p. 5).
In his conceptualisation, there are both
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instrumental and terminal values, referring
respectively to the mode of conduct (for example, being
capable, independent, responsible, etc.) and to the
end-states of existence (for example, having attained
family security, happiness, self-respect, etc.). The
thirty-six instrumental and terminal values comprising
the Rokeach Value Survey appear in Table 2.11. Although
he outlines numerous functions of values, those most
important in this context are that values (1) provide
standards guiding conduct, leading people to take
particular positions and predisposing them to prefer
one ideology over another, (2) are central to the
comparison process, and (3):
tell us how to rationalize...beliefs,
attitudes and actions that would otherwise be
socially inacceptable so that we will end up
with personal feelings of morality and
competence, both indispensable ingredients
for the maintenance and enhancement of
self-esteem (p. 13).
In discussing the differences between values and
attitudes, Rokeach notes that values are single beliefs
of a more general and enduring nature which occupy a
more central position in individual personality and
cognitive make-up than do attitudes, and which are
determinants of behaviour. In his view, values are the
foundation of attitudes, since "attitudes themselves
depend upon pre-existing social values" (Allport, 1961,
Table 2.11. Terminal and Instrumental Values
(adapted from Rokeach, 1973, p.28)
Terminal Value Instrumental Value
A comfortable life
An exciting life
A sense of accomplishment
A world at peace

































pp. 802-803), and particular specific attitudes can be
best understood in the context of their perceived
instrumentality for the attainment of one or more
values.
Although Rokeach speaks about the instrumental
relationships between attitude objects and values, his
primary concern is with assessing the relative average
ranking of eighteen instrumental and eighteen terminal
values across various groups of individuals.
As a first attempt at outlining an approach to
understanding pensioners' attitudes to different
sources of income, the Rokeach methodology was adopted
nearly in its entirety, but not exclusively. A full
research proposal was written in which it was proposed
that two linked studies be undertaken, the first being
a relatively large-scale extensive value survey of
Edinburgh pensioners and the second a more intensive
follow-up of a randomly selected sub-sample in order to
discuss in detail the interrelationships between values
and attitudes towards various sources and forms of
income and assistance available to old age pensioners.
It was thought that the survey should not be confined
to asking about supplementary pensions in order to be
able to provide a proper context for understanding them
in relation to other types of income. A questionnaire
was prepared which comprised three sections devised to
collect (1) background financial, demographic and
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employment data, (2) raink-ordering of each respondent's
level of preference for nine sources of income (from
their children, from the local authority, friends,
interest on investments and savings, old age pensions,
occupational pensions, part-time jobs, relatives, and
from supplementary pensions), and (3) their
rank-ordering of the 36 instrumental and terminal
values in the Rokeach Value Survey (with amendments to
make the value names less abstruse, descriptions
clearer, and the entire survey tool less American in
its appearance). The main object of the studies was to
attempt to explain individuals' preferences for sources
of income in terms of their values by tying one to the
other.
However, this approach was abandoned for several
reasons. Overall, the most important reason was
procedural. This direct presentation of "values" to be
ranked was considered to be a highly artificial task
with no ecological validity. It was also thought to be
so obtuse and nomothetic as to be either too difficult
for low-income pensioners to complete that few would be
able to do so (assuming they would be willing to do
so), or if they did complete it, that the results would
be of such a general nature to be of little use in
understanding the specific problem under study. Much of
this was due to the inflexibility of the standardised
survey tool. Of lesser importance at the time, but
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probably of greater consequence overall, were the
methodological limitations of the approach and the
statistical and analytical problems anticipated. The
cross-sectional analyses implied by the use of the
survey tool would be purely descriptive and at the
molar level of group intentions or predispositions to
act, and when combined with the statistical headaches
(recognised by Rokeach himself, p. 38) caused by using
exclusively rank-order techniques, would yield very few
insights into the process by which pensioners came to
decide about one form of income in relation to another,
and especially about supplementary pensions. For these
reasons, the Rokeach paradigm was set aside in favour
of an approach which gave greater scope for pensioners
to express themselves in their own words, which would
be more intensive than the type of survey methodology
first envisaged, and which would be more flexible. It
was a natural step to explore next Kelly's Personal
Construct Theory.
2.12 Personal Construct Theory
The Personal Construct Theory of G. A. Kelly
(1955) embodies the epitome of an idiographic technique
aimed at "exploring and analyzing the system of
interrelated interpretations of the world used by
individuals to bring coherence to their view of it"
(Bannister and Mair, 1968, p. 5). The fundamental
postulate of the theory is that "a person's processes
84.
are psychologically channelized by the ways in which he
anticipates events" (Bannister and Mair, 1968, p. 12);
thus, events do not imply their own classifications or
meanings, but can only be found meaningful if the
individual has "erected constructions to subsume them"
(p.12). Therefore, the focus of the technique is to
elicit the pattern of and relationships between the
constructs which an individual uses to interpret his
world. In its simplest form this is achieved by the use
of the "rep grid" to elicit individuals' systems of
constructs, a construct being defined as a way "in
which some things are interpreted as being alike and at
the same time different from other things" (Bannister
and Mair, 1968, p.13). In this technique an individual
is presented with triads of items (objects, ideas, or
more usually, people) and asked in what way two are
alike such that they differ from the third. By
successive repetition of this question using different
triads the entire repertoire of constructs used by the
individual can be elicited; these construct dimensions
can then be used to elicit the individuals' views about
any particular item.
This rep grid technique was very appealing since
it avoided assuming the universal salience of
constructs to all pensioners, and allowed an
understanding of how individuals perceive the world to
emerge. The technique was tried in a pilot study of
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seven low-income pensioners in August 1977. In this
study, the pensioners were interviewed individually,
and after an introductory chat to settle them in and
collect background information, they were presented
with eleven, 3x5- inch cards which had printed on
them the following sources of income: Supplementary
Pensions, Rent Rebates, Rate Rebates, Old Age Pensions,
Savings, Present Earnings, Occupational Pensions,
Building Society, Children, Relatives and Friends.
Blank twelfth and thirteenth cards were presented to
enable each individual to include any other sources of
income he or she thought important to retired people.
After examining the cards, each of which was labelled
"Money from...", the first elicitation was attempted.
Three elements (sources of money) were withdrawn from
the group of eleven (since none of the pensioners had
provided any additional elements at the outset of their
elicitation procedure), and the respondent was asked:
"What do two of these sources of money have in common
that make them different from the third?" This
procedure was continued until the individual either (a)
failed to discriminate any difference on three triads,
or (b) repeated the same construct dimension on three
triads. Each interview lasted approximately one and
three-quarter hours.
An example of a completed rep grid appears as

























































































represented by the abbreviations in the first 13
columns. The "emergent pole" of the construct (e.g.
that which emerges first and is the focus of the
description) is placed in the first wide column under
"Constructs", and the "implicit pole" (e.g. that which
either emerges second or never at all) is placed in the
last column. As a matter of convention, if the implicit
pole was never made explicit, it appears in
parentheses. It is also conventional to ring the three
elements used to elicit the dimension and to place a
tick under each element which shares the
characteristics of the emergent pole, as perceived by
the respondent. Thus in Row 4 of Figure 2.12, when
asked, "Considering 'supplementary pensions', 'rent
rebates' and 'occupational pensions', in what way are
two alike and different from the third?", one pensioner
explicitly stated that "people take advantage" of the
first two (the emergent pole), and implied that this
was not the case for occupational pensions. This
particular attribute was also shared by rate rebates,
but not by any of the remaining sources of income.
As can be appreciated from even this very simple
example, this technique immediately immerses the
researcher into a thicket of dimensions which are, more
often than not, unique to the individual. This approach
was deemed to be useful at the pilot stage because of
its fertility in generating constructs, but was thought
to be inappropriate for any further work. There were
several reasons why the work using the rep grid was not
developed further. First, some of the pensioners had
very considerable difficulty discriminating between
elements, and of those who could do so, some simply
could not find the words to describe these dimensions.
Second, there was a very strong tendency for pensioners
to respond in terms of how they thought other
pensioners felt about the alternative sources of
income, thus side-stepping the issue of how they
personally construed these alternatives. Thirdly, one
of Kelly's corollaries is about the range of
convenience - "A construct is convenient for the
anticipation of a finite range of events only"
(Bannister and Mair, 1968, p. 18) - which means that
some elements are simply not perceived by the
individual in terms of the elicited construct. Although
the work- of Warren (1966) indicates that the rep grid
can be used on young working-class people when the
constructs are provided, there is no literature
discussing the feasibility of using the technique with
the working-class elderly. It therefore appeared from
the results of this very modest study that the
technique itself may well have been beyond its range of
convenience when applied to working-class elderly.
Fourth, the rep grid is an idiographic technique,
which, by definition, is bound to be intensive rather
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than extensive, and this made it inappropriate to use
on large samples, mainly because, as Vernon (1964, p.
284) notes, the technique is "so flexible as to be
almost unmanageable". In this context, it is important
to note that to the personal construct theorist,
motivation is construed in terms of the change in and
re-structuring of individuals' construct systems
(Mancuso, 1977) rather than in terms of any formal
model which attempts to link constructs with behaviour.
Fifth, although many of these procedural problems could
have been overcome by using alternative but equally
valid rep grid techniques, and indeed several were
contemplated, it was believed that the inherent
limitations of the approach combined with the author's
difficulties using it and pensioners' mystification by
it outweighed the benefits which might have accrued
from its use.[1]
Thus, this approach ceased to be the mainstay of
the research in November 1977, although it did
influence the further development of the project in two
important ways. First, it provided a wealth of
constructs which could be used as the poles of scales
in a more nomothetic style, and second, it clarified
the importance of believing, with Kelly, that the:
question of directionality of behaviour is
narrowed down by the realization that a
person's behaviour must take place within the
limited dimensions of his personal construct
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system. Yet, as long as his system does have
dimensions, it must provide him with some
sets of alternatives. And as long as he has
some alternatives of his own making we must
seek to explain why he chooses some of them
in preference to others (Kelly, 1958b, p.54).
Neither the Rokeach Value Survey nor Kelly's rep
grid technique was thought to be wholly appropriate for
investigating the research problem. Although in some
ways they were diametrically opposed -- the Value
Survey being extensive and nomothetic whereas the rep
grid was intensive and idiographic -- they were similar
insofar as both were static approaches. Some of the
more specific inadequacies shared by the two approaches
were that neither approach (1) posited a theoretical
link between a specific action or attitude object (e.g.
applying for benefit) and the values which were
purportedly the determinants of the attitudes towards
the object; (2) implied any theoretical view of how
decisions might be made; (3) could be readily slotted
into a prospective validation design aimed at
predicting criteria such as intention or behaviour from
attitudes and values; and (4) was explicitly concerned
with motivation as a process, although
motivational-type explanations have been based upon
them. In December 1977, the investigation of the
appropriateness of using an expectancy-valence (VIE)
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model of motivation was undertaken.
2.13 Expectancy-Valence Theory
The expectancy-valence theory of motivation
(Vroom, 1964), a cognitive theory from industrial and
organisational psychology, appeared to possess the four
desired attributes outlined above. Applied in this
context, the theory would state that:
a pensioner's motivation to apply for a
supplementary pension is a function of the
combination of the strength of his
expectations that applying leads to certain
outcomes and his perceptions of the potential
desirability of those outcomes if they did
follow.
Lewin (1935) has distinguished between two types of
explanations of behaviour, the historical and the
ahistorical. From the former viewpoint, current
behaviour is directly dependent upon previous events
(c.f. Freud and the learning theorists). From the
latter viewpoint, current behaviour is considered to be
dependent only upon other current events. Vroom
conceived expectancy-valence theory to provide
ahistorical explanations. He wrote:
The choices made by a person in a given
situation are explained in terms of his
motives and cognitions at the time he makes
the choice. The process by which these
motives or cognitions were acquired is not
specified nor is it regarded as crucial to a
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consideration of their present role in
behaviour (Vroom, 1964, p.14).
This is not to say that previous events are not
important, but to suggest that their importance lies
mainly with their contributions to shaping current
beliefs and feelings (i.e. a previous and unsuccessful
application for assistance does not determine a
pensioner's motivation to claim in future, but does
shape his or her expectations about and the perceived
desirability of the outcomes of applying).
In the Vroom model, there are three main concepts,
expectancy, valence, and force. [2] Vroom (p.17)
defines an expectancy as being:
a momentary belief concerning the likelihood
that a particular act will be followed by a
particular outcome,
which is tantamount to stating that it is a subjective
probability that the act will be followed by the
outcome. Expectancies serve to account for the
perceived element of risk that an individual encounters
in a decision-making situation.
Vroom's concept of "valence" (taken directly from
Lewin (1935)) refers to:
affective orientations towards particular
outcomes ... It is assumed that valence can
take a wide range of both positive and
negative values (p. 15).
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Vroom carefully distinguishes between the "value" of an
outcome and "valence"; the former is the actual
satisfaction the outcome provides, whereas the latter
is the anticipated satisfaction from the outcome.
Vroom notes that many outcomes are positively or
negatively valent not because they are inherently
satisfying or dissatisfying themselves, but because of
"the anticipated satisfaction or dissatisfaction
associated with other outcomes to which they are
expected to lead" (pp. 15-16). Thus, there is an
instrumental link between various levels of outcomes.
Vroom therefore provides the following functional
definition for valence:
The valence of an outcome to a person is a
monotonically increasing function of the
algebraic sum of the products of the valences
of all other outcomes and his conceptions of
its instrumentality for the attainment of
these other outcomes.
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where j =1 to n,
V the valence of outcome j,
I = the perceived instrumentality of
jk outcome j for attaining outcome k.
Thus, the valence of a first-order outcome (e.g.
the initial level of outcome from the act) equals the
sum of the products of the instrumentalities (conceived
-1 to +1 in value) of that first-order outcome for
attaining second-order outcomes, and the anticipated
satisfaction attached to attaining the second-order
outcomes.
The third major concept used by Vroom, that of the
Force on a person to perform an act, is defined as
being:
a monotonically increasing function of the
algebraic sum of the products of the valences
of all outcomes and the strength of his
expectancies that the act will be followed by
the attainment of these outcomes.
as correlations between levels of outcomes ranging from
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Put into the form of an equation which summarises the
relationships between Force, on the one hand, and
expectancies, instrumentalities and valences, on the
other, this statement would read:
n
F = f [ \ (E V )]
i i Z ij j
j=l
I
fi > 0; iHj = ®, $ is the null set,
where i = n+1 m,
F = the force to perform act i
i
E = the strength of the expectancy (0< E < 1)
ij ij
that act i will be followed by outcome j,
V = the valence on outcome j,
j
Although the basic notions underlying force,
expectancy, instrumentality and valence are rather
simple, when combined, a complex representation of
interacting forces results. To clarify the
relationships amongst the concepts, a hypothetical
example from this research context is presented in
Figure 2.13.
In this example, the force to apply would be a
function of the sum of the strength of the three
expectations that applying would lead to receipt of the
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benefit, a visit from an official, and the family
finding out, each multiplied by their respective
instrumentalities for second-order outcomes and the
valences attached to those outcomes.
This expectancy-valence model of motivation (also
known as a VIE model) seemed appropriate for use
towards understanding the differential benefit claiming
behaviour of low income pensioners. First, it provided
a theoretical link between the attitude object of
"applying for benefit" and values - the force to apply
was ultimately a function of expectations and the
anticipated desirability of second-order outcomes, the
strength and direction of which would be determined by
pensioners' values. For instance, it is easy to
understand how pensioners' perceptions of the
desirability of having more money, or being treated by
others as being poor would be shaped by the importance
to them of the values of family security, independence
and self-esteem.
Second, expectancy-valence theory would appear
implicitly to be a theory of decision-making which
attempts to model a rational weighing-up process,
insofar as it assumes "that people choose from among
alternative acts the one corresponding to the strongest
positive (or weakest negative) force" (Vroom, 1964,
p.19). However, it does not assume, as do theories of
riskless choice, that the person who makes any decision
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to which the theory is applied is (a) completely
informed, (b) infinitely sensitive, and (c) rational
(Edwards, 1954). Instead, it assumes that people choose
the alternative which maximises the subjective expected
utility to them, therefore allowing the possibility
that choices are made on the basis of a rational
combination of what might be irrational beliefs based
on incomplete knowledge and profound misconceptions.
Third, the expectancy-valence theory had been
subjected to numerous tests using correlational
validation designs, and was obviously well-suited from
this viewpoint (cf Mitchell, 1974; Mitchell and Beach,
1976; Peters, 1977). [3] However, although the theory
and some of its modifications have been extensively
tested in the fields of work motivation, occupational
choice and vocational choice, the results have
generally been a bit disappointing. The reasons for the
low correlational ceiling between VIE scores and the
criteria being predicted are briefly reviewed below.
2.2 Expectancy-Valence Theory: Some Conceptual and
Methodological Problems
Problems with tests of expectancy-valence theory
can be grouped into four general categories, problems
of (1) design, (2) the criterion, (3) theory and
method, and of (4) the range of convenience or
applicability of the theory.
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Problems of Design
There are two approaches to the use of VIE theory,
the within-subjects individual choice design and the
across-subjects design. The purposes of these designs
are distinctly different. Any within-subjects analysis
is essentially a test of the theory's validity since it
asks, "Do measures of expectancies, instrumentalities
and valences, when combined in this way, predict and
thus explain behaviour?". The design of a
within-subjects analysis can be conceptualised as a
contingency table which categorises predicted choice or
behaviour by actual choice or behaviour. Evaluations of
within-subjects tests are therefore measures of the
significance of the proportions of correct matches
between predicted and actual choice, intention, or
behaviour.
In contrast, across-subjects analyses seem to be
orientated towards deriving substantive findings, since
they essentially ask, "What expectancy-valence
dimensions correlate with the behaviour or intentions
of this group of subjects?". Here the outcomes used
must be invariant and are assumed to have common
meaning across subjects. The design of an
across-subjects analysis can be conceptualised as a
correlational scatterplot, and the evaluative measure
is that of the neatness of fit between expectancy
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"force scores" and the criterion.
Although envisaged by Vroom (1964) as a
within-subjects theory, only a few researchers have
employed it as such (Mitchell and Knudson, 1973;
Sheard, 1970; Holmstrom and Beach, 1973; Dachler and
Mobley, 1973; Parker and Dyer, 1976; Matsui and
Ohtsuka, 1978; Matsui, et. al., 1977; Teas, 1981; Stahl
and Harrell, 1981; Schmidt and Son, 1981). Mitchell
(1974) noted that prior to the publication of his
review paper in 1974, "not a single investigation" had
predicted job effort by using the within-subjects
design, and that while many authors describe it as
being a within-subjects choice model, they nonetheless
test it using across-subjects designs. One of the
practical problems arising from using a within-subjects
design is that a full set of instrumentalities and
expectancies must be rated by the respondent for each
choice alternative; thus to acquire total VIE scores
for two to three alternatives for any one subject could
easily involve nearly 100 separate measures. For
whatever reasons, the majority of researchers have
opted to use it as an across-subjects measurement of
motivation yet without subjecting it to the same rigid
assessment procedures typically demanded of nomothetic
measures. In this regard, Mitchell (1974) also notes
that the lack of standardised responses when using an
across-subjects design can allow individuals' differing
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response sets to confound prediction. He writes
(Mitchell, 1974, p. 1070): "thus, someone who
systematically rates the extremes on scales will have a
behavioural prediction that is very different from a
'conservative' subject even though they feel the same
way". Parker and Dyer (1976) speculated that as a
result of the mismatch between theory and practice,
"between-persons tests of expectancy theory may tend to
show reduced validity through no theoretical fault of
the model".
Problems of the Criterion
Correlations between VIE scores and criteria of
"intention" or "preference" have been only moderate,
and those between force scores and behaviour have been
lower still. For example, using a within-subjects
design, Mitchell and Knudson (1973) found that although
their VIE model predicted students' attitudes towards
business occupations with a correlation of 0.69, their
actual choice was predicted with a correlation of only
0.38. The validity of VIE models may be affected not
only by the type of criterion being predicted, but also
by the source of the criterion rating. For instance,
most correlational field studies have had a
correlational ceiling of 0.30 when the criterion is an
independent rating of effort, but this ceiling is
raised when the criterion is a self-rating of effort
(Campbell and Pritchard, 1976). Schwab, et. al. (1979)
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confirmed this finding, in part, by demonstrating that
over a sample of 32 studies, "variance explained was
greater when ... self-report or quantitative measures
of effort and performance were used rather than
evaluations of these variables by someone other than
the subject". Campbell and Pritchard (1976) state that
"it's no wonder that the 'model' correlates higher with
self-rated effort than with independent ratings"; this
may well be due to the fact that the VIE and criterion
ratings are not experimentally independent.
Conceptual and Methodological Problems
Many researchers have pointed out the
methodological problems (Campbell and Pritchard, 1976;
Mitchell, 1974; Heneman and Schwab, 1972; Schwab, et.
al., 1979; Herriot and Ecob, 1979; Connolly, 1976) and
conceptual problems (Gavin, 1970; Feldman, 1974;
Schwab, et. al. , 1979; Mitchell and Pollard, 1973;
Lawler and Porter, 1967; Sheridan, et. al., 1975) with
VIE theory which may have contributed to the low
correlational ceiling on the predictor-criterion
relationship. It is not possible to review all the
problems which have been noted, but a sampling might
include the following.
Methodological - VIE theory, because of its
essentially mathematical form, allows the deduction of
numerous hypotheses which should be empirically
testable; however, few of these have been tested. The
notable exceptions are tests of the hypotheses of the
independence of the main components (conducted by Gavin
(1970), Parker and Dyer (1976), and Erez (1979)), and
tests of the transitivity of valence ratings (Sheridan,
et. al. , 1975; Liddell and Solomon, 1977). Concerning
outcomes, there are the issues of how many outcomes to
use, how specific they should be, whether they all
carry the same weight, and how they should be selected
(Herriot and Ecob, 1979). Although Fishbein and Azjen
(1975) recommend using Miller's (1956) criterion of
seven plus or minus two outcomes, only recently has an
empirical basis for using a small number of outcomes
emerged. To maximise predictive validity, Schwab, et.
al. (1979) suggest using ten to fifteen outcomes.
However, the more recent work of Leon (1979) indicates
that prediction is maximised where the number of
outcomes used is less than ten. There seems to be
emerging a consensus that outcomes shown to be salient
to each individual must be used where a within-subjects
analysis design is used.
In terms of the elicitation of responses,
according to Campbell and Pritchard (1976) most studies
have used questionnaires requiring the respondents to
provide ratings on Likert scales. This technique not
only lifts the individual out of his context (e.g. an
interview procedure or perhaps observation procedure
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might be a bit more realistic) but also causes
measurement problems. According to Schmidt (1973), in
order for the main components to be multiplied, the
scales should have the properties of ratio scales.
However, this view is contested by Arnold and Evans
(1979) who state that ratio scales are not necessary in
testing a multiplicative model if a hierarchical
regression technique is used at the analysis stage.
Conceptual - One of the main conceptual problems
is the meaning of the computed total VIE score.
Although Vroom's concept of "force" acquired its
meaning from the context of Lewinian field theory out
of which it grew, in using VIE scores to predict other
criteria such as behaviour or performance, other
researchers have implied a different meaning for the
combined score which has not been made explicit. Even
using VIE scores to predict "intention" may imply a
level of directedness not connoted by the concept of
"force". Other conceptual problems belie the difficulty
of constructing a theory which simultaneously predicts
well and represents how and what individuals think. For
instance, it is unclear whether an instrumentality
means the same thing to researchers and respondents,
why components should be multiplied rather than added,
and what this means in terms of representing
individuals' ways of thinking, and why there must be a
linear relationship between the criterion and the
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individual components. Are there any grounds for
assuming that there is a direct linear relationship
between valences on outcomes and effort, intention or
performance? Could not the valence on some outcomes be
better models of people's feelings if their
relationship to the criterion was construed as
exponential, inverted logarithmic, discontinuous or
even of a threshold nature? None of these questions
have been answered, but it is very clear that
expectancy-valence theory is far more complex and makes
far more assumptions than many writers imagine.
Range of Convenience
In addition to the problems with the theory
discussed above, there is the important consideration
of the range of convenience of the VIE theory.
Recently, several authors have implied or suggested
that VIE scores might better predict the behaviour of
sub-groups rather than of the entire group of
individuals being studied (Parker and Dyer, 1976;
Nebeker and Mitchell, 1974; Dachler and Mobley, 1973;
Herriot and Ecob, 1979; Seybolt and Pavett, 1980; Teas,
1981). As Parker and Dyer (1976) concluded in their
study using VIE scores to predict (post-hoc) the
retirement of US naval officers, "the act of retiring
may be influenced by environmental factors with which
expectancy theory does not deal...and researchers have
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begun to delineate variables which might enhance
expectancy theory predictions of behavior outcomes". It
is also possible that, at a fundamental level,
expectancy theory is appropriate only for certain types
of people in certain situations. Although in a study
using force scores to predict the leadership behaviour
of naval airmen Nebeker and Mitchell (1974) found
significant correlations, the predictor accounted for
only eight to ten percent of the criterion variance,
leaving the authors to propose that "it is possible
that either the theory predicts well only for some
individuals, or that other approaches may be more
efficient". In addition, Dachler and Mobley (1973) have
suggested that the theory may only be predictive in
situations in which outcomes are objectively linked to
behaviour. Herriot and Ecob (1979) demonstrated that
the preferred variant of expectancy theory for
predicting students1 intentions varied depending upon
the type of job being assessed, and they encouraged
researchers to turn to a closer study of the use of
differential predictors. It seems possible that no
matter how many modifications are made to the VIE
model, no one model will predict with total accuracy
the behaviour of all individuals all of the time. It
would therefore be theoretically and practically wise
to attempt to incorporate variables outwith the VIE
model in order to increase predictive validity. One
possible approach to this is to use moderator
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variables.
Expectancy-Valence Theory and Moderator Variables
Although very popular during the 1960s and early
1970s, moderator variables have since disappeared from
the mainstream of analysis in psychology (Landy and
Trumbo, 1980). The use of moderator variables is based
upon the presupposition that the behaviour of
individuals in homogeneous sub-groups may be more
predictable than that of the entire group. Banas (1964)
provides the following definition for moderator
variables:
the general term to refer to all variables,
quantitative or qualitative, which improve
the usefulness of a predictor by isolating
subgroups of individuals for whom a predictor
or set of regression weights are especially
appropriate.
Any variable that can be used to sub-divide a group and
to demonstrate differential validity in a
predictor-criterion relationship is a potential
moderator variable. For example, if "sex" were used as
a variable to sub-divide a group of men and women whose
levels of effort were being predicted with an overall
low validity, and the result was an enhanced
correlation between the predictor and the level of
effort for women only, this would be a case of
differential validity, and "sex" could provisionally be
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called a moderator variable. This case of differential
validity is represented pictorially by Figure 2.3, in
which the first scatterplot represents this
relationship for the sexes combined, and the second and
third for the sexes taken individually.
Although simple dichotomous or trichotomous
variables such as sex or race have been used as
moderators (Bartlett and O'Leary, 1969), they have by
no means been limited to such. Other more complex
variables have been used as moderators, including
individual differences in higher-order need strength
(Jackson, et. al., 1981) and perceived level of
feedback (Seybolt and Pavett, 1980). Indeed, Ghiselli
(1956a), whose thinking underlies much of the work
which followed on differential prediction, used scores
on an Occupational Level Inventory as a moderator
variable with a resulting increase in predictive
validity from 0.259 for the total group to 0.664 for
the theoretically most predictable sub-group. Guion
(1976) notes that there are at least three types of
moderator variables, those which correlate with the
cross-products of predictor and criterion, which
correlate with the systematic errors of prediction, or
which provide significant interactions with
predictions. Moderator variables are used in the
expectation that improved prediction will occur in only
some, but not all sub-groups (Guion, 1976).
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Figure 2.3. Moderated and Unrncderated Relationships
(x = males, o = females)
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Moderated relationship between VIE scores and effort.
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Various post-hoc methods have been used to locate
moderator variables (Ghiselli, 1956; Saunders, 1956;
Zedeck, 1971), but one of the simplest was outlined by
Hobert and Dunnette (1967) known as quadrant analysis.
Based on a search for factors which correlate with the
systematic errors of prediction, individuals are placed
into one of four cells: True Positive, False Positive,
True Negative, and False Negative. True Positives and
True Negatives are those who have been correctly
predicted; False Positives and False Negatives are the
"unpredictables". It is then up to the researcher,
using whatever means he or she has available (and
usually following his or her hunches) to locate the
variable or variables which distinguish True from False
Positives and True from False Negatives. However, other
researchers have objected strongly to the post-hoc
search for moderators (Schmidt and Hunter, 1978;
Arnold, 1982). Arnold (1982) writes:
It should be emphasized that the
investigation of whether either the form or
the degree of relationship between two
variables X and Y varies systematically with
the values of some third (moderator) variable
Z can only meaningfully proceed in the
presence of some a priori hypothesis
regarding the influence of variable Z upon
the X-Y relationship....A random search for
moderator variables... is no more justified
and no more theoretically enlightening than a
random search for significant zero-order
relationships between variables (p.146).
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The use of "sex" and "race" as moderator variables
has been substantially criticised since several
researchers (Humphreys, 1973; Schmidt, Berner and
Hunter, 1973; Schmidt and Hunter, 1978) have
demonstrated that the effects found were statistical
artefacts and that claims for differential validity
could not truly be supported. According to Landy and
Trumbo (1980), these false claims often resulted from
the erroneous comparison of the validity coefficient
for each sub-group against the zero correlation, rather
than testing the significance of the difference between
the coefficients obtained for both groups.
However, even though the correct statistics may be
used and a potential moderator located (or the
effectiveness of an a priori moderator partly
validated, several writers have indicated that the
sample sizes necessary to attain adequate statistical
power are quite large (Arnold, 1982; Trattner and
O'Leary, 1980; Cascio, et. al., 1980). Arnold (1982)
states that, because of the attenuated unreliablity in
both the predictor and the criterion, there results "a
(sometimes drastic) reduction in the power of the
statistical tests to detect a true difference" (p.166).
He concludes with the three statements that (1) the
statistical power to detect true differences between
validity coefficients is very low, (2) the probability
of detecting them in all but the very large-scale
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research projects is extremely small, and (3) the
utility of looking for them is infinitesimally small,
except where (a) there exists a strong theoretical
argument which directly implies the existence of
differential validity and an explanation for it and (b)
the theoretical statement can be tested in a few large
scale studies or several small-scale studies.
Ghiselli (1972) notes that true moderator
variables may be both fragile and elusive. There are
statistical problems in locating them, and they tend to
stand up rather poorly under cross-validation (Zedeck,
1971). Yet, Guion (1976) points out that moderator
variables are occasionally found and even replicated.
Even though moderator variables, by demonstrating
differential validity, may enhance the predictive
validity and imply the boundaries of the use of a
predictive equation, from the perspective of explaining
most of the criterion variance for the entire group,
different predictive equations or predictors may be
needed. Instead of applying a different regression
equation to the same predictions, totally different
predictors may be applied. Ghiselli (1956b), in
positing the individual dimensionality of the
criterion, set the tone for this; Herriot and Ecob
(1979) have demonstrated that different predictive
equations are preferred for predicting occupational
preferences, the preferred equation depending upon both
the type of job being rated and the course year of the
student subjects.
There are precedents for using moderator variables
in combination with expectancy models. For instance,
Mitchell and Nebeker (1973) demonstrated that the
accuracy with which an expectancy model predicted the
academic effort of university undergraduates was
moderated by the amount of control that individual
students felt they had over the time they had available
to spend on academic activities. Parker and Dyer (1976)
significantly increased the accuracy of their
expectancy-based predictions of the retirement of naval
officers from 68 to 80 percent by incorporating the two
moderators of "wife/family influences" and "hesitancy
to act". Similar enhanced correlations were
demonstrated by Jacobson and Eran (1980) who showed
that force scores bore a significantly stronger
relationship to the retiring behaviour of Israeli
physicians who had lower job satisfaction, higher job
stress, and lower evaluations of their own medical
competence than to the behaviour of physicians in the
opposite situations. In contrast, however, are the
findings of Seybolt and Pavett (1980) that using
perceived level of feedback as a moderator of the
relationship between nurses' effort and their VIE
scores did not improve VIE model predictions.
In summary, it is clear that in terms of
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explaining criterion variance, both within-subjects and
across-subjects applications of expectancy theory have
been only moderately successful. These low validity
coefficients may be due to some combination of
procedural and conceptual problems, but it is equally
probable that expectancy models, in having been applied
to all individuals in a given situation, may have been
applied outwith their range of convenience, and
therefore may be valid predictors for only certain
sub-groups of individuals. It behooves expectancy
theorists to locate non-expectancy variables which can
be used (a) to select out those for whom VIE based
predictions are inappropriate, and (b) to predict the
behaviour of this "unpredictable" group.
2.4 A Provisional Model of the Process of Deciding
In Chapter 1, the reasons given by pensioners for
not claiming supplementary pensions were reviewed.
These reasons comprised pensioners' perceptions of
their current circumstances as well as their
expectations and feelings about outcomes which they
believed might have occurred had they applied.
Transforming these post-hoc reasons into variables
would yield two general classes, expectancy variables
and non-expectancy variables. The previous two sections
have reviewed a particularly promising theoretical
model which presents one means by which different
expectancy variables can be integrated to form an
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overall predictor score (the VIE score). However, it
was rioted that using VIE scores alone may have limited
the accuracy with which intention and behaviour were
predicted, and that prediction might be enhanced by
incorporating non-expectancy variables as moderator
variables.
The aim of this section is to cast the substantive
problem of understanding differential claiming into the
methodological mould of expectancy-valence theory.
Since one of the main aims of the thesis is to provide
a theoretical basis for interpreting differential
claiming, the following documentation of the model of
the process of deciding must include a theoretical
account of the linkages between and the order amongst
constructs as well as provide a theoretical rationale
for the proposed effectiveness of these constructs in
enhancing the prediction of behaviour.
The Theoretical Model: Variables and Linkages
Variables
The first step towards developing a theoretical
model of differential claiming was to transform the
general reasons given for not claiming into six
conceptually distinct sets of variables and to give
them the operational definitions which follow: (1)
perceived need (NEED) - the individual's perception of
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the extent to which he or she is having difficulty
making ends meet; (2) basic knowledge (KNOW) - a
combination of the individual's awareness both (a) of
the existence of extra income from the DHSS and (b) of
the name of this income; (3) perceived eligibility
(ELIG) - the individual's perception of the likelihood
that he or she either is eligible for a supplementary
pension or potentially better off on a supplementary
pension if currently receiving a rebate; (4) perceived
utility (UTIL) - the individual's perception of the
utility of the supplementary pension to meet his or her
specific needs; (5) expectations and feelings about the
application procedure (VIE) - the sum of all negative
and positive forces exerted by an individual's feelings
about the possible outcomes of applying combined with
his estimations of how likely the outcomes are to
occur; (6) perceived stability of the situation (STAB)
the extent to which an individual believes that his
or her situation is unstable and that it will prevent
him or her from applying until it stabilises.
The VIE component forms the core of the
theoretical model. It is based directly upon the
expectancy-valence theory of motivation and
decision-making as described above. In this research
problem, the outcomes of applying are of three types:
(1) procedural outcomes - outcomes of lodging an
application including, for instance, having a
117.
means-test interview, revealing the value of savings,
or having to verify this information; (2) social
outcomes - the possibility that significant referents
such as family, friends or neighbours might find out;
(3) implications - that applying for a supplementary
pension is tantamount to "asking for charity".
In this VIE component, the expectancies and
instrumentalities can be considered measures of
pensioners' levels of awareness about the outcomes of
applying, and the valences as the pensioners' attitudes
towards these outcomes. Thus, awareness of the outcomes
(or expectations) and attitudes towards the outcomes
(or valences) are conceptually and empirically
separable using the expectancy-valence formulation.
This poses a theoretical solution to the problem
documented by other researchers (McDonagh and Matthews,
1980) in attempting to separate respondents' awareness
of the application procedure from their attitudes
towards it.
Because it simplifies matters considerably to
speak in terms of pensioners' "feelings" rather than in
terms of "valences", the two terms will be used
synonymously throughout the remaining chapters.
Linkages between Constructs
The second step in constructing the theoretical
model was to consider the nature of the linkages
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between the main constructs. Previous research had
suggested that none of these constructs alone explained
claiming or non-claiming, and that the constructs
appeared to be highly interrelated. For instance,
action research studies (DHSS, 1977c; Adler and du Feu,
1975; Broad, 1977) had demonstrated that there was no
one-to-one correspondence between behaviour and
knowledge of the existence of the benefit or knowledge
of eligibility, otherwise all those informed of their
entitlement by the researchers would have claimed. It
was also observed that non-claimants could possess
perceptions of substantial need or of eligibility, yet
still not claim (Broad,1977). It was apparent from
studies of claimants that some basic knowledge and
perceptions of need, eligibility, utility and stability
were necessary for pensioners to claim; it was equally
apparent from studies of non-claimants that each taken
alone was not sufficient to catalyse claiming. Thus it
was thought that these six main constructs comprised a
series of thresholds, and that in order to apply, a
pensioner would have to achieve all six.
Order of Constructs
The third step was to decide how the thresholds
were ordered. It was possible that the order in which
the thresholds were achieved was immaterial, but as
efficiently as the cumulative point scale implied by
such an approach might predict behaviour, it would not
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provide a theoretical understanding of the process;
beyond this, it was strongly suspected that a definite
order of thresholds did exist.
The ordering of constructs was deduced in the
following way. The expectancy-valence model used as the
VIE threshold implied that all pensioners weigh up
their expectations and feelings about the outcomes of
applying with a degree of rationality not always
encountered when interviewing non-claimants. For
instance, many pensioners (especially widows) simply
refuse to discuss social security, and others, when
informed of their entitlement, adamantly exclaim that
they do not need any help. Obviously, while some
pensioners do weigh up the advantages and disadvantages
of applying and thus make a decision,- others never
reach this stage. Therefore, it was believed that
making a decision would be salient for some but not all
pensioners, and that these "deciders" and
"non-deciders" could be differentiated by their levels
of basic knowledge and perceived levels of need, of
eligibility and of utility. Thus the VIE threshold was
placed towards the end of the theoretical model,
preceded by the other four thresholds, each of which
would serve to moderate the relationship between the
VIE scores and behaviour.
The order amongst the first four thresholds was
determined by the following logic. Underlying most
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psychological theories of motivation is the concept of
dissonance - the discrepancy between an organism's
present state and homeostasis. If the dissonance
exceeds a certain threshold, the organism begins to
search for alternatives to reduce the dissonance,
rejecting those alternatives which it perceives have no
utility towards reducing the dissonance to an
acceptable level. When it finds those alternatives with
potential utility, it makes an evaluation and may or
may not act further towards securing the alternative.
Although it may be strongly orientated towards securing
the alternative, other needs may temporarily loom
larger, and prevent it from pursuing the alternative at
that time. The threshold model is based upon this
general motivational process.
Thus, the threshold model assumes that a pensioner
must achieve all six thresholds in succession in order
to claim, and that the explanation for his or her
failure to claim lies in the first unachieved
threshold. The assumption that only a sub-group of all
eligible pensioners actively make decisions has two
important implications. First, if it is true, the
distinction between deciders and non-deciders resolves
the interpretative problem of trying to distinguish
between pensioners who decide not to apply and those
who simply do nothing (typified by the fairly common
response of "I just couldn't be bothered"). Secondly,
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this distinction is very relevant to policy-making
since changes to the application procedure must be
based upon data from respondents for whom thinking
about the procedure is salient, and the threshold model
provides a means of identifying that group. Thus, in
this context, pensioners' perceptions of difficulty
managing would be the energising factor, catalysing
them to search for, evaluate and decide whether or not
to apply for benefits which could improve their
circumstances. The simple threshold model appears as
the bottom row in Figure 2.4.
Referring to this overall process makes it easier
to explain the theoretical function of including the
first four variables as moderators. First, the general
issue of looking for ways of increasing one's income is
not salient for people who are experiencing no
dissonance, and their VIE scores (and predictions based
upon them) would therefore be expected to contribute
only random variance to the predictor-criterion
relationship. The inclusion of NEED as the initial
threshold might account for the observations of other
researchers that pre-existing attitudes seem to
moderate the extent to which publicity and information
about benefits is absorbed by benefit non-claimants
(McDonagh and Matthews, 1980; Connell, 1980).
At a more specific level, the outcomes of applying
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person who either did not know that the benefit existed
(KNOW) or who believed that the probability that he
would be eligible was zero (ELIG). In a similar vein,
those who perceive no utility to the benefit would
consider it no further (UTIL), and their VIE scores
would, theoretically, bear no relationship to their
behaviour.
A different argument applies to the fifth
moderator variable (STAB). The outcomes of applying are
highly salient to these people, but another need, that
to resolve the ambiguity or instability of their
situations first, temporarily looms larger and prevents
them from pursuing the alternative at that time.
Level of Explanation
Being essentially ahistorical, this model provides
explanations of claiming behaviour in terms of
pensioners' subjective perceptions, expectations and
feelings, but it does not specify either the method by
which these perceptions are formed or the experiences
which catalysed their formation. For example, the fact
that a widow perceives no difficulty making ends meet
may explain why she does not apply for a supplementary
pension, but not how she came to hold that perception.
Since understanding both the methods and experiences
behind these perceptions are important for theoretical
reasons and for posing policy solutions aimed at
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increasing take-up, their place in the model must be
specified.
It was believed that each perception, expectancy
and valence in the model represented the end-product of
a series of evaluations based on or related to specific
experiences. This is represented by the first two rows
of Figure 2.4. For example, in the case of perceptions
of need, the method by which the hypothetical widow
came to perceive no difficulty managing may have been
by comparing her current situation (1) with that of
another pensioner (as a result of a discussion with
other widows at the local OAP club) or (2) with her own
previous situation (referring to a critical experience
such as the death of her husband) or (3) with her
internal beliefs about how well she should be managing
(which may be prompted by media publicity about
inflation, the needs of pensioners, and benefit
entitlement). This particular example draws heavily
upon reference group theory, an approach which some
authors have considered to be of paramount importance
in understanding non-claiming (Taylor-Gooby, 1980).
Reference group theory used in the context of relative
deprivation as set out by Runciman (1966), will be
discussed in greater detail at the analysis stage of
the full study.
The conceptualisation presented in Figure 2.4 thus
allows a theoretical explanation of why previous
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experience alone will not account for future behaviour
by positing that the two are linked through the medium
of current perceptions, expectations and feelings.
Accounting for Other Alternatives
It was always planned that this research should
attempt to elicit pensioners' cognitions of
supplementary pensions in the context of other benefits
and forms of managing. Indeed, this notion of relative
motivation was embodied in the two previous approaches
outlined above, as well as being implied in the choice
models derived from VIE theory. However, this angle was
not developed here, for two main reasons. First, the
number of outcomes of applying for SB to be discussed
with pensioners was very large; to have discussed all
the outcomes of all the alternatives with each
pensioner would simply have been impossible, although
this was tried in the feasibility study.
The original in-depth interview for the
feasibility study was 60 pages long, the last 45 pages
comprising rating scales of the expectations and
feelings about each of thirteen alternative ways of
improving pensioners' financial circumstances. The
schedule was set up such that only those alternatives
salient to each individual were discussed in detail;
this was piloted with three respondents, and although
each had only three options, the amount of effort on
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the part of both the interviewer and the respondents
was enormous, as was the level of difficulty.
Second, although all pensioners in theory face a
choice between applying for a supplementary pension and
applying for rebates, in practice most eligible
non-claimants are already receiving rebates. For them
the choice was not between applying for a supplementary
pension or applying for rebates, but whether or not to
apply for a supplementary pension. Thus, although
rebates had to be accounted for, their influence was of
an indirect historical nature rather than as a direct
contrasting alternative to SB.
The Conceptual Independence of the Moderator Variables
It is intuitively obvious that the strength of the
relationship between individuals' expectations and
feelings about applying and their behaviour must be
moderated by whether or not they know that the benefit
exists, and whether or not they believe there is at
least some chance that they are eligible for it. Thus
these "knowledge variables" would seem legitimately to
belong outwith the expectancy-valence component.
However, it could be argued that NEED, UTIL and STAB
actually represent functions normally embraced by the
VIE model, and that placing them outwith the VIE
component arbitrarily reduces the power of this
component to predict behaviour.
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For instance, expectancy theory applied in this
context implies that the force to apply is partly a
function of the individual's expectation of his ability
to apply, the instrumentality of the anticipated amount
of benefit for meeting his needs, and the desirability
of having his needs met. These measures might be
considered to be synonymous with STAB, UTIL, and NEED.
However, there are theoretical grounds for arguing
against this view, these arguments being based upon a
distinction to be drawn between the salience of the
action and of its outcomes, on the one hand, and on the
other, the relative strength of the ratings of
instrumentalities and valences surrounding these
outcomes.
NEED is a measure of the salience of the general
focus of action (i.e. difficulty making ends meet) for
the individual, and is not a measure of the valence or
the desirability of having needs met. An example may
make this clearer. A man can give his evaluation of how
he would feel if he could pay his heating bills without
worry (the valence). But if making ends meet in general
is not a problem to him, then the positive feelings
attached to this specific outcome would not motivate
him to apply, although an expectancy theory prediction
which did not account for salience would lead one to
predict that he would apply. Only if the general focus
of action is salient can the valences on meeting
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specific needs be used to predict behaviour. If the
general issue is not salient, that fact in itself is
sufficient to predict non-claiming.
Applying a similar logic to the variable of UTIL,
any probability scale which has a zero point indicates
both (1) whether or not the individual perceives any
utility of the benefit to meet his needs, and (2) if he
does, the strength of his belief. Deciding that some
utility exists is a necessary prerequisite of assessing
the utility of its amount. However, since a person who
decides or believes a priori that the benefit has no
utility is unlikely to consider the further outcomes of
applying in a more than casual fashion, it seems
logical to postulate that the relationship between
total force scores and behaviour will be strongest for
those for whom the further outcomes are salient. The
perceived existence of some possible utility to the
benefit makes the other outcomes salient and thus
ratings of them more valid; as such it serves as a
moderator variable. On the other hand, the strength of
this belief, used as an instrumentality, contributes to
the forces leading him towards making his decision.
STAB might be considered to be an expectancy
since, in a sense, it comprises a measure of the extent
to which an individual believes he could apply if he
wanted to. The main arguments against it being
considered such is that, by definition, it does not
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apply to all individuals. By definition it is a
variable underlying the decision-making processes only
of those who are positively predisposed towards
applying. Since disposition to apply has been defined
as the force score, STAB cannot be included as part of
that score. By postulating it to be a moderator
variable for only those positively predisposed to
apply, it is being assumed that people can decide not
to apply in both stable and unstable circumstances;
however, people can only decide positively to apply
when their circumstances are stable.
Perceptions of need, utility and stability would
appear, in theory at least, to stand as variables
outwith the VIE model, and outline the boundary
conditions or range of convenience of the use of the
VIE model.
Salience and Ambiguity as Boundary Conditions
There is fairly widespread agreement in applied
psychology that the concept of "salience" is important.
For instance, in the fields of work motivation, "work
salience" (Super, 1976) has been shown to be a fertile
concept, as have the concepts of "work experience" and
"career salience" (Greenhaus, 1973; 1974). Indeed, an
entire project was devoted to the study of work values
and work salience (Kidd and Knasel, 1980). There is
some direct support for using the concept of "salience"
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in conjunction with VIE theory. Although they did not
use the term "salience", Jacobson and Eran (1980)
explained the differential validity of their expectancy
model's predictions in terms of the post-hoc hypothesis
that members of the best predicted group "may have
been, in fact, more conscious of the consequences of
continued employment and retirement...". As a result of
their higher job stress, lower job satisfaction and
lower estimates of their professional competence, the
issue of retirement would, hypothetically, be in the
foreground of their thinking.
The fifth moderator, perceived stability of the
situation (STAB), may stand as a boundary condition
distinct from salience. Although the issues may be
salient and the outcomes clear, the ambiguity of the
situation expressed as an inability to make a decision
may prevent action and result in false predictions.
This definition of ambiguity as a reflection of ability
is implied in Mayes' (1978) proposition that expectancy
models may only be valid predictors of choices in
unambiguous situations. This definition is also
directly reflected in Parker and Dyer's (1976) use of
"hesitancy to act" as a moderator variable. In applying
expectancy models in other contexts, Fishbein and Azjen
(1975) have noted that this type of variable is
frequently found moderating the relationship between
peoples' intentions and their actual behaviour.
131 .
* * * * * *
In this chapter, a provisional theoretical model
of the process of deciding about applying for
supplementary pensions has been outlined. The remainder
of the thesis deals with validating and modifying this
model, and with using it to derive substantive findings
about the problem of differential claiming.
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3.0 The Feasibility Study: Design and Methods
3.1 Introduction
Because the Department of Health and Social
Security had the only nearly complete list of UK
pensioners, and because it was necessary to gain access
to this list in order to obtain a representative sample
of pensioners, it was necessary to obtain the support
of the DHSS before the project advanced any further.
Drafts of proposals were prepared between December 1977
and May 1978 and submitted in May 1978, but were not
acceptable to the DHSS. The approach was altered and
the proposals were completely re-written and
re-submitted in December 1978 for funding as from 1
February 1979. These proposals were eventually approved
in April 1979, athough support for the feasibility
study spanned the fourteen-month period from 1 February
1979 to 31 March 1980. Because the research was
commissioned by the DHSS and could not have been
conducted without their direct co-operation, certain
design constraints were imposed by the need to meet the
Department's objectives, which were not always
synonymous with the author's. Thus it must be borne in
mind that the research was conducted subject to many
practical and political considerations.
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3.2 Aims
The general aims of this study were to demonstrate
the feasibility of using (1) the proposed sampling
frame to locate a representative sample of eligible
non-claiming pensioners (ENCs), (2) the proposed
interviewing technique to elicit these ENCs1
expectations and feelings about applying for
supplementary pensions, and (3) the proposed model to
predict and thus to explain ENCs1 intentions to apply
for supplementary pensions and their actual claiming
behaviour. Although the latter two aims were of greater
interest to the author, the sampling frame was of
greatest interest to the DHSS, as indicated by the
importance attached to it in reports on the project




At this stage of research, the only a priori
hypotheses were methodological, the primary hypothesis
being one about differential validity springing
directly from the model of deciding presented in
Chapter 2. However, it did seem important to
demonstrate from the outset, rather than to assume,
that the statistical mode of prediction implied by
using VIE scores was superior to non-statistical
methods of predicting pensioners' intentions and/or
behaviour. Because there were both theoretical reasons
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(Fishbein and Azjen, 1975) and empirical reasons (e.g.
common-method variance introduced by self-rated
criteria (Campbell and Pritchard, 1976)) for believing
that "intentions to apply" would be more predictable
than "claiming behaviour", this was also set out as a
methodological hypothesis. These hypotheses were very
much of an exploratory nature, serving more as an
anchor for preliminary analysis of results than as a
platform for profound revelation. These specific
hypotheses were:
(1) that of three different predictive methods,
behaviour would be best predicted, in
descending order, by the full threshold
model, VIE scores alone, and by a
clinical/intuitive method.
(2) that an intentional criterion would be more
predictable than a behavioural criterion
using VIE scores.
(3) that the behaviour of pensioners who had
achieved the first four thresholds of NEED,
KNOW, ELIG and UTIL and who perceived their
situations to be stable (the "stable
deciders") would be significantly more
predictable than those of pensioners who had
failed to achieve any one of the first four
thresholds (the "non-deciders").
Although discussed in detail later, it must be
noted here that the overriding concern of the
Department was with the prediction of behaviour, and
that they expressed little interest in the use of
intention as a criterion.
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3.4 Research Design (Please see Figure 3.4)
The design of the feasibility study was
prospective and involved three stages. In the first
stage, using an in-depth interview (known as the
research interview), a small sample of ENCs would be
(a) interviewed as to why they had not claimed
supplementary pensions to date, (b) informed of the
approximate amount of their entitlement to
supplementary pensions, (c) interviewed about their
expectations and feelings about the outcomes of
applying, and (d) asked about their intentions to apply
now that they knew of their entitlement. In the second
stage, predictions would be made using the data
collected in Stages 1(a) and 1(c). In the third stage,
they would be re-interviewed about ten weeks later to
find out who claimed. The aims of this design were
primarily to collect measures of expectations and
feelings (at Stage 1(c)) which could be used to predict
intentions (as a test of concurrent validity) and
behaviour (at Stage III) (as a test of predictive
validity), and secondarily to explore the impact upon
claiming behaviour of informing pensioners of their
entitlement. Because there was considerable doubt that
any ENCs would be located to form a sample and because
this was the feasibility stage of the research, the
control groups necessary to determine the precise
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and informing them of their entitlement were not
included.
Some explanation of why pensioners were informed
of their entitlement as an integral part of the
research design is necessary. First, in order to
fulfill their ethical obligations, the DHSS made it a
condition of the research that the author inform each
pensioner of his or her own entitlement during the
research interview. To have done so after the interview
would have confounded prediction; however, informing
them prior to taking the main measues would have
reduced the ecological validity of the findings.
Therefore, on this count, it was preferable to inform
the pensioners earlier in the interview rather than
later. Second, there were methodological
considerations. It was obvious from previous studies
(as well as intuitively) that low levels of awareness
of the existence of the benefit and of eligibility for
it effectively prevent claiming. Because of this,
because the longitudinal design required at least some
claimants (or, put another way, some criterion variance
to predict), and because of the ethical obligations,
all eligible non-claimants were told of the existence
of the benefit and of the approximate amount of their
entitlement. Thus the design of the feasibility study
involved testing a modified version of the theoretical
model since this intervention made two of the
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thresholds (KNOW and ELIG) inoperable.
3.5 Methods
3.51 Sampling Frame and Sample
Access and Representativeness
Two problems presented themselves in the attempt
to construct a sampling frame. These were the problems
of access and representativeness. Access merely
indicates the problems inherent in attempting to
identify the population from which the sample is to be
drawn; unlike samples of college sophomores, the
disabled or the unemployed, all of whom are very
accessible since they are registered in terms of their
salient characteristics, eligible non-claiming
pensioners do not form a readily identifiable
population. Their membership in this population is a
result of the application, by outsiders, of a complex
and arbitrary set of rules to their circumstances. Most
do not know with any certainty that they are members of
this population, and of those who do, many do not wish
to identify themselves as such. The need to use
multiple criteria to identify them, combined with their
own lack of self-identity as members of this
population, make them very inaccessible. The closest
available register from which a representative sample
of ENCs could be drawn was the complete list of
National Insurance Pension (NIP) recipients, a group of
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which the ENCs form only about one-twelfth. In
addition, this register would not be completely
satisfactory for sampling purposes since it does
exclude some pensioners who do not receive NIPs, but
who would be entitled to SB.
Representativeness, on the other hand, refers to
the empirical problem of obtaining a sample in such a
way that the statistics of that sample can be said to
represent the parameters of the population, such that
inferences can be made from the characteristics of the
sample to the population with as much confidence (in
statistical terms) as is possible.
The usual procedure is to identify the population
first and then to sample it. However, in this research
problem, the reverse procedure was adopted because
representativeness could be obtained in this way and
because it was a prerequisite of access.
Description of Sampling Frame
Although both stratified and simple random
sampling procedures were considered, they were not
used, the former because of the excessive time and
effort that would have had to be spent at the sampling
frame construction stage (and because the most
important population, parameters were not readily
available), and the latter because of excessive time
and effort that would have had to be spent at the
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interviewing stages. Thus a cluster sampling technique,
as outlined by Kish (1953), was used.
The DHSS computer at Newcastle-upon-Tyne (ADP
Newcastle) holds limited information including the
names, ages, marital status (in some cases), amounts of
pension due, and the post-office at which the pension
is to be paid for National Insurance Pensioners. The
first stage in the sampling frame (please see Table
3.51A) was to select at random one "split" (l/13th) of
National Insurance Pension payees at each of ten
designated post-offices in the west of Edinburgh (where
Local DHSS Office co-operation was thought to be most
likely to be forthcoming). These ten post-offices were
randomly selected from a list of 28 post-offices which
clearly fell within the catchment area of the
co-operating local office. This selection procedure
guaranteed that a representative sample of the
population of NIP recipients in this area was obtained.
The remaining sample frame stages aimed to
increase the chances of identifying ENCs by excluding
(a) in Stages II and III, populations who were
categorically ineligible (i.e. those in receipt of
supplementary pensions and married women) or of whom
the vast majority would have been above the eligibility
levels (married women receiving full NIPs in their own
right) and (b) individuals assessed to be ineligible in
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In Stage IV, the Department sent out a letter to the
279 pensioners who remained, giving them the
opportunity to opt out of the research. A copy of the
DHSS letter appears in Appendix A1. Of these 279, 115
"opted out", 44 "opted in" (by writing to confirm that
they did wish to participate), and 120 did not reply.
(The letter had suggested this as the sign of
acquiescence.) The list of the 164 pensioners who did
not "opt out" (comprising 58.3% of those invited) was
then forwarded to the author. Appendix A2 contains
selected excerpts from the letters of pensioners who
refused to participate, and clearly illustrates the
rich variety of reasons pensioners give for refusing.
The four pensioners who were late in replying to
the DHSS and who did not want to be interviewed were
excluded, as were the three other people, two of whom
were obviously ineligible (being members of the
aristocracy), and the third who lived outwith the
geographic area being covered by the research. Letters
arranging times and dates for screening interviews were
sent at three points during the summer. Two types of
letters were sent (see Appendix A3), one to those who
had agreed, and the other to those who had not replied.
In all, 33 of the 120 non-respondents refused to
participate at this point, and four others refused
after the second attempt to arrange a screening
interview. Up to the end of sampling Stage III, the
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ENCs in the sample would, theoretically at least, have
been very representative of the ENCs in the population;
however, the element of self-selection introduced in
Stage IV may have allowed some distortions to creep in.
At the end of Stage V, 120 pensioners had been
interviewed, or 43% of those originally invited to
participate. A summary of sample attrition at various
points in the sampling frame is given in Table 3.51B.
The Screening Interview
*
The screening interview schedule and the
assessment forms used to calculate entitlement were
created by the author between February and May 1979.
Although the research was commissioned by the DHSS with
their expectation that the assessments of eligibility
would be as accurate as possible, the author was not
allowed any access to the authoritative official (and
unpublished) assessment code (the A-code) which
revealed the details of how assessments were
undertaken. Thus, the questionnaire was constructed
from published material, feedback from the Department
as to what was wrong with it (but not always why), and
with the occasional and very helpful leakage of
confidential information.
The screening interview, in its substantive
content at least, was very similar to the assessment
interview used by DHSS officers. This interview
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Table 3.51B. Sample Attrition at Stage IV of Sampling Frame
NO. REMAINING
INVITED BY EHSS TO PARTICIPATE 279
Accepted N = 44
No Reply N = 120
Refused N = 115
NAMES FORWARDED TO RESEARCHER 164
Late replies to EHSS N = 4
Deleted by researcher N = 3
REFUSED RESEARCHER'S LETTER
REASONS:
Poor Health N = 4
Going on holiday N = 3
Doesn't approve N = 2
Doesn't need
any help N = 3
Death in family N = 3
Other N = 18
SUBTOTAL N = 33 124
DOORSTEP REFUSALS
N = 4 120
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collected all the information necessary for assessing
entitlement at the basic rate. In addition, it
collected assessments of entitlement to Exceptional
Circumstances Additions (ECAs) (now known as Additional
Requirements) for diet and heating (on both health and
accommodation grounds). It also included a section
which piloted several alternative measures of
perceptions of need. A copy of the screening interview
is provided in Appendix A4.
Each screening interview took one hour to
complete, on average, although completion time ranged
from 20 minutes to one and three-quarter hours. All
were conducted in pensioners' homes, and except for a
handful, nearly all 120 were conducted in the six week
period from the end of July to early September 1979.
Just prior to completing the 120 assessments, a
selection of them (primarily those assessed to be ENCs)
was passed on to a DHSS official for cross-checking.
This official corrected the assessments for unusual
cases (e.g. "personal requirements" for a woman who was
a joint owner with her two unmarried sisters, and
"tariff" on capital invested in index-linked savings in
mid-term), and also checked the accuracy of the
calculations on a random sample of eligible
non-claimants. Excluding the two cases mentioned where
the established assessment procedure was unfamiliar,
the author's calculations always agreed to within two
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pence of those of the DHSS officer. Although
verification of resources in the screening interviews
was not explicitly sought, it was usually offered in
cases where the issue was particularly complex (e.g.
rents, rates, rebates, and in some instances, savings).
Considering the strong rapport which was developed with
the respondents, there was little reason to believe
that any were dishonest. The three errors in the
assessments due to the understatement of resources were
discovered when briefly reviewing each pensioner's
financial circumstances at the beginning of the
research interview. In one case, this review led to a
pensioner being dropped from the "eligible" category,
but in the other two cases, this review of finances
resulted only in decreasing the level of entitlement.
Response Rates
For the purpose of evaluating the power of the
sampling frame, the distribution of the sample of 23
pensioners eligible for SB at the basic rate (e.g.
excluding entitlement to ECAs) in terms of marital
status and housing tenure is shown in Table 3.51C.
By using the figures provided in Tables 12.11 and
12.13 of the SBC 1978 Annual Report (SBC, 1979), it was
estimated that the 610,000 eligible non-claimants of
supplementary pensions were distributed as in Table
3.51D. Based upon findings from previous Family
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Expenditure Survey analyses, it was estimated that
there were about 36 ENCs at the basic rate in the
author's initial sample of 279. Applying the
percentages in parentheses in Table 3.51D to this
expected number of ENCs, one can derive the expected
distribution shown in Table 3.51E.
It was stated above that the overall response rate
was 43%. However, during the assessment stage (Stage
IV), more than the expected number of ENCs were found,
suggesting that the relatively wealthier people were
disproportionately "opting out" of the research. Of the
279 pensioners, one would have expected to find 36 ENCs
at the basic rate (i.e. excluding entitlement to ECAs),
and 243 who were not eligible at the basic rate. Of the
120 interviewed, 23 were eligible at the basic rate and
97 were not. Although the overall response rate was
about 43%, for ineligible pensioners it was 40% and for
ENCs it was 64%. By comparing Tables 3.51E and 3.51C,
one can speculate that differential response rates were
possibly at work within the category of ENCs. For
example, the observed number of ENCs equalled the
expected number in three of the four categories, but
fell short by about half in the category of "single
householders", the vast majority of whom were unmarried
and widowed women.
It seems very likely that the actual response rate
was much better than at first thought, and was
Table3.51E.ExpectedDistributionof6ENCs atB sicRatebyM ri alndHousehol erSt tus MarriedCoupl sSinglePersons
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somewhere between 60 and 70%. However, it remains to be
determined if there were other factors which
systematically differentiated respondents and
non-respondents.
Sample Biases
Table 3.51F presents the data available for
analysing response rates by area and by age. Since the
housing tenure of each individual non-respondent was
not known, analysis was conducted at the level of
postal area. Areas were assigned to one of four
categories based upon the predominant type of housing
in the area.
If type of housing tenure was a main factor
determining response rates, one would expect there to
be substantial differences in average response rates
between the four categories. However, a Chi-squared
test between the numbers responding and not responding
and the four categories revealed that this relationship
was not significant (Chi-squared = 3.17, df = 3, ns).
Most of the deviation from the expected numbers
occurred in the first and second categories, indicating
that respondents were under-represented in areas
comprising mainly council tenants and over-represented
in areas comprising mainly owner-occupiers.
It was then hypothesised that the areas with very
low response rates were "older" areas, in terms of the
Table3.51F.ResponsatebyTyofAreaandg(% )
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mean age of the pensioners invited, than those with
higher response rates. The analysis showed that 56% of
the sample invited from areas with lower response rates
were over 75, as contrasted with 24% of those invited
from areas with higher response rates. Having
determined that "older" areas had lower response rates
(29% on average) than did "younger" areas (48% on
average), the influence of presumed housing tenure
within these two categories was then examined. Table
3.51G summarises the results of this analysis.
For the older areas, the combined response rate
for the mixed area and predominantly owner-occupied
area (37%) is substantially greater than that for the
predominantly council rented area (12.5%). The same
general rule of thumb holds for the younger area.
Taking the mixed and predominantly owner-occupied areas
together yields a response rate of 53%, in contrast to
the 45% yielded by combining the response rate of areas
occupied predominantly by private or council tenants.
In summary, two findings are clear: (1) older
areas have lower response rates than do younger areas;
(2) within both of these categories, areas comprising
predominantly owner-occupiers and of mixed
owner-occupier and private tenancy have higher response
rates than do areas comprising predominantly private
or council tenants.
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Table 3.51G. Response Rates by Age of
Area and Presumed Housing Tenure (%s)










































All Tenures 29 48 43
155.
Characteristics of the Assessed Sample
Table 3.51H provides a breakdown of the
characteristics of the 43% (120) of the sample
interviewed, with reference to their levels of
entitlement to supplementary pensions and to rebates.
Characteristics of the Sample of ENCs
In Tables 3.511, 3.51J, and 3.51K are presented
the characteristics of the 31 eligible non-claimants
identified by the screening interviews. As can be seen
from Table 3.511, the eligible non-claimants comprised
seven owner-occupiers, eleven council tenants, twelve
private tenants, no boarders, and one non-householder.
Table 3.51J shows that of seven units with work
pensions, six of these were married couples and one was
a widow. On average, widows and widowers were due the
largest amounts, and over all groups the average amount
unclaimed (or potentially better off) was £2.98.
Twenty-five of the thirty-one ENCs had some savings,
five amounting to between £1250 and £1500, seven
between £500 and £1249, and thirteen of less than £500.
Thirty of the thirty-one were eligible for rebates;
twenty-nine of those eligible were receiving their
entitlement.
Table 3.51K shows that, with the exception of the
small number of single and widowed men and women over
Table3.51H.EligibilityofAssess dSampletRebat sndupplem ntaryP nsion
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80 with quite substantial entitlements, entitlement was
generally greatest for single and widowed women between
60 and 64 years of age (£3.73).
3.52 Technique - The Research Interview
The in-depth research interviews were conducted
with 25 of the 31 ENCs during November 1979. Only 25
were re-interviewed because two respondents were too
difficult to interview (one was mentally unstable, and
the other was completely deaf and nearly blind), two
were very marginal cases where the estimated difference
between their rebate and supplementary pension
entitlement was less than ten pence, one respondent's
wife had become seriously ill in the period between
interviews, and one refused to be interviewed a second
time.
The research interviews had two general aims: (1)
to understand why these ENCs had not applied for
supplementary pensions to date; (2) to assess their
motivation to apply after being informed of their
entitlement. Therefore, two aims were paramount, the
first to elicit post-hoc reasons for non-claiming, and
the second to validate expectations and feelings as
predictors of intention and behaviour within a
prospective design. Although the description of the
procedure includes a description of the first half of
the research interview, the results of the post-hoc
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study will be mentioned only briefly since they conform
to those of other post-hoc studies and, because of
design limitations, they add nothing new to an
understanding of the problem.
The research interviews were divided roughly into
eight stages (please see Table 3.52A). The first three
stages dealt with important background, demographic and
financial, and attitudinal information. This included
checking for changes in household and financial
circumstances since the screening interview, work
history, attitudes to work and to unemployment and to
claiming unemployment benefit, and self-assessments of
degrees of health, mobility, social engagement and
contact with family. The fourth stage collected three
measures of perceptions of need, the primary one being
"degree of difficulty making ends meet" (on a five
point scale ranging from "no trouble" to "almost
impossible"), and two secondary measures, "difficulty
managing now as compared to some previous period" (on a
five-point scale ranging from "much better off than
before" to "much worse off than before"), and "balance
of income and expenses" (rated on a five-point scale
ranging from "income is quite a bit greater than
expenses" to "income is quite a bit less than
expenses"). In all cases, these scales were presented
to pensioners typed on cards in double-sized print, and
the pensioners themselves chose the sentence or phrase
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Table 3.52A. Contents of Feasibility Study Research
Interview
I. Checks for changes in household and financial
circunstances
II. Vfork history, attitudes to work and to any
experience of unemployment and claiming of unemployment
benefit
III. Health, mobility, degree of social engagment, and
contact with family
IV. Three alternative measures of perceptions of need
V. Post-Hoc study: (a) knowledge of existence of
benefit; (b) perception of eligibility to it; (c)
reasons for not claiming (open-ended); (d) behavioural
anchored and attitudinal measures of intention to apply
VI. Informed of amount of entitlement to supplementary
pensions (or amount by which potentially better off);
perceptions of utility of benefit rated
VII. Outcomes of applying discussed, and subjective
perceptions of the probability of their occurring and
their desirability rated (expectancies,
instrumentalities and valences). (See Table 3.52B for a
listing of outcomes discussed and rated)
VIII. Second attitudinal measure of intention to apply
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which they thought best summarised their viewpoint.
The fifth stage comprised the measures taken for
the post-hoc study. First, pensioners' general
knowledge of the existence of the benefit was assessed
by asking: "To your knowledge, can pensioners in
certain circumstances get extra income each week from
the Department of Health and Social Security in order
to top up their pensions?" They were also asked what
the name of that income was. If they failed on either
or both of the items, they were given the correct
information in order to facilitate further discussion.
They were then asked how confident they were that they
would be better off on or eligible for supplementary
pensions, and their responses were recorded on a
five-point scale ranging from "never thought about it"
to "dead certain" that they would be better off. Only
those who had expressed at least a minimal level of
confidence that they might be eligible were asked why
they hadn't applied so far, in the form of the
question: "Since you think that there might be some
chance that you may be better off/eligible, can you
tell me, what has prevented you from applying so far?"
The recording of the answers in this section was
completely unstructured. At the end of this section,
two measures of their propensity to claim were taken.
The first was a behavioural measure of previous
anticipatory behaviour (e.g. thinking about applying,
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talking with someone else about it, getting a leaflet
from the post-office, etc.). The second was a
seven-point Likert scale of intention ranging from "I
definitely will not apply" to "I definitely will
apply". While the items on the former measure were read
out to them, the latter scale was presented to them and
they chose the point which best represented their
intentions.
In the sixth stage of the research interview, each
respondent was informed (a) that he or she probably
would be eligible for/better off on a supplementary
pension, and (b) of the probable range of money values
involved, using brackets fifty pence apart. Thus a
subject assessed to be better off by £2.79 would have
been told that he was almost certain to be better off
by somewhere between £2.50 and £3.00 per week. In order
to avoid acquiring a bad name, either for the author or
the DHSS, and raising false hopes amongst the
respondents, they were given the information in the
following form:
Based on the information that you have given
me during our two interviews, _it seems very
likely that you would be eligible for/better
off on a supplementary pension. Although I_ am
not a government official and thxs is only an
estimate, it seems likely that you would be
eligible for/better off by somewhere between
and per week.
At this point the utility of the benefit to meet
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the pensioner's needs was discussed, as it often arose
spontaneously. The utility was rated by the author on a
five-point scale ranging from "no help at all" to
"cover costs completely").
The seventh stage involved discussing and rating
pensioners' expectations of and feelings about the
outcomes of applying for supplementary pensions, using
the expectancy-valence model as a guide for
questioning. Four levels of outcomes were discussed and
rated (see Table 3.52B). These were (1) the immediate
outcomes of applying, (2) the outcomes of having an
interview, (3) the outcomes of completing an interview,
and (4) the outcomes of receiving the supplementary
pension. The conceptual linkages between these levels
are indicated in Figure 3.52A. In that figure, it can
be seen that applying leads to having an interview,
having an interview leads to being asked certain types
of questions, verifying information, etc., complying
leads to getting the benefit, and this leads to
specific fourth-order outcomes such as meeting specific
needs, giving up the housing rebate, and automatic
entitlement to other benefits (e.g. the "perks" in the
last column). The linkages between applying and the
first-order outcomes are the expectancies, and those
between any of the further sets of outcomes are the
instrumentalities. The blank spaces to the left of
outcomes indicate valences, all of which were free to




(a) Direct involvement with the DHSS
(b) Having an interview
(c) Having the interview at heme
(d) Having the interview at the office
(e) Speaking with a particular type of interviewer
(f) Having to answer specific means-test questions
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This figure represents a departure from
traditional expectancy-valence research, since the
number of outcomes discussed and rated is very large
(30 in all), due mainly to the interpolation of 18
intermediate second- and third-order outcomes. For the
purposes of prediction, discussion of these
intermediate outcomes may introduce random variance
into the predictor-criterion relationship; however, the
effort at this stage was to determine which were the
important outcomes, thus this large number had to be
included. Also, although a more parsimonious
formulation may have predicted behaviour equally well,
if not better, there was a contractual obligation to
provide the DHSS with an assessment of the importance
of all procedural outcomes; the outcomes of applying in
which the Department was interested were obviously
those implied by the application procedure -- the
second and third-order outcomes.
The expectancies and instrumentalities were rated
on five-point probability scales ranging from "nil
probability" to "certainty" that the outcome would
follow. Although this does not conform to the
theoretical explication of instrumentality as a
correlation, there are research precedents for its use
(House, 1971; Hackman and Porter, 1968). Wahba and
House (1974) discuss the implications of this
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alteration for VIE theory. However, of greater
importance to the author were practical considerations;
although the author managed on several occasions to
convey the meaning of negative instrumentality to
several of his educated friends, it was absolutely
impossible to do so with low-income pensioners, for
many of whom even the notion of expectancy was slightly
obtuse. As is implied by Figure 3.52A, many of the
expectancies and instrumentalities were invariate. This
was because some common knowledge had to be assumed in
order to facilitate discussion of the procedure. Thus,
in discussing the procedure, the author stated that the
outcomes of applying would certainly include having an
interview, being asked certain questions, and that
complying would lead to getting the benefit, and that
this would automatically entitle the respondent to
several other benefits. Although it is arguable that
this manipulation severely distorts an understanding of
the process, it was in fact found that nearly all
pensioners, save those with the grossest ignorance,
knew these simple facts already. Thus, where outcomes
were considered to be certain to follow, they were
automatically assigned an instrumentality or expectancy
value of 1.0.
Although expectancy-valence theory specifies that
the valence on any outcome is the product of its
instrumentality for other outcomes and the valences on
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those outcomes, the valences on all outcomes were
rated, whether or not they were theoretically usable in
computing valences. This was done in order to allow
further and different forms of analysis at the analysis
stage, and to prevent being limited by one specific
conceptual structure. Valences were rated on
seven-point scales ranging from (-3) "very unhappy" to
(+3) "very happy". The research interview schedule in
Appendix A5 implies that only five-point scales were
used as was a different terminology; it must be stated
here that the actual procedure differed from that
anticipated when interview schedules were typed and
produced. Five-point scales were found to be of
insufficient range, and terminology often had to be
altered slightly to convey the meaning of constructs to
respondents.
The eighth and final stage of the research
interview involved obtaining a measure of the
pensioners' intentions to apply within the following
two months. The same seven-point scale as used before
was used to obtain this measure, and the interview
ended after a discussion of any aspects of their
situations which might prevent them from applying. At
the analysis stage, their perceptions of the stability




3.53 Formulation of Predictions
The second stage of the research design was to
formulate predictions of the behaviour of the 25
pensioners in advance of collecting the behavioural
criterion data. To test the validity of the threshold
model relative to that of using VIE scores alone, and
the relative effectiveness of statistical versus
clinical predictive techniques, three methods of
prediction were used, two being statistical and the
third being clinical.
Method I - Clinical Predictions
After the research interview, a motivational
profile of each pensioner (or couple) was written.
These included vignettes of their financial, household
and health circumstances, descriptions of their
attitudes towards claiming, discussion of other forces
swaying them to move in one direction or the other, and
other information which was thought potentially useful
in understanding their circumstances. These profiles
averaged 2000 words in length, and provided a rich
account of pensioners' circumstances. Copies of two
appear as Appendix A6. These were the basis for forming
intuitive predictions of claiming behaviour; these
predictions were made prior to those using the
statistical models in order to prevent contamination.
172 .
Method II - VIE Scores Only
In this method, VIE scores alone were used to
predict individuals' behaviour. These scores were
derived in a fashion implied by Figure 3.52A, where the
computed valence on having an interview is ultimately a
function of several levels of intermediate
instrumentalities and the valences on the fourth-order
outcomes.
The traditional within-persons expectancy test
involves taking separate measures of people's
instrumentalities and valences for at least two
alternatives and comparing them. However, this was
impractical since, as mentioned in Chapter 2, most of
these pensioners had no real alternative course of
action. Thus, an internal VIE threshold value of zero
was adopted on a priori grounds. Therefore, if
positively valued outcomes outweighed negatively valued
outcomes, application was predicted; if the negative
outweighed the positive, non-application was predicted.
Method III - VIE Scores Combined with Perceptions
Here the VIE scores derived in Method II were
combined with the three a priori moderator variables in
the manner implied by Figure 3.53. Thus in order to be
predicted to apply an individual would have to perceive
some need and some utility to the benefit, to expect
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Figure 3.53. Method III Prediction Algorithm
Predictor Prediction
> 0 NO >Won't Apply
> 0 NO >Won't Apply
NO >Won't Apply




J.. -YES- ■>Will Apply
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the positive outcomes of applying to outweigh the
negative outcomes, and to perceive that his situation
was stable.
3.54 Collection of the Criterion Measures
The intentional criterion, "intention to apply"
was collected at the end of the research interview.
However, it was considered to be critical that the
author use a behavioural criterion, lest the results be
statistically over-inflated and practically
under-valued. The behavioural criterion was whether or
not each pensioner would arrange to have an official
interview to see if he or she was entitled to a
supplementary pension. Thus, "applying" was equated
with "having arranged an interview".
As a condition of conducting the research, the
author was promised that the DHSS local office involved
would co-operate by providing the "hard" criterion data
on who had applied by the end of January 1980, and of
the amounts of entitlement of those who had applied. In
the event, due to some of the problems outlined in the
introduction, the promised co-operation never
materialised. The author thus collected the criterion
information by whatever means was available (by phone,
post, and in person).
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The aim of this chapter has been to describe what
predictive and criterion measures were taken and how
they were taken. The aim of Chapter 4 is to describe
the results of comparing and linking predictors and
criteria, in terms both of testing the three
exploratory hypotheses and deriving some preliminary
substantive findngs.
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4.0 Feasibility Study: Results, Discussion and
Conclusions
4.1 Methods of Analysis
Most of the analyses which follow were performed
using elementary parametric and non-parametric
statistical tests including Pearson's product-moment
correlation coefficient (r), the point-biserial
correlation coefficient (a variant of r where one
variable -- such as behaviour — is a true dichotomy),
various t-tests, and the chi-squared test. However,
several exploratory analyses did involve using
multivariate statistics including multiple regression
and the less commonly used discriminant analysis
technique. Since they are relatively less common, the
aims and interpretation of the last two methods of
analysis are briefly outlined below.
Multiple Regression
There are many circumstances in which a researcher
might be interested in predicting variation in one
interval-level variable with the maximum accuracy
possible. However, using only one predictor variable
often results in disappointingly low correlations,
especially when it is remembered that the yardstick of
accuracy -- the amount of variance controlled -- is
equal to the square of the correlation coefficient.
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What would be useful in this situation would be a
technique which allows the use of a combination of
variables to predict any particular criterion, thus
maximising variance explained. Multiple regression is
such a technique. According to Harris (1975):
the coefficient of multiple correlation
(multiple R) is really nothing more than the
old familiar Pearson r between (our
outcome measure on each subject _i) and =
,a linear combination of subjects'
_i'£3 scores on the predictor variables. The
particular weights employed are simply those
we discover (...by calculus and matrix
algebra) to produce the largest possible
value of R. These weights turn out to be
identical to those values of b . in the
multiple regression equation
Y=b + b X + b X + ... + b X
0 11 2 2 mm
V~ -which make / i^f-Y^)2 [the residual random
variance] as small as possible (p.19).
In this equation, b^ to bm are the weights (or partial
regression coefficients) on each independent variable,
which when combined best predict the dependent
variable. The bQ is a mathematical constant.
In the above equation, the partial regression
coefficient b^ stands for the expected change in Y with
a change of one unit in X-^, when X2 to Xm are held
constant or otherwise controlled for. The effects of
the weights are additive; a change of one unit in each
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of Xi and X2, for instance, would result in an expected
change in Y of (b-^ + Thus, once these
unstandardised weights have been derived, they can be
applied to the raw scores of individuals to predict
their score on some criterion. Alternatively, one may
wish to have a measure of the relative contribution of
each variable in predicting the criterion, and this is
determined by referring to standardised regression
coefficients, or beta weights. As is the case with the
bivariate correlation, the multiple correlation square
(R^) indicates the variance in the criterion accounted
for by the combined influences of all the weighted
independent variables.
The aim of a multiple regression procedure is to
maximise the variance accounted for in a criterion;
this is essentially a statistical objective. Although
the relative importance of independent variables can be
assessed by consulting beta weights, from the viewpoint
of the theorist there exists the problem of what the
combination of independent variables means within his
conceptual framework. Harris (1975, p.56) concludes
that:
the relationship summarised by is a
relationship between Y and the set of
predictor variables as a whole. Rather than
attempting to decompose this relationship,
and assigning "credit" to the original
variables, it might be more rewarding
theoretically to try to interpret this new
composite variable Y substantively.
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Thus, in terms of theory, multiple regression is often
limited to exploratory uses.
Discriminant Analysis
Whereas regression analysis concentrates on
maximising the strength of the relationship between a
set of predictor variables and a criterion,
discriminant analysis aims to maximise statistically
the differences between two or more groups. Here a
researcher first selects a set of discriminating
variables on which he expects the characteristics of
the groups to differ, and the discriminant analysis
technique attempts to maximise discrimination by
forming one or more linear combinations of the
discriminating variables. These are known as
discriminant functions, and take the form of
"D = d Z + d Z + ... + d Z
i il 1 i2 2 ip p
where D-j_ is the score on the discriminant function _i,
the d_s are weighting coefficients, and the Z_s are the
standardized values of the p discriminating variables
used in the analysis" (Klecka, 1975, p.435). Here the
ds can be interpreted in a way similar to the bs in a
regression equation, since they "serve to identify the
variables which contribute most to differentiation
along the respective dimension" (Klecka, 1975, p.436).
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Although it can be used only as an analytic
technique, one of the greatest assets of discriminant
analysis is that classification functions can be
derived which allow one to classify new cases whose
criterial behaviour is unknown or to check the adequacy
of the discriminant function in order to determine how
many cases whose criterial behaviour is known are
classified correctly by the discriminating variables
being used.
In this context, discriminant analysis was used to
derive different classification functions for the
groups of claimants and non-claimants, and then to test
the adequacy of the classification function by
computing the probable group membership of each
individual with his or her actual membership group in
terms of claiming behaviour.
4.2 Results of the Post-Hoc Study
The post-hoc study yielded a categorisation of
reasons given by pensioners for not having claimed
before the date of the research interview. These appear
in Table 4.2A. Since many pensioners gave more than one
reason, the percentages do not sum to 100.
As can be seen by comparing this table to Table
1.2A, these results generally conform to those of
previous studies. The remaining results presented in
Table4.2A.Post-HocStudy:Re sonsGivef rNotCl iming ReasonPercentageofferingeaso Perceptionofnoed28 Verylowawareness8 Perceptionofin ligibility32 Perceptionofl wutility4 Expectationsaboutpplication procedure16 Expectationsofneg tive socialoutcomes32 PreferenceforR bates8 Other—
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this chapter refer to the prospective study.
4.3 Methodological Results
The first methodological hypothesis specified that
the threshold model (Method III) would predict
behaviour better than VIE scores alone (Method II), and
that both would predict behaviour more accurately than
the author when left to his own intuitive judgements
(Method I). Table 4.3A presents the results of a
within-subjects analysis designed to test this
hypothesis.
As can be seen from Table 4.3A, this hypothesis is
generally confirmed. Support for this hypothesis would
be considerably strengthened by showing that the
difference between methods is significant. In theory
this could be done by determining the Z ratio for the
difference between correlated proportions (Guilford,
1965, pp. 188-189), were it not for the limitation that
certain of the cell frequencies are too small. Thus,
although a substantial difference between methods is
implied, the significance of this difference cannot be
tested.
The results of making predictions by several other
methods are included for contrast. Two of the methods
employed alternative sets of linkages between
constructs in predicting behaviour: (i) additive
linkages (which implied a cumulative model where
Table4.3A.
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behaviour was seen to be a function of the summed
scores) and (ii) multiplicative linkages (which implied
a probabilistic model where all scores were multiplied
to produce a predictor score). In neither of these
cases was the order of the variables important, and
although a theoretical rationale for using both
approaches could be devised, they were generated
primarily for comparison to the threshold model.
Predictions using the multiplicative linkages were
made by multiplying the values of the four main
constructs (NEED, UTIL, VIE, and STAB) and, since the
product represented a continuous variable, employing a
discriminant analysis at the analysis stage to
"predict" which pensioners would apply on the basis of
these scores. Predictions using the additive linkages
were made by adding the four scores and again using a
discriminant analysis to predict their behaviour.
One multivariate predictor and two single variable
predictors of behaviour were also tested. The
multivariate analysis employed the four threshold
variables as independent variables in a discriminant
analysis (the results appear in the row marked Post-hoc
Multivariate in Table 4.3A); the two single predictors
were "previous experience of claiming social security"
and "marital status". These three alternative
predictors were chosen in order to evaluate the
relative effectiveness of the a priori threshold model
185.
against (i) a post-hoc multivariate analysis using
cognitive variables, and (ii) non-cognitive variables.
Since using the threshold model resulted in both
the most correct predictions being made by any method
and in the strongest relationship between predicted and
actual behaviour, the a priori threshold model seems to
predict at least as well as these post-hoc multivariate
methods employing cognitive variables, and considerably
better than a clinical method and either of two
non-cognitive variables. Moreover, the version using
the threshold type of linkages appears to predict at
least as well as those employing multiplicative and
additive type linkages, as well as being conceptually
more useful.
A second within-subjects analysis focused on
evaluating the impact of the stepwise introduction of
the three perceptions (NEED, UTIL, and STAB) as
combined moderators and predictors. The results, which
appear in Table 4.3B, clearly indicate that prediction
is improved as these variables are introduced.
The second methodological hypothesis, that VIE
scores would better predict an intentional criterion
than a behavioural criterion, required an
across-subjects analysis. The results presented in
Table 4.3C are the correlations between VIE scores and
intention (Row 1), behaviour (Row 2), and a combined
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criterion (Row 3) for all subjects (Column 1) and only
those fourteen who were stable deciders (Column 2). The
combined criterion was derived by assigning to
claimants a score of "7", and to non-claimants a value
corresponding to their intentions at the end of the
research interview.
Applying Hotelling's t-test for the significance
of the difference between two correlation coefficients
for correlated data (Downie and Heath, 1974, p. 228) to
the different correlations for the same groups reveals
that (1) the difference between the intention-VIE score
and behaviour-VIE score correlations for all subjects
is significant in the anticipated direction (t = 1.847,
df = 23, one-tailed, p <.05), but that (2) the same
difference for the sub-group of 14 stable deciders is
neither in the hypothesised direction nor even remotely
significant (t = -1.078, df = 11, ns). These findings
suggest some partial support for, but certainly do not
confirm, the second hypothesis. As can be seen, the
criterion most accurately predicted was the combined
criterion.
The third methodological hypothesis involved an
across-subjects analysis. This hypothesis was one of
differential validity, stating that the VIE
score-behaviour correlation would be significantly
stronger for the stable deciders than for the
non-deciders. The results of testing this deduction
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appear as Figure 4.3A. No correlation can be calculated
for the three pensioners who comprised the unstable
deciders since all three were non-claimants. The VIE
score - behaviour correlation for the theoretically-
most predictable group (the stable deciders) was
, significantly greater than that for the theoretically
least predictable group (the non-deciders) (Z = 2.06,
one-tailed, p = .0197), thus confirming the validity of
the deduction.
In addition to the analysis to test the explicit
hypotheses, a further analysis was undertaken to assess
construct validity of the main components in the
threshold model. The results presented in Table 4.3D
suggest that the four main constructs were independent.
4.4 Substantive Results
An overview of the substantive results appears as
Figure 4.4A.
As noted above, no explicit hypotheses were put
forward regarding the substantive findings. However,
numerous empirical analyses were conducted with two
general objectives in mind, these being to determine
which variables (1) underlay or co-varied with the main
constructs of NEED, UTIL and STAB and (2) comprised the
most important constituents of the VIE component.
The behavioural criterion was collected in January
Figure4.3A.VIEScore-BehaviourCorrelations forDifferentSub-GroupsfPensioner
Entire Group r=0.21 n=(25) p=.163
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1980. The theoretical model correctly predicted the
behaviour of twenty-four of the pensioners. In terms of
individual components, seven pensioners were correctly
predicted not to apply on the basis of their espoused
perceptions of no difficulty managing (NEED), one was
incorrectly predicted not to apply on the basis of his
perception of no utility (UTIL), four were correctly
predicted to apply and ten not to apply on the basis of
their VIE scores (VIE) and because their situations
were stable, and three who were favourably inclined to
apply but whose situations were unstable (STAB) were
correctly predicted not to apply. The first set of
analyses conducted were aimed at assessing the
correlates of pensioners' perceptions of need.
Co-variates of NEED
Two hypotheses present themselves immediately. The
first is to propose that the primary measure of NEED,
"degree of difficulty managing", is best predicted by
alternative subjective measures of need in general,
these being perceptions of the balance between income
and expenses and perceptions of how well they are
managing compared to other pensioners. A second
hypothesis is that those who perceive no difficulty
actually differ from those expressing at least some
difficulty in terms of their specific objective
circumstances.
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Only 15 of the 25 pensioners were able to estimate
how well they were managing compared to other
pensioners they knew. Within this group, the
correlation between the measure of their relative
advantage/disadvantage compared to their individual
reference groups and their perceptions of their own
difficulty in making ends meet was r = 0.45 (p < .10,
ns). This suggests that although comparison with
others' circumstances may be important in pensioners'
coming to decisions about their own need state, it is
not, in general, a comparison which is either made by
all pensioners, or all that powerful in explaining the
perceptions of those who can actually make such a
comparison.
In contrast, the correlation between pensioners'
perceptions of the relative balance of their income and
expenses and their degree of difficulty making ends
meet was r = 0.74 (p < .001, df = 23, n = 25). It
appears that the degree of difficulty people express
regarding making ends meet is much more strongly
related to their perceptions of the relative balance
between their income and expenses than to their
perceptions of how well they are doing compared to
other pensioners.
The importance of this concept of pensioners'
subjective perceptions of balance leads naturally to an
examination of the extent to which these perceptions
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were grounded in objective differences between
individual's circumstances, a question of locating the
special expenses or sources of extra income that
differentiate those who express some and those who
express no difficulty managing.
Of the seven respondents who expressed no
difficulty managing, two were in their nineties (aged
96 and 92). The former's 71-year-old niece cared for
her and contributed both a National Insurance Pension
and a work pension to the household's finances. The
latter's 68-year-old daughter cared for her, and she
too contributed both a National Insurance Pension and a
(very substantial) occupational pension to the
household coffers. In both of these cases, the younger
person was interviewed, and the estimate of need was
based upon the household, and not the individual
concerned. This is in contrast to the fact that all of
the respondents who expressed some need came from
households comprising only the respondent or the
respondent and spouse.
One of the pensioners who expressed no difficulty
was a widowed woman who was extremely contented with
her position - she obviously had very low expectations.
In addition, her daughter had lived with her up to a
year before, and her house was thus in very good
condition with nothing needing to be replaced. The four
remaining pensioners who expressed no difficulty all
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had work pensions, and two had also experienced recent
positive changes in their circumstances. For one unit,
this was the considerable increase in their rebate; for
the other, this was that their entire house had just
been modernised at no cost to themselves.
However, three of those who indicated some need
had work pensions equal, on average, to those of the
individuals who indicated no difficulty managing. The
possible reasons why the former group indicated some
difficulty were fairly clear. Two of the three cases
were married couples where the husband was disabled and
required substantial extra heating (in addition to
other aids). The third was a widowed woman who occupied
a five-apartment council house which was an
ever-increasing drain on her resources and which she
had been desperately trying to exchange for a smaller
house for several years. Although these people had
extra income, they had extra expenses which, to their
way of thinking, exceeded that income.
Fifteen respondents who expressed some need had no
extra income, but what differentiated them from the
widow in the same position who expressed no difficulty?
All fifteen of these people had extra expenses - nine
for general household managing (mainly buying
foodstuffs), five for extra heating on health grounds,
and one for extra heating on accommodation grounds.
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In summary, of all households with some extra
income, those which indicated some need had
extraordinary expenses for heating and household
maintenance, whereas those who expressed no need were
relatively more healthy and had no trouble meeting
heating and household expenses. Of those sixteen
without extra income, the one who indicated no need had
no extra expenses, whereas those who indicated some
need had difficulty meeting heating and household
maintenance expenses.
Most significant here, however, is that households
with some extra income were disproportionately more
common amongst respondents indicating no need than
amongst respondents indicating some need. Six of seven
who indicated no difficulty, as opposed to three in
eighteen who indicated some difficulty had either a
work pension, or a relative living in who brought both
a National Insurance Pension and a work pension to the
household. The probability of this disproportionate
distribution being due to chance is less than 0.005
(Chi-squared = 10.43, df=l).
Since the objective comparison is based upon
averages across individuals, it is tenable to argue
that no one individual actually derives a perception of
having no difficulty by comparing his specific
circumstances with those of another person. Indeed,
this was suggested above by the difficulty which
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pensioners had in discussing their ability to manage
relative to other pensioners. It is probably more
likely that the relationship between objective
circumstances and subjective perceptions of difficulty
managing in general is mediated by pensioners1
subjective appraisals of their specific resources and
needs.
Co-variates of UTIL
After filtering out the seven pensioners who
perceived no difficulty managing, eighteen pensioners
remained. Only one of these pensioner units was
predicted not to apply on the basis of a perception of
"no utility". It is quite likely that the eligible
non-claimants excluded from the research stage because
of their very small entitlement would also have been in
this group were it not for the author's short-sighted
and regrettable decision to exclude them. In the event,
the one unit in this position did apply, and
constituted the only mis-prediction made by the
threshold model (Method III). It seems very likely that
the reason for this mis-prediction was that the
interviewer focused the discussion on the husband when
it was probably the wife who made the decision. The
husband in the unit was quite disabled, and in some
pain during the interviews. It seemed, both at the time
and upon reflection, that he was having considerable
difficulty evaluating the questions put to him, and
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that he tended to answer them in a rather offhand
fashion in order to expedite the interview.
Since there were no pensioners whose non-claiming
behaviour was correctly predicted using this component,
the factors differentiating those who expressed some
utility and those who expressed none cannot be assessed
at this stage. However, a preliminary attempt to shed
light on the co-variates of UTIL was undertaken, again
using a regression analysis. The dependent variable was
perceived level of utility (UTIL), and the independent
variables, with the exception of the age of the HOH,
were all valence ratings on outcomes. The regression
analysis used searched for that combination of ten
variables which, when combined, best predicted
behaviour. Ten was specified because it is known that
as the number of variables approaches the number of
cases, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish
between true relationships and chance fluctuations in
the data (Harris, 1975, p.20). The results of this
exploratory analysis appear in Table 4.4B.
As can be seen from the total multiple correlation
of .999, pensioners' perceptions of the utility of
supplementary pensions are highly predictable,
requiring only seven variables to reach nearly maximum
predictive accuracy. The beta weights in the final
column can be consulted as the most reliable measures
of the relative importance of these variables in

































































determining UTIL scores. As can clearly be seen,
concerns about the short-term outcome of having the
official interview figured most prominently (in the
form of feelings about having an interview (1.41),
about the interviewer's personality (-0.87) and about
revealing savings (0.42)), as did concerns with giving
up the rebate (-0.99). In the context of these ten
variables, the remaining five variables were of
relatively little consequence.
An additional analysis revealed that the single
best non-expectancy predictor of perceived level of
utility was the actual amount which these pensioners
stood to gain by applying (r = 0.74, n = 18, p < .001).
However, it is necessary to treat this result
cautiously since perceptions of utility were rated by
the author, whose judgements may have been biased by
his knowledge of pensioners' levels of entitlement.
Key Variables in the VIE Component
Seventeen of the pensioners were deciders,
although three of those whose VIE scores were greater
than zero were correctly predicted not to apply because
they perceived their situations to be unstable.
Table 4.4C presents the simple correlations
between behaviour and expectancies, instrumentalities
and valences for the fourteen remaining stable
deciders. None of the other valence measures regarding
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Table 4.4C. Correlations Between Expectancies,
Instrunentalities, Valences and Behaviour for
Sub-Group of Fourteen Pensioners
MEASURES r SIG.
EXPECTATION THAT APPLYING LEADS TO:
Family finding out 0.26 +
Neighbours finding out 0.30 +
INSTRUMENTALITIES OF:
Interview for meeting an official -0.52 *
Getting the benefit for meeting:
First need mentioned -0.06 +
Second need mentioned -0.19 + (n=13)
Third need mentioned -0.31 + (n= 9)
VALENCES ON:
Implication that applying is synony¬
mous with asking for help 0.24 +
Family finding out 0.79
Neighbours finding out 0.44 +
Having an interview -0.06 +
Preferred interview site 0.25 +





Household furnishings 0.18 +
Income frcm family 0.25 +
Verifying financial details 0.26 +
First need mentioned 0.03 +
Second need mentioned 0.57 * (n=13)
Third need mentioned 0.46 + (n= 9)
Giving up the rebate -0.70 * (n=12)
+ = non-significant
* = p<.05 level
** = p<.005 level
*** = p<.001 level
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questions asked in the means-test interview evoked any
response from the pensioners; therefore, they were
dropped from the analysis and do not appear in Table
4.4C. Only four measures significantly differentiated
claimants and non-claimants; these were pensioners'
feelings (1) about their families finding out, (2)
about having to give up their rebates, (3) about having
fulfilled the second need spontaneously mentioned, and
(4) the strength of the instrumentality between having
an interview and discussing personal matters with an
official who was in some way undesirable.
Table 4.4D shows the best predictors of these four
variables. As can be seen, the measures are far from
independent; even a casual glance at Table 4.4D would
suggest that the best combination of VIE measures would
include the first two but not the latter two, because
of what would appear to be a considerable amount of
common variance.
Perceived Stability of the Situation
Three pensioner units (one married couple and two
widows) whose VIE scores and intention ratings
indicated that they were positively predisposed towards
applying were correctly predicted not to apply on the
basis of their perceptions that their situations were
unstable. The married couple was in the process of
applying for sheltered housing, and since they expected
Table4.4D.BestPredictorsofF uM inVIEeasures(n=14) MEASUREPREDICTO VALENCEON:
SIGNIFICANCE
Familyfindingout (VFAM) Givinguprebate Secondneedmentio e (VNEED2) INSTRUMENTALITYOF:
IINTPERS VVERIFY VNEED2 VINTERVIEW VFAM VVERIFY
Interviewforinter¬ viewerpersonalityVFAM
-0.60 0.47 0.63 0.67 0.63 0.60
* *







to hear about their application within a few weeks of
the research interview, felt that applying for benefit
at that time would complicate matters. The first widow
was in the midst of appealing against a decision which
had refused her a Mobility Allowance, and felt it
unwise to apply for another benefit until she heard the
outcome of her appeal. The second widow was both (a)
awaiting a decision from the council on her request for
re-location to a smaller house, and (b) planning to go
to Australia for two months soon after the interview.
Although using STAB as a component helps to
increase the predictive validity of the overall model,
it does not indicate how to increase take-up amongst
this group. However, what it does suggest is that there
will always be a certain proportion of individuals
whose situations will be unstable, and for whom little
can be done to encourage them to claim immediately. In
essence, knowing how many are in unstable situations at
any one time would effectively allow the derivation of
a more realistic target for take-up by lowering the
number that one could expect to affect in the
short-term.
4.5 Other Research Findings
This study involved interviewing and assessing 120
pensioner units to find 31 eligible non-claimants. An
analysis of the extensive financial data revealed a
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strong relationship between the percentage which a
pensioner's rebates formed of her total rent and rates
and the likelihood that she would have been better off
on a supplementary pension. Of all pensioners whose
rebates were worth less than 50% of their housing costs
(e.g. rent and rates), only 3% were potentially better
off on supplementary pensions; conversely, of those
whose rebates were worth more than 50%, 65% were
potentially better off on supplementary pensions. This
relationship is summarised in Figure 4.5.
Further analysis revealed that of the 31 eligible
non-claimants, only one was a non-householder. All of
the remaining 30 were eligible for rebates; 29 were in
receipt of rebates. This finding, although probably
unreliable due to the small size of the sample, is in
fit with the OPCS research finding that some 75% of
those notionally assessed to be entitled to
supplementary pensions were already receiving rebates
(Broad, 1977) .
The remaining feasibility study finding concerns
the impact of the author's intervention on pensioners'
claiming behaviour. The design of the feasibility study
called for a lengthy interview with those eligible both
to discuss in detail the many facets of the claiming
procedure and to inform them of the approximate amount
of their entitlement to supplementary pensions. By this
maximal intervention one would have expected to
Figure4.5.ProbabilityfBeingetterOfonSB byPercentageofRe tandtesebate Probability ofbeing better-off onSB1.0 .9 .8 .7 .6 .5 .4 .3 .2 .1A. 102345678910 PercentageR tand/ortesR bated(N=70)
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catalyse a substantial number of claims. However, this
intervention resulted in only five claims out of a
possible 25. Though the numbers here are small, and the
design was incomplete insofar as it lacked proper
control groups, the result is again comparable with
that of the OPCS researchers (Broad, 1977), who found
that only 11 of 46 would even consider making a claim
for supplementary pensions after being informed of
their possible entitlement.
4.6 Discussion
One of the aims of this thesis is to provide a
conceptually and empirically valid model of the process
by which pensioners decide about benefit. Conceptual
validity is really a non-empirical measure of the
extent to which the model is theoretically sound and
enhances one's understanding of the relationships
amongst cognitions and feelings and between them and
behaviour. Thus, to the extent that the theoretical
threshold model described in Section 2.4 integrates the
fragmented picture presented in Chapter 1, it possesses
some conceptual validity. However, conceptual validity
alone is not sufficient for adopting a particular
theoretical slant; empirical validity must also be
achieved.
This feasibility study has demonstrated the
empirical validity of the model in four ways. It has
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demonstrated: (1) the predictive validity of the
threshold model to make extremely accurate and blind
predictions of pensioners' behaviour; (2) the construct
validity (or independence) of the four main conceptual
factors; (3) the differential validity of using VIE
scores to predict behaviour of only a sub-group of
pensioners identified by the a priori model; (4) the
validity of the threshold linkages in contrast to
multiplicative or additive linkages between main
constructs. Although it could be argued that some of
these findings are due to chance or that they are not
as powerful as might at first appear, the fact that the
results consistently support an a priori model suggests
that this is not the case. Were the model derived
post-hoc, the probability of having arrived at
spuriously significant findings would have been
dramatically increased. Although these methodological
findings must be confirmed on a larger sample, the
results suggest that the model is fruitful. However, it
is not without some conceptual problems, the most of
important of which revolve around the NEED construct.
Although the NEED component predicts very
accurately, positing that it comes first in pensioners'
decision-making processes makes the major assumption
that pensioners must perceive at least some difficulty
managing in order to apply, thus ruling out the
possibility that pensioners will apply because they
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consider the benefit to be their right. This is
tantamount to saying that the issue of entitlement does
not enter into the decision-making of this group of
pensioners.
There is some support for this assumption. First,
it appears that pensioners are more likely than any
younger group to possess and to use values in their
decision-making which run counter to the "entitlement"
line of thought. These values include, for instance,
the strong desire to maintain their sense of
independence and their pride. It also seems that, of
all pensioners, those who have not yet claimed are more
likely to possess and to use these particular values
than are those who have already claimed. This assumes
that informing pensioners of their possible entitlement
has little or no effect, an assumption which has been
borne out by both this research and the OPCS study.
Therefore, it is possible that these pensioners do not
perceive the benefit as being a "right" since (a) all
of them are from an age-group which is more likely to
think of the benefit as poor relief, and (b) they are
residual non-claimants. If pensioners think that the
benefit is "of right", then all one would have to do is
to inform them of their entitlement, and they would
apply.
Second, the pensioners themselves often discussed
the "rights" and "wrongs" of claiming in terms of
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whether or not they "needed" any extra money. When
asked directly about their feelings, in principle,
about applying, one of their most common responses was:
"I'd apply because I'm entitled to it -■— if I felt I
needed it."
But a further question arises here, one of the
veracity of pensioners' reports that they "don't need
any help". Since it is possible that this statement
represents a post-hoc rationalisation, it is important
to attempt to outline how pensioners with perceptions
of no need arrive at these assessments of their
situations.
It is frequently suggested that pensioners'
statements that they are having no difficulty making
ends meet are rationalisations which allow them to
avoid having to confront personally the implications of
being in need -- that one has failed to provide for
oneself, is poor, or that one might have to apply for
social security. It may be the case that the low levels
of expressed need reflect the end-product of a
cognitive dissonance reduction procedure, whereby the
individuals have altered their perceptions of
difficulty managing rather than acted on the
implications of being in need (assuming that
individuals are always working towards minimising inner
conflict (Festinger, 1957)). Whether or not pensioners'
subjective assessments are the end - products of
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dissonance reduction is, however, not critical to
prediction. In either case, they believe that they have
no difficulty and will not apply. But determining how
they arrive at this belief is an essential part of
explanation since, if the pensioners have lowered their
subjective estimates of difficulty, then it is
necessary to know what were the pre-existing attitudes
which have led them to do so.
Cognitive dissonance hypotheses are hypotheses
about changes within individuals over time. To test
properly the hypothesis that today's attitudes are the
result of yesterday's dissonance reduction, one
requires measures of the individuals' attitudes the day
before yesterday as well as those he holds today.
Although such tests lack contextual validity, the best
tests of cognitive dissonance hypotheses are frequently
undertaken in laboratory and field experiments where
there is a high level of control over the degree and
nature of the dissonance invoked. However, in this
study, neither experimental control nor preliminary
measures of attitudes were available. Thus, a specific
test of cognitive dissonance hypotheses could not be
undertaken.
However, it might be possible to infer that
dissonance reduction had already occurred. If it had
not occurred, one would expect that those who had some
difficulty managing would feel significantly more
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strongly about having given up certain items that would
those who had no difficulty managing. In contrast, had
dissonance reduction occurred, one might expect that
the two groups would not differ significantly in the
strength of their specific feelings about having given
up certain items, even though they differed, by
definition, in their stated general levels of
difficulty managing. This hypothesis of no difference
was supported (t=0.11, df = 6.27, p = .913), and may
provide some preliminary support for the dissonance
reduction hypothesis. However, the alternative
hypothesis analysed above, that there were no objective
differences in the circumstances of these two groups,
was not supported, thus casting some doubt on the
validity of any dissonance reduction explanation. This
analysis may be of lesser value in understanding the
substantive problem than in demonstrating the
difficulty in constructing post-hoc tests of cognitive
dissonance theory.
The determinants of perceived levels of utility
also deserve a brief mention. Although the regression
analysis employed indicates that perceived utility is
highly predictable and that certain variables are very
powerful in predicting levels of utility, one can draw
only confusing substantive interpretations from this
analysis. For instance, the results in the context of
controlling these ten variables would suggest that a
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unit change in a positive direction in a person's
feelings about having an interview would lead to nearly
half again as great a change in the individual's
perception of utility of the benefit. This, taken
alone, is tenable; it is plausible to hypothesise that
people's views about the usefulness of the benefit are
very much tempered, through some form of
rationalisation, by their feelings about having to
reveal savings. But, the other relationships directly
contradict this general rationalisation hypothesis.
Roughly speaking, a unit change in a positive direction
in either feelings about the interviewer's personality
or about giving up the rebate would cause a unit
decrease in the perceived level of utility. If some
sort of rationalisation were occurring, one would
expect a positive change in either of these sets of
feelings to lead to a unit increase in perceived
utility. The results here are very muddy, but what is
clear is that such a multivariate analysis, conducted
post-hoc, can easily render itself uninterpretable
without any consideration of the theoretical issues.
Certainly the most parsimonious explanation is that
which one might have a priori grounds for deducing —
that perceptions of utility are most strongly related
to the actual amounts to which pensioners were told
they were entitled.
Considering the VIE component, it is noteworthy
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that three of the four best predictors of behaviour
were not directly related to the application procedure,
but to feelings about referents finding out and about
the long-term outcomes of applying -- giving up the
rebates and having some needs met.
Further analysis indicated that pensioners'
feelings about their families finding out was in fact a
correlate of their beliefs about the abilities of their
families to support them (Phi=0.85, df=l, p<.001). All
fourteen would have preferred to turn to their families
rather than to the state for assistance, but the ten
who believed that their families could help them did
not apply whereas the remaining four who believed their
families could not help them did apply.
Feelings about giving up their rebates and about
the DHSS interviewers' personalities were the only
procedural consequences which differentiated claimants
and non-claimants. It was observed in the interviews
that pensioners felt very strongly that rebates
provided a much more convenient way of managing their
housing costs. It therefore came as a surprise that
those who were most negative about giving up their
rebates were the most likely to apply. However, further
analysis indicated that pensioners who were negative
about giving up their rebates were finding it
significantly more difficult to make ends meet than
those who were not negative (t=2.576,p<.05). That
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pensioners' beliefs about the social security
interviewer were salient came as no surprise; the
author was often told that it was not what was asked in
the means-test interview, but how it was asked. Many of
the non-claimants strongly resented an interview
procedure which they anticipated would leave them
feeling naked and embarrassed.
Neither any of the remaining procedural
consequences nor the extent of pensioners' beliefs that
applying was tantamount to "asking for help"
differentiated claimants and non-claimants. Over the
entire sample, pensioners had no strong feelings about
specific aspects of the application procedure; in
contrast, their feelings about the benefit being
charity were uniformly strong and negative.
It was implied above that prediction might be
enhanced by reducing the number of expectancy variables
in the VIE calculation. Several simplified models were
tested, and that which best predicted the behaviour of
these fourteen pensioners comprised valence ratings on
the outcomes of (1) the family finding out, (2) giving
up the rebate, (3) revealing savings, and (4) verifying
financial details. The correlation between this
simplified VIE component and behaviour for the group of
fourteen was r=0.92 (p<.001). This very high
correlation suggests that relatively few considerations
go into deciding, and that they are not terribly
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strongly related to the details of the application
procedure. Most interesting is that the measures
included are those which have emerged from the previous
literature as being important; thus this simplified
component would appear to have some conceptual
validity.
Finally, the findings regarding the composition of
the sample and their implications must be discussed.
Although the characteristics of ENCs in terms of type
of housing tenure (SBC, 1979, p.106) would suggest that
95% are potentially eligible for some form of rebate or
allowance, secondary analysis of Family Expenditure
Survey data has suggested that only about one-third are
actually receiving them. This implies that the
remaining two-thirds are either eligible for both
rebates and SB but claiming neither, or are eligible
only for SB and are failing to claim it. However, both
this study and the OPCS study (Broad, 1977) have found
much larger proportions of pensioners in the "better
off" situation than the figure of one third would
suggest. If it is the case that the majority of
eligible non-claimants are actually in receipt of
rebates, then this has major implications. First, the
study of the process of deciding must focus more
directly on differential perceptions of the two
benefits, taking into account the direct and indirect
influences which receipt of rebates has on disposition
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to claim supplementary pensions. Second, the discovery
of an arithmetic relationship between the proportion of
housing costs rebated and the probability of being
better-off on SB should allow the construction of a
very accurate sampling frame for drawing "better off"
cases from local authority rebate office records.
Employing such a sampling frame would mean a
considerable savings in time and money, since it would
be much more direct than the one used in this study. It
would also have the advantage of drawing a sample from
local authority records, which records could be used to
collect some information on those pensioners who
decided not to participate.
Conclusions
The results of the feasibility study lend
themselves to several general conclusions. First,
although there is a need for replicating them on a
larger and independent sample, the methodological
findings would suggest that the threshold model is a
valid model of the process of deciding -- that the use
of the constructs reflecting "salience" and "ambiguity"
as moderators in conjunction with VIE scores does
enhance the predictability of behaviour quite
substantially.
Second, and of critical importance, is the
parallel study of pensioners' perceptions of rebates
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and allowances. The importance of rebates in this study
suggests not only that they are perceived as
alternatives to supplementary pensions (which implies a
study of differential perceptions), but also that they
are influential in determining pensioners' perceptions
of levels of need.
Third, since perceptions of no difficulty making
ends meet accounted for the non-claiming of between a
quarter and a third of the sample, it is essential that
the possible determinants of these perceptions be
explored in much greater detail.
Fourth, this study has confirmed the findings of
previous studies that informing pensioners of their
entitlement has little effect on catalysing claiming.
However, some pensioners did claim, and it is important
at least to attempt to assess the extent to which their
claiming was the result of being informed, or merely
having discussed issues relating to entitlement in an
interview, or some combination of the two. Such an
exploration requires a larger sample and an
experimental design.
Fifth and finally, the most important VIE
construct in predicting the behaviour of the stable
deciders was their feelings about their families
finding out. The influence of significant referents on
individuals' attitudes is a common feature of modern
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social psychology; indeed, Fishbein and Azjen (1975)
think it so important that they add a special component
to their expectancy model to account for the influence
of social norms. It is clear in this context that the
perceived influence which others exert on pensioners is
considerable, and especial efforts must be made to
measure and to account for these influences.
******
By January 1980, it was clear that the Department of
Health and Social Security was interested in funding a
full study, although this interest was conspicuously
low-key due to the change of government in 1979. In the
hope of securing continuous funding as from 31 March
1980, a full interim report plus full proposals were
submitted to the Department in February 1980. Since the
final report embodying the above thoughts was not
completed until June 1980, the proposals were not as
fully developed as they could have been, and were
certainly outdated by the time they were eventually
approved in May 1980.
The remainder of this thesis deals with the
execution of the full study. Even at this stage there
were several alternative designs and strategies open,
and it is fair to say that the design finally adopted
was not that proposed to the DHSS in February 1980.
However, for the sake of simplifying the presentation,
discarded designs and plans which never came to
fruition will only be discussed where they clarify the
reasons for having chosen a particular strategy.
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5.0 Plan of the Full Study
5.1 Introduction
One of the main conclusions of the feasibility
study was that pensioners' attitudes towards
supplementary pensions and their propensity to claim
them are probably heavily influenced by their attitudes
towards their rebates. It was suggested that feelings
about rebates and perceptions of need were related; in
terms of the threshold model, this might tentatively
suggest that the relationship between pensioners'
propensity to claim supplementary pensions and their
experience of claiming rebates is mediated by the
effect which their satisfaction with rebates has on
their perceptions of difficulty making ends meet
(NEED). Thus, in order fully to understand pensioners'
perceptions of having no difficulty managing, one must
understand their histories of claiming rebates and
their differential perceptions of the two benefits.
A second conclusion was that, although it appeared
that informing pensioners of their entitlement had
little effect on claiming, some did claim, and it was
thought to be important to determine to what extent
this behaviour was catalysed by the information or the
research interview alone, or the two combined.
Third, it was noted that, encouraging as the
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methodological findings were, they needed to be
confirmed on a larger sample of pensioners.
Exploring each of these issues requires a
different type of research design. Thus the full study
essentially embodies three separate but related
studies: (1) a mainly post-hoc survey of pensioners'
histories of claiming rebates and past and current
differential perceptions of benefits; (2) a field
experiment to test the effects of knowledge and the
research interview on claiming; (3) a longitudinal
study of the relationship between perceptions,
expectations and valences on the one hand, and claiming
behaviour on the other.
Each aspect of the full study plan is described in
detail in the sections which follow.
5.2 Aims
The aims of the feasibility study were almost
exclusively to develop and to validate a theoretical
model of the process of deciding about benefits. In
contrast, the aims of the full study were essentially
to apply this model to clarifying the identity and
importance of the main factors considered in
pensioners' decisions. Thus, the emphasis of the full
study analysis and discussion is not on proposing and
supporting tight theoretical arguments as was the case
in the feasibility study. Instead, the emphasis lies
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primarily upon clarifying the substance of pensioners'
decision-making. The aims of the full study were to
obtain a sample of approximately 125 eligible
non-claimants, to follow them up over a five month
period, and to use the data collected from them:
(1) to describe pensioners' histories of claiming
rebates and their differential perceptions of rebates
and supplementary pensions, and to analyse the
relationship between these perceptions and their
current perceptions of level of difficulty making ends
meet;
(2) to demonstrate empirically the effects upon
claiming behaviour of informing pensioners of their
eligibility and discussing applying with them in detail
using a field experiment design;
(3) to confirm the validity of the threshold model in
predicting behaviour using a longitudinal design;
(4) to assess the importance of the various
perceptions, expectations and feelings held by
pensioners in determining their behaviour using the
threshold model;
(5) to use these data as a basis for formulating
suggestions for the solution of the problem.
The presentation and discussion of full study
findings occupy the majority of Chapters 6 and 7.
5.3 Research Hypotheses
Three main a priori research hypotheses were set
out. The first was substantive, being about the impact
upon claiming behaviour of informing ENCs of their
eligibility. The second and third were methodological,
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being about the confirmation of the validity of the
threshold model. These three specific hypotheses were:
Hypothesis _1
that neither being informed of the amount of
their entitlement nor discussing applying in
detail in a second interview, nor the two
combined, would have any significant effect
on claiming behaviour;
Hypothesis 2_
that of three different types of predictive
methods, behaviour would be best predicted,
in descending order, by the full threshold
model, VIE scores alone, and by financial and
demographic variables;
Hypothesis 3_
that the behaviour of pensioners who had
achieved the first four thresholds of NEED,
KNOW, ELIG and UTIL and who perceived their
situations to be stable (the 'stable
deciders') would be significantly more
predictable than that of pensioners who had
failed to achieve any one of the first four
thresholds (the 'non-deciders').
In addition, eleven subsidiary hypotheses dealing
with the sources of pensioners' perceptions of need and
utility were also set out. The rationale behind these




The feasibility study demonstrated that the NEED
construct was very important in explaining
non-claiming. Thus, it was thought important to give it
special consideration and to attempt to outline in
advance some hypotheses about the sources of
differential perceptions of need. These hypotheses draw
upon the three theoretical concepts of reference
groups, relative deprivation, and cognitive dissonance.
The first four need hypotheses put forward assume the
importance to pensioners (a) of the presence of and (b)
of the apparent circumstances of other individuals or
groups. Thus they are called reference group
hypotheses. A reference group is any group in which a
person "aspires to attain or maintain membership"
(Siegel and Siegel, 1957, p.232). It is often the case
that an individual's membership group (the group of
which he is a member as a result of his circumstances)
is not the same as his reference group (that group with
whom he shares expectations about circumstances). A
timely example would be an unemployed person who shares
the expectations of people who are fully employed.
The concept of reference group may be useful here
in two ways. First it may provide a framework for
interpreting why pensioners objectively determined to
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be in need (by virtue of their eligibility to
supplementary pensions) do not perceive themselves to
be so. Secondly, when applied to the study of
decision-making, the concept may help to explain why
some individuals are apparently incapable of making
decisions.
Reference Groups and Relative Deprivation - A
considerable body of social psychological research,
culminating in Runciman's Relative Deprivation and
Social Justice (1966), has suggested that people's
levels of satisfaction with their circumstances are
determined by their expectations which, in turn, are
related to the standards of their reference groups.
According to Runciman, a state of relative deprivation
arises when a person who desires but is not currently
achieving a certain standard of living sees others who
have achieved or are achieving that standard and
believes it to be viable for him to attain that
standard. Considering this sample of pensioners, the
desired standards of living might be based upon either
or both (1) that which they had achieved prior to
retiring and (2) some internal expectation that they
ought to be a certain amount better off than pensioners
of the previous generation because of the general
increase in standards of living. Thus it would be
appropriate to hypothesise that whether or not
pensioners perceived any difficulty managing would be
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strongly related to their perceptions of the extent of
their deprivation relative to comparison reference
groups. These specific hypotheses were:
Hypothesis N1
that the differences between their
pre-retirement expectations and their current
financial circumstances would be
significantly greater for pensioners who
perceived some difficulty than for those who
perceived no difficulty;
Hypothesis N2
that the perceived difference between their
current circumstances and those of the
previous generation of pensioners would be
significantly greater for pensioners who
perceived no difficulty than for those who
perceived some difficulty managing.
Although one would naturally expect that "other
pensioners" might form a salient reference group for
this sample, the feasibility study demonstrated that a
large number of pensioners were either unable or
unwilling to compare themselves with other pensioners
that they knew.
Reference Groups, Attitude Change and
Decision-Making - Research into group dynamics (Siegel
and Siegel, 1.960) has suggested that when an
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individual's membership group is arbitrarily changed,
his expectations will become more similar to those of
the new membership group, even though he may not
immediately accept the new group as his reference
group. Applying this logic to a pensioner's
circumstances, at retirement his membership group would
change from wage-earners to low-income pensioners,
while the reference group (e.g. wage-earners) would
remain the same. One would expect that the reduction in
pensioners' expectations as a consequence of this new
group membership would vary with the amount of time
that they had been retired. Thus it was also
hypothesised:
Hypothesis N3
that those who perceived no difficulty
managing would have been retired
significantly longer than those who perceived
some difficulty, this difference being due to
changes in expectations as a consequence of
the impact of change of membership group over
time.
Group dynamics research has also indicated that
the susceptibility of an individual to attitude change,
his decision-making ability, and his propensity to act
depend largely on the strength of his relationships to
reference groups or individuals, and on the norms he
perceives to prevail in those reference groups. In
230.
these contexts, membership of a reference group
provides "stable anchors and stable guides to action"
(Sherif and Sherif, 1969). When stable ties with one's
reference group are lost, such as when a spouse dies, a
state of "normlessness" arises which can inhibit or
prevent patterned action (e.g. decision-making, taking
action, etc.) .
Sherif and Sherif (1969, p. 241) write:
One of the most acute motivational-emotional
tensions for a person to endure is the loss
of stable ties to others and the lack of any
values that can give some sort of integration
to his feelings about himself. To lack a
sense of belongingness, to feel isolated from
people around one, to see little or nothing
left to hang on to, arouses striving to
restore one's ties or to re-establish new
bearings.... If new self-identity with others
is not actualized, if the person must
continue to flounder about in search of it
despite his resort to all kinds of measures
(realistic or unrealistic) and can see
nothing but a dead end to further effort, the
last resort may be suicide, as conceptualised
by Durkheim (1951).
Thus, reference group theory applied here would
predict that widows, because of the loss of stable ties
resulting from the death of their spouses, would be the
least able to make decisions. Indeed during the
interviews it was commonly observed that widows were
very rigid and inflexible in their attitudes, so much
so that some appeared to fail altogether to absorb the
information they were given about their entitlement. It
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was as if they had closed themselves off from the
world. Many directly confirmed the final observation
quoted above, stating that they wished that they had
died with their husbands and that they had little
interest in the world. Their indecisiveness was very
commonly expressed as "Oh, I just don't know what I'm
going to do".
Conversely, because their referents were intact,
married couples would be the most able to make
decisions, and single persons (who one might infer to
be relatively independent of referents) would also be
more able to make decisions. Therefore, a stated
perception of "no difficulty managing" was interpreted
as indicating the inability (and thus the
unwillingness) of pensioners to enter into a
decision-making process. Thus the fourth reference
group hypothesis was:
Hypothesis N4
that married couples and single persons would
be significantly less likely to state that
they were having no difficulty making ends
meet than widows.
Cognitive Dissonance - The second area of theory
drawn upon is Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive
dissonance. This theory states that individuals are
always seeking consistent knowledge about themselves
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and their environment, desiring that all aspects of
their circumstances have the same implications for
their behaviour. When two co-existing perceptions have
opposing behavioural implications, the consequent state
of conflict is termed cognitive dissonance. Festinger's
theory states that people are motivated to reduce this
dissonance either by modifying one or both of these
perceptions, or by taking action.
Cognitive dissonance theory is applicable here in
two ways. First, as they grow older, many pensioners
become more concerned with family and spiritual issues
and with their health and less concerned with the
affairs of the world, undergoing a type of social
disengagement as outlined by Cumming and Henry (1961).
The behavioural implication of this tendency to
introspection is disengagement from society; in
opposition to this is the need to take action implied
by a perception of having some difficulty managing.
Therefore, as long as the two perceptions co-exist, the
individual will experience cognitive dissonance. It is
therefore arguable that pensioners who express no
difficulty making ends meet will have lowered their
perceptions of difficulty managing in order to avoid
having to take action. It is directly in line with this
to suggest that these pensioners have also inflated
their sense of satisfaction with the value of their
rebates. Having thus freed themselves from the worry of
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peripheral issues such as income maintenance, they
could then concentrate on issues which they believed to
be of cardinal importance.
Neither the longitudinal data nor the direct
measures of pensioners' levels of concern with their
health and mobility needed to test this hypothesis
fully are available. However, one can use measures of
their states of health and mobility to test the
following hypothesis, which should be considered more
exploratory than formal:
Hypothesis N5
that pensioners who perceived no difficulty
managing would be significantly older, less
healthy, less mobile and more satisfied with
the amounts of their rebates than pensioners
who perceived some difficulty.
Secondly and alternatively, it can be argued that
the crucial behavioural implication of perceiving some
difficulty managing is not the general issue of
participating in the world, but the specific act of
applying for supplementary benefit. Here cognitive
dissonance theory would posit that the pensioners who
perceived no difficulty managing were people so
negative about the application procedure that they
would have done anything to avoid applying. The
simplest resolution of this situation would be for them
234.
to alter their perceptions of the amount of difficulty.
If this hypothesis were true, one would expect:
Hypothesis N6
that pensioners who perceived no difficulty
managing would be significantly more negative
in their feelings about applying than
pensioners who perceived some difficulty.
Reference group and cognitive dissonance theories
have provided the six main hypotheses, but there is a
seventh. Perhaps the most obvious and simplest
hypothesis is that pensioners' perceptions of
difficulty stem from characteristics of their
circumstances such as the perceived balance between
their income and expenses and whether or not they have
any work pensions or non-dependents living in. The last
hypothesis therefore was:
Hypothesis N7
that pensioners who perceived no difficulty
would perceive a significantly smaller
discrepancy between their income and expenses
and would be significantly more likely to
have work pensions and non-dependents living
in than pensioners who perceived some
difficulty.
The Utility Hypotheses
Four hypotheses were set out regarding the origins
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of pensioners' perceptions of utility. These were
essentially hypotheses about differences between the
group who perceived no utility and the group who
perceived some utility, after having filtered out the
"no need" group. The four specific hypotheses were:
Hypothesis U1
that the two groups would differ
significantly in the average number of items
cut down on or given up due to reduced
income;
Hypothesis U2
that the two groups would differ
significantly in the average level of
negative feelings expressed about having cut
down on or given up these items;
Hypothesis U3
that "more essential" items (such as food,
clothing and fuel) would better differentiate
the two groups than would "less essential"
items (such as luxuries and presents for the
grandchildren);
Hypothesis U4
that the two groups would differ
significantly in the average amounts by which
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they would be better off on supplementary
pensions.
5.4 Time Frame
The full study ran from April 1980 to March 1982.
Table 5.4A sets out the time frame.
5.5 Interviewers
It was very clear that even with a vastly more
efficient sampling frame than was used in the
feasibility study, it would be necessary to hire
interviewers for the full study. Thus, five experienced
interviewers were selected from a pool of nearly two
hundred applicants in December 1980. All five had had
some previous experience interviewing the elderly,
although the nature of their contact varied
considerably. Two interviewers had worked for the
Scottish Special Housing Association, and one of these
had also worked, first as a CO and then as an EO, in
the DHSS for three years. The third interviewer was a
professional freelance journalist, the fourth a
clinical psychologist, and the fifth a Social Survey
Division interviewer.
Each interviewer attended two separate
one-and-a-half-day training sessions on the use of the
screening and research interviews. These were organised
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Table 5.4A. Time Frame
1. Preparatory period for revising and piloting April to
screening and research interview schedules; August
re-designing sampling frame; staff holidays. 1980
2. Selection of cwner-occupier sample. August
3. Production of screening interview schedules; September-
selection of interviewers;selection of December
council and private tenant cases;
preparation of training programme for inter¬
viewers; preparation of invitation letter in
consultation with and launch of letter by
Edinburgh Housing Department.
4. Final format and production of research
interview schedules; training programme on
screening interview for interviewers;
arranging appointments with pensioners.
5. Conduct screening interviews.
6. Training on research interview schedules
and preparation of interim report;
conduct research interviews.
7. Data preparation; interviewers writing
profiles.
8. Interviewers follow up cases to assess
behaviour and intentions.
9. DHSS Local Office staff collect "hard"










10. Data preparation,data analysis,





and conducted by the author. In order to ensure high
reliability of responses from pensioners over the
course of three interviews, it was thought best that
each interviewer be responsible for his or her "own"
group of pensioners. Four of the five interviewers were





The sampling frame used in the full study was
based upon two feasibility study findings: (1) that 65%
of those eligible non-claimants who were receiving
rebates worth amounts in excess of 50% of their rent
and/or rates would be better off on supplementary
pensions; (2) that of 30 eligible non-claimants who
were also eligible for rebates, 29 were claiming their
rebate entitlement. Thus, it appeared that, at least in
the Edinburgh area, research should concentrate on
locating "better off" cases; this required the design
of an inferential technique for locating such cases
using a "50% rebate" criterion as the first step in the
sampling frame. The most significant advantage of such
an approach would be that it avoided relying upon the
DHSS computer staff (ADP Newcastle) and could be
conducted relatively swiftly and entirely at a local
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level using records held by the City of Edinburgh
District Council Housing Department.
However, this technique potentially excluded two
types of eligible non-claimants: (1) non-householders
(who, according to official statistics, comprise 5% of
all eligible non-claimants), and (2) householders
eligible for yet not claiming rebates (whom the author
estimated to comprise about 2% of Edinburgh eligible
non-claimants). Considerable effort was directed
towards obtaining sub-samples of these two types of
ENCs. The most promising strategy was to draw a sample
from the list of Non-Contributory Retirement Pension
(NCRP) recipients held by ADP Newcastle. The NCRP is
awarded to pensioners who never obtained an NIP on the
basis of their own or their spouse's contributions 7
because it is worth only 60% of the NIP basic rate, and
is thus worth substantially less than the SB needs
allowances for either householders or non-householders,
it was expected that the proportion of ENCs amongst
NCRP recipients would be rather large. However, since
NCRP recipients comprise only a fraction of all
pensioners, it was planned to over-sample heavily in
this category. Thus, the sampling frame was designed to
include householders receiving rebates greater than 50%
(located from Edinburgh Housing Department records),
NCRP householders eligible for both benefits and
receiving neither, and NCRP non-householders (both
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located from DHSS ADP Newcastle records).
The second feasibility study finding suggested
that the number of NIP householders eligible for both
benefits but receiving neither was so small that it
would take about 370 interviews to find less than 10
such people. This group, regrettably, was excluded from
the sample.
Throughout the planning stages of the research the
author was very concerned to obtain the sample of NCRP
non-householders. However, ADP Newcastle stated that in
order to locate a sample of 50 NCRP cases, about half
the computer file for Edinburgh would have to be
examined, and they had not received permission to do
so. Although some consideration was given to the idea
of requesting DHSS Local Office staff to do a manual
search, this idea was abandoned due to the industrial
action by civil servants. Therefore, there was no
alternative but to exclude from the research the sample
of non-householders.
A summary of the sampling frame as executed
appears as Table 5.61A. As this table implies, at no
point did the author examine any records, and at no
point was the name or address of any person unwilling
to be interviewed revealed to him. Copies of letters of
invitation from the Edinburgh Housing Department appear
as Appendix B1.
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Table 5.61A: Sampling Frame for Rebate Recipients
1. Research team produced set of instructions, based on
random numbers, for the selection of cases from
Edinburgh Housing Department rebate records.
2. EHD staff, following those instructions, chose cases
from their files and collected the following
information:
a. Whether or not the case was a pensioner. If it
was not, then it was returned to the file and the
next nominated case was examined;
b. If it was a pensioner, whether or not the net
rebate was greater than 50%. If it was not, the
case was returned to the file and the next
nominated case was examined;
c. If the net rebate was greater than 50%, then
the name and address of the pensioner were
recorded, and the case was returned to the file.
3. EHD eliminated from list of pensioners with rebates
greater than 50% the names of those pensioners who
participated in the feasibility study.
4. EHD wrote to pensioners with rebates greater than
50% to request their consent to be interviewed under an
'opting out' procedure.
5. EHC passed list of names of pensioners who did not
'opt out' to research team.
6. Research team carried out screening interviews with
those who did not opt out, and located those eligible
for yet not claiming supplementary pensions.
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Table 5.61B shows the expected and actual numbers
of cases involved at various stages of the sampling
frame. The expected numbers at each stage were inferred
from local authority and feasibility study statistics.
As can be seen, the sampling frame was very accurate in
locating eligible tenants, but substantially less
accurate in locating eligible owner-occupiers. This was
because the feasibility study eligibility statistics
were no longer completely valid. Eligible non-claiming
owner-occupiers in the feasibility study were
substantially more likely than were tenants to have
capital in excess of £2000; thus the £2000 cut-off
point introduced in November 1980 had a differential
effect across tenures, rendering ineligible
proportionately more owner-occupiers than tenants.
The main requirement in designing this sampling
frame was that the research sample should include
sufficient numbers of eligible non-claimants within
each tenure category such that the author could place
some confidence in generalisations made from these
samples. This means that the ratio of such individuals
across tenure categories in the obtained sample did not
correspond to national estimates based upon the Family
Expenditure Survey. In discussing the
representativeness of the assessed sample, results will
be discussed separately for each tenure category.




























The overall response rate (the number successfully
and completely interviewed divided by the total number
invited) was about 42%. This is roughly the same as the
response rate in the feasibility study, although it was
substantially lower than was expected. The causes of
this relatively low response rate are discussed further
below.
The Screening Interview
Upon receiving the lists of 421 names and
addresses of those who did not opt out in response to
the letter of invitation from the EHD, the author
reorganised the addresses by postal area, assigned
interviewers to each area, and wrote to each of the 421
suggesting an appointment. Copies of these letters
appear as Appendix B2. The response rates at successive
steps in the sampling procedure are shown in Table
5.61C.
In total, 307 pensioners' homes were visited, with
287 complete assessments being made by the five
interviewers. Of these pensioners, 87% were contacted
on the first attempt, 8% on the second, 3% on the
third, and about 2% required four or more attempts to
contact. Interviewers were generally instructed not to
make exceptional efforts to contact people who had not
been contacted by the fourth attempt. The shortest
assessment interview was conducted in 30 minutes; the





































longest took one and three-quarter hours; the average
was 65 minutes.
As in the feasibility study, the full study
screening interviews were primarily geared towards
locating eligible non-claimants, and the research
interviews towards taking the measures necessary to
predict ENCs' future claiming behaviour. However, the
full study screening interviews (please see Appendix
B3) also included very important sections on
respondents' histories of claiming rebates, measures of
their differential perceptions of rebates and
supplementary pensions, and several measures of their
perceptions of "need". The second half of the screening
interview therefore comprised the post-hoc survey. A
general guide to the content of the screening interview
appears as Table 5.61D.
This historical and attitudinal information was
collected in the following fashion: at the end of the
financial section, which usually took about 25 minutes,
interviewers inquired about pensioners' rebates, how
long they had had them, what had led them to claim, and
the like. This was followed by some questions designed
to see if they had considered supplementary pensions as
an alternative at the time they applied for their
rebates, and if not, why not. This time of previous
application was used as a focal point for inquiring
about their differential perceptions of rebates and
247.
Table 5.61D. Screening Interview Format
I. Demographic and Financial Information
Employment status, age, health, marital status,
household composition, housing tenure, amenities,
services included in gross rent, rent, rates, feu duty,
subletting, rent rebates/allowances, rate rebates,
difficulty heating house, mobility, wages, pensions,
Mobility or Attendance Allowance, ranges in which
capital falls.
II. History of Claiming Rebates
Years on rebates, initial knowledge of scheme, first
perception of eligibility, circumstances leading to
claim, difficulty involved deciding to claim.
III. Differential Perceptions of Both Benefits
At time of rebate claim, salience of SB and advantages
and disadvantages of applying for rebates and SB.
Measures of satisfaction with benefits varied with
tenure as below:
COUNCIL TENANTS AND OWNER-OCCUPIERS
Satisfaction with rebates as low cash flow form of
managing and potential satisfaction with high cash flow-
style implied by SB.
PRIVATE TENANTS ONLY
Satisfaction with frequency and timing of rent
allowance payment, potential satisfaction with weekly
SB payments and with having to save over a period of
weeks to meet rent payments.
ALL TENURES
Satisfaction with Local Authority as source of rebates,
potential satisfaction with DHSS as source of
assistance, satisfaction with current amount of rebate,
overall satisfaction with form, amount and source of
rebates.
IV. Perceptions of Need
Degree of difficulty making ends meet, perception of
current relationship between income and expenses,
success in current managing as compared to own past,
success in current managing as compared to pensioners
of the previous generation.
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supplementary pensions.
In the next section of the screening interview,
interviewers asked a series of questions dealing with
the contrasting attributes of supplementary pensions
and rebates. These questions were designed to assess
pensioners' current satisfaction with the amount, form,
source, and frequency of "payment" of their rebates in
contrast to their potential satisfaction with the form,
source and frequency of payment of supplementary
pensions. Interviewers presented the questions from the
perspective that the amount of supplementary pension in
this hypothetical situation would be worth the same as
their rebates, and that only their salient
characteristics would differ.
Interviewers then ended the screening interviews
by asking about: (1) how difficult pensioners found it
to make ends meet; (2) the relationship between their
income and their expenses; (3) how well they managed
currently as compared to some point in their past; and
(4) how well they managed currently compared to
pensioners of the previous generation whom they had
known (such as parents, aunts, uncles).
Representativeness of the Assessed Sample
It must be borne in mind that the sub-sample of
ENCs included in the initial sample excluded from the
outset (i) non-householders and householders eligible
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for both benefits but receiving neither and (ii)
householders potentially better off on supplementary
pensions but whose rebates were worth less than 50% of
their housing costs. Therefore, any test of
representativeness at this level is merely a test of
how well the sub-sample of 287 interviewed pensioners
represented the entire sample of 691, all of whom were
householders whose rebates were worth an amount in
excess of 50% of their housing costs at some point
between August and November 1980.
In March 1981, after the screening interviews were
completed, the author generated a list of code numbers
of the 134 pensioners who had - not opted out in response
to the EHD letter but whom interviewers had not been
able to interview. A previous arrangement to collect
anonymised follow-up information on all
non-participants had been agreed, but in the interim,
the records of rate rebate recipients had been
transferred from Edinburgh District to Lothian Region.
As a result, separate negotiations to obtain the
co-operation of the Region had to be undertaken at a
very late date. Once co-operation was obtained, the
code numbers of council and private tenants were sent
to the EHD, and the code numbers of owner-occupiers
were sent to Lothian Region. These lists, along with
the lists of code numbers of those who had opted out,
were used to identify each case not assessed by the
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research team. These two offices collected and
anonymised the following information on each of the
cases: postal area, sex, marital status, presence of
blindness in the head of household (HOH) unit, presence
of any occupants other than the HOH unit, whether
six-monthly interest on savings and investments was
above or below £105 (a rough guide to the value of
their capital), and whether the pensioner received a
National Insurance Pension, an Attendance Allowance, a
Mobility Allowance or other private income (such as a
work pension).
A series of Chi-squared analyses was performed on
the data, and, in general, the results of these
analyses indicated that the assessed and unassessed
samples were very similar in terms of the limited
information available. However, the sample of those
assessed over-represented private tenants and
under-represented council tenants, although not to a
significant degree in statistical terms (Chi-squared =
2.25, df = 1, ns).
Taking each tenure category on its own, the
following biases were observed:
For Owner-Occupiers, non-dependents were
over-represented in the households of
non-participants by a factor of 2.8
(Chi-squared =7.96,df=l,p<.005);
For Council Tenants, sickness and disability
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was noticeably more common amongst
non-participants than participants, although
this relationship was neither significant nor
strong (Chi-squared = 2.25, df=l,ns);
For Private Tenants, persons with private
income in addition to interest on capital
were over-represented amongst participants
(Chi-squared =4.12, p<.05). This relationship
was not a function of the relatively poorer
health of non-participants; the Chi-squared
between health and extra income was not
significant.
A detailed description of these analyses appears
as Appendix B4.
Description of the Eligible Non-Claimants
Data collected in the screening interviews was
also used to develop a profile of the demographic,
financial and health characteristics of the 123 ENCs.
In terms of employment, only four heads of households
and one spouse were employed, and their mean weekly
income after the £4 disregard was £7.11. In terms of
health, 60% of council tenants reported some difficulty
getting out and about; the corresponding percentages
for owner-occupiers and private tenants were 19% and
45% respectively. In terms of marital status, over half
the sample were widows, three-tenths were married
couples and one-tenth were single women. In terms of
household composition, only council tenants reported
having any non-dependents living in; this was, in part,
a by-product of the recent changes in the SB assessment
procedure.
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Considering sources and amounts of income, nearly
30% had at least one extra pension, their average
weekly values ranging from £4.60 for council and
private tenants to £3.45 for owner-occupiers. Of all
single people, widows had the smallest National
Insurance Pensions (£27.77, only 62 pence above the
basic rate). In terms of age , the average age was 72.9
years; owner-occupiers were the oldest at 74.5 years,
followed by private tenants (73.8) and council tenants
(71.4). By marital status, widowed men were the oldest
(77.2); unmarried women were the youngest (72.0).
The mean amount potentially better off on
supplementary pensions (including entitlement to
additional requirements) was £3.16, council tenants
being potentially better off by £3.42 per week,
owner-occupiers by £3.23 and private tenants by £2.82.
By marital status, widowed women were potentially
better off by the most (£3.38) and widowed men the
least (£2.48). By age, the eldest group for whom
reliable estimates can be made (the 80 to 85 years
olds) were potentially better off by the most (£3.82)
and the youngest (60 to 65 year olds) were potentially
better off by the least (£2.82); this relationship
between age and amount potentially better off is not
direct. The less mobile were potentially better off by
more (£3.41) than the mobile (£2.97), and those with
non-dependents living in were potentially better off by
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nearly £2.00 more than those without non-dependents
living in.
A full description of the sample of 123 eligible
non-claimants appears as Appendix B5.
5.62 Design (Please see Figures 5.62A and 5.62B)
The design used in the full study comprised three
stages, an assessment stage and two research stages. In
the assessment stage all willing and able pensioners
identified by the sampling frame were assessed using
the screening interviews described above. At the
beginning of Research Stage I, eligible non-claimants
were assigned to three groups in the approximate ratio
of 2:1:1 as shown in Figure 5.62A.
During this stage, Group A members were informed
by letter of their eligibility (and of the amount due,
to the nearest lOp), and within seven days were given
the research interview about their attitudes towards
claiming. Group B members were also informed by letter
of their entitlement but were not interviewed
immediately; the contrast in claiming rates between
these two groups would indicate the effect which the
research interview had upon claiming. Group C was
neither informed nor interviewed during this stage. The
contrast between claiming rates of Groups C and B would
indicate the effects of knowledge of the amount of
entitlement on claiming. Research Stage I represents
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Figure 5.62A. Design of Research Stage I
Group Size Informed? Research Behaviour
Int? Criterion?
A 58 YES YES YES
B 33 YES NO YES
C 32 NO NO YES
Figure 5.62B. Design of Research Stage II
Group Size Informed? Research Behaviour
Int? Criterion?
A 51 YES
B 26 YES YES
C 24 YES YES YES
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the field experiment embedded in the full study.
Appendix B6 contains copies of the letters used to
inform pensioners of their entitlement.
Figure 5.62B presents the design of Research Stage
II. Here it was intended to bring into line the
treatments given to Groups B and C with those given to
Group A in the first stage. This standardisation was
performed to enable the author later to pool the cases
from all three groups when looking at the attitudinal
factors which best differentiated claimants and
non-claimants within the longitudinal study (the third
embedded study). Thus, Group A members received no
further intervention, and Group B members received the
research interview about 6 weeks after they were
informed of their eligibility. Group C now received
treatment identical to that given to Group A in Stage
I, namely, they were informed and given the research
interview within a week of being informed. The numbers
in each group at this stage were less than at Research
Stage I since some of the pensioners in Groups B and C
could not be given research interviews.
At the end of Research Stage II, the ineligible
pensioners were informed that they were ineligible and
why (copies of the letters used appear in Appendix B6).
Thus, by this point, the author had fulfilled his
ethical obligations to inform all pensioners of their
eligibility status, a point which had dominated
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discussion with the DHSS.
A Note on Timing and Randomness
Figures 5.62A and 5.62B represent the conceptual
designs which were followed. They imply that, for
instance, the interviewers spoke with all Group A
members, did nothing for 7 weeks, and then interviewed
members of Groups B and C. Such an approach, in strict
scientific terms, would have been correct, as it would
have held constant the effects of any concurrent social
changes outwith the research, such as publicity on
social security, civil service strikes, massive
increases in rates and rent,etc. However, it was
impossible to engage first-rate interviewers on this
intermittent basis and concessions had to be made.
In order to standardise the length of Research
Stage I for all respondents while simultaneously fully
engaging the interviewers, the author used the
following procedure: (1) eligible non-claimants were
assigned to groups on the basis of the dates upon which
they were assessed, Group C comprising the first
quarter of ENCs identified in early February, Group B
comprising the second quarter identified in mid- to
late February, and Group A comprising the most recently
interviewed. (2) The groups were treated in the
following way: A was interviewed first, C second, and B
last. Thus the time that it took to interview Groups A
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and C created the 6 weeks between the members of Group
B being informed and being interviewed, and kept the
interviewers fully employed over the period of the
fieldwork. The net effect of this was twofold: (i)
although the length of Research Stage I was virtually
the same for members of each group, it was not the same
time period? (ii) ENCs were systematically, rather than
randomly, assigned to the three experimental groups.
This effectively created the possibility that any
differences in claiming behaviour might have been due
not to the experimental treatment, but to some
difference in the characteristics of the groups. One
can only speculate that different (yet overlapping)
time periods might have had some effect on the claiming
rates of groups; however, the similarity of these
groups in terms of composition can be checked, and the
results of this exercise are presented in Chapter 6.
5.63 The Research Interview: Technique and Measures
Upon completion of the assessment stage, the
interviewers attempted to re-interview as many of the
123 ENCs as possible in the order determined by the
design. In the event, 22 pensioners could not be
re-interviewed, and a further nine were re-interviewed
although they had applied either just before or soon
after their screening interviews. Table 5.63A gives the
explanations for not interviewing these 22 pensioners.
Thus, there were only 92 pensioners used in the
Table 5.63A. Attrition at Research Stages
Total number ENCs identified 123
Refused 5
Unable-ill health 7
Away or on holiday 5
Couldn't be contacted 5
Total number given research
interviews 101
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longitudinal study testing the threshold model.
However, because the nature of the field experiment
design did not necessitate re-interviewing some
pensioners, the total available for that design was
114.
About one week prior to their research interviews,
the eligible pensioners were informed of the amounts of
their entitlement to within lOp. They were then given
the research interview, and their behaviour during the
following seven weeks was monitored. This comprised the
longitudinal study, the third embedded study. The
research interview had the format shown in Table 5.63B.
Its contents, and the interviewing technique employed,
are fully described below. A copy of the full study
research interview schedule appears as Appendix B7.
The first section of each interview comprised a
series of checks for changes in household composition,
income and expenses, and employment status. Changes in
perceptions of need were also measured, using two of
the five-point scales employed in the screening
interview. These were the "degree of difficulty making
ends meet" and the "balance of income and expenses".
The first of these measures corresponds to the main
conceptual variable of Perceived Need. If any changes
had occurred, interviewers probed a's to the causes of
the changes.
Table5.63B.ResearchInt rviewForm t
I.Checksforc angesinhouseholdcomposition,inc ea d expensesemploym nt,andperceptionsofn d; II.Detailedfamilytr e; III.Assessmentofspecificne ds; IV.Assessmentofperceivedutilityofsuppl mentary pensions; V.Expectationsandfeelingsaboud t ilsofapplication procedure(includingtrade-offagainstreb te )a aboutsignificantreferentfindingout; VI.Criterionmeasure:likelihoodofapplyingfoSB; VII.Feelingsaboutfam lysnalternativesou ceof assistance.
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Since the feasibility study had indicated that
expectations and feelings about significant referents
finding out were critical in determining the behaviour
of stable deciders, considerable importance was
attached to identifying the significant referent. This
was to be accomplished by eliciting a detailed family
tree. In the second section, interviewers recorded the
numbers of, the employment of, the location of and the
frequency of contact with siblings, children and
favourite nieces and nephews. In addition, similar
information was also sought about their best friends,
and about their relationships with their neighbours.
The interviewer then inquired as to which of these
individuals (if any) the respondent was particularly
close to or trusted as a confidant. The family tree was
placed near the beginning of the interview in the hope
that it would allow a gentle re-warming of the
relationship between the interviewers and their
pensioners, thus avoiding the problems anticipated in
attempting to discuss needs and attitudes towards
supplementary pensions.
In the third section, pensioners were asked what
items or commodities they had cut down on or given up
over the past few years because they could no longer
afford them. After eliciting these items, interviewers
then rated how the respondents felt about having to do
without each of them. The ratings were made on
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seven-point scales ranging from "very unhappy" (-3) to
"very happy" (+3). At the analysis stage, the items
mentioned were classified into nine categories. These
measures were included to provide greater detail on the
specific needs of eligible non-claimants, and to allow
an exploration of the relationship between their
feelings about their needs and their propensity to
claim.
In the fourth section, interviewers reminded the
respondents of the estimated amounts of their
entitlement, and rated their perceptions of the utility
of the benefit to meet their needs. This rating, which
corresponded to the conceptual variable of Perceived
Utility, was introduced by the question: "Thinking
about that sum of money, how far would it go towards
meeting the costs of the expenses we've just talked
about?" The pensioners' responses were rated on a
five-point scale ranging from "No use at all" (0) to
"Cover them completely" (4).
At this stage interviewers also sought to find out
what the pensioners' initial reactions were to learning
of their eligibility, and whether they had subsequently
made any moves towards applying.
The fifth section elicited pensioners'
Expectations and Feelings about applying, and formed
the bulk of the remainder of the research interview.
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Here the interviewers systematically informed the
respondents of the certain outcomes of applying and
measured the strength of their expectations that the
remaining outcomes would follow applying. Their
feelings about all these outcomes were also rated.
Table 5.63C summarises the expectations and feelings
measured. "Implied" means that the strength of the
expectation was assumed to be held constant for all
individuals since it was certain that applying led to
the outcome. Where the strength of the expectation was
variable from person to person, such as in the case of
the expectation that applying would lead to the
significant referent finding out, it was measured.
The first measures taken in this section were of
the strength of pensioners' expectations that
supplementary pensions and rebates represented charity.
Respondents were asked to indicate to what extent both
benefits were mixtures of "right and charity", ranging
from "its definitely charity" at one pole of a
five-point scale to "its definitely a right" at the
other pole. However, due to an unfortunate oversight,
the corresponding measures of pensioners' feelings
about the importance of the issue of "entitlement
versus charity" were not measured. This means that
although a contrast for each individual in their
perceptions of the "rights" status of the benefits is
available, these measures may not differentiate
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Table 5.63C. Outcomes for Which Expectations
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claimants and non-claimants since it is not known "how
important these issues are to each individual.
The second level of questioning moved quickly on
to the concrete outcomes of applying. The first of the
measures taken was of feelings about direct involvement
with the DHSS. It was anticipated that this general
feeling would be important in predicting behaviour, but
when taken alone would not account for it. Thus
interviewers also explored and measured feelings
towards the outcomes which were thought to explain
feelings about direct involvement with the DHSS. These
outcomes were having an official interview, talking
with an official, answering specific questions and
verifying resources and expenses in the means-test
interview. Although interviewers presented these
outcomes as being certain to follow applying, most of
the pensioners seemed already to be aware of what an
application entailed. Pensioners' feelings about these
outcomes were then measured. Since they have a choice
as to where to have the official interview, pensioners
were first asked where they would prefer to have the
interview, and how they would feel about having it (a)
at the preferred site and (b) at the alternative site.
Interviewers also measured pensioners' feelings about
other claimants at the DHSS office, assuming that if
they went to the office there would be other claimants
there.
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The last three measures covered two issues which
were found to be very important in the feasibility
study. These were (1) their expectations and feelings
about their significant referent finding out if they
were to make an application (both measured), and (2)
their feelings about having to give up their rebates in
exchange for the supplementary pension.
All the measures of expectations were taken on
five-point probability scales ranging from "nil
probability" (0) to "certainty" (1.0). Measures of
feelings were taken on seven-point scales ranging from
"very undesirable" (-3) to "very desirable" (+3). The
combined ratings of expectations and feelings
corresponds to the VIE component of the theoretical
model. To accommodate the views of those pensioners who
had applied prior to the research interview, and for
whom the interview would be a record of their
experiences rather than expectations, the margin of the
schedule was reserved for questions about their
experiences. These questions were parallel to those
asked of non-claimants.
The sixth section comprised a criterion measure of
intention to apply. Interviewers here presented to
respondents a card which had six statements expressing
increasing levels of probability of applying ranging
from "I definitely will not" (1) to "I definitely will"
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(6). Respondents were asked to study the card and to
choose the statement which best summarised their answer
to the question:
Considering the way you feel and are managing
at the moment, how likely is it that you will
apply for social security sometime in the
next month or so?
This section also included a question designed to
elicit pensioners' perceptions of any non-volitional
factors in their situations which might prevent them
from going out and claiming immediately. This measure
corresponded to the main conceptual variable of
Perceived Stability of the Situation.
The final section of the schedule dealt with
providing a context for their views about supplementary
benefit. The first task was for the respondents to rank
order each of seven alternative strategies for making
ends meet, including getting a part-time job, applying
for supplementary benefit, taking in a lodger, asking
the family for help, staying on the rebate and doing
nothing else, and cutting down further on expenses. The
second part of this section dealt with respondents'
families. Two questions were asked about pensioners'
expectations that their families would be willing to
help out if they were asked and that they would be able
to help out if they were asked; a third question was
asked about how they would feel if their families were
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able to help them out. As above, the expectations were
rated on five-point scales and the feelings on
seven-point scales.
The research interviews averaged one hour and
forty-five minutes in length. The longest was three
hours and fifteen minutes, and the shortest was
forty-five minutes.
5.64 The Criterion Measures
In a sense the criterion measures constituted the
most important measures taken in the study. Without
them there would have been no standards against which
to compare the predictive measures, and without them
the data collected about attitudes towards applying
would have been pointless. Thus the author thought very
carefully about the nature and timing of the criterion
measures. The two measures which it was decided to
collect at the end of the day were: (1) pensioners'
intentions to apply as expressed at the end of the
research interview, measured on a seven-point scale
ranging from "definitely won't" (0) to "definitely
will" (6); (2) their actual behaviour within the seven
weeks following their research interviews (a
dichotomous scale).
In order to assess claiming behaviour during the
seven-week claiming period, it was planned that DHSS
local office staff would assist by indicating whether
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or not each respondent had claimed during the period,
and the date of their application if they had applied.
However, it appeared that local office co-operation
would again fail to materialise, and to guarantee at
least some hard criterion measure, the interviewers saw
each of their pensioners again after the seven-week
waiting period. This had the added advantage of
allowing a cross-check against DHSS records in the
event that the promised aid did appear.
The follow-up interview schedule appears as
Appendix B8. The information collected included whether
or not the person had applied, any steps they had taken
towards applying, their intentions to apply, and the
approximate date and outcome of their application. The
definition of having claimed or having applied was
"having made contact with the DHSS in writing, by phone
or in person to investigate the possibility of
entitlement to a supplementary pension".
The length of the waiting period was also a very
important consideration. The arguments in favour of a
longer period (up to three months) were that such a
period would have given individuals sufficient time for
their current situations to resolve themselves (such as
settling down to new rent and rates charges), to come
to a better assessment of their needs, and to work
through the implications of their eligiblility to SB.
Arguments for a shorter period were theoretical rather
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than practical -- the shorter the period the less
likely it was that changes in external circumstances
would occur which would invalidate the relationship
between measures of their attitudes and their
behaviour. At the end of the day, neither set of
considerations was important in deciding the length of
the criterion period. The decision was ultimately made
on practical grounds. Because it seemed unlikely that
DHSS local office co-operation would actually
materialise, the follow-up information had to be
collected by the interviewers. Their services could not
be engaged beyond early summer, and thus the waiting
period was reduced from three to just under two months.
In the event, DHSS local office co-operation did
materialise, albeit very late in the day. Using the
form shown in Appendix B9, the local offices provided
the author with the following information: the date of
claim (if any), the outcome of the assessment, and the
amount of entitlement.
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6.0 Full Study Findings: Part I
6.1 Introduction
Chapters 6 and 7 contain the main findings of the
full study. Although these findings could have been
presented in a variety of ways, it was thought most
appropriate to adhere to some sort of chronological
order in presentation. Thus, as a background to their
current perceptions, expectations and feelings about
applying for supplementary pensions, the results of the
post-hoc survey of pensioners' attitudes towards and
experiences of claiming rebates are presented in
Section 6.2. Section 6.3 contains the results of the
field experiment, and Section 6.4 the first half of the
findings relating to the threshold model. Because the
majority of the analyses were non-experimental, this
section is longer than it might have been had the
author been able to employ the traditional "hypotheses
- results - discussion" format. This has, therefore,
necessitated setting forth the remaining findings in
Chapter 7. Chapter 7 comprises a detailed examination
of the correlates of the key factors of NEED and UTIL;
it also contains the findings of an alternative
analysis using the same data.
6.2 The Post-Hoc Survey
Although it will be seen at the discussion stage
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that this survey provides useful background
information, it was thought that a detailed
presentation of these data would be peripheral to the
main thrust of the thesis. For the reader who is
interested, Appendix BIO provides a complete account of
the findings of the survey. The appropriate tables are
referred to using the shorthand (BIO, Table ).
Histories of Claiming Rebates
Five issues were discussed including (1) the
length of time pensioners had been on rebates, (2) how
they came to find out about rebates , (3) how they came
to perceive themselves to be eligible, (4) what
circumstances led them to claim rebates, and (5) how
much difficulty they had deciding to apply.
Of the entire sample, nearly 60% had been
receiving rebates for at least five years, and over 90%
for at least two years (BIO, Table 1). Although 14% did
not know or could not remember how they came to find
out about the scheme, 37% learned about it through
advertising, and 45% learned about it from other
people. The remaining 4% were not involved in the
decisions to apply for their rebates. Advertising was
the most important source for council tenants,
accounting for 50% of their responses; other people
were the most important sources for private tenants and
owner-occupiers (52%) (BIO, Table 2). In terms of how
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they came to perceive themselves to be eligible, 10%
stated that they arrived at this conclusion by
comparing themselves with other pensioners in similar
circumstances, 11% that a friend or relative had
suggested it, 54% that it was as a direct result of a
substantial drop in income or increase in expenses, and
15% stated that they applied on the off-chance, never
perceiving themselves to be eligible with any
certainty. The remaining 10% comprised individuals who
gave other explanations, who could not remember, or who
had not been involved in the decision to apply for
their rebates. Owner-occupiers were over twice as
likely to apply on the off-chance as were council or
private tenants (28% as opposed to 13% and 9%) (BIO,
Table 3).
Seventy-one per cent (71%) of the sample stated
that it was a change in the balance of their income and
expenses which had catalysed them to claim (BIO, Table
4). For 47% this event was retirement, for 14% it was
the death of their spouse, and for 10% it was increased
housing costs. In general, only just over a fifth (22%)
had any difficulty deciding to claim; the proportion
who felt at least a bit sensitive about applying varied
dramatically as a function of tenure, with 40% of
owner-occupiers, 27% of private tenants and a mere 8%
of council tenants having expressed some ambivalence
(BIO, Table 5 ) .
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Perceived Advantages and Disadvantages of Rebates and
Supplementary Pensions
Excepting a small proportion, all of these
pensioners had taken part in the decisions to apply for
their rebates. It was clearly relevant to examine why
they had opted for rebates rather than for
supplementary benefit at the time they initially
applied for their rebates. Therefore, their
explanations were elicited in terms of what they had
believed would be the advantages and disadvantages of
both benefits at that time.
Of the 107 who stated what they had believed would
be the advantages of rebates, 91% thought the advantage
would be financial, and 10% thought it would be the
convenience of the form of the rebate (BIO, Table 6).
Only ten pensioners anticipated any disadvantages with
rebates; six of these were frustrated by continuous
correspondence with the local authority.
Turning to supplementary pensions, 90% (109) did
not even consider these as an alternative when they
were thinking of applying for their rebates. This
figure for private sector pensioners was 96% whereas it
was 82% for council tenants. Of the 9% who did think
about applying, not one went as far as to test the
system by actually applying. Two of the pensioners had
actually transferred from supplementary pensions and
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they comprise the remaining 1%.
Reasons given by the 109 for not applying (BIO,
Table 7) included basic ignorance of the benefit (11%),
perceptions of ineligibility (15%), perceptions that
they would be better off on rebates (10%), no reason
given (1%), and feelings about applying and about the
outcomes of applying (63%). Of the 66 who constituted
the last category, the main reasons given (BIO, Table
8) were pride, charity or independence (62%), low
utility (52%), invasions of privacy (23%), negative
perceptions of claimants (17%) and negative feelings
about DHSS officers (10%).
Only about one-third (30%) of the pensioners
expected any advantages to supplementary pensions prior
to applying for their rebates. One-fifth of this group
thought that supplementary benefit might have been
worth more to them; the expected advantage for the
remaining four-fifths was the automatic entitlement to
other benefits made possible by receipt of
supplementary benefit.
Levels and Predictors of Satisfaction with Rebates
Turning to pensioners' current attitudes to both
benefits, interviewers discussed with them their
satisfaction with the amount, form, source, and
frequency of payment of their rebates as well as their
potential satisfaction with •the form, source and
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frequency of supplementary pensions. A measure of
pensioners' overall satisfaction with their rebates was
also taken. These data were used in two ways.
First, the distribution of overall satisfaction
was analysed (BIO, Table 9). Over the entire sample,
only 5% expressed even slight dissatisfaction with
their rebates, 9% were ambivalent, and 86% expressed
substantial satisfaction with their rebates. Secondly,
in predicting overall satisfaction, multiple regression
analyses were used to assess the importance of measures
(a) of satisfaction with rebate form, amount, source
and frequency and (b) of potential satisfaction with
supp1ernentary benefit form, source and frequency. The
regression analyses revealed that pensioners'
satisfaction with the amounts of their rebates was
consistently the most powerful predictor of their
overall satisfaction with their rebates. Depending upon
the tenure, this measure alone accounted for between
46% and 59% of the variance in overall satisfaction
(BIO, Tables 10-13). Other predictors of overall
satisfaction varied by housing tenure.
Satisfaction with the Contrasting Features of Rebates
and Supplementary Pensions
The previous regression analyses determined the
strength of the relationships between overall
satisfaction with rebates and various other measures of
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satisfaction. Here, the data were used again, but this
time analysed in terms of the distributions of types of
satisfaction. Taking owner-occupiers and council
tenants combined (BIO, Table 14), over 90% expressed
substantial satisfaction with the low cash-flow style
of managing implied by rebates and over 75% expressed
substantial dissatisfaction with the prospect of
managing on the high cash-flow style implied by
supplementary pensions (BIO, Table 15). Over 80%
expressed some satisfaction with receiving benefit from
the local authority (BIO, Table 17), and 37% expressed
some potential dissatisfaction with receiving benefit
from the DHSS (BIO, Table 18). Most of the private
tenants received their rent allowances quarterly, thus
it was no surprise that 90% were satisfied with the
frequency of their allowances and that 89% would be
substantially dissatisfied with receiving the benefit
on a weekly basis (as would be the case with
supplementary pensions) (BIO, Table 16). Unlike
owner-occupiers and council tenants, private tenants
were much more likely to look upon the DHSS as the
source of benefit in a favourable light; the issue for
private tenants was more a matter of getting enough
benefit than of its source. Over all tenures combined,
78% expressed positive satisfaction with the amounts of
their rebates (BIO, Table 19).
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Perceptions of Need
The four measures of perceptions of need taken at
the end of the screening interview were used (1) to
explore the hypothesis that satisfaction with the
amount of rebates was inversely related to perceptions
of need (e.g. as need increased, satisfaction
decreased) and (2) to present a general description of
the levels of need perceived by the sample. The results
of exploring the first hypothesis appear in Table 6.2A.
These results clearly show that, for all tenures
combined, all measures of perceived need were strongly
and significantly associated with satisfaction with the
amount of rebate in the expected direction. In terms of
levels of perceived need, the following was observed:
(a) about a third (33%) expressed no difficulty making
ends meet (BIO, Table 21); (b) nearly half (45%)
indicated that their income and expenses were about
equal, while only 18% indicated that their income was
less than their expenses (BIO, Table 22); (c) nearly
half (48%) were finding it at least a bit more
difficult to manage then than in the past (BIO, Table
23); (d) 88% perceived that they were at least a bit
better off than pensioners of the previous generation
(BIO, Table 24).
Table6.2A.RelationshipbetweeSatisfactionwithAmountoRe ateand FourMeasuresofPerceivedN d MEASURES 1.2.3.4. TENUREDegreeofInc mandOwnPastPrevious DifficultyExpensesSituationGeneration Owner Council Privater=-0.34 n=25 p<.05 r=-0.19 n=50 p<.10 r=-0.45 n=44 p<.002r=0.22 n=25 p<.15 r=0.25 n=50 p<.04 r=0.58 n=44 p<.001r=0.27 n=25 p<.10 r=0.20 n=50 p<.08 r=0.47 n=44 p<.002
r=-0.02 n=25 p<.46 r=0.31 n=50 p<.02 r=0.08 n=43 p<.32
AllTenuresr--0.31r=0.38r=0.3r=0.17 n=l19n^l19n=119n=118 p<.001p<.0 1p<.001p<.04
"5r
Correlationcoefficientsinthfirstcolumnarinvertedbec use
thescalevalu sforthismeasu ew reinverted.
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Summary
The following main points emerged from the
post-hoc survey: (1) the majority of pensioners had
been receiving rebates for fairly long periods, having
been catalysed to claim them by drops in income or
increases in expenses around retirement or after the
death of a spouse; (2) at the time they applied for
their rebates, 90% did not even consider applying for
supplementary pensions as an alternative, two-thirds of
these because of their negative feelings and
expectations about the outcomes of applying; (3) the
vast majority (86%) were very satisfied with their
rebates, and their overall satisfaction was determined
by their satisfaction with the value of their rebates;
(4) of owner-occupiers and council tenants, 90% were
satisfied with the low cash-flow style of managing
implied by rebates and with receiving benefit from the
local authority whereas over 75% were dissatisfied with
the prospect of managing on the high cash-flow style
implied by supplementary benefit and 38% were
dissatisfied with the prospect of receiving benefit
from the DHSS; (5) of private tenants, 90% were
satisfied with the frequency of their rent allowance
payments (mainly quarterly) and the same percentage
were dissatisfied with the prospect of receiving
benefit weekly; (6) pensioners' perceptions of the
levels of their needs were strongly related to their
satisfaction with their rebates, and in absolute terms
the majority of pensioners expressed little difficulty
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managing to make ends meet.
6.3 The Field Experiment
Figure 6.3A represents the design of the field
experiment. It is a modification of Figure 5.62A.
The behaviour of all individuals was monitored
over a seven-week waiting period (from the date of
research interview for Group A, the date of being
informed for Group B, and from the date of screening
interview for Group C); differences in the proportions
claiming during these periods would reveal the precise
effects which providing knowledge of eligibility and of
the application procedure would have upon catalysing
claiming. In the event, seven of the Group A members
were not given research interviews. Two had applied
very soon after their screening interviews, and five
were not available for a second interview. Thus the
size of Group A was reduced to 51.
Table 6.3B shows the effects of the experimental
treatments upon claiming within the seven-week period.
Fisher's Exact Probability Test (Siegel, 1956) was
used to assess the significance of the effects upon
claiming of the influences taken separately and
combined. The exact probabilities of finding the
observed distributions of claimants and non-claimants
(a) between Groups A and B was p=.230, (b) between
Figure6.3A.FieldExperimentDes n ExperimentalAssess e tInforofInformfRec d GroupInterviewEligibilityApplicationClaimi g ResultsbyLetterProc dureAft7 InPersonW eks AEligibleX<--7weeks—> (n=56) BEligibleX<7weeks> (n=33) CEligible<7weeks>X (n=32)












Groups B and C was p=.291, and (c) between Groups A and
C was p=.196. These tests indicated that, although the
differences were in the predicted direction, neither
the individual nor the combined effects upon claiming
of being informed of their eligibility and of
discussing applying were significant.
Due to the practical factors discussed in Section
5.62, the assignment of individuals to each of the
groups was not completely random. In order to ensure
that there were no significant differences amongst
groups which may have influenced the proportions
claiming, the groups were compared on the following
variables: DHSS local office catchment area, type of
tenure, marital status, health, mobility, household
composition, difficulty heating the house, overall
satisfaction with rebates and satisfaction with the
amount, age of the HOH, proportion which rebates formed
of total housing costs, number of years in receipt of
rebates, difficulty deciding to apply for rebates and
perceptions of supplementary benefit (as charity, as
possessing no utility, of claimants being undesirable
people, of the procedure being an invasion of privacy,
of the officers' personalities, of families', friends'
and neighbours' expected reactions).
Chi-squared analyses between the values of these
variables and the groups were conducted; the groups,
with two exceptions, were found to be exceptionally
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similar and well-balanced. The first exception was the
DHSS area in which the group members resided - the
distribution of area by group was not random, but this
was a by-product of the distribution of the
interviewing workload across interviewers. A test of
the importance of this systematic bias revealed that
DHSS area was not significantly related to claiming
behaviour (Chi-squared = 8.69, df = 4, ns). The second
difference between groups which was significant was
that of the number of years the pensioners had been in
receipt of their rebates (Chi-squared = 9.24, df=3,
p<.05). Group A over-represented people who had been
receiving rebates for less than 5 years; Group B was
correctly balanced; Group C under-represented people
who had been in receipt of rebates for less than 5
years. Although the groups were not balanced in this
respect, the bias did not seem to be serious since a
Chi-squared test between number of years in receipt of
rebates and claiming demonstrated absolutely no
relationship.
The three groups of eligible non-claimants were
also compared on the variables of the weekly values of
their rent, rates, rebates, state and occupational
pensions, total income, etc., and no significant
differences were found.
It is possible that any difference between Groups
A and B might have been due not to the fact that Group
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A was interviewed whereas Group B was not, but to the
possibility that the amount to which members of both
groups were told that they were entitled differed. To
demonstrate that this was not the case, the author
compared the mean amounts of their entitlement; for
Group A this was £3.20, and for Group B this was £3.11.
There was obviously no significant difference.
6.4 The Longitudinal Study
6.41 Composition of the VIE Component
Previous VIE research has suggested that the
optimum number of outcomes for predictive purposes
should be less than ten (Leon, 1979). However, there
remains the question of which outcomes to use,
especially when there is a considerable number from
which to choose. The consensus is that the outcomes
chosen should be those which are salient to the
individuals under study. The feasibility study
suggested that the optimal number of outcomes was small
(only four) and that applying seemingly revolved around
the four issues of feelings about the DHSS, about
rebates, about significant referents finding out, and
about having needs met. It was thus thought, but not
explicitly hypothesised, that a simple VIE model
represented by Figure 6.41A might be one of the best
predictors of behaviour.
In this conceptualisation, there are no
Figure6.41A.ConceptualStru turefVIEComponent
Applying leadsto:
Strengthof Expectation (constant)- (measured) UTIL (measured)








instrumentalities, only expectancies and valences. The
expectancies are the subjective probabilities that
applying leads to direct involvement with the DHSS,
having needs met, the significant referent finding out,
and giving up the rebate. The valences are the feelings
attached to each of these outcomes. Because they are
known by these pensioners to be certain to follow
applying, the expectancies for direct involvement with
the DHSS and giving up the rebate are set at 1.0; the
expectancy for having needs met is represented by the
unrestricted scale used for measuring perceived
utility; the corresponding valence is the inverse of
the amount of difficulty experienced making ends meet.
In order to determine which combination of
expectancy-valence variables contained the most salient
outcomes, nearly 30 alternative VIE formulations were
constructed, and the resulting scores correlated with
behaviour. The results of tests of 15 of these
combinations appear in Table 6.41A.
As can be seen from Table 6.41A, EV1 is the best
VIE combination in terms of the prediction of behaviour
across all subjects. It is also noteworthy that,
although the composition of the VIE component may
change, in twelve of the fifteen cases the correlation
for the stable deciders is stronger than that for the
non-deciders and unstable deciders combined. This would
suggest that the differential validity found in the
Table 6.41A. Alternative VIE Combinations: Correlations
with Behaviour for Different Sub-groups










EV1 E1V1+E2V2+V3+V4 0.400 0.509 0.134
EV2 E2V2+V3 TO V7 0.355 0.451 0.201
EV3 E2V2+V4 TO V7 0.310 0.385 0.189
EV4 V3+V4 0.353 0.467 0.213
EV5 E2V2+V5 0.246 0.308 0.113
EV6 ElVI 0.341 0.265 0.410
EV7 E2V2+V3 0.335 0.493 0.048
EV8 V3+V7 0.355 0.464 0.180
EV9 E2V2+V3+V4+V8 0.366 0.501 0.129
EV10 E2V2+V3+V4 0.353 0.484 0.118
EV11 E1V1+V4 0.307 0.317 0.218
EV12 V6 TO V12 0.007 -0.028 0.089



















leads to having needs met
leads to significant referent finding out
is synonymous with asking for charity
VALENCE ON:
having needs met






V8 having means-test interview
V9 revealing income
V10 revealing state of health
VI1 revealing state of clothing
VI2 revealing income from family
VL3 having interview at home
VL4 having interview at office
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pilot study is not an artefact of having failed to
select outcomes salient to all subjects.
Having identified the VIE component with the most
salient outcomes, the next step was to examine the
interrelatedness of the expectancy and valence measures
comprising the VIE component. Table 6.41B presents
these intercorrelations. The results are disappointing;
perceptions of utility (El) and of need (VI) are as
strongly related to each other as the total VIE score
is to behaviour, expectancies of the significant
referent finding out (E2) are moderately related to
feelings about that person finding out (V2), and
feelings about giving up the rebate (V4) are related,
although only weakly, to nearly everything. The
implications of these interrelationships will be
discussed in Chapter 8.
6.42 Confirming the Validity of the Threshold Model
Confirming the validity of the threshold model
required demonstrating (1) the validity of the model as
a predictor of behaviour, (2) the empirical
independence of the key variables in the model, and (3)
the validity of the main deduction from the model —
that the VIE scores would better predict the behaviour
of the stable deciders than any of the other
sub-groups.
Table 6.42A presents the results of the
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within-persons analyses for predictive validity. "VIE
scores only" means that only the VIE scores were used
to predict the behaviour of all 92 respondents; in the
"threshold model", these scores were used to predict
the behaviour of only the 51 respondents who perceived
some need, some utility to the benefit, and that their
situations were stable. The non-claiming behaviour of
the remaining 41 was predicted by their perceptions of
no need, or no utility to the benefit or that their
situations were unstable. Under each of these
categories are two sub-categories of "zero threshold"
and "optimal threshold". In the feasibility study it
was found that the VIE scores best predicted behaviour
when the threshold was set at zero. This was
interpreted as indicating that the positive outcomes of
applying need only fractionally outweigh the negative
outcomes in order for a pensioner to apply. That
analysis indicated that the zero threshold was also the
optimal threshold, "optimal" meaning producing the
strongest relationship between predicted and actual
behaviour.
However, the full study analysis indicated that
the two were not synonymous, and that the optimal
threshold was substantially higher than in the first
study. Thus, presented below are the findings for both
VIE thresholds under each method. The optimal threshold
was the same in both methods.
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In order to contrast the predictive power of
cognitive and non-cognitive variables, the
effectiveness of using "marital status", "housing
tenure", and "amount better off on supplementary
pension" to predict behaviour is also shown. In
addition, the formulations involving multiplicative and
additive linkages and the post-hoc multivariate method
used in the feasibility study were also used here for
comparison. The continuous predictors implied by the
"amount better off" and the last three methods were
transformed into dichotomous predictors using the
discriminant analysis technique discussed in Chapter 4.
Chi-squared tests were used to assess the strength
of the relationship between predicted and actual
behaviour for each method. Since the author did not
formulate explicit hypotheses about the direction of
relationships between behaviour and type of tenure and
marital status, it would be inappropriate to present
the number of correct predictions made using these two
variables.
In general, these results confirmed the predictive
validity of the threshold model. As expected, it
provided more correct predictions of behaviour than use
of VIE scores alone; the probability that the level of
predictive accuracy achieved by the threshold model was
due to chance was less than one in one thousand.
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Behaviour was also better predicted by the two methods
employing cognitive variables than by marital status,
housing tenure, or amount better off.
As the second step, confirmation was sought of the
feasibility study finding that the VIE scores better
predicted the behaviour of the stable deciders than of
the unstable deciders and of the non-deciders, and that
they better predicted the behaviour of the deciders
than of the non-deciders. The results of these analyses
appear as Figure 6.42A.
Tests were conducted to determine the significance
of the difference between these correlations. The
probabilities that these differences were due to chance
alone were (a) p=.026 (Z=1.93) for the difference
between deciders and non-deciders, and (b) p=.018
(Z=2.08) for the difference between stable deciders and
non-deciders. These results clearly confirmed the
feasibilty study findings that the VIE scores
powerfully predicted the behaviour of the stable
deciders, but predicted very poorly the behaviour of
the non-deciders.
6.43 Explanations for Differential Claiming Using the
Threshold Model (Please see Figure 6.43A)
Using the threshold model to interpret
differential claiming, it was found that, for 37
Figure6.42A.VIEScore-BehaviourCor lationsf r DifferentSub-Groups Entire Group r=0.40 n=(92) p=.000Deciders r=0.48 n=(55) p=.000 Non- Deciders r=0.097 n=(37) p=.283
Stable Deciders r=0.51 n=(51) p-.000 Unstable Deciders r=-0.27 n=(4) p=.365
Figure6.43A.OverviewofSubstantivFindi gs
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respondents (40%), making a decision about whether or
not to apply for a supplementary pension was not a
salient issue. These non-deciders comprised two groups,
the 27 pensioners who stated that they had no
difficulty making ends meet (comprising 29% of the
sample), and the 10 pensioners (11% of the sample) who
had varying levels of difficulty managing but who
believed that the amount of supplementary pension would
be of no use towards meeting their needs. Twenty-six
(26) of the 27 who perceived no need did not apply, and
of the 10 who perceived no utility, none applied.
Making a decision about applying was salient for
55 respondents (60% of the sample). Of this group, 15
(16%) made decisions to apply, and 40 (44%) made
decisions not to apply. It can be assumed that their
decisions were based upon their expectations and
feelings about applying. As was anticipated, not all
fifteen who decided to apply did so. The eleven (12%)
who perceived their situations to be stable did apply;
all four who perceived their situations to be unstable
did not apply.
As can be seen from Table 6.43A, in terms of the
main steps at which the explanations for behaviour lie,
there is a remarkable correspondence between the
results of the two studies.
Although the reasons for non-claiming, such as
Table6.43A.St geatWhichExpl n tionsforBehaviour Lie:AComparisonfFeasibilityandFullSt yFindings STAGEFEASIBILITYSTUDYFULSTUDY Issuesofapplying NOTSALIENTdueto: (a)PerceptionsofNO NEED28%29% (b)PerceptionsofNO UTILITY4%11 IssuesSALIENT,deci ion made,ansituation STABLE.56%56% IssuesSALIENT,tentativ decisionmade,but situationUNSTABLE.12%
4%
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perceptions of no difficulty managing, of no utility to
the benefit or of unstable situations, would appear to
be self-explanatory, the VIE scores which
differentiated the 40 who presumably decided not to
apply and the 15 who decided to apply need to be
studied in detail. This is the aim of the next section.
6.44 The Stable Deciders: Expectations and Feelings
Differentiating Claimants and Non-Claimants
Although EV1 was made up of four
expectancy-valence products, these can be decomposed
into six expectancies and valences. The aim of this
section is to analyse the relationships between these
six measures and behaviour, and between them and their
possible determinants.
Best Predictors of Behaviour
The VIE component which best predicted behaviour
comprised measures of pensioners' feelings (1) about
direct involvement with the DHSS, (2) about having to
give up their rebates in exchange for the supplementary
pensions, (3) about having their needs met, (4) about
their most important "significant referent" finding
out, and measures of their expectations (5) about the
extent to which the benefit would meet their needs and
(6) about the likelihood that the significant referent
would find out. The correlations between these six
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variables and behaviour are presented in Table 6.44A.
The two correlations between behaviour and the products
of corresponding expectations and feelings about having
needs met and significant referents finding out are
also shown. (The correlations between behaviour and all
the expectancy-valence variables measured appear in
Appendix Bll.)
As can be seen from Table 6.44A, the best
predictor of pensioners' behaviour was the measure of
their feelings about direct involvement with the DHSS.
Their expectations about the extent to which the
benefit would meet their needs were also important, but
when combined with their corresponding feelings about
having needs met, the products predicted behaviour not
much better than did their feelings about giving up
their rebates and their expectations and feelings about
their significant referent finding out if they were to
apply.
It was not anticipated that all these expectations
and feelings would predict equally well across tenure
and marital categories. Although it was believed that
expectations and feelings about having needs met and
feelings about direct involvement with the DHSS were
very important to all groups, it was hypothesised that
expectations and feelings about the significant
referent finding out and feelings about giving up the
rebates would be important for some groups and not for
302.




1. Direct involvement 0.46 ***
2. Giving up rebate 0.25 *
3. Having needs met 0.22 +
4. Significant referent
finding out 0.21 +
EXPECTATIONS THAT:
5. Receiving SP will
meet needs 0.34 **
6. Applying for SP leads to
significant referent
finding out 0.13 +
EXPECTATION-FEELING
PRODUCTS FOR OUTCOMES OF:





** = p< .01
*** = p<.001
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others. The specific hypotheses were:
(i) that expectations and feelings about the
significant referent finding out would
predict the behaviour of single persons and
widows significantly better than that of
married couples, since married couples were
less likely to to ask for and to rely upon
the opinions of others;
(ii) that feelings about giving up the
rebates would predict the behaviour of
private and council tenants significantly
better than that of owner-occupiers since
housing costs formed a much larger concern
for tenants than house owners, both
financially and in terms of worry.
Neither hypothesis was confirmed. Although
expectations and feelings about the significant
referent finding out did predict non-married persons1
behaviour better (r=0.35,n=31,p=.028) than married
persons' behaviour (r=0.15, n=20, p=.480), the
difference between these coefficients was not
significant (Z=0.696, ns). The same was true for the
second hypothesis. Although feelings about giving up
the rebate predicted the behaviour of the private and
council tenants (r=0.34, n=42, p=.013) better than the
behaviour of the owner-occupiers (r=-0.01, n=9,
p=.480), the difference between these coefficients was
not significant (Z=1.78, ns).
Since expectations and feelings about the
significant referent finding out formed a very
important part of the explanation for differential
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claiming in the feasibility study, several further
analyses were performed. The first was to explore who
these significant referents were in terms of their
generation, sex and their relationship to the
respondents. The second was to determine the extent to
which the relationship between the pensioners'
behaviour and their expectations and feelings about the
significant referent finding out varied as a function
of the characteristics of the significant referent.
Table 6.44B identifies the significant referents. As
can be seen, over half the significant referents were
members of the next youngest generation, and, over all
age groups, the majority of significant referents were
women.
Table 6.44C presents the correlations between
feelings about the significant referent finding out and
behaviour categorised by the characteristics of the
significant referents. As can clearly be seen, the
relationship is much stronger where the significant
referent is a male rather than a female, and where he
is a sibling or in-law rather than a member of the
younger generation.
******
The effectiveness of the six main expectations and
feelings in predicting behaviour has been explored in
detail. The next logical step is to attempt to clarify
Table6.44B.IdentityofRespondents'Sig ificanR fer nts IDENTITYNUMBER FAMILY:Samegeneration Sister5 Sister-in-law1 Brother4 Brother-in-law0 TOTAL10 FAMILY:Nextg neration Daughter17 Son8 Neice2 Nephew1 TOTAL28 FRIENDS6 NOSIGNIFICANTREFERENT IDENTIFIED7 TOTAL51


















the attitudes which best explain these main feelings.
Since feelings about direct involvement with the DHSS
were clearly the most important predictors of
behaviour, they are examined first.
Explanations of Feelings about Direct Involvement
In conceptual terms, pensioners' feelings about
direct involvement with the DHSS could be reflecting
feelings about (1) the acts involved in the application
procedure, (2) other people who might be involved in
the application procedure, or about (3) pensioners'
views, in principle, about applying (e.g. the extent to
which the benefit is perceived as being charity, etc.).
Two analyses were undertaken here, (i) simple
correlations between feelings about involvement and
variables which represented feelings about acts, others
and principles, and (ii) regression analyses against
feelings about involvement using the three sets of
variables as predictors.
The results of the simple correlational analyses
appear in Table 6.44D. Feelings about having an
interview provided by far the most powerful
explanations for feelings about direct involvement;
also important were pensioners' feelings about being
asked about any income from their families, and about
any savings, and their feelings about the type of
person they expected the interviewer to be. Of lesser
Table 6.44D. Predictors of "Feelings about Direct
Involvement" (N=51)
VARIABLES r Sig.
FEELINGS ABCOT THE ACTS OF:
1. Having an official interview 0.67 **
2. Having interview at EHSS office 0.12 +
3. Having interview at heme 0.38 *
4. Being asked about savings 0.50 **
5. Being asked about inccme 0.19 +
6. Being asked about clothing 0.13 +
7. Being asked to verify resources 0.37 ★
8. Being asked about any inccme
frcm family 0.52 **
FEET,TNGS ABOUT OTHERS INCLUDING:
1. The EHSS interviewer 0.45 **
2. Other claimants at office -0.08 +
VARIBLES POSSIBLY INDICATING
PRINCIPLES:
1. Belief that SB is charity -0.36 *
2. Belief that rebate is charity -0.09 +
3. Feelings about EHSS as source
of Supplementary Pension 0.17 +
4. Feelings about Local Authority
as source of rebates 0.06 +





importance but still significant were their feelings
about having the interview at home (even though
nine-tenths preferred to have the interview at home),
being asked in the means-test interview to provide
verification of their resources and expenses, and their
belief that supplementary benefit is charity. It is
also noteworthy that the two variables of "feelings
about other claimants at the social security office"
and the "age of the head of household" were unrelated
to their feelings about direct involvement with the
DHSS.
The results of the regression analyses clearly
indicated that feelings about the acts involved in the
application procedure were the best predictors of
feelings about direct involvement (R=.737). This was
followed by feelings about others involved in the
procedure (R=.450) and by the set of variables which it
was believed partially represented their views in
principle about the benefit (R=.419). Summaries of
these analyses appear in Tables 6.44E, F, and G.
Explanations of Feelings about Giving Up the Rebate
Throughout the interview stages in both the
feasibility and the full studies it was apparent that
pensioners' views about their rebates formed an
important part of their feelings about supplementary
pensions. It was also fairly clear that there were
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three types of explanation for these feelings, and
these were related to their perceptions (1) of the
convenience of the rebates coming as a reduction at
source, (2) of the extent to which they believed
supplementary benefit was charity, and (3) of their
satisfaction with the amount of their rebates. Since
these three issues were not relevant to all tenure
categories, the results in Table 6.44H are presented by
tenure. "NR" in Table 6.44H indicates "not relevant".
As can be seen from Table 6.44H, the best
predictor of owner-occupiers' feelings about giving up
their rebates was the strength of their belief that the
alternative, supplementary benefit, was charity. The
stronger was their belief that supplementary benefit
was charity, the greater was their unwillingness to
give up their rebates. Issues of convenience of form
and satisfaction with the value of their rebates were
more important for council tenants than were their
concerns about the connotations of supplementary
pensions. Since private tenants receive rent allowances
as cash, the convenience of the form of the rebate was
not a relevant issue for them. The best predictor of
private tenants' feelings about giving up their rebates
was the strength of their belief that supplementary
benefit was charity. However, the relationship was
inverted? the stronger their belief that supplementary
benefit was charity, the less upset they were about
Table6.44H.BestPredictorsofFeel ngsabouGiving UpRebatesbyHousingTen r .










giving up their rebates. Over all tenure categories,
only satisfaction with the value of their rebates
predicted pensioners' feelings about giving them up
(r=-0.23, n=51, p<.05). This relationship was in the
expected direction, indicating that the more satisfied
they were with the current amounts of their rebates,
the less likely they were to want to give them up.
Explanations of Feelings about Significant Referent
Finding Out
Of those 44 who indicated that they had a person
with whom they were particularly close and with whom
they discussed confidential issues, 38 mentioned
specific members of their families as their significant
referents. Thus it seemed most appropriate that a
search for the best explanations of feelings about the
significant referent finding out should concentrate on
family-related issues.
It appeared that pensioners were quite often
concerned about the implications of their families
finding out if they were to apply. The main implication
was that their families would offer to help them, and
it was thought that the pensioners' feelings could have
been reflecting either of two aspects of this: (1)
their feelings if their families volunteered to help
them; (2) their perceptions of how able their families
were to help them. In the feasibility study it was
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found that the latter concept provided the best
explanation; although pensioners uniformly believed
their families to be willing to help out, there was a
direct relationship between feelings about them finding
out and their ability to help them out.
The first hypothesis, essentially implying that
feelings about the family finding out were really
reflections of the willingness of pensioners to accept
help from their families, was not directly supported.
The correlation between the two variables was r=-0.03
(n=51, p<.393). The second hypothesis was not supported
either. Pensioners' feelings about their families
finding out were strongly but inversely related to
their perceptions of the ability of their families to
assist them; the more able the family was perceived to
be, the unhappier the pensioners were about them
finding out (r= -0.30, n=51, p=.015). This would appear
to support indirectly the view that pensioners
generally desire to remain independent of their
families.
Explanations of Feelings about Having Needs Met
It seems intuitively obvious that for pensioners
who are having some difficulty managing, there should
be a relationship between their level of difficulty and
their claiming behaviour. However, much less obvious
are the sources of their perceptions of having
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difficulty managing.
As discussed in Chapter 5, prior to discussing
supplementary pensions in detail with the respondents,
the interviewers first noted the items, commodities and
pastimes that the pensioners had either cut down on or
given up recently due to lack of money. The
interviewers then inquired as to the pensioners1
feelings about these changes, and rated their feelings
on seven-point scales ranging from "very upset" (-3) to
"very pleased" (+3), with the middle point (0)
summarised by the phrase "not bothered". It was thought
that these measures would provide the best
explanations, in conceptual terms at least, for the
variation in levels of difficulty making ends meet
experienced by the stable deciders. Table 6.441
presents the correlations between feelings about having
cut down or given up certain items and how difficult
they were finding it to manage.
As can be seen from this table, feelings about
having given up going out for entertainment (such as to
a club, the cinema, or to the theatre), and about
having given up going on holidays and travelling,
provided the best explanations of pensioners1
perceptions of their levels of difficulty managing. To
put the latter set of feelings into a proper context, a
"holiday" was a weekend or at most a week away with
friends or relatives, frequently somewhere within an
Table6.441.CorrelationsbetweeF elingsaboutH vingCu DownnrGiveUpItemsandDifficultyM nagi g(N=51) ITEM,COMMODITYRPASTIME CUTDOWNONRGIVEUP:rSig. 1.Clothing0.23+ 2.Fuel(Electricity,0.08+ Gas,CoalOil) 3.Entertainment0.44*** 4.HolidaysandTr vel0.39** 5.Food(especially0.12+ meatandfreshuit) 6.Luxuries(cigarett ,drink0.16+ andsweets) 7.Presentsforgrandchildren-0.14+ 8.Otheritems0.13+ + * *=non-significant —p<.01 =p<.001
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hour's drive of Edinburgh. What was meant by
"travelling" was going by public transport to some
location such as Glasgow or Kirkcaldy to see friends or
relatives. None of the other sets of feelings about
reductions in using fuel, buying food, buying luxuries,
buying presents for the grandchildren and buying
clothing correlated highly with the level of difficulty
managing, although the measure of feelings about having
given up buying clothing was nearly significant
(p=.057).
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7.0 Full Study Findings: Part II
7.1 Introduction
Section 6.44 contained an examination of the
factors which best differentiated two types of
deciders, those who decided to claim and did so and
those who decided not to claim. However, the results
presented in Table 6.43A showed that two-fifths of the
pensioners never went as far as to make a decision
which involved weighing up the consequences of
applying. The main explanations why these pensioners
did not make decisions and thus did not apply were (1)
that they perceived no difficulty managing or (2) that
they perceived some difficulty managing but no utility
to a supplementary pension. Others made decisions to
apply but did not do so because they perceived their
situations to be unstable. Therefore, in the first half
of this chapter, the author presents findings which
will shed light on the factors differentiating those
who perceived some need, utility or stability from
those who did not.
In the second half of the chapter, the data from
the longitudinal study are used in a different fashion.
There are many times when an investigator wishes to
know exactly what the unique effect of one or a number
of independent variables is upon a dependent variable.
321 .
By using an experimental design, in which a small
number of variables are manipulated while others not
central to the research are controlled, these unique
effects can be directly studied. A clear example of
this is in the field experiment discussed previously.
However, in many research situations - particularly in
the social sciences - such a high level of control is
not possible. It is often the case that a lot of
independent variables are varying simultaneously, that
it is not possible (or perhaps not acceptable) to
manipulate these variables, or that there are so many
variables that using a factorial design would require
far more subjects than were available (disregarding
completely the problems caused by the ^x post facto
selection procedure).
This situation accurately describes the
longitudinal study, in which many cognitive variables
are varying simultaneously, and in which it is
difficult to be certain of the unique contribution of
each variable to variation in behaviour. Regression
analysis provides an alternative means of assessing the
unique contributions of individual variables.
Therefore, the longitudinal study data are used in
a series of regression analyses in the second half of
the chapter. These analyses were undertaken as a check
against the conclusions as to the importance of certain
cognitive variables derived using the threshold model.
322.
It must be stated that these analyses are not to be
considered a substitute for the theoretical analysis
performed above, since the two approaches are
essentially very different. Rather, they should be
treated as being complementary.
7.2 Differentiating Those with No Difficulty and Those
with Some Difficulty Managing
This section presents the results of the tests of
the seven need hypotheses set out in Section 5.3.
Hypothesis N1: Wage-earning Reference Group
Pensioners who perceived some difficulty managing
perceived a significantly greater discrepancy between
their pre-retirement expectations and their current
circumstances than did those who perceived no
difficulty (t=4.63, df=89, p<.001), thus confirming
Hypothesis N1.
Hypothesis N2: Previous Generation Reference Group
The extent of the perceived difference between
their current difficulty managing and that encountered
by the previous generation of pensioners was
significantly greater for pensioners who perceived no
difficulty managing than for those who perceived some
difficulty (t=2.58, df=87, p=.006), thus confirming
Hypothesis N2.
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Hypothesis N3: Assimilation of Expectations of Imposed
Membership Group
Those who perceived no difficulty managing had
been retired significantly longer than those who
perceived some difficulty (t=2.54, df=36.19, p=.008),
thus confirming Hypothesis N3. This may suggest that
the difference in perceptions of degree of difficulty
managing is due to changes in pensioners' expectations
resulting from the gradual impact over time of the
change in membership group status. However, this
finding may be confounded by the fact that those who
have been retired the longest are the oldest, and are
pensioners of a previous generation who may always have
had lower expectations than the later generation.
Hypothesis N4: Structure of Decision-Making Unit
Married couples and single persons were
significantly less likely than were widows to state
that they were having no difficulty managing
(Chi-squared = 14.62, df=2, p=.0007), thus confirming
Hypothesis N4. Table 7.2A presents the distribution of
pensioners by marital status and perceptions of
difficulty managing.
It is possible that these differences could be
reflecting the relative adequacy of income maintenance
provisions for single persons and married couples.
Table7.2A.MaritaSt tusbyLevelofDifficul yManaging PERCEIVEDL V LMARITALSTATUS OFDIFFICULTYMARRIEDSINGLWIDOWEDALL NONE05227 SOME24122965 TOTAL2417519
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Disregarding entirely the fact that adequacy is not an
objective evaluation but may itself be determined by
differing expectations, this alternative hypothesis
would contradict the author's first-hand observations
that widows were much more rigid, anxious, and
inflexible than non-widows.
Hypothesis N5: Cognitive Dissonance - Disengagement
Pensioners who perceived no difficulty managing
were significantly more satisfied with the amounts of
their rebates (t=2.89, df=75.24, p=.0025), and tended
to be older than those who perceived some difficulty
(t=1.63, df=35.54, p=.056). However, there were no
significant differences between the two groups in terms
of three measures of health and of mobility. Although
there was the hint of a relationship between age and
perception of difficulty managing, Hypothesis N5 was
only partially confirmed. However, it must be noted
that this explanatory hypothesis was the most likely to
be confounded by the incomplete response rate since
non-respondents tended to be less healthy and were
possibly older than were respondents. Had the obtained
sample represented the invited sample in terms of age
and health, this hypothesis may have had stronger
support.
Hypothesis N6: Cognitive Dissonance - Applying for SB
Pensioners who perceived no difficulty managing
326.
were not significantly more negative in their feelings
about applying than were pensioners who perceived some
difficulty managing. Thus Hypothesis 6 was not
confirmed. Seven measures were studied: pensioners'
expectations that supplementary benefit was charity,
and their feelings about direct involvement with the
DHSS, having a means-test interview, having the
official interview at home, having the official
interview at the office, the DHSS officers, and about
giving up their rebates. As can be seen from Table
7.2B, only two of these variables, feelings about
direct involvement and about having the interview at
home, came close to differentiating the two groups.
Because these hypotheses were directional, one-tailed
t-tests were used.[l]
Hypothesis N7: Perceptions of Current Circumstances
Pensioners who perceived no difficulty managing
did perceive significantly smaller discrepancies
between their income and expenses than did pensioners
who perceived some difficulty (t=5.40, df=64.19,
pc.OOl), but these differences were not based on
objective group differences in the mean number of extra
pensions (Chi-squared = 3.53, df=2, ns) or
non-dependents (Chi-squared = 0.13, df=l, ns). As such,
Hypothesis N7 was only partly confirmed.





















7.3 Differentiating Those Who Perceive Some Utility and
Those Who Perceive None
Of the 65 pensioners who passed the first
threshold of need, 10 perceived no utility to the
benefit to meet their needs, and 55 perceived some
utility. The further analyses attempted to discover
where the sources of the differences in the perceptions
of utility of benefit lay.
The Three Need-Related Hypotheses
Hypotheses U1 and U2 were unsupported. Neither (1)
the number of items cut down on (t=0.38, df=63, p=.352)
nor (2) pensioners' feelings about having cut down on
these items (t=0.55, df=63, p=.293) differed
significantly between the two groups. Taken
individually, the presence or absence of specific needs
mentioned by pensioners did not distinguish the two
groups; the essential items were no better at
distinguishing the two groups than were the
non-essential items. Thus, Hypothesis U3 was also
unsupported. It was amply clear that the
characteristics of pensioners' perceptions of the
utility of the benefit were not to be simply explained
by the characteristics of their needs.
The Benefit-Related Hypothesis
Hypothesis U4 was that the average amount better
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off on supplementary pensions would be significantly
greater for those who perceived some utility to the
benefit than for those who perceived no utility. This
hypothesis was confirmed very emphatically (t=3.34,
df=63, p=.0005), thus clearly indicating that those who
perceived some utility were due significantly larger
supplementary pensions than were those who perceived no
utility.
In summary, it was simply the amount which they
would gain from being on supplementary benefit, rather
than the characteristics of their needs, which was most
influential in determining whether or not pensioners
perceive any utility to the benefit.
7.4 The Unstable Deciders
Figure 6.43A indicates that 55 pensioners
progressed to the stage of making a decision about
supplementary pensions. Of these, the threshold model
implied that fifteen made decisions to apply and 40
made decisions not to apply. For four of the fifteen
who decided to apply, going ahead and claiming was
contingent upon certain conditions being met. It is
this group of four that have been called the unstable
deciders, since their acting on their decisions was
conditional upon the uncertainty of their situations
being resolved.
Two of the pensioner units, one a married couple
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and one a widow, were waiting to see the size of their
forthcoming increases in rent and rates and to see how
well they could manage for a few weeks prior to
claiming. One widow was in the midst of trying to
decide whether or not to give up her part-time job. The
remaining pensioner, a spinster, was very positive
about claiming in almost every way except that she was
terrified by the prospect of an official interview.
This woman was waiting to find out if a young friend of
hers would be available to sit with her at the official
interview if she claimed. (After the criterion date, a
member of the research team agreed to be at the
official interview with her, she claimed, carried
through with the interview, and is now some £6.50 per
week better off.)
Although it must be admitted that there is a
particular type of person who will always put off until
tomorrow what he or she could easily have done today,
there are neither the data to justify nor any cause to
believe that it is a characteristic of these
pensioners' personalities that prevents them from
applying immediately. These conditions are real
considerations which must be taken at face value
towards explaining why some pensioners whom one expects
to claim do not do so.
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7.5 Summary of Main Findings
In Chapters 6 and 7 the author has demonstrated
the validity of the threshold model and has used it to
derive substantive findings about pensioners1 attitudes
towards applying. The main findings are summarised
below, but it must be borne in mind that they apply
only to pensioners who are in the "better off"
situation and who are aware of their eligibility:
1. Forty percent (40%) of the sample never went
as far as to weigh up the advantages and
disadvantages of applying and to come to any
decision. Three-quarters of these perceived
no difficulty managing; the majority were
widows for whom making a decison about
applying was probably too demanding and who
therefore avoided making such a decision. The
remaining quarter made no decisions in terms
of their expectations about outcomes of
applying because they perceived the benefit
to have no utility towards meeting their
needs. Their perceptions of the usefulness of
the benefit were directly related to the
amount of their entitlement; the amount by
which this group would be better off would
have to be raised by £2.00 per week on
average before it would be sufficiently
useful for them to consider applying. As a
general rule of thumb, any amount less than
£3.25 per week was not worth considering.
2. Four percent (4%) of the sample made
conditional decisions to apply when informed
of their eligibility, but were prevented from
claiming by the uncertainties of their
situations.
3. Fifty-six percent (56%) of the sample made
decisions about applying for supplementary
pensions and were able to act on these
decisions. The expectations and feelings
about the consequences of applying which best
differentiated the eleven claimants and 40
non-claimants were (in descending order of
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importance): (a) feelings about direct
involvement with the DHSS, (b) feelings about
having to give up the rebate in exchange for
the supplementary pension, (c) expectations
and feelings about significant referents
finding out if the pensioners applied, and
(d) expectations and feelings about having
needs met.
7.6 An Alternative Approach: The Regression Analyses
7.61 Variables Used for Regression Analyses
The variables chosen for the analyses which follow
were limited to 36 psychological variables which could
be defined as being measures of perceptions,
expectations or feelings. They included six taken from
the screening interview, four of which pertained to
satisfaction with rebates and two of which dealt with
pensioners' perceptions of need relative to their own
past and to previous generations. From the research
interview came the up-dated measures of need
(difficulty making ends meet and balance of income and
expenses), of feelings attached to nine types of items
cut down on or given up, of perceived utility, of the
beliefs that supplementary benefit and rebates were
charity, and of feelings attached to the outcomes of
applying. Since eight individuals refused to provide
estimates of Perceived Utility of the benefit to meet
their needs, the overall number of cases was reduced
from 92 to 84.
The dependent variable in these analyses was
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behaviour during the seven-week waiting period.
7.62 Method of Regression Analysis Used
A forward (stepwise) inclusion method was used
wherein variables were entered into the regression
equation in the order in which they explained the
greatest amounts of variation in the criterion. It was
specified that the regression equation should include
only those ten variables which, when combined, best
predicted behaviour. This specification was made
because of the relationship between sample size and
number of variables mentioned in Chapter 4.
Separate analyses using the same set of variables
were conducted for the entire sample (n=84), for
married couples (24), for widows (44), and others (16)
and for owner-occupiers (16), council tenants (34) and
private tenants (34).
7.63 Interpreting the Beta Weights
To evaluate the impact of any one of the
independent variables, the Beta weights (or partial
regression coefficients) are used. The beta weight
indicates the influence that each independent variable
has on behaviour when the other variables are held
constant. Since these weights are presented in
standardised units they are useful in interpreting the
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individual effects of each independent variable.
However, these weights are not absolute measures of
importance, but have been derived in the context of
controlling the other variables, nine in this case. If
either the number or the nature of the variables were
changed, the beta weight of any predictor relative to
its fellow predictors would also change.
7.64 Results for the Entire Sample (N=84)
As can be seen from Table 7.64A, the final
multiple correlation for all subjects (to be found at
the bottom of the second column) stands at .653, the
predictor variables accounting for 43% of the variation
in the behaviour of the pensioners.
In terms of substantive findings, it was first
noted that the same issues emerged as being important
in this analysis as were important in the feasibility
study. These key issues were, with their corresponding
beta weights in parentheses, feelings about having to
verify information given in the official interview
(.50), feelings about being asked about savings (.46),
perceptions of the utility of the supplementary pension
toward making ends meet (.35), feelings about direct
involvement with the DHSS (.33), feelings about having
an interview (.30), perceptions of difficulty making
ends meet (.25), and feelings about being asked about
income ( . 21) .
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Pensioners' feelings about their significant
referents finding out, one of the most important
variables in the feasibility study, did not appear
amongst the ten most important predictors here. Also
important in the feasibility study was the measure of
pensioners' feelings about giving up their rebates. It
did not appear amongst the ten best predictors of
behaviour here, but the conceptually related construct
of satisfaction with the current amount of rebate did
appear (although with a relatively very low weight of
.17). The remaining two variables which appeared were
feelings about being asked about any income from the
family (.17) and about having given up luxuries
including cigarettes, alcohol and sweets (.13). This
last variable was the least important of the ten in
predicting behaviour.
An equally important issue is to consider the
variables that could have been important but were not.
Two of these were the separate measures of pensioners'
beliefs that supplementary benefit and rebates were
charity. Although it has some conceptual validity in
explaining non-claiming, the strength of pensioners'
belief that SB is charity did not appear directly to
differentiate claimants and non-claimants. It is quite
possible, however, that the long-held attitudes
reflecting these views had influenced the respondents'
views about involvement with the DHSS.
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In summary, a few general points can be made. (1)
Pensioners' behaviour was primarily controlled by their
feelings about direct involvement with the DHSS and the
short-term procedural outcomes of that involvement. (2)
There was relatively little evidence to suggest that
issues of principle and of other people's opinions were
directly important. (3) Pensioners' perceptions of the
utility of the benefit were less important than were
their evaluations of the application procedure, but
were substantially more important than their
perceptions of difficulty managing. Perceptions of
utility were generally related to the amounts by which
the respondents would be better off (r=0.38, n=84,
p<.001). (4) Generally speaking, behaviour was a
function of pensioners' perceptions of the
supplementary benefits scheme; their perceptions of
their rebates did not relate to this behaviour as
strongly as was expected.
These comments apply to the entire group of
pensioners in the "better off" situation. However,
there was reason to expect that there would be
variations in the importance of factors across tenures
and marital status. This belief was substantiated by
the findings presented in the following section.
65 Summary of the Results for Sub-groups
1. For OWNER-OCCUPIERS (see Table 7.65A),
behaviour was best predicted by the variables
which reflected issues of principle (the
extent to which the benefit was viewed as
being a right or charity), of self-esteem and
of privacy (feelings about having an
interview at the DHSS office, about being
with other claimants at the office).
Owner-occupiers, more than the other two
groups, appeared to be very conscious of
other people's presence and opinions; their
feelings about the significant referents
finding out were also important.
2. For COUNCIL TENANTS (see Table 7.65B),
behaviour was best predicted by variables
which reflected their very real concern about
their rebates and the implications of
adopting a high cash-flow style of managing.
3. For PRIVATE TENANTS (see Table 7.65C),
behaviour was best predicted by the variables
which reflected their feelings about items
and pastimes which they had cut down on or
given up due to lack of money. Although
concern about losing their rebates was
important, the need-related variables were
substantially more important.
4. For MARRIED COUPLES (see Table 7.65D), there
was no clear characterisation, but it
appeared that feelings about the application
procedure, perceptions of need, and feelings
about the DHSS as the source of the benefit
were more important in predicting behaviour
than were concerns about the utility of the
benefit or about rebates.
5. For OTHERS (see Table 7.65E), behaviour was
very largely predicted by perceptions of the
amount of difficulty encountered making ends
meet. Other variables were only of minor
importance.
6. For WIDOWS (see Table 7.65F), behaviour was
best predicted by variables which represented
various facets of need. Concerns about
rebates were important, but were overshadowed
by both the number and the magnitude of the
need-related variables.
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7.66 Summary of Regression Analyses (Table 7.66A)
Regression analysis is a statistical technique
which derives standardised measures of the relative
importance of variables in predicting a criterion.
Since it is a statistical procedure which does not
always readily lend itself to a theoretical
interpretation, it is difficult to summarise the
results of these analyses in a way which is
conceptually meaningful. However, the author has
attempted to provide in Table 7.66A a summary of the
importance of various conceptual categories of
variables for each of the seven groups of respondents.
Two points arise from Table 7.66A. First it is
abundantly clear that different sets of variables
provided the best predictions of behaviour for
different groups of pensioners. This finding
considerably strengthens the assumption underlying the
general methodology — that eligible non-claimants
comprise an attitudinally heterogeneous group — and
also has implications for attempts to increase
claiming. That the sub-groups are attitudinally
hetereogeneous is clearly indicated by the finding that
all the regression analyses for sub-groups were much
more successful than the regression analysis performed
on the entire group. Second, over the entire sample,
the conceptual category of variables which reflected









































pensioners' concerns about the application procedure
was the most important in explaining their behaviour.
It has already been seen that the threshold analysis




The full study findings give rise to many issues
which could be discussed. These range from the
methodological to the substantive, and from the
practicalities of applied research to wider-ranging
theoretical issues implied by the threshold model.
Although many issues merit discussion, for the sake of
brevity an attempt will be made to limit the discussion
to issues directly relevant to the theoretical model
and its application, while broaching a handful of the
wider-ranging theoretical issues.
Thus, Section 8.2 contains a discussion of some of
the methodological problems encountered in conducting
the full study, and the implications of these problems
for the findings. In Sections 8.3 and 8.4 the issues of
predictive and differential validity are discussed. In
Section 8.5, the author presents some wider theoretical
issues, not in a presumptuous attempt to resolve them,
but merely to admit their existence and to outline the
extent of their importance. Section 8.6 contains an
interpretation of several substantive findings. Chapter
9 comprises a discussion of the implications of the
substantive findings for attempts to increase take-up,
and summarises the conclusions of the thesis.
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8.2 Methodological Problems
The aim of this section is to review the important
methodological problems encountered in conducting the
research and to spell out their implications for the
applicability of the research findings to understanding
and solving the non-claiming problem. These problems
are dealt with in chronological order.
Sampling and representativeness - The overall
response rate in the feasibility study, conducted
during the summer of 1979, was 43%. Despite the
author's belief that this low response rate was due to
the letter of invitation being issued on a DHSS
letterhead, using an EHD letterhead in the full study
produced no improvement at all. It is important to
clarify why this happened, and what are the
implications of this disappointingly low response rate.
The most probable explanation for the low full
study response rate was that letters of invitation went
out in December 1980 and January to February 1981
during the time of year when pensioners were most
likely to be experiencing poor health. Although, as
mentioned above, the direct relationship between health
and response rate cannot be directly shown, over half
of those who opted out of the research after receiving
the research team's letter arranging an appointment
stated that they were doing so because of their own or
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their spouse's ill health. If this observation is
representative of all non-participants' situations,
then there are a number of important implications.
First, the data on the characteristics of the ENCs
will be distorted, the proportions eligible being
under-represented (because poor health attracts larger
additional requirements) and the amounts of their
entitlement will not be accurate. Second, and more
important from the psychologist's viewpoint, is the
extent to which not gaining access to these pensioners
distorts one's understanding of the problem. In this
regard, any measures which one believes are directly or
indirectly related to pensioners' states of health are
possibly unrepresentative. The direct implications of
this problem were encountered in the sixth need
hypothesis, where it was suggested that pensioners'
tendencies to disengage from society, as inferred by
their states of health, determined their perceptions of
no difficulty managing. Since statistical inference is
based on the assumption that the measures involved are
representative, one must tread with very considerable
caution in using and interpreting the results of
significance tests on such measures. Thus, it cannot be
stressed too much that the results of the tests of the
sixth need hypothesis are only tentative. In addition,
since there is a clear prima facie case for arguing a
relationship between the degree of difficulty managing
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and state of health, it is possible that none of the
measures of need are wholly representative, and that
the results of analyses using all of them should be
treated with caution.
The same logic applies to the "paradox of
participation" brought up in Chapter 1. It may well be
that pensioners fail to participate because they
possess the very attributes that one wishes to study.
In the extreme, this would mean that none of the
attitudinal measures could be used with any confidence
as a basis for inference. Judging by the responses of
participants, this extreme is unlikely to be the case.
However, because of the lack of a complete response
rate, the onus is upon the author to demonstrate
representativeness of these measures. Since this is
impossible, the only responsible act is to point out
these limitations.
The remaining caution about drawing inferences
from these findings refers to the nature of the
population sampled. It is probably correct to assume
that the feasibility study sample was more
representative of all Edinburgh ENCs because of the
random sampling procedure involved. The systematic
sampling frame used in the full study, because it
started with only "better off" cases and aimed to
obtain a sufficiently large sample rather than a fully
representative one, is bound to be incompletely
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representative. Although unlikely, it is theoretically
possible that, for instance, non-householder ENCs or
"better off" cases whose rebates are worth less than
50% of their rent and rates see applying in a different
light from the pensioners studied. However, the author
would suggest that, although the substance of
pensioners' decsion-making may differ across groups,
the process by which they decide is probably fairly
standard.
The field experiment - There were two
methodological problems with the field experiment. The
first was the author's lack of power to assign at
random the respondents to the three experimental
groups. In order to be economical, interviewers were
responsible for their own clusters of respondents
assigned to them on the basis of postal areas. They
interviewed nearly all the potential ENCs in each area
before moving on to the next area. Thus, since
individuals were assigned to experimental groups on the
basis of the date of their screening interview, this
assignment procedure introduced a systematic bias in
terms of the area of residence. The potential risk
involved was that the author could have attributed to
the experimental treatment what were in fact the
results of group differences. To check on this
possibility, the groups were compared; they were found
to be similar except in two ways, neither of which were
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related to claiming behaviour. Although the check
showed the groups to be similar on available measures,
the seven-week claiming period differed across groups.
Therefore, differential claiming could have been the
result of events which occurred during the claiming
period of one group but not the others. For instance,
the claiming period of Group C was between February and
mid-March, Group B between late February and early
April, and Group A between late March and early May.
During this three-month span, a variety of significant
events occurred, including the announcement of an
increase of approximately 50% in rates by Lothian
Region, and comparably large increases in council rents
by Edinburgh District (both in early March), the
implementation of these changes (early April), the
distribution of a local paper carrying cut-out claim
forms for supplementary benefit to all the homes in the
Region (mid-April), and the civil service strike which
closed the social security offices (April). Although
one would tend to argue that these events had no
significant effect, there is no way of evaluating the
possibility that claiming was differentially influenced
by these events. It is very easy to argue that the lack
of significant differences between experimental groups
was due to members of Groups C and B being catalysed to
claim by the impending increases in rent and rates,
while members of Group A were inhibited from claiming
by the social security office strike. However, these
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must remain conjectures which, in the absence of
supporting evidence, will be treated as unproven.
The research interview - Although little mention
has been made of the difficulties encountered in
interviewing pensioners during the course of the
research, they were, in fact, very considerable.
Nowhere was this more evident than in their responses
to three tasks in the research interviews. The first of
these tasks was the family tree. From pensioners'
willingness to discuss their families which the author
encountered in the feasibility study, it was thought
that building a family tree into the early stages of
the research interview would be both an ideal
warming-up exercise and a convenient way of identifying
their significant referents. However, the author could
not have been more wrong. Married couples and those
single and widowed persons who had good relationships
with their families were generally eager to provide
this information. However, for many widows and single
persons, this line of questioning brought to the
surface considerable guilt, anger and despair about
both living relatives with whom they had unfulfilling
relationships and dead ones who had died before
important problems in their relationships could be
resolved. The stress upon the interviewers produced by
these released emotions was in some cases nearly
overwhelming; for this reason, and because the author
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believed it was unethical to stir up such feelings in
these people without a commitment to dealing with them,
the detailed family tree was abandoned. Thus the
information consistently obtained was limited to
knowing which were the most important family members,
and a few general details about family size.
Asking about perceptions of utility (UTIL) was the
second rough patch in the research interview. Eight of
the 92 pensioners refused to give an estimate of the
usefulness of the amount of their supplementary pension
entitlement. Their reasons for refusing were that they
were not having any difficulty managing or did not need
any help, and thus it was inappropriate (sometimes
voiced with considerable aggravation) for them to
discuss the usefulness of the benefit. Interestingly,
this attitude towards answering questions is what one
would predict from the insights into the process of
deciding provided by the threshold model. However,
missing data on such an important dimension, athough
consonant with the preferred model, effectively makes
it very difficult to test fully any alternative model
employing the same constructs.
The third major problem with the research
interview was with the attempted rank-order task at the
end. The aim of this task was to provide a clear idea
of where applying for supplementary pensions was
located in a field of other options which pensioners
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could have taken to change their circumstances. It was
also planned to use this ranking in a within-subjects
choice test of VIE theory and the threshold model. In
that test, a small number of expectancy measures were
to be re-combined as a score representing the force
towards asking the family to help; the rank-ordering
was thought to have potential as an interim intentional
criterion.
In the event, the task was a complete fiasco. As
Broad (1977) had found in her attempt to encourage
pensioners in a rank-ordering task, many found its
purpose unclear, many could not be bothered with what
they thought was just a silly game, and many
(especially those who "didn't need any help") had grown
exasperated by this stage and simply refused to
co-operate. It was apparent that the amount of
unspoiled data would have been very small; thus the
task was abandoned after the first 40 research
interviews.
The criterion information - In spite of the
substantial effort put into guaranteeing reliable
criterion information from the DHSS, cross-checking
this information with the follow-up interview data
turned out to be very important--local office data
revealed 19 claimants while the interviewers' records
revealed 23 claimants. All 19 identified by the local
offices were identified by the interviewers as
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claimants; four identified by one interviewer did not
appear on local office records despite an additional
re-check by the local office concerned. The interviewer
concerned was a former DHSS official with several
years' experience interviewing pensioners regarding
their eligibility to SB. In three of the four cases he
saw letters or pension books which proved that they had
applied; in the fourth case, the respondent cited a
date of application and an approximate amount of
entitlement which left the interviewer with no grounds
for disbelieving the respondent's claim that he had
applied.
This discrepancy could have arisen from one of two
general sources: the mix-ups and delays which occurred
during the aftermath of the civil servants' strike, and
the fact that these "unverified" claimants came from a
postal area for which responsibility was spread over
two DHSS offices. These are merely hypotheses, and
there is still no firm explanation of the discrepancy.
Since there was no reason to doubt the reliability of
the interviewer's reports, the total number of
claimants was accepted as having been 23. One of these
had applied just before her screening interview, eight
between their screening and research interviews, and
two after the waiting period, thus leaving a group of
12 people who had claimed during the seven weeks
following their research interviews.
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Regardless of these methodological problems,
sufficient measures of independent and dependent
variables were collected to allow a test of the
threshold model as well as of several alternative
models. However, the amount of variance in the
behavioural criterion explained by the VIE scores of
the stable deciders (26%) was disappointingly weak,
especially in contrast to the comparable amount
explained in the feasibility study (66%). The following
section examines some possible causes of this low
relationship, and briefly touches upon its
implications.
8.3 Predictive Validity
8.31 The Across-subjects Test
This discussion centres on the strength of the
relationship between VIE scores and behaviour for the
stable deciders only. As was discussed at length in
Section 2.2, a wide variety of explanations have been
offered for the only moderate correlations between
predictors and criteria in VIE research. The
explanations most apposite in this context include
issues of which design to use, how the independent and
dependent variables are chosen, and the presumed nature
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of the relationship between the two sets of measures.
The relevance of each of these considerations to this
research problem is discussed in detail in the
following sections.
Design - Since the VIE model was conceived as a
within-subjects model of motivation, one might
naturally expect that applying it in an across-subjects
design would not be maximally effective for the
following reasons. First, the outcomes used may be the
most salient to the group as a whole, but may not be
the most salient to each individual. Second, there is
no guarantee that the meaning of each VIE dimension is
the same across individuals. This is partly a problem
of measurement; since the scales used in the research
were Likert type, used without firm verbal anchors and
without prior standardisation by normal scale
construction and validation techniques, it is possible
that considerable noise was introduced. Third, there is
the problem of response sets discussed by Mitchell
(1974). It is possible that some individuals
consistently rate conservatively (e.g. using a
restricted range) on scales, whereas others
consistently used the scale poles, when they both
"intend" similar levels of response. In a
within-subjects design, the effects of response sets
are controlled, at least in theory. In contrast, in an
across-subjects design, the effect is to confound
360.
prediction. All thr.ee of these topics will be familiar
to students of test and questionnaire construction and
validation; these problems can be solved by resorting
to the nomothetic tradition, and approaching the
problem of measuring motivation in VIE terms as a
problem of measurement.
Such a standardisation procedure was considered at
the outset of the research. This, however, was
untenable because of sampling problems. The sample
required to sort the pools of scale items was both
inaccessible and not really capable of accomplishing
such a sorting task. Thus, standardisation was ruled
out. However, using interviewers to rate pensioners'
responses, a significant departure from normal VIE
methodology, may have partially reduced the noise
introduced by the above problems. This is discussed
further below.
Independent variables - Many of the fundamental
criticisms of across-subjects tests of VIE theory have
focused upon the character and measurement of the
independent, or predictor, variables. For instance,
there are the issues of how many outcomes should be
used and how they should be selected, and how the
variables should be measured. Concerning the number of
outcomes, the author followed the advice of Leon (1979)
and Fishbein and Azjen (1975) and used only four
outcomes. It would thus seem that this counters any
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argument that decreased validity resulted from the
introduction of random variance by the use of too many
outcomes.
Considering the selection of outcomes, it is often
argued that the selection of non-salient outcomes is a
cause of poor predictive validity. In the full study,
there is every reason to believe that these outcomes
were salient (across-subjects) since the outcomes were
chosen on the basis of which combination of outcomes
bore the strongest relationship to behaviour. It can
legitimately be argued that such an approach does not
guarantee including all the most important outcomes, if
one's criterion of importance is the correlation
between behaviour and the expectancy or valence
attached to each individual outcome. However, this
argument can be criticised on both empirical and
theoretical grounds. Empirically, using outcomes which
are all strongly related to behaviour might not be
appropriate because they would control considerable
criterion variance in common, thus perhaps failing to
maximise predictive validity. In a sense, the adopted
approach of selecting the best or most salient
combination represents a compromise between the goals
of conceptual understanding of the total force score
and maximum predictive validity. The adopted approach
was preferred because it was considered that the
inclusion of variables not strongly related to
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behaviour on their own would, when combined with other
variables, contribute significantly to the
predictability of behaviour because of the unique
contribution they made. This approach was also thought
to be acceptable on theoretical grounds. Extrapolating
from Vroom's original definition, behaviour would be a
monotonically increasing function of the force to apply
(as represented by the VIE score), and force a
comparable function of the combination of expectancy
variables. Thus it would appear that there may be no
real reason to expect that individual expectancy
variables correlate with the criterion when it is, in
fact, the total force score which should correlate with
the criterion. (A similar line of reasoning is employed
by Fishbein and Azjen (1975) with regard to using
"intention" as an intermediate criterion. This will be
discussed further below.) However, even though the best
combination was chosen, validity may have been limited
by the choice of constructs. As can be seen from Table
6.41B, feelings about giving up the rebates did
correlate with nearly all the other expectancy
variables.
Problems with the measurement of the expectancy
variables may also have contributed somewhat to the low
correlation between the predictor and criterion.
Traditional VIE research uses questionnaires, and, as
pointed out in Chapter 2, often relies upon the
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respondent to provide both predictive and criterion
information. Studies employing this approach have been
seen to have higher validity coefficients (cf. Schwab,
et. al. , 1979), perhaps due to the standardisation of
measurement in the questionnaire as well as to the
common method variance (e.g. where both independent and
dependent variable measures are self-reports). In the
full study (and feasibility study as well), the
measures were taken in an interview, which is in itself
a radical departure from tradition and which may have
introduced considerable noise. Also, the bulk of the
pensioners' responses were rated by interviewers. This
approach was used primarily because it was known that
these pensioners could not cope with self-completion
questionnaires; an advantage of this approach was that
it standardised (at least at the level of interviewer)
the ratings of most of the measures, countering the
problem of response sets. However, using interviewers
to make judgements and to rate responses introduced
another level of variability which may have contributed
to poor predictability. This hypothesis about the
quality of interviewer was partly testable. The results
in Table 8.3A show the behaviour - VIE score
correlations for each interviewer (for the sub-sample
of stable deciders), and suggest that the interviewers
did not differ substantially in terms of the level of
reliability of their ratings. This finding is quite
surprising considering that each interviewer had a
Table8.3A.Behaviour-VIEScoreCorrelations ForEachInterviewe INTERVIEWER:1234 r=0.967.5730.4150.565 N=318410 p=0.082. 060.070. 44
5
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distinctive style. However, in order to test fully this
hypothesis, an inter-rater reliability design would be
necessary in which the ratings of each interviewer on
the same subjects were compared.
Dependent variable - The criterion used in this
study was the dichotomous measure of behaviour
whether or not the pensioner claimed within the given
period. The problems with gathering and validating the
criterion information were discussed above. A
behavioural criterion was chosen in preference to an
intentional one because the initial literature review
suggested that intentional criteria tended to inflate
the predictive accuracy of VIE models because (1) of
common method variance, and (2) they were taken
simultaneously or very soon after the predictive
measures. In addition, and perhaps most important, was
the fact that the DHSS was definitely not interested in
predicting intentions.
However, far from believing that "intention" is a
problematic criterion, Fishbein and Azjen (1975) would
argue that it is the most appropriate criterion for
expectancy predictions. Within their scheme, beliefs
and evaluations (comparable to expectancies and
valences) combined would predict intention, which, in
turn, should provide the best explanation for actual
behaviour. Figure 8. 3A shows the results of an analysis
using these alternative pathways. As can be seen,
Figure8.31A.AnalysisofPredictiveValidity (afterFishbeinandAzj ,1975)(N=51)
VIESCOREr=0.70>INTENTION>r=0.58BEHAVI UR \ \/ \/ \/ N/ s >r=0.51' (N.B.Allcorrelationsa esignificanttthp<.001lev l)
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Fishbein and Azjen's approach is generally supported.
What are the implications of this finding that
intention is a better predictor of behaviour than are
VIE scores? At the risk of appearing to be
rationalising six years of research, the author would
make the following simple point. In theoretical and
empirical terms, Fishbein and Azjen's approach is very
appealing, but the fact that there are a priori
arguments both for and against using an intentional
criterion makes it impossible to say which approach is
"best". Thus, one can choose either intention or
behaviour, and argue against using the other criterion.
The criterion chosen at the end of the day depends
primarily upon what one believes "force scores"
represent and upon the aims of the research. In this
situation, the aims (to predict and explain behaviour
directly from force scores) superseded other
theoretical concerns, and thus behaviour was chosen as
the primary criterion.
One final issue must be mentioned, and this
concerns the anticipated nature of the relationship
between the predictor and the criterion. A very
substantial amount (if not nearly all) of the VIE
research conducted, because it relies upon statistical
techniques deriving from the Pearson tradition, assumes
that the relationship between independent and dependent
variables should be linear. Although no effort has been
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made to explore this avenue of thinking, it might be
worth while simply to conjecture that the relationship
may be predictable but not linear, and that this would
have interesting implications for interpreting the
meaning of the force scores.
Finally, although the amount of variance explained
in the feasibility study was substantially greater than
in the full study, the level of significance was lower.
This is because, holding level of significance
constant, the magnitude of the correlation is inversely
related to sample size. Thus, one would expect
correlations for smaller samples to be greater than
correlations for larger samples. A test of the
significance of the difference between the two
correlations on the independent samples reveals that,
although the magnitudes differ very greatly, it was not
likely that the two correlations represented
relationships from different populations (Z=1.687,
two-tailed, p=.093).
In summary, it would appear that the only moderate
amount of variance explained might have been due to
using a behavioural criterion instead of an intentional
criterion, to measurement problems with dependent
variables, and to the salience of the outcomes to
pensioners. Perhaps of greatest importance, however,
was the character of the subjects themselves.
Considering the substantial amount of error variance
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introduced by interviewing elderly working-class people
with little previous experience of being interviewed,
compounded by the error variance introduced by using
different interviewers who, even after training, were
not as certain about what they were "looking for" as
was the author, it is somewhat surprising and
gratifying the the VIE component predicted as well as
it did.
8.32 The Within-subjects Test
This section focuses on the validity of the
within-subjects predictions made by the threshold model
using the entire sample. The fundamental distinction
between the two approaches is that within-subjects
prediction requires analysis of the proportions
correctly predicted to claim or not to claim, whereas
across-subjects prediction requires analyses of the
strength of the relationship between the VIE scores and
behaviour.
The traditional within-subjects test of expectancy
theory requires separate ratings of expectancies and
instrumentalities for at least two choice alternatives
for each individual under study. Predictions for each
subject are then made on the basis of which choice
alternative was associated with the highest relative
score. Thus, two individuals may have identical force
scores for the same choice alternative, yet one is
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predicted to choose and the other not to choose that
alternative.
However, it was not possible for the author to
follow the traditional design in this research because
(1) the majority of pensioners had no alternatives, and
(2) even if they had, the large number of outcomes
related to SB which the author was required to explore
precluded the detailed study of any other choice
alternative. Therefore, in order to retain the
within-subjects design, an absolute and internal VIE
threshold had to be derived in order to predict the
claiming behaviour of each individual. In the
feasibility study this threshold was zero; in the full
study, a series of threshold values ranging from zero
upwards was set out, and the results observed. It was
seen in Chapter 6 that the optimal threshold was
considerably greater than zero. Although it is
difficult to put a precise interpretation on this
finding, it is clear that pensioners' perceptions of
the positive aspects of applying must not merely
outweigh their perceptions of the negative aspects, but
must substantially outweigh them. This would imply for
corrective measures, for instance, that any new
attempts to catalyse pensioners to claim must not
merely passively remove the barriers to claiming, but
must actively assist them to claim. This point will be
taken up again in Chapter 9.
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One issue remains regarding the within-subjects
analyses. In the strictest terms, this test was not a
within-subjects test because it was not possible to use
unique outcomes for each individual and because one
standard VIE threshold was used across all individuals.
It must be acknowledged that this threshold probably
does vary between individuals; but in the same breath
it must be stated that there were no a. priori criteria
for deciding differential thresholds, and that without
some internal criterion, no single test of the
effectiveness of the entire threshold model could have
been undertaken.
8.4 Differential Validity
One of the main concepts underlying the threshold
model is the concept of salience -- that making a
decision should be more salient for one group of
pensioners than for others. The threshold model implies
that the former group comprises those who perceive some
need and some utility to the supplementary pension. The
proof of differential salience might possibly lie in
the difference in strengths of relationships between
behaviour and VIE scores for the two groups. One of the
key methodological hypotheses of the research was,
therefore, that the VIE - behaviour correlation would
be significantly stronger for stable deciders than for
non-deciders.
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In the feasibility study this hypothesis was
strongly supported (Z=2.06, one-tailed, p=.019); it was
confirmed in the full study (Z=2.08, one-tailed,
p=.018). Arnold (1982) notes, however, that these
significant differences can be interpreted in either of
two ways:
(a) the degree of underlying relationship
between the two variables is different for
the two groups; or (b) the degree of
underlying relationship between the two
variables is the same for the two groups, but
the groups vary in terms of various
extraneous sources of error such as test
reliabilities, sampling error, etc. (Arnold,
1982, p. 153).
Taking the second tack, in order to demonstrate fully
that differential validity exists would require
knowledge of the reliability of the measures (which
does not exist) and knowledge of their sampling error.
Since the easiest way of minimising sampling error is
to increase sample size, it is not surprising to find
that:
even very large differences in correlations
require formidable sample sizes to attain
adequate power, and as the magnitude of
differences becomes smaller, the required
sample sizes become intimidating (Arnold,
1982, p. 166).
Arnold summarises his argument by noting that just
finding a moderator variable is not enough. In order
for a moderator to be plausible:
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it cannot stand alone, but requires
additional theoretical propositions regarding
why the degree of relationship should vary
with Z. In the absence of such a theoretical
explanation, the most plausible explanation
of differing degrees of relationship is in
terms of differing degrees of extraneous
error introduced for differing values of the
moderator (Arnold, 1982, p. 170).
Without the very much larger sample necessary to
increase the power of the VIE scores as a predictor,
the final proof for the existence of this differential
validity cannot be offered. However, unlike other
research circumstances in which moderators have been
derived post-hoc (cf. Hobert and Dunnette, 1967;
Zedeck, 1971), the existence of these moderators was
postulated a priori♦ Additional support for
differential validity was found in two independent
tests, and the effect was also observed in varying
degrees in twelve of the fifteen different VIE
formulations (Table 6.41A). Thus, on balance, the
evidence would suggest that this is a true instance of
differential validity.
From a theoretical perspective, it is interesting
to note that more and more researchers are beginning to
question the usefulness of VIE models in predicting the
behaviour of all individuals, an approach which implies
analysis for differential validity. As Mitchell (1982)
observes:
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the question being asked is shifting from "Is
expectancy theory right or wrong?" to "When
is expectancy theory right or wrong?" Some
environments, some people and some
circumstances are more likely to result in an
expectancy-like process than others ... It
seems to me that the task of future research
is even somewhat broader than pointing out
when or where expectancy theory is useful or
not. We must develop theories which integrate
all of our motivational models (p. 309).
8.5 Some Wider Theoretical Issues
Prior to discussing the substantive findings and
their implications, it would seem appropriate to
mention briefly four theoretical issues and to state
the author's position on each.
First, there is the question of what evidence
exists that pensioners actually decide. Throughout this
thesis, the author has labelled groups of individuals
in terms of whether or not they made decisions. In
fact, the author rarely observed a decision being made,
but there is ample evidence to allow him to infer that
they were made. On the one hand, there is the strong
empirical argument underlying the hypothesis of
differential validity. On the other hand, there is the
fact that, in this situation, interviewers implicitly
asked pensioners to make decisions by discussing in
detail with them the outcomes of applying.
The second issue is about the nature of the model.
Strictly speaking, the label "process model of
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deciding" implies that this is a within-subjects model
derived from the detailed study of individuals1
decision-making over time. It would be more correct to
state that it is a within-subjects model comprising
constructs observed to be important in across-subjects
studies, in which the constructs have been ordered and
linked along logical lines. It would be an ideal test
of the veracity of this model if one were able to
undertake a series of naturalistic case studies of
individuals' decision-making over time.
The third issue is whether or not one believes
pensioners actually weigh up expectancies,
instrumentalities and valences. There can be little
doubt that people use these constructs — after all,
man anticipates events, man infers relationships
between events, and man values events -- but the crux
of the question is not the validity of the basic
constructs but the way in which they are measured and
combined. In this regard, Mitchell (1982) notes:
most researchers agree that the model is not
descriptive of the actual motivational
process. People do not compute probabilities
and values, multiply them together, add the
products, and base their choice on these
computations. It is far too taxing and
complex a process (p.309).
However, Mitchell neither offers evidence to support
this viewpoint nor offers an alternative model; in the
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absence of both, the author would suggest that it is
tenable to hypothesise that the model does reflect the
motivational process. However, no empirical test can
demonstrate that one model is conceptually more valid
than another; such evidence must derive from case
studies of the decision-making processes of individuals
and from the construction of sound theoretical
rationale for preferring one model to another. In
short, a considerable amount of theoretical development
work on the VIE model would appear still to be
necessary.
The general applicability of the threshold model
is the fourth and final issue. Although derived from
and validated on two samples of pensioners, it would
seem likely that the threshold model reflects a general
motivational process. However, such a claim to general
validity rests upon how well the threshold model (1)
predicts the behaviour of other groups of non-claimants
towards other benefits in other circumstances, and (2)
compares with alternative models (if any can be found)
in terms of both conceptual and empirical validity. To
date, the threshold model has formed the foundation of
two other welfare benefit studies (Corden, 1982;
Ritchie and Matthews, 1982); although Corden's (1982)
study of the non-claiming of Family Income Supplement
provided firm evidence for the model's conceptual
validity, neither study tested the model empirically.
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Thus, to what extent the model is generalisable
remains, by and large, an open question.
8.6 Substantive Findings
The aim of the feasibility study was to derive a
theoretical model of the process of deciding; in
contrast, the aims of the full study were to apply that
model to derive substantive findings which could then
be used to interpret the differential claiming problem
in such a way as to propose solutions to that problem.
Since this thesis began with the author's interest in
the social problem of differential claiming, it is
highly appropriate that it should end with a discussion
of the implications of the findings for attempts to
catalyse claiming. However, before doing so, there are
several issues which deserve especial examination.
The first concerns the origins of pensioners'
perceptions of need (NEED). The results of the
feasibility study suggested a number of possible
explanations; most of these were formulated into
explicit research hypotheses for the full study.
However, problems arise because the majority of the
hypotheses were found to be equally tenable. For
instance, it was found that those who perceived no need
and those who perceived some need differed
significantly in terms of: (1) their perceptions of the
discrepancy between their pre-retirement expectations
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and their current circumstances; (2) their perceptions
of the extent to which their current circumstances
exceeded the expectations which they presumably
acquired from the previous generation of pensioners;
(3) the presumed influence of the change of membership
group over time; and (4) the structure of the
decision-making unit.
It was also seen that a viable explanation for
whether or not pensioners perceived any difficulty
managing clearly emerged from the post-hoc survey,
where it was observed that there was a strong link
between NEED and pensioners' levels of satisfaction
with the amount of their rebates.
From these hypotheses, two divergent explanations
emerge, one based upon reference group theory and the
other upon cognitive dissonance theory. The former
explanation would suggest that pensioners' perceptions
of no need are based upon their satisfaction with the
amount of their rebates, which satisfaction is
simultaneously reflected in their perceptions of being
better off than their reference groups. This view would
be supported by the reference group hypotheses.
The alternative explanation is that perceptions of
no need are really rationalisations, the end-product of
attempts to reduce the dissonance caused by the main
implication of having difficulty managing — that they
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must make a decision to do something about their
situation. This interpretation would be supported by
the finding that widows were disproportionately more
likely to say that they were having no trouble managing
than were other groups (a finding which was also very
clear in the MPNI study (MPNI, 1966)). In this
explanation, one would explain their high satisfaction
with the amount of their rebates as an end-product of
dissonance reduction — it being much the easier
solution to change one's valuation of a benefit in hand
than to attempt to make an important decision off one's
own bat.
Unfortunately, the choice of which explanation
best fits the data cannot be resolved on the basis of
this empirical study for one main reason. To study the
influence of reference groups and of cognitive
dissonance reduction would have required experimental
and longitudinal research designs. In this study, such
designs could not be employed.
However, the author would suggest that the more
tenable interpretation of these findings is the
dissonance reduction, mainly because it squares best
with experience. It was observed throughout many
interviews with widows that they were extremely tense,
rigid, and uncertain in the interviews, and were
sometimes extremely upset about being informed that
they were eligible. On many occasions they clearly
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stated that they could not decide, and often they asked
the interviewer to help them to decide. Although it
could be argued that one of the dissonance reduction
hypotheses tested found that those perceiving no
difficulty were not significantly more negative in
their feelings about applying than were those who
perceived some difficulty, it is worth noting: (a) that
this is exactly what one would expect from a successful
dissonance reduction process (since, because applying
was no longer held to be salient, there would be no
point in harbouring negative feelings about it), and
(b) that the dissonance in this case would not be
evoked by the prospect of the application procedure,
but by the attempt to come to a decision on one's own.
Thus, it is impossible to say for certain which is the
"correct" explanation. However, regardless of which
interpretation is accepted, the implications for
catalysing these pensioners to claim are the same --
the only way to catalyse them to claim would be to take
the decision out of their hands completely, a
possibility which is discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 9.
The second issue requiring discussion is the
discrepancy between the two studies in terms of which
VIE dimensions were the most important. First, although
of paramount importance in the feasibility study,
pensioners' expectations and feelings about their
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significant referents finding out were of substantially-
less importance in the full study. There is no clear
explanation of this, although one might suspect that
much of its lack of predictive validity stemmed from
the considerable trouble experienced in attempting to
elicit the significant referent, as described earlier.
In addition, at several stages during the full study,
it became clear that some interviewers were uncertain
whether they were to be rating the pensioners' feelings
or the feelings of the significant referents as
perceived by the pensioners. Second, pensioners'
feelings about giving up the rebates in the feasibility
study were inversely related to their behaviour; in the
full study they were directly related to each other, as
hypothesised. Again, it is unclear why this should have
been the case.
The final substantive issue to be discussed is the
meaning of the regression analyses. The regression
analyses were not undertaken to provide a contrast to
the predictive ability of the threshold model, since
the two approaches are so totally different that a
direct comparison would be of limited use. Instead,
they were undertaken (a) to provide a general check on
the interpretation provided by the threshold model, and
(b) because they were relatively easy to perform.
Considering their substantial differences, one might
naturally question how the regression results could be
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of any use.
The answer is that they are useful in three ways.
First, the fact that eight pensioners could not be
included in the analyses because they were unwilling to
discuss the utility of supplementary pensions
implicitly supports the threshold model. This behaviour
would be predicted by the model; since all of these
pensioners expressed no difficulty managing, the issue
of applying would not be salient to them, and therefore
it would be inappropriate for them to discuss the
utility of the benefit.
Second, the results clearly indicate that, for all
pensioners, aspects of the application procedure
provided the most powerful explanations of claiming
behaviour. This strongly suggests that the main
deterrants to claiming are related to the application
procedure, and implies — in parallel with the results
of the threshold analyses -- that changes to the
procedure must be undertaken in order to catalyse
further claiming.
Third, underlying the entire research methodology
is the assumption that ENCs comprise an attitudinally
heterogeneous group -- that the best attitudinal
predictors of pensioners' behaviour vary from group to
group. The summary of the regression analyses presented
in Table 7.66A substantially supports this assumption
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by demonstrating clearly that the best predictors of
claiming behaviour vary by type of housing tenure and
by marital status.The finding that sub-groups are much
more predictable than the entire group suggests that
these sub-groups are attitudinally heterogeneous; this
has very important implications for attempts to
increase take-up. It suggests that one general approach
will not be adequate for all groups of pensioners and
that, short of devising a series of different marketing
strategies for each group, the cheapest and most
effective means of increasing take-up is to take the
responsibility for deciding to claim out of pensioners'
hands altogether. This issue will be discussed again in
the following chapter.
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9.0 Implications and Conclusions
9.1 Implications of the Research Findings
By the time the full study was commissioned, it
was clear to the government that the "better off"
problem was of considerable magnitude. Throughout
several reports (SBC, 1978b; 1979; 1980a), the
Supplementary Benefits Commission had urged the
government to rationalise into one scheme the many ways
of providing assistance with housing costs. The SBC
envisaged:
a single scheme of housing benefit which
would cover all low-income householders,
whether or not they were eligible for
supplementary benefit. Such a scheme would
replace rate rebates, rent rebates and
allowances and the rent element of
supplementary benefit and, ideally, would
extend to the owner-occupier the help now
given to the tenant through his rent rebate
or allowance. It would need to provide 100
per cent of reasonable housing costs for all
supplementary benefit recipients and should
do the same for others, including people in
full-time work, on comparable incomes (SBC,
1978b, p. 57).
After much deliberation, DHSS ministers in July
1980 authorised consultation with local authorities
regarding such a scheme (SBC, 1980b). It was envisaged
that a consultative paper be made available by the
autumn of 1980; this eventually appeared as the paper
"Assistance with Housing Costs" in March 1981 (Scottish
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Office, 1981). This paper formed the foundation for the
Social Security and Housing Benefits Bill (Bill 6,
1981) put before Parliament in the autumn of 1981.
However, the scheme as outlined in the consultative
paper was substantially different from that desired by
the SBC, apparantly because of the government's concern
with the reform being nil-cost (Scottish Office, 1981,
para. 7). The government's plan was to:
leave with the DHSS assistance for mortgage
interest and water rates currently available
to supplementary benefit recipients. Reform
might then build on the existing system of
rebates. Where possible this would be
simplified, freed of technical restrictions
on eligibility and harmonised with the
supplementary benefit scheme. The Government
considers that the most promising scheme
would have the following features - (a) Local
authorities would administer the scheme for
all recipients. (b) People who receive
supplementary benefit would be entitled to
full assistance with rent and rates. Local
authorities would automatically be told by
DHSS that they should apply full rebates,
without further income assessment, (c) Local
authorities would send out net demands for
rates and council rents. In most cases there
would be nothing to pay- (d) Local
authorities would assess rents and pay cash
allowances to private tenants (Scottish
Office, 1981, para. 8).
Although nearly everyone involved has welcomed the
administrative simplifications for the sake of the
claimants, the so-called Unified Housing Benefits (UHB)
scheme has attracted much criticism. First, local
authorities, because of the lateness of regulations,
have become very concerned about the feasibility of
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fully implementing the scheme by April 1983 (Carvel,
1982). When it is implemented, the net increase in
local authority expenditure it causes is to be
reimbursed by the government. However, local
authorities are very worried about what formula will be
used to derive the net increase figure; being fully
reimbursed is especially important when (a) local
authority funds from central government come as a block
grant, and (b) local authorities are under severe
pressure to restrict spending. The importance of
working out the formula led one director of housing to
state quite bluntly: "mutual agreement on net costs
will be difficult to achieve" (King, 1981). From a
reformer's viewpoint, most of the advantage of
concentrating housing benefit administration in one
authority will be lost since, because the reform does
not make water rates eligible for rebate purposes, many
UHB recipients will still need to approach the DHSS for
payments to meet such costs.
Second, according to some writers, the scheme will
have undesirable redistributional effects (Lynes, 1980;
Wicks and Bradshaw, 1982). According to Lynes, using
the new assessment criteria will cause "redistribution
in favour of the poor, but at the expense of the near
poor" (Lynes, 1980, p.615), will exacerbate the poverty
trap, and might even pave the way for a simplified SB
scheme for short-term claims which would ignore
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individual differences in family structure and special
needs.[1]
Third, and most important, is the potential impact
of the scheme upon claimants. The new scheme not only
ignores altogether extra help for the owner-occupier,
but may also prevent future benefit claimants from
obtaining their maximum benefit entitlement. This may
arise because of the following. Pensioners currently
better off on supplementary pensions will, when
transferred to UHB, require to claim an additional
"topping up" payment from the DHSS. Although the
initial transfer from SB will guarantee that these
pensioners retain their extra SB, Raynsford (1981) has
pointed out that the consultative paper contains the
ominous sentence: "In principle, in a change like this,
future losers cannot be protected" (Scottish Office,
1981, para. 10(e)). Thus, although the reform will "end
doubts about which benefit is best for each claimant
and make the paperwork simpler for most people" (DHSS,
1981c), it will do little towards solving the take-up
problem.
Although the new take-up problem will be of a
slightly different order from the old one, it would
seem that the research findings would be equally
relevant to both problems. Therefore, their application
to both the old and the new problems are discussed
below.
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However, two further issues must be discussed.
First, although small sample evidence (Broad, 1977;
Nelson and Kerr, 1980b) suggests that the "better off"
cases constitute the majority of the ENCs, it cannot be
claimed with certainty that these findings represent
the views of all non-claimants. Second, it is extremely
important to consider the maxim post hoc ergo propter
hoc. In an ideal research world, where one could
experimentally manipulate the experiences underlying
pensioners' expectations and feelings about benefits,
one could be very confident about the causal
relationships between these experiences and behaviour.
However, where this is not possible, one could
erroneously assume that, for instance, because
pensioners' feelings about giving up their rebates
co-vary with and precede their behaviour, those
feelings cause their behaviour. Ideally, policy
suggestions should be based upon a knowledge of causal
relationships; however, such a knowledge could not be
derived from the research design used. Thus, the extent
to which these research findings are of value may well
rest upon the claim for causality, one which cannot be
substantiated.
9.11 One or the Other: The Current Better Off Problem
At the root of the "better off" problem is the
fact that pensioners can be eligible for both rebates
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and supplementary pensions but can receive only one.
Thus the onus is upon the individual to weigh up the
advantages of both benefits, commonly in the absence of
any concrete information about the relative values of
their respective entitlements, and to decide which
benefit constitutes the best buy. The model of the
process of deciding has implied that even when fully
informed of the relative financial advantage to
supplementary benefit, (1) 40% presumably do not even
make decisions about applying, (2) a further 45%
presumably decide not to apply, and (3) over a quarter
of those 16% who presumably decide to apply do not do
so in the short term.
In addition, the threshold model analysis would
suggest that, as long as the responsibility rests with
the pensioners themselves to make decisions, the
following implications would hold. First, further
general advertising and publicity would have virtually
no effect upon catalysing applications for nearly a
third of these eligible non-claimants (those who
perceive no need). Such information simply would not be
absorbed or retained by pensioners who perceive it to
be irrelevant.
Second, a small minority (about a tenth) of
non-claimants might be catalysed to consider claiming
if they believed that the benefit would be more useful
towards meeting their needs. Short of raising
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pensioners' expectations by raising and being seen to
be raising personal allowances, this group also would
remain virtually unaffected by further publicity.
Third, in a situation where the onus to act
remains with individual pensioners and their
perceptions of the amounts they would gain remain as at
present, a maximum of 60% (the stable deciders) could
be potentially affected by attempts to increase
claiming which involved providing information about
eligibility. However, the effectiveness of these
attempts would be limited by pensioners' expectations
and feelings about the central and unique features of
the supplementary pensions means-test procedure. Short
of changing (a) the form of the assessment procedure
and (b) its content, and being seen to be making such
changes, intensive take-up campaigns would result in
something less than a 5% increase in overall take-up
rates (were, being optimistic, 20% of the eligible
non-claimants to apply). Even if such changes were seen
to be implemented, the results suggest that substantial
proportions of pensioners would not apply because of
their preference for the style of managing afforded by
rebates. As was suggested previously, the fact that the
optimal VIE threshold is substantially greater than
zero implies that not merely must the perceived
barriers to applying be removed, but pensioners must
actively be assisted to apply. This leads one to
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suggest that even re-vamping the means-test would not
be sufficient.
Fourth, there will always be a small proportion of
pensioners who will not be in a position to act upon
their intentions to apply. Thus take-up will always be
less than 100%, although this is not to say that it
must remain at its current level.
Table 9.11 presents three plans which have arisen
from the research findings and which are aimed at
solving the old non-claiming problem. To distinguish
these plans from those aimed at solving the new
non-claiming problem, the former will be referred to as
"Options" and the latter as "Plans". Based on the
results of the field experiment, it would appear that
further intensive advertising would probably result in
only a very small increase in overall take-up rates,
since an absolute maximum of only 20% of ENCs would be
catalysed to claim by this approach. This is called
Option A.
Option B would involve Option A in conjunction
with a substantial revision of the means-test
assessment procedure. The rationale for revising the
procedure is clear. Pensioners' feelings about "direct
involvement with the DHSS" were the strongest
predictors of their behaviour; those feelings were
determined by their feelings about having an official
Table9.11.OptionsforIncrea ingke-up UnderCurrentSyst m OPTIONDESCRIPTION
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interview, about having it at home, about the official
interviewer, about being asked to reveal and to verify
the value of their savings and income from their
families, and by their belief that supplementary
benefit was charity.
It is important to clarify that the emphasis in
Option B is upon changing the method of means-testing
and not upon discarding the means-test altogether. The
findings suggest that making the SB procedure similar
to the rebate application procedure might have
considerable merit. This is deduced from the
observations that application for rebates involves a
similarly detailed assessment, but does not require:
either (1) an interview (and thus neither does it
require contact with an official interviewer nor an
interview at home) or (2) the revelation and
verification of savings and the revelation of income
from families (although it does require revelation and
verification of income from capital and from other
sources). It was seen that these very issues were the
most important in predicting the claiming behaviour of
the stable deciders. If it were possible to standardise
the content of the means-tests for both benefits, this
would have the added advantage of allowing estimates to
be made of the amount of entitlement (at the basic
rate) to supplementary benefit from rebate application
information. This could prevent future rebate
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applicants from getting the poorer deal by choosing
rebates.
Obviously, however, the impact of Option B would
be limited by the salience to pensioners of the issues
of applying and by their preferences for the form of
rebates. Hazarding a guess, it is likely that making
and publicising such changes might catalyse at most
somewhat less than a 12% increase in take-up, bringing
it to a maximum of 85%.
There is, however, a third option (Option C)
arising from the substantive findings. Throughout the
course of the research the author found many pensioners
who would have appreciated having the extra money, but
for whom giving up their rebates would have been too
much of a risk. It was clear that if these people had
been able to receive both benefits, they also would
have applied for supplementary benefit. This third
option, because it would be a "no risks" option in
terms of giving up their rebates, might also eventually
catalyse the claiming of many pensioners for whom
applying formerly was not salient. This would possibly
yield a further increase in overall take-up. The
theoretical ceiling of each option in terms of overall
take-up is summarised in Table 9.11.
The preceding discussion was presented without
making reference to the Unified Housing Benefit, since
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in the strictest terms, (a) the author was not in a
position to evaluate it, (b) it is not primarily an
attempt to increase take-up, and (c) it is not
exclusively directed at pensioners who are eligible for
but not claiming supplementary benefit, or, even,
pensioners in general. However, as stated above, the
research findings are relevant to understanding the
relationship between the UHB and the non-claiming of
supplementary pensions.
9.12 One and the Other: Relationship Between the UHB
and the Take-Up of Supplementary Pensions
From the perspective of potential applicants, the
main advantage of the UHB is that getting housing
benefit will no longer involve choosing between
supplementary benefit and rebates. In this scheme, the
applicant will be able to receive both benefits, a "one
plus one" arrangement much simpler to communicate to
potential claimants and theoretically much easier for
them to understand. When the first stage of the UHB
scheme is implemented in November 1982, the percentages
of those eligible and claiming their supplementary
pensions will automatically increase; this is because
many pensioners currently eligible for but not claiming
SB will no longer be eligible under the scheme,
resulting in a relatively smaller denominator in the
take-up fraction. Those no longer eligible will be
pensioners whose current rebate entitlement is less
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than their current SB entitlement, and for whom both
are less than their total housing costs. Thus when
their rent and rates are fully covered by UHB, they
will not be eligible for any additional supplementary
benefit.
However, although take-up rates will be increased,
substantial amounts of supplementary pension will
remain unclaimed unless special efforts are made to
encourage dual claiming.
The "new" group of pensioners eligible for yet not
claiming supplementary pensions will comprise three
sub-groups; the approach to increasing take-up should
differ for each group, thus they are considered
individually in addressing the question of how to
facilitate their claiming under the new scheme.
First come those rebate recipients who will
automatically become UHB claimants and who will also be
entitled to the SB "topping up" payments described
above. For the sake of convenience, they are referred
to as Type X pensioners. Current and future Type X
pensioners will be supplementary benefit non-claimants
because their point of entry into the UHB network was
the local authority. (Those Type X pensioners who
entered through the Supplementary Benefits Office
presumably will receive their entitlement to both
benefits, although a small minority may decide that
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they want only UHB.) Two opposing arguments apply to
the extent to which Type X pensioners can be encouraged
to apply: (1) that because the UHB will be more
generous than their rebates were and thus will cause a
further reduction in their housing costs, these
pensioners will be even less likely than before to
apply for SB; (2) that because there will no longer be
any "risk" of losing their rebates involved, they will
be more likely to to apply than before. Both arguments
presuppose that, as before, the individual will be left
alone to assess the usefulness of applying for
supplementary benefit.
Rather than leaving the initiative solely with the
individual, the research findings suggest that some
responsibility to facilitate claiming should be taken
by the new UHB offices in co-operation with the DHSS
offices. This arises from the within-subjects finding
that the optimal VIE threshold was substantially
greater than zero, thus implying that pensioners would
need active assistance in order to claim supplementary
pensions. The set of plans outlined in Table 9.12 to
facilitate the claiming of Type X pensioners are based
on the following three observations: (1) The amounts of
supplementary pension due to Type X pensioners in this
study comprised almost exclusively (a) allowances for
repairs and insurance for owner-occupiers, and (b)
additional requirements for special diets, for extra





heating on health grounds, and for extra heating on age
criteria; (2) with the possible exception of the higher
rate of heating on health criteria, all of the
information necessary to assess the entitlement to
these allowances and additional requirements could be
collected and verified by a postal procedure without
necessitating any official interview; (3) some local
authorities already collect the bulk of this
information, and with a small amount of thoughtful
preparation the remainder of it could be collected at
minimum expense.
In Plan A, specially designed leaflets/claim forms
could be sent to each pensioner at the commencement of
the scheme or at the annual uprating (which will most
likely be synonymous). Caution should be exercised as
to the content of the leaflets. Great emphasis should
be placed on the facts (a) that people can now receive
both benefits and (b) that many pensioners who are
getting all of their housing costs subsidised are
particularly likely to be eligible for a bit extra on
supplementary benefit. Although the evidence is only
anecdotal, enough pensioners spontaneously remarked
that some of the older supplementary benefit leaflets
were "as clear as mud" to lead one to suggest that
future leaflets should not include specific information
which would allow the self-assessment of eligibility.
It would be worth while to clarify briefly the
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categories for which additional payments are available
and their amounts. The leaflet should end with a
reminder that both benefits can be claimed. The author
is thoroughly convinced that previous advertising has
been so successful that pensioners will continue to
believe that the benefits are mutually exclusive unless
direct action is taken to clarify this change. The
target population for these leaflets would be mainly
those with the majority of their housing costs rebated.
Plan B would involve using Plan A in tandem with
efforts by the departments concerned to infer the
eligibility status of individual pensioners and to
inform them of their probable eligibility. Plan C would
be identical to Plan B, but would involve extending the
UHB application form to collect nearly all the
information necessary to assess entitlement to
supplementary pensions. In Plan D, as in the first
three plans, the decision to claim would remain with
the pensioners, but the process would be initiated by
the DHSS upon the advice of the UHB office. Under Plan
E, pensioners would not have to make any decisions
since assessment of their entitlement to supplementary
benefit would be made automatically from information on
the extended UHB form, and payment of supplementary
benefit would be made as a matter of course in the form
of an increase to their National Insurance Pensions.
It was implied above that the limited information
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necessary to assess entitlement to supplementary
pensions could be collected and verified by post. Such
a postal application scheme could be implemented in
tandem with any of Plans A, B, C, or D above.
Obviously, none of these plans would assist in
catalysing claiming by householders eligible for both
UHB and supplementary benefit but not receiving either
(Type Y pensioners), or non-householders eligible for
but not claiming supplementary pensions (Type Z
pensioners). The claiming of Type Y and Type Z
pensioners might be facilitated by the changes to the
assessment procedure advocated at the end of Section
9.11 under Option B. If such simplifications were made,
they would pave the way for a postal application
procedure for all but a few complicated pensioner
cases.
******
This section has discussed the implications of the
research findings for improving take-up. Inferences
have also been drawn from those findings and have
served as the basis for some suggestions by which the
claiming of the new group of eligible non-claimants
might be facilitated. These suggestions have involved
two basic principles, the provision of information to
potential claimants and the facilitation of their
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responses.
It is the author's belief, based upon the results
of the two studies, that the successful solution to the
problem of non-claiming will only be achieved by a plan
which combines (a) the provision of comprehensible
information to the target population of pensioners for
whom it is relevant with (b) changes in the assessment
procedure which make claiming both more acceptable and
easier. This research has suggested that the latter
changes might involve modifying the content and form of
the means-test, making it similar to the current rebate
assessment and application procedure, and still leaving
the responsibility with the individual to apply.
Alternatively, these changes might involve eliminating
altogether active decision-making by pensioners under a
scheme where entitlement to one benefit was assessed
from application information gathered for the other.
9.2 Conclusions
The aims of this thesis were (1) to construct, to
validate and to confirm the validity of a model of the
process of deciding whether to apply for supplementary
pensions, and (2) to apply this model to explaining
differential claiming in the context of attempts to
catalyse claiming.
The methodological findings of the feasibility
study and the first half of the full study allow one to
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conclude that it is convenient and valid to consider
differential claiming behaviour as being the result of
pensioners' success or failure in achieving a series of
cognitive thresholds in a particular order. Thus, in
order to apply, a pensioner must (1) perceive at least
some difficulty managing, (2) know of the existence of
supplementary pensions, (3) perceive at least some
likelihood of eligibility to them, (4) perceive that a
supplementary pension has a least some utility for
meeting her needs, (5) believe the positive outcomes of
applying to outweigh the negative outcomes, and (6) be
in a position to apply. Within this interpretative
framework, the explanation for the non-claiming of any
pensioner would lie at the first threshold not
achieved.
This is not to suggest that each pensioner goes
through the process of deciding in exactly this way —
it is possible that a person can have considered the
outcomes of applying prior to perceiving any need,
although the findings would suggest that this is
unlikely. It is best if these thresholds be considered
as a series of necessary preconditions, all of which
must be fulfilled in order for a pensioner to apply.
From a theoretical perspective, it would be extremely
useful and interesting to undertake a series of case
studies of individuals' decision-making over a fairly
long period in order to observe the actual ordering of
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stages, the time periods between them, the individual
thresholds, and the factors which would catalyse
persons to move on to the next stage. Such a
naturalistic study, in which ideally the researcher
would not intervene at all, would also allow a clearer
understanding of the relationship between knowledge of
the existence of the benefit and of eligibility to it
and the other main factors. It was one of the
limitations of the research that the study of the
influence of KNOW and ELIG upon claiming behaviour
effectively prevented the study of their relationship
with the other main constructs. Only a longitudinal
within-subjects study could reveal the extent to which
the threshold model is a true account of the chronology
of decision-making, or merely a (logical) heuristic
device.
The confirmation of differential validity and the
substantive findings have been used as the basis for
proposing solutions to the problem with specific
reference to present and to future benefit systems. The
confirmation of differential validity has suggested
that, since large proportions of pensioners presumably
do not advance to the stage of making decisions about
applying, any approach to catalysing claiming which
leaves the onus upon the individual pensioners to make
decisions is bound to fall short of maximising
claiming. The analysis of the VIE component of the
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threshold model also suggests that, for the 56% of
pensioners who constitute stable deciders, the
effective strategy would be to reform completely the SB
means-test and associated application procedure. Even
this would not be totally effective for this group,
since the within-subjects analysis suggested that
pensioners must be actively assisted to claim.
The remaining substantive findings revealed that
applying was not salient for substantial numbers of
pensioners because they perceived no difficulty
managing or no utility to the benefit. It was seen that
these perceptions of need could have resulted from
their perceptions that they were better off than their
reference groups, or from attempts to reduce the
dissonance caused by admitting having difficulty
managing. Neither hypothesis is fully illuminating or
satisfactory; full explorations of both were limited by
methodological constraints. It would be of theoretical
interest to explore further and empirically which of
these hypotheses best explained perceptions of need;
however, the interpretation for the practitioner is
similar in either case -- that providing more
information about eligibility or changing the
application procedure will have little impact on the
behaviour of these pensioners.
It was also seen that pensioners' perceptions of
utility were most strongly related to the amounts by
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which they were potentially better off, allowing one to
conclude that, in order to encourage those who perceive
no utility to the benefit to claim, it would be
necessary to raise the amount of their entitlement by a
very substantial sum and to communicate this to them.
It was also noted that the theoretical model implied
that there will always be a small group of persons
whose situations are unstable and who are thus not in a
position to act upon their decisions to apply.
All these substantive conclusions were drawn in
the awareness that the correlational designs used in
both studies do not allow one to infer causal linkages
between these constructs and behaviour; thus the extent
to which the suggestions made might be effective
depends upon the validity of assuming underlying causal
relationships between the experiences preceding these
psychological variables and behaviour, an issue which
could not be explored in this thesis. Further research
into this problem might concentrate on attempting to
demonstrate such relationships following the example of
Herriot and Rothwell (1981).
In conclusion, this research has demonstrated the
validity of a threshold model to predict pensioners'
claiming behaviour, and has used this model to propose
solutions to the substantive problem. It is the
author's view that future research arising from this
thesis might best concentrate on: (1) the validity of
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the threshold model as an accurate account of
individuals' decision-making processes; (2)
experimentally manipulating the variables underlying
pensioners' expectations and feelings about the
outcomes of applying in order to understand their
causal relationships with claiming behaviour and thus





1. This return to the use of an absolute capital threshold
was implemented in November 1980 under legislation in
the Social Security Bill (1979), the effects of which
are described in "Reform of the Supplementary Benefits
Scheme" (DHSS, 1979). Prior to November 1980, the value
of capital for SB assessment purposes was subject to a
tariff computed by deducting from the amount of a
pensioner's weekly entitlement 25 pence for each
complete unit of £50 by which her capital exceeded
£1200. Other major changes included: (1) simplifying
the calculation of non-dependents1 contributions to
housing costs by changing it from a proportionate to a
fixed rate contribution; (2) reducing the number of
discretionary levels of payments for additional
requirements. These changes are mentioned in detail
since part of the research was conducted under old
regulations and part under new, and as the regulations
change, so does the character of the'sample.
2. Prior to November 1980, under the old scheme, this
couple would still have been entitled to £2.09, since a
tariff of £4.00 (25 pence x 16 complete units of £50)
would have been deducted from their weekly eligibility.
3. In constructing this review of the history of income
maintenance, the author was indebted to booklets
published by the National Consumer Council (NCC, 1976)
and Central Office of Information (COI, 1977), and
particularly to Victor George's Social Security and
Society (George, 1973).
4. For his understanding of the rebate assessment
procedure, the author drew heavily from the National
Welfare Benefits Handbook (Allbeson, 1981).
5. An examination of response rates to the Family
Expenditure Survey between 1957 and 1979 reveals that
response rates were initially at 60%, shot up to the
mid-70%s between 1962 and 1966, had slipped down to 67%
by 1969, and since then have hovered between 68% and
71%. The rates in 1978 and 1979 were 68% (Ministry of
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Labour, 1961-1967; Department of Employment and
Productivity, 1968-1970; Department of Employment,
1971-1980). Although these response rates are
reasonable, Kemsley (1975) has noted that there was a
"regular falling off in response of about 2 percentage
points for each increase of 5 years [in age]" from a
response rate of 100% for 16-21 year old heads of
household in 1971 to 62% for heads of households 71
years old and older. The correlation between response
rate and age of head of household was -0.9180.
6. Goffman's (1963) original definition of stigma was "an
attribute that is deeply discrediting" (p.13).
Furthermore, he makes an important distinction between
discredited individuals (those who assume that the
attribute is known and obvious) and the discreditable
(those who make no such assumptions). The expanded
conception of stigma is at variance with this
definition because (a) it is very unlikely that many of
its conditions are in fact deeply discrediting
(especially so in the eyes of others), and (b) many of
the circumstances simply cannot be known to others. It
may be more appropriate to conceptualise "stigma" as
being the combination of the strength of the belief
that the attribute is observable, and how the
individual would feel if it were observable, a
formulation which will be discussed in detail later.
7. This is true of nearly all research into the
non-claiming of welfare benefits. The main exception is
found in Universality and Selectivity (Davies and
Reddin, 1978); these authors attempted to derive a
theoretical explanation for the differential claiming
of free school meals based upon the results of their
extensive AID analyses.
Chapter Two
1. J. Miller Mair was consulted about the feasibility of
using the rep grid technique in this particular
research setting.
2. Although Vroom was responsible for the first explicit
formulation of this motivational model, he was by no
means the first to use the concepts of expectancy,
valence and force. Since this is an applied thesis, it
would be inappropriate to provide an extensive
historical discourse on the pedigree of the model.
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However, the table on the next page might serve to
indicate the universality of these concepts. This table
is an expansion of that originally presented in Lawler
(1971) and updated by Mitchell (1974). Feather's recent
book (Feather, 1982) demonstrates precisely how
pervasive the expectancy-times-valence concept is in
all walks of psychology; the interested reader should
consult that source for a comprehensive review and
synthesis of the theoretical, methodological and
empirical issues surrounding expectancy models in
psychology.
3. Due to its ahistorical nature, the model has naturally
lent itself to correlational studies which allow only
the description of relationships between expectancies
and valences and behaviour, and not the attribution of
causal links between them. The only way to test for
causality is to use an experimental design,
manipulating VIE variables and observing the effect on
behaviour (or some intermediate criterion). Direct
manipulation of cognitions and feelings is impossible.
However, if VIE variables are considered as variables
mediating between specific experiences and behaviour,
then it should be possible to test experimentally for
the factors causing their co-variation with the
criterion. Herriot and Rothwell (1981) experimentally
manipulated two experiences found in a previous study
(Herriot, et. al., 1980) to be important correlates of
changes in both students' intentions to apply for jobs
and their beliefs and feelings (as summarised by
expectancy scores) about these jobs. They hypothesised
that these manipulations would result in simultaneous
changes in both expectancy scores and intentions.
However, the results did not confirm this view, and
although the authors explicitly state that this result
was probably due to a poor choice of independent
variables rather than an inherent limitation of
decision theory, the outlook for inferring causal links
between expectancy variables and intentions or
behaviour is, for the moment, not very bright.
Chapter Seven
1. It will be noticed that one of the degrees of freedom
in this table is a non-integer number. This is because
where two populations have unequal variances, an
approximation to t must be used since t cannot be
computed. This approximation does not have the same
distribution as does t, but the probability for t can
be approximated using a formula for computing degrees
of freedom which usually is not an integer. Thus, the
non-integer representing degrees of freedom indicates

































Equality of sample variances was assessed by consulting
the significance of the F ratio output as a standard
function of the SPSS sub-program T-TEST (Nie, et. al.,
1975, Chapter 17).
Chapter Nine
Researchers have recognised the need to moniter
carefully the impact of the UHB. Hill (1981; 1982) is
currently studying the effects upon two local
authorities of implementing the scheme; the DHSS is
also monitoring the effects upon recipients' income of
the changes in assessment criteria as well as the
subsequent changes in work incentives for low income
households (Fiegehen and McGwire, 1982).
This figure comes from the SBC Annual Report for 1978
(SBC, 1979, Table 12.11, p.104).
These figures were derived in the following way. If
15-20% of all remaining eligible non-claimants were to
be catalysed to claim by the knowledge that they were
eligible, the net effect on overall take-up would be to
increase it by 4-5% to somewhere between 77 and 78%.
Assuming that the majority of those 41% who made
decisions not to apply did so because of their feelings
about the means-test procedure and that changing this
procedure would catalyse the bulk of them to claim, the
additional net increase in take-up would be between 7
and 8%, leading to an overall take-up rate of between
84 and 85%. Assuming that the remaining eligible
non-claimants who decided not to apply did so because
they believed their rebates to be more convenient, that
these deciders would all claim if they had the option
to claim both rebates and SB, and that some
non-deciders would apply as well because of the reduced
risk involved, take-up might be further increased by
between 4 and 5%. Thus the overall ceiling on take-up
under Plan C might be in the range of 88-93%.
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Appendix Al: DHSS Letter of Invitation
(446.)
Department of Health and Social Security
Alexander Fleming House Elephant and Castle London SE1 6BY
Room A 303






RESEARCH: MAKING ENDS MEET
[ am writing to ask if you woul d take part in a study of the views of pensioners
about the various pensions and benefits which are available and about the
iifferent ways there are of making ends meet.
Phe Department has asked Mr Scott Kerr, an independent researcher from Edinburgh
Jniversity to undertake this work. To assist him we have selected names at
random from our records of retirement pensioners who 1 ive in Eldinburgh and your
lame has been included. Mr Kerr would like to visit you, at home, some time
rithin the next few weeks: his visit will last less than an hour.
. hope you will agree to take part in this study: anything you said to Mr Kerr
rould be kept completely private as he is bound by strict rules of secrecy, and
;he results of the survey will be produced in such a way that no-one will be
ible to identify you.
(f you do not wish to take part, please write to me as soon as possible and I
shall not then pass your name to the researcher. Whether or not you take part
rill in no way affect your retirement pension or any other benefit you may be
•eceiving.
very much hope that you will feel able to help in this research.
Yours sincerely
Appendix A2: Letters of Refusal from Pensioners
(448.)
Appendix A2: Extracts of Letters from Respondents
Refusing to Participate
Case A: Holidays
I am very sorry that I will be unable to accept your
offer to meet Mr. Scott Kerr. Unfortunately, I am going
on holiday for six weeks and would not be available.
This is a holiday given to me by my family abroad.
Thanking you for the opportunity to discuss this sore
problem.
Case B: Part-Time Workers
I do not feel that I would make a good candidate for
your survey on "Making Ends Meet" as both myself and my
wife do part time work and have no need at present for
benefits other than our government pension. This being
the case I think it would be a waste of your
researcher's time, so I decline to be interviewed but
am sure that you will have plenty of willing
candidates.
Case C: Ill-Health
Re this circular. I am sorry for the delay in its
return; I have just returned from a brief holiday which
I spent with some friends as a guest. I am, as your
circular states, retired (seven and a half years), I
have for my wife and I a state pension of £32-12, add
to this, income from a small investment I made over the
50 odd years I was working, or in the army (8 years),
this brings it to £36 per week. My wife and I like
other pensioners are subject to the steady increase in
prices which affect everybody. In addition to this I
understand, as the result of the recent budget
proposals that if my wife or I unfortunately require to
purchase any of a wide variety of goods (clothes etc.)
we will be charged an extra 15% (VAT) this starts from
now and it's purpose is to finance the reduction in
other peoples income tax. To partly offset this extra
burden we shall have a pension increase, in five months
time.
For the last four years I have had a heart condition
that necessitates my attendance regularly at the health
clinic in West Edinburgh, and in accordance with the
doctors advice, I am trying to avoid becoming excited
or more important depressed.
So please, no interviews on "Making Ends Meet", I feel
(449.)
it could be fatal. Mr. Scott Kerr may find something
useful in what I have written.
Case D: Occupational Pension
I am sorry to have been so long in replying to your
letter of 31st May last, but it did not reach me until
my return from holiday.
In addition to my retirement pension, I am fortunate
enough to have an occupational pension, I own my own
home and, having been thrifty I have an income from
investments. All in all, although I have only been in
receipt of the retirement pension for three months, I
do not anticipate any difficulty in making ends meet
and I do not consider myself a suitable subject for
your researcher, Mr. Scott Kerr.
Case E: Too Early to Say
With reference to your letter regarding the subject of
"Making Ends Meet", I feel that since I have only been
drawing my pension since February 1979 [three months
prior to receiving the DHSS letter of invitation] that
I am not in a position at the moment to really know how
I will be able to cope say in a few months time.
I feel it would be better for someone else to be chosen
who has been drawing their pension for a longer period
of time. Thanking you for your letter.
Case F: Ill-Health
I am writing on behalf of my father in reply to your
letter regarding a visit from Mr. Kerr.
I am afraid that my father's powers of concentration
and memory are not very good now and I think it may be
quite difficult for him to help with your research.
As it happens, he really does not have any problems in
making ends meet as I stay with him and help
financially with the running of the house. Thank you
for your letter.
Case G: Manage without Hardship
Many thanks for your interest in the senior citizens,
but as we manage without any hardship, I feel it would
be wasting your time by interviewing us.
(450.)
Case H: Do Not Wish to Take Part
Re your "Research Making Ends Meet" dated 31st May
1979, I am not at all interested and will not take
part.
Case J: Satisfied with Pension
In reply to your letter Re research "Making Ends Meet",
I feel that as I am quite satisfied with the
arrangements that exist, it would be unnecessary to
arrange an interview with Mr. Scott Kerr.
Thank you for offering me the opportunity.
Case K: Ill-Health
I am today in receipt of your letter (6 June), whilst I
would normally be quite agreeable to take part in your
study, I beg to be excused as I suffer badly from
bronchitis and emphysema and talking very soon has me
played out and also, for some unknown reason knowing
that someone is calling, even friends, I find I get
worked up and am gasping before I start speaking.
I am fortunate enough to have superannuation from my
ex-employers so I am not affected as many others are
through rising costs.
Case L: Deafness
I wish to thank you for today's letter about the
research work on pensioners' income being carried out.
I am 85 years old and very deaf and I do not wish to
see Mr. Kerr as I would not hear him. I keep house to
my brother-in-law since my sister, his wife, died. He
is 70 years old and with our joint retirement pensions,
and very careful management, we manage to make ends
meet. My pension pays our food and my brother-in-law's
pension pays the rates, rent, t.v., gas and electric
bills. We have no car, or holidays or luxuries, but we
are content with our way of life. We stay in a very
pleasant and healthy locality.
Case M: Full-time Occupation
Re the research, "Making Ends Meet" and the helping
hand in this study I am sorry, but at the moment I am
engaged in buying and selling homes, which is literally
a full-time occupation. Moreover I have not really felt
all that much difference in financial resources, for I
have done with great enjoyment some relief teaching.
Another time perhaps.
(451 . )
Case N: Occupational Pension
I have today received a letter asking me to take part
in a study of the views of pensioners. I do not know if
I would be of much assistance to you, as in addition to
my pension and superannuation I have a private income.
You will understand that I do not have the same
problems which many others with whom I have the
greatest sympathy have to meet and worry about.
Case 0: Do Not Wish to Take Part
Lady of the above address begs to inform you that
she does not wish to discuss her private affairs with
your researcher.
Case P: Do Not Wish to Take Part
In reply to your letter. It's just to say that I am
happy as things are with my pension and a rise in the
near future.
Case Q: Very Old
My mother has asked me to write to you in connection
with your circular letter, dated 31st May, concerning
the proposed research on pensioners' benefits, etc. She
is a very old lady now, not very well at times, and
does not feel able to be interviewed by Mr. Scott Kerr.
I must ask you, therefore, to excuse her on this
occasion, but she wishes you all success.
Case R: Do Not Approve of the Research
I refer to your letter of 31st May which has come to
hand despite postal strikes and redirections causing
postal delays. I do not intend to take part in your
research and disapprove of such expenditure when
cut-backs are necessary.
Your reference to "Taking part will have no affect
[sic.] to pension rate" is insulting to one's
intelligence, but neither will your study make any
difference to what is paid to pensioners.
Appendix A3: Letters Establishing Appointments
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH (453.)
DHSS Project: Making Ends Meet
'Pr3lIiinf^»nDl" 031-667 1011, Ext.
7 GEORGE SQUARE, EDINBURGH EH8 9JZ
RESEARCH STAFF: DAVID M. NELSON, SCOTT A. KERR
Research: Making Ends Meet
My name is Scott Kerr and I am a researcher from Edinburgh University.
You will remember that a few weeks ago Mr. McGinty of the Department of
Health and Social Security, London, wrote to you about a survey of retirement
pensioners which I have been asked to undertake. As you agreed to take part
in this research, I am now writing to arrange a suitable time to call on you
at your home to talk about the research. Our talk will last no longer than an
hour.
I wonder if it will be suitable for you to see me, say between
and on . If this is not suitable perhaps
you will let me know and suggest an alternative time and date. If you have
a telephone it will be helpful if you can let me have a note of the number so
that I can 'phone to make arrangements.
Although I will be making notes on a questionnaire during our talk,
especially on matters relating to income, expenditure, savings and how you
make ends meet, I can assure you that this information and indeed our whole
conversation will be treated as strictly private. Your name will not be noted
on the form I use and under no circumstances will any information be given to
the Department of Health and Social Security. In addition any report of the
study will be written in such a manner that no one who has taken part will be
able to be identified.




DHSS Project: Making Ends Meet
(454.)
,h 7 GEORGE SQUARE, EDINBURGH EH8 9JZ
031-667 1011, Ext.
RESEARCH STAFF: DAVID M. NELSON, SCOTT A. KERR
Research: Making Ends Meet
My name is Scott Kerr and I am a researcher from Edinburgh University.
You will remember that a few weeks ago Mr. McGinty of the Department of
Health and Social Security, London, wrote to you about a survey of retirement
pensioners which I have been asked to undertake. As the Department has not
heard from you they hope you will agree to take part in the research and I am
now writing to arrange a suitable time to call on you at your home to talk
about the research. Our talk will last no longer than an hour.
I wonder if it will be suitable for you to see me, say between
and on . If this is not suitable perhaps
you will let me know and suggest an alternative time and date. If you have
a telephone it will be helpful if you can let me have a note of the number so
that I can 'phone to make arrangements.
Although I will be making notes on a questionnaire during our talk,
especially on matters relating to income, expenditure, savings and how you-
make ends meet, I can assure you that this information and indeed our whole
conversation will be treated as strictly private. Your name will not be noted
on the form I use and under no circumstances will any information be given to
the Department of Health and Social Security. In addition any report of the
study will be written in such a manner that no one who has taken part will be
able to be identified.
Thank you for your cooperation and I look forward to meeting you soon.
Yours sincerely
Scott A. Kerr
Appendix A4: Screening Interview and Calculation Sheet
(456.)
SUBJECT CODE NUMBER



















Interview ended e^rly because
| | Applied for SP and waiting
to hear
[~~| Has S.P. now
I | Assessed Mo Longer eligible
within last 3 months






Interview not completed because: Subject
I | Not in
□ Not capable
I [ Refused part. (Specify)
| | Refused all








TO BE COMPLETED AFTER COMPLETING ALI ASSESSMENT INTERVIEWS
5. ACTION TAKEN
□ Non elig - results
□ Eligible - no consent
results
I | Letter
SUBSAMPLE LETTER RI FORM


















My r?me is Scott Kerr and I am a researcher from Edinburgh University. I
expect that you remember my name from the two letters that you have had about
my visit, one letter from the DHSS in London, and one from me .lust a few days
ago telling you when I wculd call.
First, I would like to thank you very much for agreeing to let me talk with
you. It was ve-y good of you to do so, and I'm certain that whatever information
you can give me will help me to understand more clearly how different pensioners
are making ends meet.
Second, could I mention another very important matter? That is keeping your
personal affairs private. When we finish talking today, you can be quite certain
that nobody other than you and I will know what we have talked about. This is
especially important since I will be asking you some detailed questions about
your income expenses, savings and about the people that live with you in order
to find out how you are making ends meet. I will not write your mme or address
on t^e interview sheet, and all other details that I write down will be put away
under lock and key.
Mow I'd like to begin our talk b.y telling you something about my research. I
believe that when people retire, some find it easier to make ends meet than
others do, for a variety of reasons. I also believe that different retired people
find different ways of making ends meet. For example, some people try to save
with a building society, whereas others try to buy expensive items early in
retirement so that they won't have to buy t em later. Also, some pensioners
get part-time iobs, whereas others will move Into a house belonging to one of
their children in order to economise.
In my research, I want to find out about the ways that you and other retired
people have found of making ends meet. In order to do that, I will be asking
you about your income, expenses, your household, and a few general questions
about your savings. I shall be making a note of your answers on those sheets,
but no one else is going to know that you have given me this information.










Check A: Martial Status M S
If Married, S Interviewed '• HOH WIFE BOTH
Sex of M F








(b) (Interviewer note: Go to end of interview since HOH in
full-time work carnot be eligible)
2. How old were you (and your






Add 25p if either over
80
Tick here





4. Do you have any children living with you who
are dependent upon you for their support?
Yes (a)
No Q5
IF YES PERSONAL REQUIREMENTS: DEPENDENT CHILDREN
(a) How old is each of them?
STD LODGER DEPENDENT







For each child over 16, ask (b)
(b) What is his/her occupation?
NOTE:If still at school or low paid apprentice (under 18, earning less
than i 13.55) ( over 18, earnings less than £ 16.45),
INCLUDE IN ASSESSMENT. Ask (i)
If unemployed, sick or disabled, treat as non-dependent
(i) What are his/her weekly wages?
do you own your home here?
'
PERSONAL REQUIREMENTS :
SCALE RATES (PLEASE CIRCLE)
yes Go to q6 HOUSEHOLDERS
(a)
Single Married
NO Go to 19.90 31.55
b21.15 b32.80
Are you (or your wife) 2b3q'.60
responsible for the rent N0N-HOUSEHOLDERS
of your home here? Single Married
yes Go to q6 15.95 31.55
b21.15 b32.80







5b. Do you (or your wife) pay board and






NOTE:If answer to (b) is "help out when we can:
or S lives with relatives, treat as a non-
householder, and see check below.
INTERVIEWER CHECK: Remember to add %1A5 Standard
rent addition for all non-householders.
Go to Q23
TO ALL HOUSEHOLDERS
6. Do you have central heating?
YES A
NO B
A. ALL WHO HAVE CENTRAL HEATING
RENTERS











1. Lighting (2) (i)
2. Fuel for
Cooking (2) (i)
3. Hot water (2) (i)
Central
Heating (2) (ii) (i)
IF YES
(2) Do you pay the landlord a specified charge
for... (each service ticked)
YES (i)
If 'no* to central heating,
ask (ii) NO
IF YES





OWNER OCCUPIER AMD RENTERS PAYING CWN CH.
(ii) How many rooms are there in your house/
flat excluding lavatory and bathroom?
CH. ADDITION
1-2
2 - h .85
5+ 1.70
OWNER OCCUPIERS GO TO QUESTION 11
RENTERS GO TO QUESTION 7
B. NO CENTRAL HEATING - RENTERS ONLY. OWN-OCC GO TO Qll.
RENTERS ONLY
(i) Does the rent you pay include...
SPEC. CHARGE? CHARGE/
YES NO YES NO WEEK=
1. Lighting (2) (i)
2. Feul for
Cooking (2) (i)
3. Hot water (2) (i)
h. Heating (2) (i)
IF YES
(2) Do you pay the landlord a specified charge











RENTERS GO TC QUESTION 7
CALCULATIONS
CENTRAL HEATING: DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS RENT FOR SERVICES INCLUDED
Rent includes: Spec. Charge= Scale rate= Ded. from GR =
Lighting (L) .15
Fuel (FC) .35
Ch + Hot water 3.40
Ch + H'»l + L 3.55
Ch + HW + FC 3.75
All 3.90
Spec. Chge. - Sc. rate = EHCA
EHCA Deduct smaller
or two figures
CENTRAL HEATING: CgA^cr renters or owri-occ. paying CH
add CfjAas discretionary addition
C HA= )
NOTE: Compare C^A
with HA (H+A) from
Questions 23-24
Add higher of two
figures as DA.
B. NO CH. DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS RENT FOR SERVICES INCLUDED
REUTERS ONLY
Rent Includes1 Spec. Charges= Scale Rate= Ded. from RA=
Lighting (L) .15
Fuel (FC) .35
H + Hot Water 3.^0
H + Hw + L 3.55






7. Do you rent your house from the Local Authority or
from a private landlord?
LA (a)
PL (a)
(a) How much rent do you have to pay for your
house here?






(c) Are there any weeks in the year that you







(d) Do you pay that amount of rent every











CHECK: Remember to average out rent over 52 weeks.
NOTE:
Check
•Rent', for SB purposes, includes all
at Questions 8-10 and 19-21.
rates.




(a) How much do you have to pay for your rates?




(1) Are there any weeks during the year









(ii) How many monthly rate payments do











(a) Were they included in the rent, or rates you





(b) How much do you have to pay for your water
rates?






(i) Are there any weeks during the year that








(ii) How many monthly water rate
payments do you have to make?
10. And do you pay any sewerage charges?
YES (a)
NC Ql6
(a) How much d° Y°u have to pay?
(b) How long a period does this cover?
GO TO QUESTION 16
TO OWNER-OCCUPIERS




(a) Approximately how much do you
have left to pay?
(b) And what is the current rate of
interest on this amount?
$
12. And how much do you have to pay toward
your rates?







(b) How many times per year do you have
to pay that sum?








(a) Were they included in the figure




(b) How much do you have to pay for
your water rates?
(c) How long a period does this cover?
(d) How many times per year do you have
to pay this sum?




(a)How much do you have to pay?
(b) How long a period does this cover?
(c) How many times per year do you have
to pay this amount?
13. Do you pay any f©tJ duty? (ground rent)
YES ^a)
NO 016
(a) How much do you have to pay?
(b) How long a period does this cover?
(c) How many times per ye^r do you have













GO TO QUESTION 16
TO RENTERS AND OWNER OCCUPIERS
16. Are you renting any rooms in your




(a) How much rert do they pay you?





(c) Do you supply the furniture or
do they have to? MINUS
Furniture Tick col.l
No Furniture Tick col.2
•
Col. 1 Furniture Col. 2
No
Furniture









GO TO QUESTION 17
. (Other than your wife and/or children) are
there any other people living here?
NOTE: Exclude subtenants and boarders
YES see check below
NO Q18
CHECK FROM QUESTION 3: Is blind scale appropriate for
respondent and/or wife?
No deduction
YES Go to Q18
NO (a)
(a) How many are there (in addition
to your wife and/or children)?
(b) And how many are under 16?
(c) And thinking of those who are
over 16, what are their
occupations?
Deduction from Net Rent for
non dependents =
(a) No. in HOH Unit
No 16 X 1 =
No 16 X 7 -
TOTAL (a)
(b) No. Non-Deps.
(I) No 16 X 1 =















f1—No. in this column must




and not working =
Their average
share of rent = each
If ave. rent share> 1.^5.
deduct 1.^5 only
If ave. rent share 1.^5.
deduct ave. rent share
Adjusted deduction from Gross
rent for non-dependents =
TO ALL
18. Do you have....
a rent rebate/allowance and a rate rebate
a rent rebate/allowance only
a rate rebate only
a rebate but don't know which
no rebates
TO AIL RECEIVING RENT REBATE/ALLOWANCE AMD RATE REBATE
19. ^ow much rent rebate/allowance do you
receive?
(a) How long a period does this cover?
(b) wns the amount of rent you told me




20. And how much rate rebate do you
receive?
(a) How long a period does this cover?
(b) And was the amount of rates you told
me you paid before or after your
rate rebate?
Before
After Go to Q23
TO ALL RECEIVING A RENT REBATE/klLOWANCE OR RATE REBATE
21. How much rebate/allowance do you
receive?
(a) How long a period does this cover?
(b) Is the amount of rent/rates you
mentioned earlier before or after
your rebate was deducted?
Before
After Go to Q23
TO AIL BOARDERS. OTHERS GO TO QUEST[CW
22. How much do you have to pay for your
board and lodging here?
£










(b) And does this charge include
three meals every day?
YES Q23
NO (c)
(c) What meals does the amount you
pay include?


















Q4 for Dep. Child
addition)
EATING OUT ALLOWANCE (CHILDREN)
(1)If full board, children get
lodger rate at Qk
(2) If no full board, children
get standard rate at Q4
(474.)
TO ALL
How difficult is it to he-t your
house adequately? Would you say
that it is
CHECK: Respondent's age
from Q2. Most OAEs
to get .85 addition
Do you (or your wife) have
difficulty getting out and
about as much as you would
like?
(a) Are (either of) you house¬
bound?
(also: chronic ill-health)
















27. Can you cope with your laundry at
home, or do you have to take it
out or send it out to be done
elsewhere?
cope at home Q28
take it out (a)
(a) And on average, about how much






28. And do you have any other special





(a) What are those epxenses?
(b) How much are they per week?
GO TO QUESTION 29
TO ALL IN PART-TIKE EMPLOYMENT FROM Ql(a)
OTHERS GO TO QUESTION 21
29. What were your total wages the last
time that you were paid?
(a) And how much of that did you get
as take-home pay?
(b) And how long a period does that
cover?
(c) Is the figure you gave me a regular
figure? ' YES
IF NO NO
(i) Considering the past four weeks
what has your average weekly take-
home pay been?
30. An important cost for those still working
can be the cost of getting to and from
work. In the week ending last Saturday,
did (either of) you spend any money






(a) How much did it cost (each of) you
to get to and from work last week?
31. Do you have any other expenses in
connection with your work (such as





(a) What expenses are they? Expense Wk/mth.
(b) How much are they per week?
TO ALL
32. How much state retirement pension
do you get per week?
HOH WIFE







(a) What type of work pension(s)
do you (and your wife) have?
(b) How much do you get each week WEEKLY AMOUNT
from (each of) these pensions?
HOH WIFE
TYPE
GO TO QUESTION 3U









Do you have any other pensions or




(a) What is that income? HOH WIFE
(b) How much does it bring you?
(c) How long a period does that cover?
As I said at the beginning of the interview, I am very interested
in learning more about the ways retired people use to make ends
meet. One way which some retired people use is to try and save
a little each week. I know that different people prefer to save
at different places, and in a minute I'll go on to that. But
first, can you tell me if you (and your husband/wife) have any
savings at the present?
(a) YES _ Has savings
No - No savings
(b) I have here a list of ways that some retired people use to save
their money and I would like you to tell me as I read through
the list if you save in the way I mention. I don't need to know
how much you have in each place. Your answers to these questions
will help us to understand where retired people prefer to save.
Do you have any savings (in): Amount (from (c) )
a deposit account ________
a current account
a Post Office Giro account






some other account (specify)
at home here
TOTAL =
(c) I would now like to ask you approximately how much you have saved
away altogether. If you don't think that you can give me an
accurate estimate of how much you have in all the places we've
already talked about, you can tell me how much you have in each
place and we'll do the sums together.
Would you prefer to tell me how much you have in each place or
would you rather iust try to estimate how much you have saved
altogether?
Sums (Go back to (b) )
Total (Go on to (d) )
(480.)
l) Thinking of your savings in all the places we've talked about
and adding them all together, would you say that you have more













NOTE:,Capital over 2800 = tariff of
Y.8.00 & unlikely to be entitled.
NOTE: Calculate tariff on capital
at question 36 (e) (i)
) (Other than your home here) do you own






(i) Is it completely paid for, or is










(ii) If you sold that property today, how much
do you think you would get for it?
Estimated 10$ of Outstanding Additional

















Before we finish, I'd like to ask you to think about all the money
you have coming in each week and all of the expenses you have. I'd
like to recall some sentences to you which describe people's feelings
about how their income and expenses compare. When I read the sentence
that best describes how you feel, please tell me, and then we'll go to
the next question.
(Present Card 1) Here's a card which has the sentences written on it.
I'll now read through them.




1. You have enough to buy almost
anything you want?
2. You have enough to afford a few
luxuries?
3. Your income just matches your
expenses?
4. You sometimes don't have enough
money to make ends meet?
5. You never seem to have enough
money to make ends meet?
And in general, how hard do you find it to make ends meet
nowadays?
Do you find it to be:
1. No trouble
2. a wee bit difficult
3• pretty hard
4. a great struggle
5. almost impossible
That's the last question that I have to ask you today. But, before I leave,
do you have any questions?
QUERIES:
There is one final favour that I would like to ask of you. You are one of
250 retired people that I have interviewed and in about two month's time I
may want to come back and talk with you again about other things. If I
come back to see you, I won't ask any more questions about money. But I
will want to ask you about how you spend your time, how you feel about being
retired, about your family, and about some ways that retired people have of
making ends meet.
I would be very grateful if I could talk with you again in about two month's
time. But if you are absolutely certain that you don't want me to come and
see you again, would you please tell me now?
Consent | "j
No consent □
TO THOSE WHO CONSENT






And are there any days during the week which are not
convenient for you?
M T W Th F
To End
(484.)
TO THOSE WHO DO NOT CONSENT
May I ask why you do not want to see me again?
TO ALL
Thank you very much for your time and co-operation. (I will send you
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Appendix A5: Research Interview
RESEARCH INTERVIEW
(487.)
te / / Subject Code:
terviev: Dual or Single
tempt Number: 12 3*+
me Started: :
pm
terviewer Reminder: Please complete all background information for CHECKS







SCK A: When I saw you before, you said that (the people listed below) were
ring with you. Has that changed in any way? (Check also for changes in
:ital status).
•
Relation to HOH d ere*
o
M F Marital Status Change
(specify)
1 2 M W S D SP
1 2 M W S D SP
1 2 M W S D SP
1 2 M W S D SP
1 2 M W S D S?
;CK 3: When I last saw you, you said that you were getting income from (the










it source is that?
l (after tax), how much does that bring in per week?
ICK C: Employment status of HOH (and wife) at time of screening interview.
WIFE:




































And how much of the time that you spent working were you self-employed?
None 1
About a quarter 2
About one-half 3
About three-quarters U
All of the time 5




1 Go to (a)









Three or more times 3
(b) Adding all those times together, for how long would you say that you
were unemployed in total?
(c) And how did you feel about being unemployed?
-2-1012
(d) Can you remember, did you ever apply for any unemployment benefit
or other benefit from the government while you were unemployed?
Yes 1 Go to (i)
No 2 See CHECK D
at Q. U
(i) How did you feel about the way you were treated when you applied?
-2-1012
(ii) And did you get the benefit?
Yes 1
No 2
(iii) And how did you feel about that?
-2-1012
CK D: To all now in employment (from CHECK C). Others no longer in employment
to question 6.
How old were you when you gave up full-time work?
Many people give up work completely when they reach retirement age.




- asked to stay on by employers
- spouse not retired
- other (specify
GO TO QUESTION 8
(490.)
How old were you when you gave up work completely?
(If female retired after 60, or male after 65, ask (a). Others go to
question 7)•
(a) Why did you decide to carry on working after the age of 60(65)?
- need the money
- like work
- bored otherwise
- asked to stay on by employers
- spouse not retired
- other (specify)
How would you feel about having some kind of part-time job now, if it was
possible for you to get one?
-2-1012
(If any score except '0', ask (a). Others go to question 8)
(a) What makes you feel that way?
(For ( + ) scores only. Others go to Q.8)
(b) What kind of job would you like to have?
ALL
Now I would like to talk with you about yourself and how you spend your time





How do you feel about that?
-2-1012
Are you usually able to get out of the house without help if the weather





(How that you are retired from full-time work) what are some of the things












(a) How often do you (activities)?
4 At least once per week
3 At least once per fortnight
2 At least once per month
1 less than once per month
What sort of things do you dislike about being retired?
In general, how do you feel about being retired?
-2-1012
Now I would like to ask you about any contacts (either of) you may have
had with some of the health services.
Do (either of) you have any of the following come to visit you?
HOH WIFE
Home help 1 1
Meals on wheels 2 2
District Nurse 3 3
During the last three months, have (either of) you had any contact with
the following people, either here or at their place of work?
Family doctor 1 1




Health Visitor 6 6
Social Worker T T
Housing Dept. Visitor 8 8
Social Sec. Visitor 9 9
-6-
(492.)
How often, as a rule, do (either of) you see your friends, either here or
in their own homes?
k 3 2 1 0
Now thinking of your neighbours in the area here, about how often in a
typical week do (either of) you see them to chat to?
At least every day 5
At least every other day U
At least twice a week 3
At least once a week 2
Less than once a week 1
If you found out that one of your neighbours was having difficulties, how
likely is it that (either of) you would offer to help?
HOH 0 12 3k
WIFE 0 12 3k
(If likelihood greater than '0', ask (a). Others go to Q.19)
(a) In what sort of situations would you offer to help?
And, turning the previous question on end, how likely is it that you would
ask your neighbours for help if you were having difficulties?
HOH 0 12 3k
WIFE 0 12 31*
(If likelihood greater than '0' ask (a). Others go to Q.19 )
(a) In what sort of situations would you ask them for help?
CX E: To be coded from CHECK A.
Does subject have:
(a) Any children or grandchildren living in? YES NO
(b) Any other relatives living in? YES NO
-7-
(493.)
I'd now like to ask you about your family. (Apart from those living with




(a) How often, as a rule, do you see any of them?
1+3210




(a) How often, as a rule, do you see any of them?
1+ 3 2 1 0
(If no relatives, children, or grandchildren, go to question 23.)
Others with relatives, go to question 21).
And do any of your relatives or family ever help you to make ends meet by





(b) How often, as a rule?
1+3210
(c) And thinking about the money that they give you, how much does it
help when it comes to making ends meet? Would you say that it ...
(Present Card l) _ ., ., , . , -, _Doesn't really help at all 0
Helps a wee bit 1
Helps a fair bit 2
Helps very much 3
You would be lost without it 1+
And does anyone from your family ever help you to make ends meet by helping
you out in other ways, for example, by buying you food, clothing, or by






(a) Who helps you out?
(b) In what way do they help?
PERSON STRATEGY FREQUENCY
h 3 2 1
U 3 2 1
^321
r—1OJm
(c) How often, as a rule, do they help you out by doing this?
At least once a week U
At least once a fortnight 3
At least once a month 2
Less than once a month 1
(d) And thinking about the help that they give you, how much does it
help when it comes to making ends meet? Would you say that ....
Present Card 1)
Doesn't really help at all 0
Helps a wee bit 1
Helps a fair bit 2
Helps very much 3
You would be lost without it k
From talking with many pensioners during my interviews over the summer, I
have found that, as people grow older, certain things happen which make it
more difficult for them to make ends meet. For some people the turning
point is the death of a loved one, for others it may be retirement, or
receiving a large bill for a roof repair, or a breakdown of their health.
I'd now like to ask you to look back over the past few years, and to tell
me if you can put your finger on any changes in your circumstsinces that
have made it more difficult for you to make ends meet since that time.
0 No changes - go to Q.2^
1 Changes - ask (a)
(a) What were those changes?
I would now like to ask you to look at this card (Present Csmd 2). As you
can see it has four sentences on it. The question that I would like to ask
you is "How well are you managing to make ends meet now, as compared to the
t ime befor e ( OTP). "




1. You're a wee bit worse off than before
2. You'.re a good bit worse off than before
3. You're very much worse off than before
U. You're extremely worse off than before
The next question is one which I probably already asked you in our first
talk, but since I'd like to see if your opinion has changed since then, I
hope that you won't mind if I ask you it again.
You'll probably recognise this card (Present Card 3).
Now, looking at the five sentences on it, which sentence do you think
best describes your situation here?
Would you say that,
1. Your income is quite a bit greater than your expense
2. Your income is a little bit greater than your expense
3. Your income just matches your expense
U. Your income is a little bit less than your expense
5. Your income is quite a bit less than your expense.
And, again another question that I have probably already asked you.
Using this card (Present Card 3) could you tell me how difficult it is
for you to make ends meet nowadays?
no trouble 0
a wee bit difficult 1
pretty hard 2
a great struggle 3
almost impossible 1
Most of the other pensioners I have talked with have told me that they have
cut down or given up buying or doing certain things lately, because they
have become too dear. I have a list of a few things that most people buy or
do, and as I read through it, would you please tell me if you have cut down
or stopped doing it altogether over the past few years.
Going out for entertainment
(pub, club, meals, bingo, cinema, bowls) 2 1
Going on holidays 2 1
Travelling to see relatives 2 1
Buying newspapers and magazines 2 1
Using the 'phone much 2 1
Heating 2 1
Buying clothing and shoes 2 q
Using electricity 2 1
Smoking (query if for health reasons) 2 1
Buying meat 2 1
Buying eggs, cheese and milk 2 . I
(
~10~ (496.)
most of the rest of our conversation, I would like to talk with you
t some steps that retired people take to make it easier to make ends
irst question is;
To your knowledge, can pensioners in certain circumstances get extra
income each week from the Department of Health and Social Security





(a) Can you tell me what you think the naQe of this extra income is?
Yes Ask 2.
No Ask (i)
(i) The (correct) name for this
Pensions.
Name given;
extra income is Supplementary
I'd now like to ask you a question which is a wee bit more difficult,
so please take your time to think about your answer. The question is;
"Considering your present financial situation, have you ever thought
there was any chance at all that you might be /' better off financially




(a) And what first made you think that you might be / better off /
eligible?
(b) I'd like to ask you now, how confident are you that you would








Since you think that there might be sons chance that you may be
/ better off / eligible, can you toll me, what has prevented you
from applying so far?
-12-
(498.)
Before I came and talked with you today, had you ever.<..
Thought about applying for a Supplementary Pension?
(if yes, 'How often did you think about this?)
Taired with other people about the possibility of applying?
(If yes, ,r7ho?* )
Asked other people, such as a doctor or social worker, for
advice about applying? (if yes, './ho?')
Picked up a leaflet from the Post Office describing Supplementary
Pensions?
Completed the ap ilication form on the leaflet, but never sent
it in?
Hade an appointment for an interview, but decided not to go
through with it after all?
Now I would like you to have a look at this card ( present Card 5 )>
and, if you would please, to use it to answer the following question;
"Considering what you know about Supplementary Pensions and yo"r
present financial circumstances, how likely is it that you will apply
for a Supplementary Pension sometime during the next two months?"
1. I definitely will not apply
2. There is a small chance that I will apply, but it is ve:
3. I probably will not apply, but I'm not certain of this.
4. I'm not certain what I will do.
5. I probably will apply, but I'm not certain of this.
6. I very likely will apply.
7. I definitely will apply.
GO TO STATSLENT 6
IF NEVER KEAPdD OF SP. FR0I1 yllEOTIQN 1
In fact, pensioners in certain circumstances can get their weekly pensions
topped up. The name of this extra income is Supplementary Pensions.
Now when I spoke with you earlier in the year about making ends meet,
I asked you a few questions about your financial circumstances. From that
information I was able to estimate if you would be / better off on /
eligible for / a Supplementary Pension. I'd like to tell you now that,
although I'm not a government official and I'm not dead certain, it seems
very likely that you would be / better off financially on / eligible
for / a Supplementary Pension. Although this is only an estimate,
it seems likely that the amount which you would be / better off by /
eligible for / is between and pounds per week. Obviously,
the only way to be certain if you are / in the better off situation /
eligible / is to arrange to have an interview with a Social Security
interviewer. I'd now like to go on by telling you a bit more
about what making an application involves, and to ask you a few
questions about how you would feel about the application procedure.
-13-
(499.)
First of all, as a matter ox general principle, do you have any
strong feelings one way or the other about asking for help?
Yes Ask (a)
No Ask 3.
(a) How would you feel, then?
-2-112
Ask 3.
Assxming that you would apply and get this extra pounds par 'week,






(a) And how hard has it been for you to do without / cut down on ...
(ask valences for each)
(b) And, in general, how useful would this extra per week be toward





4 Extremely useful - solves
most of the problem
-14-
(500.)
If you decided to apply, you would have to apply to the Department of
Health and Social Security to verify that you / would he better off /
are eligible. Hay I ask, would you have any strong feelings one way
or the other about applying to the DHS3?
Yes Ask (a)
No Ask 10.
(a) How would you feel, then?
-2-112
If you decided to apply, you would have to have an interview to verify
for certain that you / would be better off / are eligible. Now, do you
have any strong feelings one way or the other about have an interview?
Yes Ask (a)
No Ask 11.
(a) How would you feel then?
-2 -1 1 2
I'd like to ask you now about any previous experiences that you may have
had with officials. First, have you ever had any dealings in person
with an official from the Social Security Office before?
Yes Ask (d)
No Ask (a)
(a) Have you ever had any dealings in person with any of the officials
at the Housing Department ( Taterloo Place ) before?
Yes Ask (d)
No Ask (b)
(b) Have you ever had any dealings in person with other officials,




(c) Based on what you have heard and know about Civil Servants and
other officials, how do you think that the Social Security Officer





(d) Do you remember, how did that official treat you?
-2-1012
(e) And if you decided to ap.Yy for a Supplementary Pension now,
how likely is it that the Social Security Officer would treat
you the same way?
0 1 2 3 4-
Ask 12.
If you were to apply, you could have the interview either here in
your home, or you could go to Clifton House at Haymarket to have it.
How, which do you think that you -would prefer?
Home Ask (a)
C.H. Ask (b)
(a) And do you have any strong feelings one way or the other about
having a DHS3 interviewer come around to your house?
Yes Ask (i)
No Ask 13.
(i) And how would you feel, then?
-2-112
Ask 13.
(b) And do you have any strong feelings one way or the other about
going to Clifton House to have an interview?
Yes Ask (i)
No Ask (c)
(i) And how would you feel, than?
-2 -1 1 2
GO TO (c)
-16- (502.)
(c) I would like you to think for a minut a about Clifton H0use.
It is very likely that there would be other types of people
'waiting there to be interviewed when you went in. I'd like-
to ask you if you could tell me what you imagine that those
people would be like.
(i) And would you have any strong feelings one way or the
other about being in their company?
Yes Ask (ii)
Ho Ask 13.
(ii) And how would you feel, then?
-2-112
I'd now like to discuss with you the types of questions that the Social
Security interviewer would most likely ask you if you. decided to apply.
Since I'm very interested in what you feel about being asked these
types of questions, you can help me to understand your feelings in the
following way. After I tell you about each question that the interviewer
is likely to ask, I'd like you to tell me if it would bother you to
have to answer that particular question. If you tell me that the par¬
ticular question would bother you, I'll be asking you if it would
bother you only a wee bit, or quite a lot.
Now, one of the questions that the interviewer would ask you iss
VALENCES
Yes Ho
r 1 i i—i
(a) How old are (both of) you? -2 -1 0
(b) TJho lives in your house here? -2 -1 0
(o) How much is your weekly income, and
where does it come from? -2 -1 0
(a) How much are your savings, and where do
you have them saved? -2 -1 0
(a) How much is the total rent on your house? -2 -1 0
(f) How much are the total rates on your house? -2 -j 0
(g) Do you have any rebates, and how much are they
worth? _2 -1 0
-17- (503.)
(h) Do you pay any feu duty, and ho.7 much
is it that you pay? -2 -1 0
(i) How difficult do you think it is to heat your
house? -2 -1 0
(j) How is your health, and hot? able are you '^°
get out and about on your own? -2 -1 0
(k) Do you have any special expenses in connection
with your diet? -2-10
(l) Do you do your laundry out, and if so, hot? much
does it cost per week? -2 -1 0
(m) Do you need to replace any old items such as
bedding, furniture, or household equipment? -2 -1 0
(n) Do you need any clothing replaced? -2 -1 0
(o) Do you get any steady income from your family,
and if so, how much is it? -2 -1 0
I have only a feu more questions to ask you regarding applying for
Supplementary Pensions and then we will be finished with the subject.
Now, when the Social Security interviewer asks you about your circum¬
stances, it is very likely that he will also wish to see evidence of
your income, and of your expenses such as rent and rates. I'd like to
ask you now, do you have any strong feelings one way or the other about
having to give him evidence of your income and of some ox your expenses?
Yes Ask (a)
No Ask 15.





TF SUBJECT HAS FAIIIIY. OTI-lirTISN GO TO ON 12
If you decided to apply for a Supplementary Pension., would you tell
your family that you were doing so?
Yes Ask (a)
No Ask (b)
(a) And how do you think that they would react?
, , 1C -2-1012Ask 16.
(b) -That do you think would keep you from telling them?
Ask 16,
And if you decided to apply, would you tell, say, your closest friends?
Yes Ask (a)
No Ask (b)
(a) And how do you think that they would react?
-2-101 2
Ask 17.
(b) What do you think would keep you from telling thorn?
Ask 1? m
And if you decided to apply, uould you tell any of your neighbours?
Yes Ask (a)
No Ask (b)
(a) And how do you think they would react?
-2-1012
Ask 13,
(b) What do you think would keep you from telling them?
ia-Skl 13 #
-19- (505.)
18. One of the advantages of receiving a Supplementary Pension is that,
in addition to the extra money that it would bring in, you would also
automatically get your glasses and dental treatment free of charge.
I'd like to ask you now, how would you feel about getting those things
free of charge?
-2-1012
19. Another advantage of receiving a Supplementary Pension is that any
fares you paid on going to the hospital yourself are refunded to you
by the hospital when you show them that you are receiving a






THOST OK PZSAT.TS ONLY. O'ZI liS GO TO QUESTION 21,
Earlier I told you that it is very likely that you would bo better off
financially by claiming a Supplementary Pension than you presently ore
by being on your rebate(s). 'This means, quite simply, that the amount
of cash that you would got from a Supplementary Pension would be greater
than, the amount of rebate(s) that you are presently receiving.
The government says that people cannot have both a rebate and a
Supplementary Pension at the same time, and if you received a Supple¬
mentary Pension you would eventually have to go off the rebate.
Although the Supplementary Pension would be the better option for you
in financial terms, I would like to ask you now if you have any strong





(a) And how would you feel about eventually giving up your rebate?
-2-112
Ask (i)
(i) And what makes you feel that way?
(ii) And if the Supplementary Pension was worth 10£ per week
more to you than your rebates presently are, would you
still be bothered about giving up your rebate(s)?




I have only one last question to ask you about applying for a
Supplementary Pension. I would like you to look at this card (again)j
(present Card 5) please, and to use it to answer the following
question.
"Considering that you now know that it is very likely that you / are eligible
for / would be better off on / a Supplementary Pension, how likely is it
that you 'will apply for one sometime during the next two months?
1. I definitely will not apply.
2. There is a small chance that I will apply, but it is very unlikely.
3. I probably will not apply, but I'm not certain of this.
4. I'm not certain what I will do.
5. I probably will apply, but I'm not certain of this.
6. I very likely will apply.
7. I definitely will apply.
e interview ended:
X D: S31/SB8 Left?
SB! □
SB8 l l
Appendix A6: Two Profiles
(509.)
Appendix A6: Two Profiles
Mrs. K.
1. Description of Financial and Household Situation
Mrs. K. was a 76 year old widow who lived alone in
a two apartment flat in a small tenement in the
Roseburn/Murrayfield area of Edinburgh. She rented her
flat from a landlord who owned several small properties
in the area and who lived locally. Although she said
that she was quite content, and her lifelong friend
Mrs. M. lived across the street, Mrs. K. seemed a bit
lonely. She also recognised that she was slowly losing
her memory, and that her mobility was severely limited
by her angina, her severe arthritis, and her doctor's
warnings that if she was not careful, she might develop
a hiatus hernia (a condition not uncommon amongst the
pensioners I interviewed).
Mrs. K.'s housing situation worried her on two
counts: (1) her neighbour across the common first-floor
landing was an alcoholic prone to vociferous profanity
and frequent dog-battering, and (2) her landlord ran
his properties on the cheap, spending the minimum on
upkeep. As a result, the water cistern above Mrs. K.'s
bedroom leaked, and had ruined her ceiling. She was
dismayed not only by the unsightly appearance this
presented, but also, and more importantly, by her fear
that the ceiling would collapse.
I had scheduled Mrs. K. to be my second
interviewee on the first day of interviewing. When I
rang her doorbell, there was no answer. I called out to
her through the letterbox, and a few seconds later I
heard her moaning, "Someone please help me, someone
please help me". I told her that I would go for help,
and I immediately went to the neighbour across the
stair.
He remembered that Mrs. K.'s daughter worked at a
nearby bank and I suggested that he ring her. However,
she had not yet arrived at work, so I asked him to ring
for the police, while I went and looked for a neighbour
with a key. In the event, the keyholder was out, and I
began to look around for an object with which to prise
open the door. Just as I was about to attempt my first
ever break-in, Mrs. K. managed to get to the door and
to open it.
I took her to her bedroom, placed her on the bed,
put a cold flannel on her head, and somewhat anxiously
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awaited the arrival of the police. Mrs. K. continually
moaned, "Why did he have to do it, oh why? Someone hit
me on the head." Although the door had been double
locked, I checked the windows and found that they were
all secure. Then I realised that she thought I had done
it i
The police arrived about 20 minutes later. By
piecing together the account given by the sister at the
hospital with that given by her daughter, I later
surmised that Mrs. K. had turned her head quickly,
pinched an artery, and consequently fainted. When I
rang the ward to inquire after Mrs. K., the sister was
already quite familiar with my name since Mrs. K. had
continually associated me with the crime.
Fortunately, Mrs. K. recovered quickly, and five
weeks later I was able to conduct a screening interview
with her.
Mrs. K.'s only source of income was her NIP of
£19.50 per week. She received a rent allowance and a
rate rebate, and, combined, their weekly value was
£3.98. I estimated her entitlement, which included
heating additions at the half-rate (£1.70) to be £6.95,
which would have left her potentially better off on a
supplementary pension by £2.97 per week.
2. Description of Motivation to Apply Prior to Research
Interview
Perceived Need
In the screening interview, Mrs. K. indicated that
her income just matched her expenses and that she found
it a wee bit difficult to make ends meet. In the
research interview, she indicated that her income was a
little bit less than her expenses, and that she found
it pretty hard to make ends meet. However, to put
"pretty hard" into context, this didn't really worry
her a great deal. This was because her plight then was
far better than when her husband was alive:
When the children were young, it was an awful
struggle. He [her husband] was a gardener,
and in the winter he had no wages and we had
to dip into savings.... He also drank and I
sometimes didn't get his wages....If it
hadn't been for drink, things would be
different now.
So although Mrs. K. found it pretty hard to manage, it
was much easier for her at the time of our interview
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than before her husband died.
Knowledge of the Existence of Supplementary Pensions
At first, Mrs. K. did not understand my question,
but when I re-phrased it she indicated that she knew
that some form of extra income for pensioners existed.
She called it "social security", but when I stated the
correct name, she immediately recognised it and told me
that she knew other people on it.
Perceived Eligibility
Mrs. K. stated that she "had never even thought
about it [being eligible for a supplementary pension]."
Expectations and Feelings about Applying
Justifiably, Mrs. K. was very proud of the way in
which she had managed to raise two children on what was
often a very small income. Her pride and independence
were reflected in the effort she put into managing her
finances. Her attitude became clear when she told me:
Certainly the gas and electric are going
up...but I put away a wee bit for the
electric, gas, phone and television every
week.... I feel that I can manage with the
rebate and the rent allowance. Rent -- that's
the biggest problem.
Summary
Although Mrs. K. recognised that she was having
some difficulty, the combination of her perceptions of
little need (lower still because her current situation
was an improvement on her previous lifestyle), pride
and independence, and the positive value placed on the
rebate and allowance kept her from applying. Although
she expressed some need, it seemed that her resistance
had effectively prevented her from considering that she
might be eligible.
At this point in the interview, Mrs. K. indicated
that she definitely would not apply.
3. Description of Motivation to Apply after Research
Interview
I then proceeded to inform Mrs. K. that she
probably would be between £2.50 and £3.00 per week
better off on a supplementary pension.
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Expectations and Feelings about Applying
Mrs. K. indicated that she would put this extra
income towards three things: (1) saving up for going
into a nursing home, (2) using more gas heat and
electricity, and (3) repairing and redecorating the
bedroom where the cistern leaked. From our conversation
it appeared that the extra money would have had a high
utility for meeting her immediate needs of extra
heating and help with the electricity bills.
Mrs. K. had some reservations about asking for
help. In response to my query, "Do you have any strong
feelings one way or the other about asking for help?",
she replied: "No, not really. But I just feel as long
as I can manage on what I have just now, I'11 carry
on." Earlier in the interview, Mrs. K. had expressed
her independence in another form. When I asked her how
she would feel about getting help from her children,
she stated: "Families have enough to think about
themselves. I would accept if they offered, but I
wouldn't ask for it." Mrs. K. also did not "think that
you should do it [apply] unless it's absolutely
necessary. I know other pensioners who are on it, but
who could do without it."
Mrs. K. felt that she could maintain her
independence very well by staying on her rebate and
allowance. She was very negative about the high cash
flow of managing implied by SB. In her words:
I feel if I'm getting a rebate, that keeps me
straight on that [rent and rates]. I_ cannot
stand debt, and the rebate keeps me straight.
[But why must it be a rebate?] If I'm getting
a rebate, I don't have to worry abut putting
money aside. I'm getting awfully forgetful,
and often have to ask my daughter how much
things are... .
Judging by her candid appraisal of her failing
memory, she perceived that she was already on the
"best" option, and switching over would have created
substantial hardships. She re-stated her feelings
later:
I feel ease of mind when I get that [the
rebates]. [The disadvantage of cash is that]
I could easily go and spend that money,
forgetting that I had to put it in place of
my rebates.
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Unlike many other pensioners, Mrs. K. was negative
about the rebated taxi fares concession. Receiving this
particular benefit would have made her feel that she
was "taking a lot off somebody who may be more
needing", and she therefore stated "I'd find another
way" .
Mrs. K., were she to apply, expected that she
would certainly tell both her family and her friend,
Mrs. M. She "never does anything" without consulting
her family, and strongly believed that they would have
encouraged her to apply because "after all, they have
their own families". She believed that her friend Mrs.
M. would also very strongly encourage her to apply.
Summary
It was clear that Mrs. K. was finding it somewhat
difficult to manage, believed that the benefit would be
useful towards meeting her needs, and expected both her
family and her friends to encourage her to apply.
However, there were also considerable forces against
applying. These were (in descending order of
importance): (1) the possibility that a cash benefit
would put her into debt and cause her a lot of worry;
(2) the loss of pride she expected to suffer by
becoming dependent on a benefit, applying for which
would have meant admitting that she "needed", and
receipt of which would have associated her with people
of lesser integrity ("other pensioners who are on it,
but who could do without it"); (3) the sense of guilt
that she expected to feel about "taking a lot off
somebody who may be more needing".
Mrs. K. closed our interview by indicating that
she definitely would not apply. She stated: "I'd just
do without. You have to do these things. I just don't
go about places where I spend money."
Contrary to the statistical predictions, I
predicted that Mrs. K. would not apply during the
waiting period. In the event, she did apply.
Mrs. N.
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Description of Financial and Household Situation
Mrs. N. (65) was a widow who lived alone in a two
apartment, ground floor flat in Wester Hailes, a
council housing estate. Mrs. N. was German, having met
and married her Scottish husband when he was in the
occupation army after the last war. She had been living
in Scotland since 1949, and her married life was never
really happy because her husband drank and gambled away
their wages.
Mrs. N. was very much a product of the "altschul"
of German upbringing. She believed quite strongly in
obeying authority, being highly organised, and that
children should be seen but not heard. Because of both
her conspicuous nationality and her firmly held
authoritarian views, she was continuously tortured
during the summer months by local children playing
directly outside her sitting room window. They often
chanted slogans such as "We won the war" and "Nazi, go
home" in order to aggravate her, and she responded to
their taunting by chastising them, which only
encouraged them all the more. She was very distressed
during our first interview, but since school had
resumed by the time of our second interview, she was
feeling much more contented.
When I arrived for our first interview, I was
greeted by loud German 'oom-pa-pa' music through the
letterbox. When Mrs. N. appeared, she told me that she
had guests from Germany, and that I could not see her.
We negotiated for a short while, and she finally said
that I could come back in "hof en ooer".
Mrs. N.1s only income was her NIP of £19.50. She
received rebates on her rent and rates worth 87%
(£7.46) of her weekly payments (£8.50). Although it was
difficult to decide between the quarter and half rates,
I "awarded" Mrs. N. a quarter-rate ECA for heating, and
this made her potentially better off on SB by £2.29 per
week.
Description of Motivation to Apply Prior to Research
Interview
The first interview with Mrs. N. was so difficult
(a combination of her accent, her attitude, the noise
of the local children, and her consequent distress)
that I was very reluctant to interview her a second
time. However, when I returned, I was pleasantly
surprised at how different she seemed. She insisted
that I have breakfast with her, and plied me with food,
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cigarettes, and a cup of "proper" coffee. As we spoke,
she warmed up considerably. It was only after I felt
that I had established a personal rapport that I
started to work through my questions with her.
Perceived Need
Mrs. N. indicated that her income was quite a bit
less than her expenses, and that she found it pretty
hard to make ends meet. In her words, "Tuesday's
pension is gone by Saturday, and there's not a penny
left in my purse. I just have to do without." Although
she, budgeted carefully, she couldn't "buy clothing
outright", and managed only by belonging to a clothing
club. "I don't buy the same messages every week", she
stated. "What I buy this week I don't buy the next. I
have to be economical." She earlier stated that there
was nothing that she disliked about her present
situation, but that she would have liked a bit more
money. Like many pensioners, Mrs. N. considered her
non-food bills to be of the highest priority. Of her
weekly £19.50, £2 went for the telephone bill, £1 for
her death insurance, £9 for her electricity bill, £1
for her rent and rates, and the remaining £6.50 was
spent on her food and personal items for the week. She
was very houseproud, and it was clear that the
maintenance of her house took priority over food
purchases. But Mrs. N. also stressed that many luxuries
(such as her new electric kettle) were bought for her
by German friends who visited her occasionally.
Knowledge of the Existence of Supplementary Pensions
Even before I asked her directly, Mrs. N.
indicated that she knew that some form of extra money
for pensioners existed. Some time previously:
One of my neighbours said, "why don't you go
on social security?" I can't go to social
security and moan and plead poverty. As long
as my bills are paid, I won't do it.
When I asked her directly, Mrs. N. told me that the
name of the extra income might be "Social Allowances",
but that, in any case, she would be ashamed to claim
it.
Perceived Eligibility
Mrs. N. admitted that there was some chance that
she might be better off on supplementary benefit, but
she was uncertain of this. She told me that her
neighbours had discussed it with her, and that they had
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suggested that she would be better off.
Expectations and Feelings about Applying
It was Mrs. N.'s negative feelings that deterred
her from applying prior to the research interview. Her
pride was generally expressed by her emphatic statement
that:
as long as I can manage, I won't. I just
feel, Oh, no (with her hands thrown up in a
gesture indicating defeat and despair).
Maybe, if I had ill health....
But, what did "as long as I can manage" mean? Mrs.
N. clarified this remark with the rhetorical question,
"Why live off the state when you can manage? [There is]
no need for that if you're careful." So, in her mind, a
person who is proud and independent is careful, and
being careful keeps one free of state support.
Receiving state support would mean admitting that she
had not been careful enough, and this would have
injured her pride. Mrs. N. also commented: "but let's
face it, we have our free bus fares." This was her way
of saying that she had already sacrificed a bit of her
pride for the sake of her needs. It seems that having
conceded once, she was even less willing to concede
again.
Mrs. N.'s pride shone through in her
interpretation of her previous experience with a DHSS
officer. In understanding this passage, it is helpful
to know that when she sold her old house for £390, she
put £190 of this toward painting and carpeting her new
rented flat. Mrs. N.'s account went as follows:
Last year I needed new reading glasses - the
NHS glasses were no good, and I had my own
frames made. The man charged me the full
amount ... and my neighbour said that this
was not right. I filled in a form for a
glasses rebate and this led to a social
security man coming [much to her surprise and
dismay].
He looked around to see how I was getting on.
I told him, "I manage, I get on." I'm not
down. They look around for dirt.
Mrs. N. knew pensioners "who spend their social
security on smoking and drink." To her, the people who
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had social security were those who squandered the
benefit on smoking and drinking, and they had obtained
the benefit by pleading poverty (which can be most
effectively done, so I was told, by "ripping up the
carpets"). Her belief that the interviewer was "looking
around for dirt" had insulted her immensely, and had
implied that he was (in her mind) associating her with
the drinking and smoking type.
Mrs. N. also tried to rationalise her way out of
eligibility. She stated, "I feel -- I'm German. Why
should they bother with me?" It seemed that Mrs. N. was
here attempting to convince herself that, because she
was a foreigner, she had no legal right to the extra
income. Since it was not a right, she considered it to
be charity. And since it was charity, she could then
feel justified in allowing her pride to dictate that
she manage without it.
In addition to the aforementioned deterrents, Mrs.
N. was generally "put off by having to go to the DHSS
and ask for it", and she expected that any experience
with a DHSS officer and with applying would be
relatively unpleasant. The officer in her previous
experience "was not unkind, but was a bit snobbish",
and to her, the entire experience was "degrading - I
felt embarassed".
Summary
There was little doubt that Mrs. N. had not
claimed because of her negative feelings. For her,
applying had numerous inplications, most of which she
felt would have damaged her pride and sense of
independence. To have had to ask for the extra money
would have been insulting enough, but to have had to
pretend to be poverty stricken and therefore to have
associated herself with undesirable people was totally
unacceptable to Mrs. N. She summed up her attitude by
stating:
I did nae [think of applying], but why should
I? I have a wee bit of pride. Give it to the
boozers and bingo players. It doesn't appeal
to me .
Mrs. N. then indicated that she definitely would not
apply, considering her feelings at the time.
3. Description of Motivation to Apply after Research
Interview
I then proceeded to inform Mrs. N. that she would
probably be between £2.00 and £2.50 per week better off
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on a supplementary pension.
Expectations and Feelings about Applying
Mrs. N. would have put this extra money towards
her electricity bill, paying off her clothing club
account, and towards paying for the telephone. She
remarked that she had already "done away with" her
television. Although she was finding it extremely
difficult to meet these expenses, her comments
regarding her clothing club payments only reiterated
her attitude towards asking for help:
It worries me to have months and months to
pay. But it is the only way for me to get on.
Mrs. N. believed that the extra money would be
extremely useful towards meeting these expenses, but
also believed that it would not completely cover all of
them.
Mrs. N. was so set against asking for help that
she stated: "I just couldn't". She was very negative
about applying to the DHSS because this would mean she
must be prepared to "plead poverty". She was also very
negative about having an interview, and expected that
the interviewer would be very offputting. This was due,
in part, to Mrs. N.'s feelings that "they would come
here and say I'm a healthy woman and don't need it."
Although I had informed her that she could have
the interview either in her home or at the DHSS office,
she insisted:
I'd still have to go down there, and I don't
have the guts to do it. I'd have to rip up
the carpets to prove that I'm poor.
Of all the questions asked in the official
interview, Mrs. N. was only against answering one -
"how much are your savings?" She had nearly £200 in
index-linked certificates about which she did not tell
me until the end of our second interview. She told me
that:
I wouldn't tell them [the DHSS] about the
index money. It's for my holiday in Germany
-- my first in 20 years.
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However, Mrs. N. then proceeded to surprise me by
stating that she would not be bothered by having to
produce evidence of her income and certain of her
expenses because "it has to be honest"!
Mrs. N. indicated that she would not be
inconvenienced by switching over from rebates, nor
would her decision be influenced by her friends because
she would not consult them. The perks of supplementary
benefit were of no use to her since she had already
taken advantage of the dental and optical concessions,
and did not need the rebated taxi fare concession.
Summary
Mrs. N.'s decision-making process essentially
involved weighing off the utility of the extra money
for meeting her electricity, clothing and telephone
bills against her negative feelings about applying. Her
reluctance to apply was considerable, since she
expected to encounter barriers at every step along the
way. First, she would have had to overcome her very
strong sense of pride in order to ask for what she
perceived to be charity (rather than entitlement). She
would then, at some point, have had to go to the DHSS,
and this was undesirable because it would have implied
that she could not manage. Third, she would have had to
have an interview, and she did not like interviews, or
the "fact" that the interviewer would have associated
her with undesirable people. She also expected that the
interviewer would be a bit snobby, and would snoop
around her house for evidence of poverty. Fourth, she
felt that in the official interview she would have both
to lie about her savings and to plead poverty, both of
which would make her feel badly. She believed that if
she pleaded poverty (or even applied), the interviewer
wouldn't believe that she was honest. This was because,
in her view, the condition of a person's house proved
their financial circumstances. Thus, in order for her
claim to be credible, her house would have to smell of
poverty. Since it was very nicely kept, she believed
that the disparity between its condition and her story
would lead the interviewer to doubt her integrity.
Fifth, she thought that the interviewer, after seeing
her and her house, would say that she was not eligible
because she was too well off and too healthy. Being
rejected in this fashion would have been heartbreaking.
Although at the end of the interview she was still
very resistant to applying, it seemed that her sense of
need was quite strong as well. This was inferred from
her surprising response to my closing query about how
likely it was that she would claim sometime during the
next two months. She said that she probably would not
apply, but that she was not certain of this.
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It's like this - the electricity is up, but I
feel that by saving I can manage. I see how I
get on by February. If I can manage, I won't
do anything else.
Mrs. N. did not have an interview within the
two-month waiting period to see if she would be better
off.
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SURVEY: MAKING ENDS MEET
I am siting to ask if you would take part in a survey of the views of
pensioners about making ends meet.
The government is interested to know how pensioners feel about the various
benefits available to them, and about the different ways pensioners use to
make ends meet. Consequently, it has asked a survey team from Edinburgh
University, headed by Mr Scott Kerr, to interview a variety of pensioners
in order to discuss the whole question.
Since Mr Kerr does not have a list of Edinburgh pensioners to interview,
I am assisting him by providingnames drawn at random from Housing Department
records. No other information has been given. Since your name has been
drawn, a member of the University team would like to visit you at home, some
time within the next few weeks; the visit will last less than an hour.
If you do not wish to be interviewed, please write to me as soon as possible.
\ reply paid envelope is enclosed for your use. Unless I hear from you, I
will pass on your name to the University team, and you will hear from
lr Kerr directly. Whether or not you take part will in no way affect any
rebate or allowance you are receiving.
In addition, anything you say during the interview will be kept completely
private as the team is bound by strict rules of secrecy. Since the list of
lames of pensioners who participate will be destroyed at the end of the
survey, no-one will ever know that you participated.
I very much hope that you will feel able to help in this survey, and that
fou will enjoy talking to a member of the University team.
Director of Housing
Please address reply to
HOUSING DEPARTMENT
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SURVEY: MAKING ENDS MEET
I am writing to ask if you would take part in a survey of the views of
pensioners about making ends meet.
The government is interested to know how pensioners feel about the various
benefits available to them, and about the different ways pensioners use to
make ends meet. Consequently, it has asked a survey team from Edinburgh
University, headed by Mr Scott Kerr, to interview a variety of pensioners
in order to discuss the whole question.
Since Mr Kerr does not have a list of Edinburgh pensioners to interview,
I am assisting him by providing names drawn at random from Housing Department
records. No other information has been given. You will be aware that the
records of owners/occupiers receiving rate rebate have recently been transferred
to the Director of Finance, Lothian Regional Council but the selection of names
was made prior to that time. Since your name has been drawn, a member of the
University team would like to visit you at home, some time within the next few
weeks; the visit will last less than an hour.
If you do not wish to be interviewed, please write to me as soon as possible.
A reply paid envelope is enclosed for your use. Unless I hear from you, I will
pass on your name to the University team, and you will hear from Mr Kerr directly.
Whether or not you take part will in no way affect any rebate or allowance you
are receiving.
In addition, anything you say during the interview will be kept completely
private as the team is bound by strict rules of secrecy. Since the list of
names of pensioners who participate will be destroyed at the end of the survey,
no-one will ever know that you participated.
I very much hope that you will feel able to help in this survey, and that you
will enjoy talking to a member of the University team.
Yours sincerely
Director of Housing
Please address reply to
HOUSING DEPARTMENT
23/25 WATERLOO PLACE, EDINBURGH EH1 3BH
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|l 7 GEORGE SQUARE, EDINBURGH EH8 9JZ
>
031-667 1011, Ext. 4448
RESEARCH STAFF: DAVID M. NELSON, SCOTT A. KERR
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
Research Project: Making EndsMeet
January 1981
Survey: Making Ends Meet
My name is Scott Kerr and I am a researcher from Edinburgh University.
You. -will remember that just before Christmas, Mr. King, of the Edinburgh
District Council Housing Department, wrote to you about a survey of retirement
pensioners which I am carrying out. As his Department has not heard from you,
it has passed your name on to me. I am now writing to arrange a suitable time
for one of my colleagues to call on you at your home to talk about the survey.
My colleague's visit will last about an hour.
I wonder if it would be suitable for to see you between
and on . If this is not suitable, perhaps
you would write to me or 'phone me and suggest an alternative time or date. I
can be reached by telephone between 9'30 and 11:30 a.m., Monday to Friday.
Although my colleague will be making notes on a questionnaire during your
talk, especially on questions of money and how you make ends meet, I can assure
you that this information will be treated as strictly private. Your name will
not be noted on the questionnaire, and any report of the survey will be written
in such a manner that no one who has taken part will be able to be identified.
I hope that you will find the interview to be a pleasant experience, and





Research Project: Making EndsMeet
h 7 GEORGE SQUARE, EDINBURGH EH8 9JZf
031-667 1011, Ext. 4448
RESEARCH STAFF: DAVID M. NELSON, SCOTT A. KERR
February 1981
Survey: Making 5nds Meet
My name is Scott Kerr and I am a researcher from Hdinburgh University.
Just before Christmas, Mr. King,of the Edinburgh District Council
Housing Department, wrote to you about a survey of retirement pensioners
which I am carrying out. I am very pleased to learn that you are willing
to tales part in this survey, and I am now writing to arrange a suitable
time for one of my colleagues to call on you at your home to talk about
the survey.
I wonder if it would be suitable for to see you
between and on . If this is
not suitable, perhaps you would write to me or 'phone me. ' I can be reached
by telephone between 9:30 and 11:30 a.m., Monday to Friday.
Although my colleague will be making notes on a questionnaire during
your talk, especially on questions of money and how you make ends meet, I
can assure you that this information will be treated as strictly private.
Your name will not be noted on the questionnaire, and any report of the
survey will be written in such a manner that no one will be able to be
identified.
I hope that you will find the interview to be a pleasant experience,
and I thank you in advance for your co-operation.
Yours sincerely,
Scott A. Kerr
Appendix B3: Screening Interview and Calculation Sheet
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SUBJECT CODE NUMBER
HISTORY OF ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT SUBJECT
Subject Contacted on: Date
□ First attempt / /


























Assessed NOT ELIGIBLE □
within last 3 months
Interview not completed because: Subject
□ Not in
□ Not capable













My name is , and I am an interviewer from Edinburgh University. I
expect that you remember my name from the letter of introduction that Mr.
Kerr sent you regarding my visit.
First, I would like to thank you very much for agreeing to let me talk
with you. It was very good of you to do so, and I'm certain that whatever
information you can give me will help us to understand more clearly how
different pensioners are making ends meet.
Perhaps I should begin with a few comments. Most people usually have
three general questions which they would like answered at the start of the
interview. These are: (l) 'Who am I?', (2) 'How did we get your name?',
and (3) 'What is this survey all about?'. The answer to the first question
is that I am one of a team of interviewers employed by Edinburgh University
on this project. In addition, I .... (interviewer provides some personal
details) .
The second question, 'How did we get your name?', is also easily
explained. Because we had no other way of finding a group of pensioners to
interview, we asked the Edinburgh Housing Department to help us out. From
their records, they were able to draw names out of a hat, and pass on to us
the names of people who did not refuse to participate. Therefore, there is
no special reason why you, rather than your neighbour, were chosen, except
that it was your lucky day, so to speak.
The answer to the third question, 'What is the survey about?', will become
clearer, but I can give you a brief description of it just now. The government
is concerned that some pensioners may be experiencing difficulty making ends
meet, and has asked Mr. Scott Kerr of Edinburgh University to investigate the
matter. In order to find out how different pensioners are managing, and how
satisfied they are with the types and amounts of income at their disposal, he
has asked us to interview several hundred pensioners in Edinburgh. The most
important outcome of this surve'y will be that this information will allow Mr.
Kerr to make recommendations to the government as to how to make it easier for
pensioners to make ends meet. Obviously, your role in this is very important,
since without your help, we cannot make such recommendations.
During our chat today, I will be asking you some basic questions about
your income, expenses, your household and a few general questions about your
investments and savings. I shall make a note of your answers on this form,
but no one else is going to know that you have given me this information,
since we are bound by strict rules of confidentiality. I'd like to start now,












HOH WIFE BOTH PROXY
(specify)




(a) May I ask, are you working full-time
or part-time Full-time (b) Q2
Part-time Q2 Q2
(b) (interviewer note: Go to end of interview since HOH in
full-time work cannot be eligible)





Add 25p for each over 80
HOH WIFE
3. And are (either of) you registered as
blind?
HOH WIFE BOTH
Add as Blind Addition
Respondent £1.25
Wife £1.25
Total Blind Add. =
Do you have any children living with you
who are dependent upon you for their support? Yes (a)
No Q5
IF YES PERSONAL REQUIREMENTS: DEPENDENT CHILDREN












For each child over l6, ask (b)
(b) What is his/her occupation?
Reminder: If still at school, INCLUDE IN ASSESSMENT. If unemployed
sick or disabled, treat as non-dependent.
And do you own your home here?
Yes Go to Q6
No Go to (a)
a) Are you (or your wife)
responsible for the rent













(b) INDIVIDUAL IS A NON-HOUSHOLDER
ADD £2.15 Standard Rate Addition
for all Non-Householders
GO TO QUESTION 22
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TO ALL HOUSEHOLDERS
6. Do you have central heating? Yes A
No B
A. ALL WHO HAVE CENTRAL HEATING
RENTERS
(i) Does the rent you pay include:
YES NO CH^GE CHARGE/WEEKIjCjO JNU
1. Lighting (2) (i)
2. Fuel for
Cooking (2) (i)
3. Hot water (2) (i)
U. Central
Heating (2) (ii) (i)
IF YES
(2) Do you pay the landlord a specified charge
for (each service ticked) YES (i)
If NO to central heating, ask (ii) NO
IF YES




OWNER OCCUPIERS MP RENTERS PAYING OWN CH.
(ii) How many rooms are there in your
house/flat excluding lavatory
and bathroom?
OWNER OCCUPIERS GO TO QUESTION 11




NO CENTRAL HEATING - RENTERS ONLY. OWN-OCC. GO TO Q„11
RENTERS ONLY
(i) Does the rent you pay include:
YES NO CH^GE? CHARGE/WEEK =
1. Lighting (2) (i)
2. Fuel for
Cooking (2) (i)
3. Hot water (2) (i)
h. Heating (2) (i)
IF YES
(2) Do you pay the landlord a specified charge YES (i)
for (each service ticked)?
NO
IF YES




RENTERS GO TO QUESTION 7
(534.)
CALCULATIONS
A. CENTRAL HEATING: DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS RENT FOR SERVICES INCLUDED
Rent includes: Spec. Charge = Scale rate = Ded.from GR =
Lighting (L) .35
Fuel (FC) .50
Ch + Hot water U.85
Ch + HW + L 5.20
Ch + HW + FC 5.35
All 5.70
Spec. Chge. - Sc rate
EHCA =
= EHCA Deduct smaller of
two figures Heating on own
equals £i+.35
Add:
CENTRAL HEATING: CHA for renters or own-occ. paying CH
add CHA as discretionary addition







B. NO CH. DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS RENT FOR SERVICES INCLUDED
RENTERS ONLY
Rent Includes: Spec. Charges = Scale Rate = Ded. from RA =
Lighting (L) .35
Fuel (FC) • 50
H + Hot Water U.85
H + HW + L 5.20






7. Do you rent your house from the Local Authority
or from a private landlord?
LA (a)
PL (a)
(a) How much rent do you have to pay for your
house here?













(c) Are there any weeks in the year that






(d) Do you pay that amount of rent every
four weeks or every calendar month?
4 weekly Q8
calendar Q8
CHECK: Remember to average out rent over 52 weeks
NOTE: 'Rent , for SB purposes, includes all rates.
Check at Questions 8-10 and 19-21.




(a) How much do you have to pay for your rates'




(i) Are there any weeks during the year





(ii) How many monthly rate payments do
you have to make?
















(a) Were they included in the rent or rates you





(b) How much do you have to pay for your water rates?




(i) Are there any weeks during the year that












(ii) How many monthly water rate payments
do you have to make? ______
10. And do you pay any sewerage charges?
YES (a)
NO Ql6
(a) How much do you have to pay?
(b) How long a period does this cover?
GO TO QUESTION l6
TO OWNER-OCCUPIERS
11. Are you still paying off a mortgage on
your property? YES (a)
NO Q12
(a) Approximately how much do you
have left to pay?
(b) And what is the current rate







12. And how much do you have to pay toward
your rates?
(a) How long a period does that cover? Weekly rates =
(b) How many times per year do you have




(How much are the rates for this year?)




(a) Were they included in the figure
that you told me you were paying
for rates? YES (b)
NO (b)
(b) How much do you have to pay for
your water rates?
(c) How long a period does this cover? ______
(d) How many times per year do you have
to pay this sum?




(a) How much do you have to pay?
(b) How long a period does this cover?
(c) How many times per year do you
have to pay this amount?
15. Do you pay any feu duty (ground rent)? YES (a)
NO Ql6
(a) How much do you have to pay?






(c) How many times per year do you have
to pay this amount?
(540.)
NOTE: Remember to add £1.25/week for owner
repair insurance allowance




TO RENTERS AND OWNER OCCUPIERS
16. Are you renting any rooms in your




(a) How much rent do they pay you?








(c) Do you supply the furniture or
do they have to?



















GO TO QUESTION IT
17. (Other than your wife and/or children) are
there any other people living here?
NOTE: Exclude subtenants and boarders
YES see check below
NO Ql8
REMINDER: If either or both blind, no deduction from Net Rent
Would you be so kind as to tell me: (a) who they are, (b) if there are
any aged l6 or 17, and if any are presently receiving social security
(SB)?
(A)













18. Do you have:
a rent rebate/allowance and a rate rebate Q19
a rent rebate/allowance only N
a rate rebate only Q21
a rebate but don't know which 4
no rebates Q23
TO ALL RENTERS
19. How much rent rebate/allowance do you receive?
(a) How long a period does this cover?
(b) Was the amount of rent you told me





20. And how much rate rebate do you receive?
(a) How long a period does this cover? _____
(b) And was the amount of rates you told
me you paid before or after your
rate rebate? Before _____
After Go to Q23
TO ALL OWNER-OCCUPIERS
21. How much rebate do you receive? _____
(a) How long a period does this cover?
(b) Is the amount of rent/rates you
mentioned earlier, before or
after your rebate was deducted? Before
After Go to Q23
22. How difficult is it to heat your
House adequately?
Would you say that it is: 1 No trouble
2 Difficult
3 Extremely difficult.
23. Do you (or your wife) have difficulty
getting out and about as much as you
would like? Yes (a)
No Q.2U
(a) Are (either of) you housebound? Yes (b)
(also: chronic ill-health) No Q.2U








Amt. Payable Amt. Payable
A. Age
1. Where one or both TO £1.1+0 nil
2. or dependent child 5 £1.1+0 nil
B. Accommodation
1. Very difficult to heat
(e.g. damp or very
large rooms) £1.1+0 nil
2. Exceptionally difficult
(e.g. v. old or exposed
house) £1.1+0 nil
C. Health
Where claimant, partner or
dependent has:
1. Difficulty walking due to
age or weakness £1.1+0 £1.1+0
2. Long-lasting illness (e.g.
rheum, arth. anaemia, etc.) £1.1+0 £1.1+0
3. Housebound or can't leave
house on own £3.1+0 £3.1+0
1+. Serious worsening illness
(kidney failure, muse. dist.
ulcer, colitis, etc.) £3.1+0 £3.1+0
5. Serious illness requiring
constant temperature £3.1+0 £3.1+0
6. Bed-ridden or almost £3.1+0 £3.1+0
7. Receiving attendance or
Mobility Allowance £3.1+0 £3.1+0
Note: Any combination of additions, one from Category B and one from
Category C is acceptable, as long as total is no greater than
£3.1+0. However, an addition from Category A cannot be added
to those from B or C. In all cases, take higher of two calcu¬
lations. (If lost, see SB Handbook, Chapter 5).
(544.)
Has your doctor recommended that you
follow any special diet (involving
extra expense)?














(a) And what are you receiving
treatment for?
NOTE: If anyone in household has TB
add £1.20 per dep. child.
Does anyone have T.B.?




use a kidney machine - 8.00
have tuberculosis - 2.80
diabetes - 2.80
throat or larynx cancer - 2.80
peptic or duodenal ulcer - 2.80
ulcerative colitis - 2.80
Can you cope with your laundry at
home, or do you have to take it
out or send it out to be done
elsewhere?
(a) And on average, about how
much per week does it cost
you to do your laundry?
cope at home Q. 27





27. And do you have any other special expenses




(a) What are those expenses?
(b) How much are they per week?
GO TO QUESTION 28
TO ALL IN PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT FROM Ql(a)
OTHERS GO TO QUESTION 7121 HOH WIFE
28. What were your total wages the last time
that you were paid?
(a) And how much of that did you get
as take-home pay?
(b) And how long a period does that
cover?




(i) Considering the past four weeks
what has your average weekly
take-home pay been?
29. An important cost for those still working
can be the cost of getting to and from
work. In the week ending last Saturday
did (either of) you spend any money
getting to and from work? YES
NO
IF YES
(a) How much did it cost (each of) you
to get to and from work last week?
(i) (i)
(546.)
30. Do you have any other expenses in connection
with your work (such as Trade.Union subscrip¬
tions, cleaning of overalls, etc.)?
YES
IF YES
(a) What expenses are they?






31. How much state retirement pension
do you get per week?
HOH WIFE




(a) What type of work pension(s)
do you (and your wife) have?
(b) How much do you get each week












GO TO QUESTION 33
(a)
(a) How much does it bring you each week? HOH WIFE
WAR
DIS
3^. Do you have any other pensions or income that I have not mentioned,




(a) What is that income
(b) How much does it bring you?
(c) How long a period does that
cover?
HOH WIFE
35. One aim of our survey is to build up a general picture of the
general amount of resources that pensioners have to draw on.
Although I do not want to know the exact amount, I would like
to ask you now if:
(a) you have any savings
(b) you have any investments
(c) you own any property (other than the house you live in)?
(PRESENT SAVINGS LEVEL CARD)
Would you please look at this card?
Thinking of the value of these resources taken together, within which
range would you say the total amount falls?
£0-1999 £2000-£il999 £5000+
That is the end of the financial section of the interview, and I would like
to thank you very much for providing me with this information.
(548.)
Rebate Claiming History (RECIPIENTS ONLY - NO NON-HOUSEHOLDERS)
So far, we have discussed primarily the pounds and pence of your
financial situation. I'd now like to ask you about your rebate,
since it is one of the resources you have to make it easier to
make ends meet.
First, approximately how long ago did you first apply for your rebate
And how did you first find out about the rebate schemes?
What made you first think that you might be eligible for one?
And what were the circumstances at the time which led you to apply
for one?
And, was it a difficult decision for you to come to?
UO. (a) Thinking back to the time when you were making
your decision, can you tell me, what were the
advantages of applying for a rebate, to your
way of thinking?
(b) And, thinking about the other side of the
question, what did you think were the
drawbacks of applying for a rebate?
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES




1+1. When you were first thinking about applying for a rebate, did you
consider the possibility of applying for social security instead?
IF YES. Ask Q.1+2
IF NO. Ask Q.l+1 (a)
(a) Why not?
Didn't know about it (e.g. basic ignorance) Ask q.1^3
Didn't think I would be eligible Ask l+i(t>)
Other (e.g. negative feelings, low utility etc.) Ask Q.l+2
(b) And what led you to believe that you would not be eligible?
ASK QUESTION 1+2
1+2. (a) Once again, thinking back to the time when you were making
your decision, what did you think would be the drawbacks
to applying for social security?
(record on table)
(b) And what did you think would be the advantages of applying
for social security?
(record on table).
One of the aims of our survey is to find out how satisfied pensioners are
with their abilities to make ends meet. Since rebates are one way of doing
so, I'd like to spend a few minutes discussing with you how satisfied you
are with your rebates.
FOR COUNCIL TENANTS AND OWNER-OCCUPIERS ONLY (PRIVATE TENANTS GO TO QUESTION 1+5)
1+3. The first issue I would like to discuss is this:
Some benefits are paid in cash, whereas others, such as your
rebate, come as reduced outlay. How satisfied are you with
your rebate coming as a reduced outlay?
3 Extremely satisfied, wonderful, over the moon
2 Very satisfied, very helpful, etc.
1 Generally pleased, but not ecstatic about it
0 Ambivalent
-1 A bit unhappy about it
-2 Dissatisfied
-3 Very unhappy about this arrangement.
1+1+. And how do you think you might feel if you were to get the same amount
of benefit, but as a cash payment rather than as a reduction in outgoings?
-3 -2 " -1 0 1 2 3
FOR PRIVATE TENANTS ONLY (COUNCIL TENANTS GO TO QUESTION 1+7)
1+5. (CHECK FREQUENCY OF RENT ALLOWANCE PAYMENT FROM QUESTION 19)
The first issue I would like to discuss is this:
Your rent allowance comes as a cash payment to reimburse you after
you have paid your rent, and thus it comes once every month/quarter/
three months.
(a) How satisfied are you with it coming once every month/quarter/
three months?
-3-2-10123
(b) And how satisfied are you with it coming after you've paid your rent?
-3-2-10123
1+6. How would you feel if you were to get the same amount of cash
(a) but in advance. such that it would allow you to have the
cash in hand for your rent payment?
-3-2-10123
(b) but it came on a weekly basis?
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
(552 . )
TO ALL RESPONDENTS
kj. The second general point I would like to discuss is this:
Your rebate comes from the Housing Department (Local Authority),
whereas some benefits come from the Department of Health and Social
Security. How do you feel about (how satisfied are you with) receiving
a benefit from the Housing Department (Local Authority)?
-3-2-10123
U8. And, again, how do you think you might feel if you got the same
amount of benefit to meet your housing costs, but it came from the
DHSS and not the Housing Department(Local Authority)?
-3-2-10123
In the last few questions, we have discussed your satisfaction with the form
in which your rebate/allowance comes. I'd now like to ask you about another
very important issue.
U9. In general, how satisfied are you with the amount of rebate you presently
receive?
-3-2-10123
So far, we have discussed the form in which your rebate/allowance comes,
where it comes from, and its amount as though they were separate issues.
To summarise your viewpoint on this matter, I would like to ask you to
consider the following question:
50. Considering the form in which your rebate/allowance comes, that it
comes from the Housing Department (Local Authority), and its amount,
generally speaking, how satisfied would you say you are with your
rebate at the present?
3 2 10-1-2-3
III Summary of Perceived Need (ALL RESPONDENTS INCLUDING NON-HOUSEHOLDERS)
We've spent most of our time today talking about either your specific financial
details, or about your feelings about your rebates/allowance. But no picture
of your situation would be complete without a description of how you feel, in
general, about making ends meet on your present financial resources.
51. (INTRODUCE CARD l) As you can see, this card has five statements on it
which describe varying levels of difficulty. The question I would like
to ask you now is, 'How hard do you find it to make ends meet nowadays?'
0 No trouble
1 A wee bit difficult
2 Pretty hard
3 A great struggle
Almost impossible
ASK THEM TO KEEP THEIR SPECTACLES ON, SINCE MANY TEND TO HAVE TWO PAIRS
52. (INTRODUCE CARD 2) This next card again has five statements on it, and
I'd like to ask you which statement best summarises the relationship
between your income and expenses.
5 Your income is quite a bit greater than your expenses
4 Your income is a little bit greater than your expense
3 Your income just matches your expenses
2 Your income is a little bit less than your expenses
1 Your income is quite a bit less than your expenses
53. (INTRODUCE CARD 3) Since people's feelings about how they are managing
change over time, as do their situations, I'd like to ask you now to look
at this third card, and ask you "How well are you managing now as compared
to the way you were managing in the past?".
5 Much better
U A bit better
3 About the same
2 A bit worse
1 Much worse
5U. Over the past 30 years or so, various governments have made efforts to
improve pensions, and many pensioners now have occupational pensions
in addition to their state pensions. Many changes, and hopefully some
improvements, have occurred. For this reason, we'd like to ask you one
final question. Would you please look at this card again (Card 3),and
use it to answer this question: 'How well do you think you are managing
to make ends meet as compared to pensioners in the past, such as your
parents, aunts or uncles, when they were your age?'
5 Much better
U A bit better
3 About the same
2 A bit worse
1 Much worse
IV Closing
That's the last question that I have to ask you today. But, before I leave,
do you have any questions?
Record queries here:
(554.)
There is one final favour that I would like to ask of you. You are one
of about 1+00 retired people that we will have interviewed this month, and this
financial information will give us a good understanding of how pensioners are
managing on their incomes. However, there are other issues, not directly
related to finances, which we would also like to explore. Therefore, we hope
to come back to about one-quarter of these 1+00 pensioners, and talk to them
again about their families, retirement and other issues, in order to round out
our picture of Edinburgh pensioners.
Since we do not yet know which pensioners we will want to see a second
time, we are not asking for a firm commitment. But may I ask if, in general,
it would be all right for me to come and see you again?
Consent
No consent
TO THOSE WHO CONSENT
I will probably be coming back sometime in March. Would it be more






And are there any days during the week which are not convenient for you?
RING DAYS NOT SUITABLE M TU WED TH F
TO END
TO THOSE WHO DO NOT CONSENT
May I ask why you do not wish me to come again?
TO ALL
Thank you very much for your time and co-operation (I look forward to
seeing you again).
Time Interview ended a.m./p.m.
INTERVIEWER NOTES:
2.Rates(inc.eb)= 3.WaterRates- 4.SewerageCha ge- 5.FeuDuty- 6.Mort.Int.(o/oonly)=» 7.£1.25(o/oonly)- 8.Bdr./Ldgrchar e- 9.£2.15SRA(non-HHonly)= TotalGrossRentEqu ls
£








DISCRETIONARYADDI NS: 1.ExcessHeatingCharge Addition= 2.CentralHeatAdd.= 3.HAs(H+Aif£3.40)= 4.DietaryAdditions- 5.ExcessLaundry(Amt- 40p)= Subtotalof4+5=




III.Pers.R q= Total= Minus 17.WeeklyIncof Equals SUPPLEMENTARY PENSIONAYABLE











Note:Thisformcalculatesen itl ¬ mentexclusiveofrebatva es.To assessmountb/onSP,subtract weeklyreb/allfromSPPayable












































Appendix B4: Representativeness of the Assessed Sample
(558.)
Appendix B4: Representativeness of the Assessed Sample
This appendix presents a detailed description of
the assessed and not assessed samples under the seven
general headings of housing tenure, health, marital
status, household composition, finances and area.
Tenure (Table 1)
The result of a Chi-squared test of the likelihood
that any relationship between tenure and participation
status was due to chance yielded a Chi-squared result
of 5.32 (2 df); this was significant at the p=.07
level. As can be seen in Table 1, council tenants were
under-represented and private tenants over-represented;
the probability that these distortions were due to
chance alone was less than seven in one hundred.
Although council tenants were significantly less likely
to participate, they nonetheless formed one-third of
the sample of participants simply because of their
large number.
Since the sample was distorted in terms of type of
housing tenure, all further analyses were conducted
separately for each housing tenure category.
Health (Table 2)
As would be expected, there was a slight, though
not significant relationship between the health of the
HOH unit and participation status for each of the three
housing tenure groups, using the criterion of "one or
more sick or disabled". What was more outstanding was
the relationship between frequency of self-reported
chronic ill health and housing tenure -- grouping
participants and non-participants together within each
category, only 7.1% of owner-occupiers as opposed to
20.2% of private tenants and 25.7% of council tenants
reported themselves as suffering chronic ill health
(Chi-squared =23.14, p<.00001).
This "health" profile must be treated with
caution. On the one hand, the proportions who stated
that at least one of the members of the household
suffered from chronic ill-health may have been an
overstatement since this was a self-assessment made by
the applicant which did not require verification by a
doctor. On the other hand, the rebate records from
which this information was collected could have
underestimated the magnitude of the problem if they
were out of date. As a rule, rebate applications are
updated only yearly unless a change of circumstances is
reported. Since council tenants' cases are generally
more active that private tenants' and owner-occupiers'
cases, the relatively poorer heath of the council
(559.)
Table 1: Tenure by Participation Status(%s)
Tenure Non-participants Participants
Owner-occupier 57.4 42.6
Council tenants 63.8 36.2
Private tenants 53.5 46.5
All tenures 58.7 41. 3
(560. )
Table 2. Health by Tenure by Participation Status(%s)
Tenure % one % one or % receiving


















tenants simply may have been reflecting greater
casepaper activity. It is the author's guess that these
statistics probably underestimate the proportion of
non-participants who were sick or disabled. Indeed,
over 50% of those who opted out in response to the
letter arranging an appointment did so for health
reasons. Although the data in Table 2 hardly
substantiate it, it was suspected that health,
especially since the sample selection and fieldwork
took place during the winter, was the major
non-attitudinal factor distinguishing participants and
non-participants.
Marital Status (Tables 3 and 4)
Over all tenure categories taken together, marital
status as a variable did not differentiate participants
and non-participants (Chi-squared =6.6,df=6, p<.36);
neither did it differentiate the groups when the
effects of housing tenure were held constant, as can be
seen in Table 3. The exception was in the case of
private tenants, where 32% of participants as opposed
to only 18.4% of non-participants were married couples.
Table 4 presents the same data in a different
fashion. Of the major groups (excluding for the moment
"other" men and women -- those who were separated or
divorced), widows had the lowest overall participation
rate; this rate was also consistently lower than
comparable rates for married couples and single woman
in all three tenure categories. Nonetheless, widows
formed the majority of participants (and
non-participants) because of their sheer number. Of
those invited to participate, 49% were widowed women,
27% married couples, 11% single women, 8% widowed men,
the remaining 5% being spread over the other three
categories.
Household Composition (Table 5)
It was clear early on in the interviewing that the
participants' households were less likely to contain
non-dependents. This was borne out empirically by a
Chi-squared analysis which showed a relationship
significant at the p<.01 level between participation
status and household composition (Chi-squared
=6.54,df=2). The results presented in Table 5 further
confirm that most of this relationship was due to the
under-representation of non-dependents amongst
participating owner-occupiers.
What this finding means in terms of attitudes is
unclear. On the one hand, it may mean that pensioners
living alone look forward to a visit. On the other
hand, it may suggest that because of the presence of
non-dependents, the pensioners believe that they are
Table3.M ritalSt tusbyTenurParticipationSt t s(%s) MARITALSTATUS TenureMarriedSingleWdowOtheri ltC ii . CoupleW manMansqr. OWNER Non-Part.15.24 359 80.908
5.25ns
Part.19.58 447 10.02 31.1 COUNCIL Non-Part.35.56.54 .072 430.6
3.35ns
Part.35.47.342 72 1280 0 PRIVATE Non-Part.18.415 .8.3 52 30 9
9.57ns
Part.32.311 148 50.06 1




































Table5.HouseholdCompositionbyTenur TenurePercentagewithOoMor non-HOHU itMember OWNER Non-Part.28.7 Part.10.3 COUNCIL Non-Part.17.8 Part.14.6 PRIVATE Non-Part.4.4 Part.2.0
ParticipationStatus Chi-Significance squared 7.96p<.005 .244ns .000ns
(565. )
"not the right type of person" or that they are "doing
very well financially". Alternatively, the findings
might also suggest that the non-dependent (usually a
mature child) had advised them not to participate. It
is likely that all of these explanations have some
merit; one cannot go beyond speculation with these
data.
Finances (Table 6)
One hypothesis advanced at an early stage of the
study was that people with capital in excess of £2000
(inferred by using the six-monthly interest figure of
£105 as the criterion) would perceive themselves to be
better off and would not participate. However, the
analysis showed that the amount of interest was
independent of participation status (Chi-squared
=.64,p<.42, df=l). If anything, these findings
indicated a small positive relationship, where those
with interest greater than £105 per six months were
slightly over-represented amongst participants. The
further analysis by tenure type shown in Table 6 shows
that this was not a strong effect for any tenure type.
On the other hand, for the sample as a whole,
there was a relationship just short of significance
between participation status and the presence of extra
income (e.g. income other than the NIP, interest,
Attendance or Mobility Allowance) with those with extra
income being over-represented amongst participants
(Chi-squared = 3.3, df=l, p<.07).
Most of this effect, as shown in Table 6, was due
to the over-representation of pensioners with extra
income amongst the participants. This finding was the
reverse of what was expected, and was initially thought
to have been caused by those in poorer health (and of
lower income) having dropped out. However, a further
analysis showed no relationship between health status
and extra income, either for all tenure groups together
(Chi-squared = .89, p<.34) or for any of the groups
alone. Almost as if underscoring the point, this
relationship for private tenants was the weakest, with
a Chi-square of .01 (p=.99).
Area (Table 7)
The variable "area" was based on postal districts
and sub-districts. As such it was difficult to decide
in what way the variable could be used meaningfully.
The author therefore transformed each postal code to a
number which represented the DHSS local office
catchment area, and found that participation varied
quite dramatically by area, as shown in Table 7.
Although it is difficult to characterise these areas,
one can make the following observations. The local
Table6.LevelsofIncomefrvestmentsndPr ence ofExtraIncomebyTenurandParticipationS atus Tenure%with6monthlyChiex a investmentco esquare >£105.(sig) OWNER Non-Part.44.20.008 1. 9 Part.43.7ns51 COUNCIL Non-Part.7.7.0354.4.96 Part.6.2ns1.5 PRIVATE Non-Part.20.2.0037 74.1 Part.19.2ns52 5p<.05































office area with the highest response rate was
Edinburgh West, where the feasibilty study was
conducted. Although a section of this area comprised a
dense concentration of tenements, most of it comprised
suburban council and private housing schemes built in
the inter-war period. Private tenants comprised the
majority of the invited sample here, and their higher
response rate was possibly the main cause of the
overall high response rate for this area. In contrast,
Edinburgh East had the lowest response rate. Much of
this area comprised mature owner-occupied detached
bungalows, although this local office does serve some
council estates. Private tenants were quite rare in
this area. Being such an old and well-established area
it came as no surprise that most of the pensioners
invited were rather older than average, and were
suffering from poor health and did not want to take
part in the study.
Appendix B5: Description of the Research Sample
(570.)
Appendix B5: Description of the Research Sample
The sample of 123 eligible non-claimants comprised
26 owner-occupiers, 52 council tenants and 45 private
tenants. In order to avoid problems of bias caused by
the nature of the sampling frame and differential
response rates by housing tenure, the findings are
presented separately for each housing tenure.
As a matter of convention, wherever averages based
on samples of less than five cases are presented, those
figures will be enclosed in parentheses.
Employment (Table 1)
As can be seen from Table 1, only five of the
eligible non-claimants were employed. Four of these
were private tenants and the heads of households and
one was a married woman and a council tenant. The mean
net weekly earnings from their part-time jobs after the
£4 per week disregard was £7.71 per week.
Health (Tables 2 and 3)
Only one pensioner unit had an Attendance
Allowance or Mobility Allowance although, as can be
seen from Table 2, one-tenth of the sample stated that
at least one member of the HOH unit was housebound, and
two-fifths that they were having at least some
difficulty getting out and about.
Only one head of household was blind, and this was
a council tenant. None of the spouses of married
householders were blind.
Only six people stated that their doctors had
recommended any special diet; one was an
owner-occupier, three were council tenants, and two
were private tenants.
Fifty-one percent stated that they were currently
receiving medical treatment and 42% specified their
ailments. Treatment by type of tenure and frequency of
specific ailments being mentioned is shown in detail in
Table 3.
Other ailments which were mentioned but which
occurred less than 3% of the time do not appear in
Table 3. Such ailments included anaemia, high blood
pressure, ulcerative colitis, peptic and duodenal
ulcers, throat cancer, cataracts and amputation.
The findings presented in Tables 2 and 3 should be
treated with caution; the screening interview was not
designed to collect data for a full health profile and
(571.)
Table 1: Frequency of Work and Net Earnings
by Tenure
Tenure Nos. Employed Net Weekly
HOH Spouses Earnings(£s)
Owner 0 0 0.00
(n=26)
Council 0 1 (7.30)






























Table3.Tre tmentandN turofAilmentsbyTenure(i ) TenurePercentagNATUREOFAILMENTBEINGTREATED ReceivingArthritisH artDiabeteBron h t sOt r TreatmentRh umat'sm Owner420815 (n=26) Council601642 (n=52) Private47116 (n=45) All tenures5181440
(574.)
it is probable that the proportions of people suffering
from any particular ailment are grossly understated.
However, comparisons across tenure categories can be
made with more confidence, and several important
differences can be observed: (1) the proportions of
council and private tenant HOH units with one/both
housebound is nearly three times that of
owner-occupiers; (2) 43% and 45% of council and private
tenants have at least some difficulty getting out and
about whereas the comparable percentage for
owner-occupiers is only 19%.
Marital Status (Table 4)
As can be seen from Table 4, people of different
marital status are not evenly distributed across all
tenure categories in the sample. Overall, widowed women
make up over one-half of the sample; married couples
comprise just under three-tenths of the eligible
non-claimants. This average percentage of 52% for
widowed women is probably an underestimate of the
proportion which widows constitute of all ENCs - this
can be inferred from the observation that only 36.5% of
widowed female owner-occupiers and council tenants
participated (see Table 4, Appendix B4) as opposed to
45% of private tenant widows. Had a larger proportion
participated, it is likely that the proportion of
eligible non-claimants found to be widows would have
been substantially larger.
Household Composition
None of the eligible pensioner units had any
dependent children; only eligible council tenants had
any non-HOH members. This was probably due to the
effects of the deduction for non-dependents in
assessing entitlement to SB. This deduction was more
likely to render ineligible owner-occupiers with
non-dependents than council tenants with non-dependents
since council tenants' rebates would already have been
adjusted to account for the presence of the
non-dependents.
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(576. )
Sources of Income (Tables 5, 6 and 7)
Generally speaking, eligible council tenants
appeared to be marginally better provided for in terms
of the numbers who had at least one extra pension, but
this is misleading without considering the value of
these pensions. This issue will be taken up below. What
is noteworthy here is (a) that extra pensions are
fairly evenly distributed across all tenure categories,
and (b) that nearly a third of all eligible
non-claimants have at least one extra pension. This may
have implications both for their perceptions of their
eligibility and for explaining why the mean amounts by
which they would be better off are quite small.
Council tenants were not only more likely to be
receiving at least one extra pension, but Table 6 shows
they also received larger amounts than owner-occupiers.
It was hypothesised that the proportion receiving extra
pensions was a function of age. However a Chi-squared
analysis which cross-tabulated age (over 74, up to 74)
by the number of extra pensions for each tenure
category revealed absolutely no relationship between
age and number of extra pensions. The analysis showed
that extra pensions were distributed evenly over all
age groups.
Table 7 categories value of National Insurance
Pension by marital status. All but one of the eligible
non-claimants were receiving at least the basic rate of
National Insurance Pension. The exception was a woman
recently separated from her husband who was receiving
only the wife's share of the married couple's pension
(£16.30). This low figure accounts for the average
pension of £22.30 in Column 6 of Table 7. Only one
other woman was in the category of "other women", and
her NIP was worth £28.30 per week.
The general picture for married couples was that
owner-occupiers and council tenants were receiving
substantially larger NIPs than were private tenants, a
difference in the order of £1.50 to £2.00 per week.
Over all categories of the non-married, those who
remained single were receiving larger NIPs than those
who were widowed; within this group, the women were
receiving larger NIPs than were the men. All
differences here were marginal; the only clear result
was that widowed women were receiving the smallest NIPs
of any of the main groups.
Age (Table 8 and Figure 1)
Again, as was the case with household composition,
health, and extra pensions, council tenants were
Table5:FrequencyofExtraPensionsandAllowances(%r porting) TenureEXTRAP NSIONSAAORMWARDI . ONETWOOTALPENSIONS Owner2704 (n=26) Council3123 (n=52) Private2240 (n=45) All2791 Tenures
Table6:ValuesofExtraPensionsandAllow nc s(£ ) TenureExtraPensionsAAoMDisability Owner3.44(1.50) Council4.66(13.38)8.15) Private4.59
Table7.V luofNIPsbyM ritalStatu(£s) TenureMarriedSi glWdow d CouplesWom nVJMen (total) Owner45.58(29.1 )7 698 07) Council45.0927 885( 8.36) Private43.62(28.58)7 99 All Tenures44.6328 47 77(28.28) Basic Rate43.4527 1.
WidowedOther MenWomen (28.79)
(22.30)
(28.09)7 68 28.51( 2 30)7.68) 27.15.
Table8.MeanAgesofHOHbyMaritalSt tu TenureMarriedSingleWidowingl CouplesW m nenMen Owner72.3( 0 7)6(68 0) Council71.937( 6) Private73.3( 6 5)4 0 All Tenures72.572.03 5( 0 7)
WidowedOtherAverage MenWomen 78.74.5 (64.0)71.4 72.5( 4 0)3.8 77.2(64.0)772.9
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(582.)
substantially different from the other two groups. As
can be seen from Table 8, they were the youngest of the
groups, on average, two and one-half years younger than
private tenants, and three years younger than
owner-occupiers. The widows and widowers, who comprised
50% of the sample, were nearly 2 years older, on
average, than were the non-widowed HOHs.
Figure 1 shows the age distribution of the
eligible non-claimants.
Amounts of Entitlement to Supplementary Pensions
(Tables 9-12)
These four tables present the amounts by which
pensioners would be better off on supplementary
pensions; the amount better off is derived by
subtracting from their SB entitlement the current value
of their rebates. Estimates of their SB entitlement
include their entitlement to payments for additional
requirements. Those estimates in parentheses are based
on samples of less than five cases.
Table 9 reveals that private tenants had the
lowest mean entitlement - about £2.82 per week. This
was because (1) they were healthier and were not
assessed to have as many additional requirements, (2)
their work pensions were higher on average, (3) their
housing costs, in SB terms, were substantially less
than were those of owner-occupiers or council tenants.
Of all main marital categories, widows were due the
most, about £3.38 on average. As was expected, this was
due to the lesser values of their NIPs, to their
slightly greater ages which increased the probability
of their being entitled to heating and health
allowances, and to the lack of work pensions. It was
often the case that whatever extra pensions they ever
possessed had died with their husbands. Widows were
significantly less likely than non-widows to be
receiving extra pensions (Chi-squared = 4.34,
df=l,p<.05). Widow owner-occupiers had the largest mean
entitlement at £4.00 per week.
An analysis of amount better off by age is
presented in Table 10. Of the five age groups with more
than five cases, the oldest group was entitled to the
most (80-85 year olds being due £3.82 on average);
however, the relationship between age and amount of
entitlement was not linear - neither did it display the
sharp increase in average entitlement around the age of
70 which one might expect to find due to the age-linked
automatic eligibility for heating allowances. Generally
speaking, it was council tenants in their early 60s,
owner-occupiers in their early to mid 70s and private
tenants in their early to mid 80s who were due the most
(£4.02, £4.81, and £3.43 per week, respectively). As a
Table9.AmountBetterOffonSBbyMaritalt sndTenure(£s) TenureMarriedSingleWdowi l dOtherAl CouplesWom neMenn Owner3.45(1 7)4 0022 7. 3 Council3.022 9864( 41)5 2. Private2.72(4 3 )8715(0. All Tenures2.982.703 38( 87)45 20.16





there were no simple
amounts of entitlement and
Table 11 shows that pensioners who stated that
they had some difficulty getting out and about, or that
at least one member of the HOH unit was virtually
housebound, were potentially better off by more than
were those who had no mobility problems. What may
appear surprising is that the difference between the
two mean amounts was so slight; this was because over
70% of the sample was over 70 years of age, and the
majority of those with no mobility problems were
entitled to extra heating allowances on age as opposed
to health criteria.
Only six council tenants reported having any
non-dependents living with them. However, what is clear
from Table 12 is that their entitlement was markedly
greater than those without non-dependents living in.
This disparity was due to the characteristics of the
charging scheme for local authority housing and the new
policy on non-dependent charges in assessing
entitlement to supplementary benefit, the net effect of
which would appear to be to the financial advantage of
households with non-dependents.
(586.)
Table 11: Amount Better Off on SB by Mobility and Tenure
Tenure DIFFICULTY GETTING ABOUT All Mobility
No Problem Some Difficulty Categories
Owner 3.15 3.53 3.23
Council 2.91 4.03 3.42
Private 2.87 2.69 2.82
All
Tenures 2.97 3.41 3.16
(587.)
Table 12: Amount Better off by Household


























Appendix B6: Letters Informing ENCs of Their Entitlement
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
(589.)
Research Project: Making EndsMeet
7 GEORGE SQUARE, EDINBURGH EH8 9JZ
031-667 1011, Ext.
RESEARCH STAFF: DAVID M. NELSON, SCOTT A. KERR
Thank you very much for agreeing to see me again on .
I am writing to confirm that I will call at about .
When I come to see you this time, I will be interested to discuss with you
your family and friends and how you spend your time in greater detail. This
will help me to complete my picture of your situation that I got from our
first talk.
You may also be interested to know that I have looked at the financial
information you gave me. Based upon it, and upon the new increases in
housing costs, it looks as though you would be better off on a Supplementary
Pension than you are on your rebate by about per week. Since I am
not a government official and this is only an estimate, it may not be total¬
ly accurate. But I do hope that it is of some use to you.
I very much look forward to seeing you again.
(590.)
ib^
h 7 GEORGE SQUARE, EDINBURGH EH8 9JZ
'
031-667 1011, Ext.
RESEARCH STAFF: DAVID M. NELSON, SCOTT A. KERR
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
Research Project: Making EndsMeet
I am writing to thanlc you very much for seeing me recently. I enjoyed our
talk very much.
Before I left, I mentioned that I might want to see you again. I am writing
to confirm that I will, but not until late April. When I come to see you again,
I will be interested to discuss with you your family and friends and how you
spend your time in greater detail. This will help me to complete my picture
of your situation that I got from our first talk. I will be in touch with
you nearer the time to arrange a good time and day to see you.
In the meantime, you may be interested to know that I have looked at the
financial information you gave me. Based upon it, and upon the new increases
in housing costs, it looks as though you would be better off on a Supplementary
Pension that you are on your rebate by about per week. Since I am not
a government official and this is only an estimate, it may not be totally
correct. But I do hope that it is of some use to you.
I look forward to seeing you again in late April.
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
Research Project: Making EndsMeet
(591.)
k 7 GEORGE SQUARE, EDINBURGH EH8 9JZ
031-667 1011, Ext.
RESEARCH STAFF: DAVID M. NELSON, SCOTT A. KERR
May 1981
Survey: Making Ends Meet
I am writing to thank you very much for participating in this survey.
The survey is almost over now, and you may be interested to know that
over three hundred Edinburgh pensioners participated along with you.
I am very grateful for the help you have given me by seeing one of my
colleagues. I sincerely hope that you enjoyed the interview.
In the course of the survey we hoped to be of some help to you by advising
you whether or not you could improve your financial situation by claiming
a Supplementary Pension from the Department of Health and Social Security
instead of your rebate. Based upon our estimates, it looks as though
you would be better off on a Supplementary Pension by about per
week. However, this is only an estimate, and you may wish to contact the
Department of Health and Social Security to find out for certain.
I hope that this information is of some use to you.
V7ith sincere thanks fir your assistance
Scott A. Kerr
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
Research Project: Making EndsMeet
(592.)
Jl 7 GEORGE SQUARE, EDINBURGH EH8 9JZ
031-667 1011, Ext.
RESEARCH STAFF: DAVID M. NELSON, SCOTT A. KERR
May 1981
Survey: Making Hnds Meet
I am writing to thank you very much for participating in this survey.
The survey is almost over now, and you may be interested to know that
over three hundred Sdinburgh pensioners participated along with you.
I am very grateful for the help you have given me by seeing one of my
colleagues. I sincerely hope that you enjoyed the interview.
In the course of the survey we hoped to be of some help to you by advising
you whether or not you could improve your financial situation by claiming
a Supplementary Pension from the Department of Health and Social Security
instead of your rebate. Based upon our estimates it looks as though you
would be better off staying as you are on your rebates rather than applying
for a Supplementary Pension.
The main reason for this is that your savings and investments combined are
worth more than £2000. If they were worth any amount less than £2,000,
it is very likely that you would be better off on a Supplementary Pension
by about per week. If, as time goes on, the value of your capital
falls below £2000, you may wish to contact the Department of Health and
Social Security to find out if you would then be better off on a
Supplementary Pension.
I hope that this information ome use to you.




Research Project: Making EndsMeet
#0
E 7 GEORGE SQUARE, EDINBURGH EH8 9JZ
)
031-667 1011, Ext.
RESEARCH STAFF: DAVID M. NELSON, SCOTT A. KERR
May 1981
Survey: Making Ends Meet
I am writing to thank you very much for participating in this survey.
The survey is almost over now, and you may be interested to know that
over three hundred Edinburgh pensioners participated along with you.
I am very grateful for the help you have given me by seeing one of my
colleagues. I sincerely hope that you enjoyed the interview.
In the course of the survey we hoped to be of some help to you by advising
you whether or not you could improve your financial situation by claiming
a Supplementary Pension from the DHSS instead of your rebate. Based upon
our estimates it looks as though you would be better off staying as you
are on your rebate rather than applying for a Supplementary Pension.
However, this is only an estimate, and if your situation has changed in any
way since my colleague saw you, you may wish to contact the Department of
Health and Social. Security to find out if you would now be better off on
a Supplementary Pension.
I hope that this information is of some use to you.
'.Yith sincere thanks your assistance
Scott A. Kerr
Appendix B7: Research Interview
RESEARCH INTERVIEW
(595.)
GROUP: E C1 C£ PROFILE: Yes No
DATE: SUBJECT CODE Attempt No. 1 2 3 1+
INTERVIEW: Joint/Single/Proxy (Specify )
TIME STARTED : a.m./p.m. DATE INFORMED:
INTERVIEWER REMINDER: Please complete all background information for CHECKS
prior to commencing RESEARCH INTERVIEW.
CHECK OBTAIN INFORMATION ON: FOR PAGE ? DONE?
A Household composition 1
B Income and/or expenditure 2
C Employment status 2
D Perceived Need 2
E Amount better off 8
I. INTRODUCTION AND CHECKS FOR CHANGES
Thank you very much for having me back a second time. Today I hope to
discuss with you your family, and later on, I would like to discuss
with you your feelings about Supplementary Pensions, now that you know
there's a good chance that you would be better off on one. But before
we start, I would like to check some information that you gave me the
last time to make sure that my records are up to date.
CHECK A: When I saw you before, you said that (the people listed belcw)
were living with you. Has that changed in any way?
Person
No









CHECK B: You also told me that you received income from the sources and
in the amounts as follows:.... Has that changed in any way?
Sources Amount Change (specify)




And have you begun to get any income from another source?
IF YES
What income is that?
Approximately how much does that bring you per week, after tax?
CHECK C: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF HOH AND WIFE AT FIRST INTERVIEW
HOH WIFE
When I last saw you, you said that you were.... Are you still?
IF NO
What are you doing now?
CHECK D: UNDERLINE INITIAL PERCEIVED NEED RATINGS (Q.51 and Q.52) BEFORE
COMMENCING RESEARCH INTERVIEW
Since we're reviewing your financial circumstances to see if they've
changed, I would be most interested to see if your feelings about the
way you are managing have changed since I last saw you. I have here
two of the cards that you looked at the last time, and would like you
to consider them again as I ask you two questions.
1. Firstly, (PRESENT CARD l) how difficult do you find it to make ends
meet nowadays? (INTERVIEWER RING RATING)
(No trouble) 0 12 3*+ (Almost impossible)
2. And secondly (PRESENT CARD 2), which of the statements on this card best
summarises the relationship between your income and your expenses?
(income greater 5 i| 3 2 1 (income less
than expenses) than expenses)
3. (597.)
INTERVIEWER NOTE: IF MOVEMENT IS GREATER THAN ONE POINT IN EITHER
DIRECTION, PROBE FOR DETAILS
(It seems that your feelings have changed since we last spoke.
What has happened to change your feelings?)
II FAMILY SITUATION
3. I mentioned earlier that I would be asking you about your family -
mainly because families form such an important part of many people's
lives that our picture of your situation would be incomplete without
talking about them.
I have with me here an outline of a family tree (SHOW TO RESPONDENT).
Could we sit together and work through it?
COMPLETING THE OUTLINE
(a) First, how many brothers and sisters did (each of) you have?
(IF NONE, GO TO (d)). And what were their names? (IN CASE OF
WIDOW OR WIDOWER, OBTAIN DECEASED SPOUSES DETAILS WHERE POSSIBLE).





(b) Secondly, considering all of these brothers and sisters, which
of them would you say you were closest to? Or, for example,
which would you feel most comfortable going to in an emergency
or if you had a problem and wanted to discuss it?
(INTERVIEWER RING APPROPRIATE NAME(S) AND ENTER IN BOX ON PAGE 15).
(c) I won't be asking you about all of your nieces and nephews, but
would like to ask if you have any favourites - those who you see

















Names Living Location Retired Contact
^Job favourite niece/ nephew
Names Ages Location Job Contact Family
■p-
FAMILYTREE
-SINGLEPERSONSO LY YOURPARENTS I
BROTHERSANDSISTERS 1
NamesYourself Living Location Retired Contac Jot FAVOURITENIECEAND/OREPHEW Names Ages Location Job Contact Family
ui
*Remembertoifavouritniec /nephewtappr priatsibli g.
6.








(e) (I've already asked you this question in relation to your brothers
and sisters, but would like to ask it in relation to your children
now.) Which of your children would you feel most comfortable going
to in an emergency or if you had a problem and wanted to discuss it?
(INTERVIEWER RING APPROPRIATE NAMES AND ENTER IN BOX ON PAGE 15 ).
(f) By looking at the ringed names on our 'tree', we now have an idea
of which of your family you are closest to. Of all these people,
I'd like to ask you now, which would you feel the most comfortable
going to in an emergency, or if you had a problem to discuss?
(INTERVIEWER, RING NAME(S) A SECOND TIME, AND RING IT IN THE BOX
ON PAGE 15 ) .
FRIENDS
U. That gives me a very clear idea of your family situation. I'd now like
to ask you a few questions about some other important people - your
friends.
(a) Who would you say your best friends are (PROBE FOR NAMES)?
(b) Where do they live?
(c) How often do you see them?
(IF MORE THAN ONE MENTIONED, ASK (d))
(d) Which of these people do you consider to be the one friend to
whom you are the closest?
(INTERVIEWER ENTER NAME IN BOX ON PAGE 15 ) .
NEIGHBOURS
5. And, would you count any of your neighbours as one of your friends?
IF YES
Who is that?
(ENTER NAME IN BOX ON PAGE 15).
7- (601.)
(a) And are there any of your neighbours with whom you don't get on
particularly well, or who you don't particularly like?.
IF YES
Who is it?
(ENTER NAME IN BOX ON PAGE 15 ).
Ill ASSESSMENT OF SPECIFIC NEEDS
6. I'd now like to get a more detailed picture of your situation, and how
it may have changed over the past few years.
(a) Are there any things that you have stopped buying or given up
over the past few years because you couldn't afford them?
(IF SO, LIST ON FORM BELOW)
(b) And what things have you cut down on buying or doing over the
past few years? (LIST BELOW)
(c) In addition to the things we've already mentioned, are there any
other things you planned to do or buy in your retirement, but
have not had enough money to do so? (LIST BELOW).
ITEMS MENTIONED FEELINGS DESCRIPTIVE LABELS
-3 -2 -1 0
-3 -2 -1 0
-3 -2 -1 0
-3 -2 -1 0
-3 -2 -1 0
(d) We now have a short list of things that you are doing without.
In order for me to get a picture of which are the most important
to you, I'd like to go through the list and ask you how you feel
about having to do without each item.
(INTERVIEWER GO THROUGH LIST, RATING FEELINGS AND NOTING
DESCRIPTIONS).
8.
CHECK E: ENTER RANGE OF AMOUNT BETTER OFF IN SPACES BELOW
(e) When I wrote to confirm our appointment, I also mentioned that
you would very likely he better off on a Supplementary Pension
"by between and per week. Thinking about that sum
of money, how far would it go toward meeting the cost of the
expenses we've just talked about?
0 No use at all
1 Help only a wee bit
2 Help a fair bit
3 Cover most of the costs
U Cover them completely
IV SUPPLEMENTARY PENSIONS
I'd like to spend the next few minutes discussing Supplementary
Pensions with you, now that you know that you would very likely
be better off on one.
7. Firstly, when you received my letter a few days(weeks) ago, what
was your reaction to learning that you very likely would be better
off financially on a Supplementary Pension?
8. And, may I ask, have you done anything toward applying since you
found out?
What have you done?
IF RESPONDENT HAS APPLIED, ASK QUESTION 9, AND GO THROUGH QUESTIONS IN PAST
TENSE, USING RIGHT-HAND COLUMN. OTHERWISE USE LEFT-HAND COLUMN.
9' (603.)
9. One of the first issues people think about when considering applying
is whether Supplementary Pensions are their right or charity. What
I mean here is that, for instance, your retirement pension (or old
age pension) is your by right, whereas anything you would get from
the Salvation Army is charity.
(a) This card (PRESENT CARD k) has five sentences on it.
Which sentence best describes your feelings about social security?
(b) And secondly, lets think now about your rebates. Looking at this




1. It's very definitely a right
2. It's more right than charity
3. It's a fairly even mixture of both
k. It's more charity than a right
5. It's very definitely charity
WHERE DIFFERENTIAL PERCEPTION EXISTS, ASK (c)
(c) What makes you say that social security (rebates) is more like
charity than rebates (social security) are?
10. I'd now like to spend a few minutes discussing with you your feelings
about the application procedure.
(INTERVIEWER NOTE: USE LEFT COLUMN FOR NON-CLAIMANTS, AND RIGHT
COLUMN FOR CLAIMANTS)
NON-CLAIMANTS CLAIMANTS
If you decided to apply, you would have to
apply to the Department of Health and Social
Security to verify that you would be better
off. May I ask, would you have any strong
feelings one way or the other about apply¬
ing to the DHSS?
How did you feel about





(a) How would you feel, then?
-3 -2 -1
Of course, if you decided to apply, How did you feel
you would also have to have an about having an
official interview. Do you have interview?
any strong feelings one way or the
other about having an interview?
Yes Ask (a)
No Ask 12.
(a) How would you feel, then?
-3-2-10123 GO TO 12(d)
I'd like to ask you now about any previous
experiences you may have had with officials.
First, have you ever had any dealings in
person with a Social Security officer?
Yes Ask (d)
No Ask ( a)
(a) With any officials from the Housing
Department (Waterloo Place)?
Yes . Ask (d)
No Ask (b)
(b) With other officials, such as people
from the electricity or gas board, or






(c) How do you think the Social Security




(d) How did those officials treat you? What was the official
like?
And, how did you feel about him/her? And, how did you feel
about him/her?
-3-2-10123
(e) And, if you decided to apply for a
Supplementary Pension now, how
likely is it that the Social Security
Officer would treat you the same way?
0 1 2 3 k
If you were to apply, you could have the Where did you have
interview either here in your home, or your interview?
you could go to the Social Security Office







(a) And do you have any strong feelings
one way or the other about having a








(b) And do you have any strong feelings
one way or the other about going to
their office to have an interview?
Yes Ask (i)
No Ask (c)
(i) How would you feel, then?
-3-2-10123
GO TO (c)
(c) I would like you to think for a minute IF INTERVIEW HELD AT OFFICE."
about their office. It is likely that
there would be other types of people Were there other people
waiting there to be interviewed. Can there?
you imagine, what would those people
be like?
What were they like?
(i) And would you have any strong
feelings one way or the other




(ii) And how would you feel, then? How did you feel about
being in their company?
-3-2-10123
I'd now like to discuss with you the types
of questions that the official would most
likely ask you if you decided to apply.
Since I'm very interested in what you feel
about being asked these types of questions,
you can help me to understand your feelings
in the following way. After 1 tell you
about each question, I'd like you to tell
me if it would bother you to have to answer
that particular question. If you tell me
that the question would bother you, I'll
be asking you how much, and why.
In your social security
interview, the official
asked you quite a few
questions. I'd now like
to ask you about how you
felt about having to
answer some of those
questions.
The interviewer would most likely ask you
about:
(a) Your weekly income, its amount, and
where it comes from. -3 -2 -1 0
(b) Your savings, their amount, and
where you have them saved. -3 -2 -1 0
(c) Your health, and how able you are to
get out and about on your own. -3 -2 -1 0
^d) The state of your clothing, and of
household goods such as bedding,
furniture or household equipment. -3 -2 -1 0
(e) Your family, whether you get any
income from them, and how much that
income amounts to. -3 -2 -1 0.
lit.
In addition to asking you about your circum- How did you feel about
stances, the official would also wish to see having to give the official
evidence of your income, savings and certain evidence of your circum-
expenses. He would wish to see, for instance, stances, such as showing
your pension book, your savings passbook, and him your pension book,
your rent and/or rates notice. How would you your savings passbook,
feel about having to show the official these and your rent and/or
things? rates notice?
-3 -2 -1 0
If you were thinking about applying for
social security, you might also consider
the views of the people to whom you are
close. Let's remind ourselves of who
those people are
(SEE BOX ON NEXT PAGE)
Before you applied, did
you talk it over with....
(ANY OF THE PEOPLE LISTED
ON NEXT PAGE)?
INTERVIEWER PROCEED THROUGH LIST OF
SIGNIFICANT OTHERS, PROMPTING WITH
THREE QUESTIONS BELOW
FOR EACH WITH WHOM
DISCUSSED, ASK:
(a) How do you think (each person) would
react if they found out?
(a) How did ,
react when they found
out ?
(b) How would you feel if they reacted
that way
(b) How did you feel
about that?
(c) How likely is it that they would find
out?
USE SAME SEQUENCE OF QUESTIONING FOR THE














































































17. Earlier, when I wrote to you, I told you that
you would be better off financially if you
were to claim a Supplementary Pension. The
government says that people cannot have both
a rebate and a Supplementary Pension at the
same time, and if you received a Supplemen¬
tary Pension, you would eventually have to
go off the rebate. I'd like to ask you now,
do you have any strong feelings one way or
the other about giving up your rebate in
favour of a Supplementary Pension?
Since you've applied,
you will eventually
have to give up your
rebate, as the govern¬




a) And how would you feel about eventually
giving up your rebate?
How do you feel about
having to give up your
rebate?
-3 -2 -1
(b) And what makes you feel that way^ And what makes you feel
that way?
APPLICANTS GO TO QUESTION 20
18. To sum up your views about applying for social security, I'd now like
you to look at this card (PRESENT CARD 5). It has seven phrases on
it, and I'd like you to pick the phrase that best summarises your view
in answer to the following question:
Considering the way you feel and are managing at the moment, how
likely is it that you will apply for social security sometime in
the next month or so?
IT. (611.)
6 I definitely will
5 I very likely will
h I probably will, but am not certain
3 I probably won't, but am not certain
2 I very likely will not, but there's a slight chance
1 I definitely will not.
19. And, is there any reason why you could not go out and apply tomorrow?
Yes Ask ( a)
No Go to 20.
(a) What is that?
V SOCIAL SECURITY IN CONTEXT
20 Throughout our talks we've concentrated on discussing two main ways in
which pensioners can make ends meet - rebates and social security.
However, there are other ways which we have not discussed, and some
of these ways I have listed on these cards (INTERVIEWER SHOW CARDS).
CARDS RANK
Get a part-time job
Apply for social security
Take in a lodger
Ask the family for help
Stay on rebate and do nothing else
Try to cut down further on expenses
18.
(a) Can you think of any other ways pensioners might use to make it
easier to make ends" meet? (IF YES, LIST ON ADDITIONAL CARDS).
(b) I'd now like to ask you, which of those strategies appeals to
you the most? (ENTER 1 UNDER RANK).
And which appeals to you the least?
Of those which remain, which appeals the most?
And which appeals the least?
Etc. UNTIL RANK ORDER OBTAINED.
[c) What made you decide to put at the top of the list?
(d) And why did you put at the bottom?
(e) I note that you've put below social security
in your list. What makes it less appealing than social security?
And you've put
your list
; above social security in
What makes it more appealing than social security?
19. (613. )
FOR THOSE WITH FAMILY ONLY (IF NOT ALREADY DISCUSSED). OTHERS GO TO END
21 May I ask just "briefly about your family?
(a) How willing do you think they would be to help you out if you
asked them to?
0 12 3^
(b) And, how able are they to help you out?
0 1 2 3 ^
(c) And, how would you feel if they were able to help you out?
-3-2-10123
CLOSING
That is the end of our interview. I hope that I haven't inconvenienced you
in any way, and would like to say that I have enjoyed our talks.
Before I go, you may want to ask me some questions. Is there anything that
you would like to ask me?
QUERIES?
Thank you very much for helping us out with the survey.
TIME INTERVIEW ENDED : a.m./p.m.
Appendix B8: Follow-up Interview
(615.)
FOLLOW - UP INFORMATION FORM
1. Subject Code Number
2. Interviewer Initials






5. IF NOT CONTACTED, check with neighbours as to
situation and ring below:




6. IF CONTACTED, individual's disposition:
able and willing to help
able but unwilling (e.g. refused)
unable
FOLLOW - UP INFORMATION
J. Have you contacted the DHSS to see if you would be




IF NO. ASK 0,. 8 and Q. 9
8. What have you done about it since I last saw you?
Nothing
Talked it over with someone (specify)
Asked other for advice (e.g. doctor, lawyer, minister)
Obtained leaflet from P.O., DHSS, OPWC, etc.
Completed application form, but not sent in
Made appointment but not followed through
Recently made appointment
9. The last time I saw you you said.... Have your
feelings changed? How would you put it now?
(underline first rating/ring new rating)
6 Definitely will
5 Vary likely will
4 Probably will but am not certain
3 Probably won't but am not certain






















IF YES, ASK OS 10 - 13
10. How long after I last saw you did you contact them?
(or, How long ago...). (Note: date of claim was a few
days before date of first payment on book of success¬
ful claimants)
11. And did they say you would be better off on a
Supplementary Pension?
No Yes
12. Just to check our estimate, how much better off (worse
off) did they say you would be?
amount
13. (if better off) Did you accept it?
No Yes












From: Mars T M Mitchell





RESEARCH:: DIFFERENTIAL TAKE-UP OF SUPPLEMENTARY PETSI0N3
(University of Edinburgh: Mr D Nelson, Mr S Kerr)
This research project has been commissioned by the DHSS from the
Department of Psychology in the University of Edinburgh. The person
whose name appears below was interviewed by a researcher earlier this
year, an4 to complete the study certain extra information is now




Appendix BIO: Full Analysis of Post-Hoc Survey
(620.)
Appendix BIO: Full Analysis of the Post-hoc Survey
1. The Post-Hoc Study of Attitudes Towards Rebates and
Supplementary Pensions
Length of Time on Rebates (Table 1)
The first question asked by interviewers was,
"Approximately how long ago did you first apply for
your rebates?" Table 1 summarises the responses of the
114 (93%) who could remember when they applied; figures
in the table represent the percentages of each tenure
category by the number of years receiving rebates.
Council tenants were the least likely to have
applied within the past two years; private tenants were
the most likely. In the main, pensioners are a fairly
static group with regard to changing from one benefit
to another, and these eligible non-claimants were no
exception. Nearly three-fifths had been receiving their
rebates for at least five years.
Surprisingly, private tenants were also the most
likely to have been receiving rebates for at least five
years. The mean number of years in receipt of rebates
for the tenure groups was 4.9, 5.5, and 7.02 for
owner-occupiers, council tenants and private tenants
respectively. One can draw two conclusions from these
findings: (1) most pensioners have been on rebates for
very substantial periods; (2) owner-occupiers were
slightly more likely to have been claiming rebates for
shorter periods, but had certainly caught up with the
other two groups over the past few years, no doubt due
to the extremely high rates increases in Lothian
Region.
Initial Knowledge of the Rebate Schemes (Table 2)
The second question asked was: "How did you first
find out about the rebate scheme?" This question was
designed to reveal both how they discovered the rebate
scheme and, more generally, which channels were most
frequently employed to transmit information about
benefits and eligibility criteria. Table 2 summarises
the responses.
Overall, 4% of the sample did not themselves
decide to apply; thus it would have been inappropriate
for them to answer the question. Typical cases were
where the late husband had applied, or a relative
applied on the respondent's behalf while he or she was
in hospital. Another 14% did not know where they had
first heard of the benefits or could not remember.
About 45% of the sample had heard through contacts with
other people; only 5% had heard from significant
(621.)
Table 1. Years in Receipt of Rebates (%s)
Tenure NO. OF YEARS IN RECEIPT
Less than Two to Five to Ten or
two four nine more
Owner 8 38 46 8
Council 6 38 41 15
Private 10 28 48 14
All
Tenures 7 35 45 13

























referents excluding family and friends (such as
solicitors, church elders, ministers, doctors,
landlords, etc.), and half of these were private
tenants informed by their landlords. Just over
one-third had heard through advertising, leaflets, or
media sources (including the Edinburgh Housing
Department, the DHSS, their local post-office, T.V. and
radio). Since the Edinburgh Housing Department sends
out rebate application forms to council tenants each
year, it was not surprising to find that 38% of council
tenants recalled learning about the benefits from the
EHD circulars.
It is very clear that friends and relatives play
an important part in transmitting information to
potential claimants. This is particularly the case for
owner-occupiers, of whom nearly two-thirds were either
informed by or received their rebates as the result of
action taken by friends and relatives. These findings
would confirm one's natural expectation that
owner-occupiers and private tenants are much more
reliant upon knowledge spread by word of mouth than are
council tenants, who have a built-in relationship with
their potential benefactors.
Factors Leading to the Self-Perception of Eligibility
(Table 3)
Table 3 presents the answers given to the
question: "What made you first think you might be
eligible?"
Over all housing categories, the experience of a
sudden drop in income was given as the main reason by
over half the sample. For two thirds of these 66
respondents, this drop was due to retirement, for just
over a tenth it was due to the death of their husband,
for just under a tenth it was due to increases in
housing costs, for about 6% it was due to ill health
causing loss of work or early retirement, and for
another tenth it was due to other reasons. These
proportions were very similar across tenure categories.
The remaining explanations given by at least a
tenth of the sample for believing that they might be
eligible were: (1) that they arrived at this conclusion
by analogy - other people in the area in similar
circumstances had rebates so they must be eligible as
well (10%); (2) that family, friends or significant
referents (SR) suggested it (accounting for 11%).
Fifteen per cent stated that they never concluded that
they were eligible, but that they applied on the
"off-chance". Nearly 30% of owner-occupiers fell into
this group, while less than half that proportion of
council and private tenants responded similarly. On the
other hand, both public and private tenants were very















much more likely to respond that they had arrived at an
estimate of their eligibility (a) because a friend,
member of the family, or significant referent had
suggested it, or (b) by analogy, by comparing
themselves to others in the area.
These findings might suggest that owner-occupiers
are not tied into a network and thus have relatively
limited means of deducing their eligibility.
Alternatively, since a substantial proportion of
owner-occupiers did manage to apply "on the
off-chance", it might be the case that network
membership is less relevant to owner-occupiers.
In contrast to owner-occupiers, from one-fifth to
a quarter of council tenants and private tenants
arrived at an estimate of their eligibility as a result
of their membership in a social network — either
directly, through direct advice from other network
members, or indirectly, by analogy.
Circumstances Leading to the Claim (Table 4)
"What were the circumstances which led you to
apply?" was the fourth question. For many pensioners
this question prompted a restatement of their previous
answer.
Loss of income, through retirement or death of the
husband, and increases in housing costs were the main
environmental catalysts of claims, accounting for over
70% of all responses. There were no notable variations
by type of housing tenure.
Degree of Difficulty Deciding to Apply (Table 5)
At this point the interviewers asked their
pensioners how difficult they had found it to decide to
apply. An analysis of their responses appears in Table
5. As can be seen, 40% of owner-occupiers as opposed to
25% of private tenants and a mere 6% of council tenants
had some difficulty deciding to apply.
Perceived Advantages and Disadvantages of Rebates
(Table 6)
Interviewers then asked what the pensioners had
felt to be the advantages and disadvantages of rebates
at the time they applied for them. Of the 123
pensioners, 107 gave specific statements about the
advantages of rebates. For 91% the advantage was
financial; for 10% it was an issue of convenience
either of form (in the case of rent and rate rebates)
or of frequency of payment (in the case of rent
allowances). The breakdown by tenure appears in Table
6 .
Table4.Circumstanc sLe dingtoClai s(%r porting) TenureNothingR 'detir -D aIncre sedIlln sOth rDon't SpecialEarly:m ntofH usinginHouse-K w 111HusbandCostsh ld Owner84461102 Council66521546 Private4431977 __ Tenures654714058


































Since respondents were allowed to give more than
one answer, the column totals do not sum to 100. Two
things are clear here: (1) the main advantage given,
from the perspective of being potential applicants
(e.g. before they applied), was financial, and not a
matter of convenience; (2) pensioners had great
difficulty finding disadvantages with the rebate scheme
-- only ten could do so, and six of these were
frustrated by continual correspondence with the local
authority over changes in rebates and rents and rates.
Supplementary Benefit as an Alternative (Tables 7 and
8)
The next question asked was: "When you were first
thinking of applying for a rebate, did you consider the
possibility of applying for social security instead?"
Over the entire sample, 109(90%) did not even consider
supplementary benefit as an alternative when they were
thinking of applying for their rebates. Again, the
public and private sectors viewed things differently;
96% of owner-occupiers and private tenants never
considered supplementary benefit; the comparable figure
for council tenants was 82%.
Of the remaining 10% (14), 7% considered applying
but went no further than thinking about it, 2% had
transferred to rebates from supplementary benefit, and
one person could not remember what she had done at the
time. Not one pensioner fell into the category of
"applied but assessed ineligible". The striking
conclusion is that of these 123 people, over
nine-tenths did not consider supplementary benefit as
an alternative, and even of those few who did, not one
went as far as to test the system.
Table 7 presents the main reasons given by those
90% (109) who did not consider applying.
There were slight differences amongst tenure
groups—council tenants were slightly more likely to be
unaware of the benefit; owner-occupiers were
substantially less likely to perceive that they were
ineligible and much more likely to believe that they
would be better off on a rebate; private tenants were
the least likely to have been unaware of the benefit
but were simultaneously the most likely to believe that
they would be ineligible for it.
Pensioners who had believed that they were
ineligible were asked why. Of those who answered,
three-fifths stated that it was because they had extra
pensions, and two-fifths because their savings were too
high.
Table7.ReasonsforNotC nsideringSupplem ntaryBe fi(% ) TenureBasicPerceivedKn wIn lig-OtherDon't IgnoranceIneligiblible;thought(SeeK w B/OonrebateTa .8) Owner10560 Council1577592 Private8214670 AllTenures (N=109)15063
(631 . )
At this point interviewers asked pensioners what
they had believed to be the advantages and
disadvantages of supplementary pensions at the time
they applied for their rebates. Obviously, it was
difficult for many to recall their thoughts at the
time. For others the entire issue of supplementary
benefit was extremely emotive-- in some cases it was so
emotive that the interviewer had to drop the subject
entirely. Thus it cannot be said with total confidence
that these results accurately reflect these pensioners'
thoughts and feelings at the time; however they do
provide some empirical insights.
Table 8 shows the disadvantages to SB given by
those deterred from applying by their perceptions of
the benefit and of the application procedure (the
"Other" category from Table 7). In no way did
interviewers prompt or prod pensioners to answer. It is
clear that, unlike the case with rebates, pensioners
perceived a whole host of disadvantages to
supplementary benefit.
The main reasons given by this group of 66
"others" were, not surprisingly, pride, charity or
independence by three-fifths, low utility of the
monetary value of the benefit by about one-half, the
feeling that the procedure constituted an invasion of
privacy by about one-quarter, perceptions of claimants
as being undesirable by just under a fifth, and
perceptions that the officer would be offensive in some
fashion by about one-tenth. Overall, expected reactions
of significant referents (SR) such as family, friends
and neighbours played little part in their current
explanation of why they did not consider claiming
supplementary benefit at the time.
By type of tenure, results were fairly consistent,
with one exception. Council tenants and owner-occupiers
were substantially more likely to appraise the benefit
and find it wanting in financial terms (low utility)
whereas private tenants seemed more concerned about
their association with claimants of supplementary
benefit.
The last row in Table 8 shows the proportions
which each category comprised of all 109 pensioners who
did not consider applying for supplementary pensions.
Here it can be seen that the reasons most frequently
given for not considering applying for supplementary
benefit were pride, charity or independence (37%),
followed by low utility(31%), invasion of privacy
(14%), and perceptions of claimants (10%).
*»
Of the 123 pensioners, only 30% perceived any
possible advantages SB. For about a fifth of this
group, the advantage was the possibility that
Table8.PercentagesReportingDisadvantagestSu pl n taryP sions(B sSample=66)* TenurePridLowP rceptionInvasiOfficers'F milyFri nds'Neighbo rs' CharityUtili-ofClaim-Pre son-Re ctionsiRe ctio Indepen.tyantsvacylit Owner665312007 (n=15) Council63712580 (n=24) Private573324100 (n=27) All Tenures625172303 As%ageof allwhodid notcon¬ sider37110462 *Rowsdon tt tal100%sincem nype sion rsg vm rethna sw r.
(633 . )
supplementary benefit might be worth more to them. It
is worth recalling, however, that not one of these
people pursued this course of action. Over four-fifths
of this group reported that the advantages of
supplementary benefit were not more money but other
benefits to which they became eligible as a result of
being on the benefit, the "perks" of supplementary
benefit. No other advantages were mentioned.
2. Levels and Predictors of Satisfaction with Rebates
Overall Levels of Satisfaction
Interviewers then asked a number of questions
about each pensioner's satisfaction with the form,
amount, source and frequency of payment of their
rebates. Comparable questions about how they would feel
if the benefit was worth the same amount but had the
contrasting salient features of supplementary pensions
were also asked, and a measure of their overall
satisfaction with rebates was then taken. These
measures were derived from questions 43 to 50 in the
screening interview.
Table 9 shows that their levels of overall
satisfaction with rebates were high. The scale at the
top of the table ranges from -3 (extremely unhappy)
through 0 (ambivalent) to +3 (extremely pleased).
Generally speaking, council tenants were slightly
less happy with their rebates than were private tenants
and owner-occupiers; however, this difference pales
into insignificance in contrast to the relative
proportions who were satisfied and dissatisfied. Over
the entire sample, only 5% expressed any level of
dissatisfaction, 9% were ambivalent and the remaining
86% expressed substantial satisfaction. Again in
general terms, these levels of satisfaction were
independent of SB eligibility status as shown by the
similarity between the percentages for the eligible and
those for the entire assessed sample (shown in
parentheses in the last row).
Predictors of Satisfaction with Rebates
This analysis involved using multiple regression
to regress against pensioners' overall satisfaction
ratings the remaining satisfaction measures. A separate
analysis was conducted for each of the three tenures;
the results of these analyses and their interpretations
are presented below.
From Table 10 it can be seen that only two
variables were used in predicting the overall
satisfaction of owner-occupiers with their rebates. The
most important of these variables was pensioners'
Table9.LevelsofOverallSatisfactionwithReb e(%s) LEVELOFSATISFACTIONTotal VeryAmbivalentVery UnhappyHap y TENURE-3-2-10123 Owner041228800 (n=26) Council0284010 (n=52) Private0279548100 (n=45) All Tenures0(1)14 39(12325 47)1 0 00)
Table10.PredictorsofOverallSatisfactionwi hR b tes:Owner-O upier(n=24 PREDICTORVARIABLEMULTIPSQU RSQCHANGIMPLB TA Satisfactionwithcur- .679461543 rentamountofebate Satisfactionwith.7525651043 1 rebateform Variablesnotincludedthequation: -Satisfactionwi htheLoc lAuthorityasourceben f t -Potentialsatisfactionwi hameam untofbenefit,ui c sfor -Potentialsatisfactionwi hDIISSsourcefbene t * Duetohfactacompl edatasetsrneed dne chindividualr r toc nductamultipleregressionnalysis,individua sf rwhommplets t arenotvailabledeletedfromthn lysis.T uvar rwhich therewasalargnumb rofmissingca esouldotbuse ullyincl d analysis,especiallysincetherrboundmiss ngca esoth r variablesswel .Thus,therisalwayensionb tweemaximi ing numberofcasestbeinclud dannalysis,ndm ximisinghhoice variablestobeused.Inhcasfianalysif rown r-occupiers,t dataforllesiredvariablesw svailablelbutt oc se .
(636.)
satisfaction with the amount of benefit, controlling
46% of the variance; the second most important variable
was their satisfaction with the rebate coming as a
reduction at source, and this variable controlled an
additional 10% of the variance beyond that controlled
by the first variable. Consulting the Beta weights, one
sees that satisfaction with the amount of rebate was
about half again as important as satisfaction with its
form in determining overall satisfaction. It was
noteworthy that neither current satisfaction with the
local authority as source nor feelings about the source
and cash form of SB contributed at all to their overall
satisfaction.
Satisfaction with the amount of rebate was the
most important contributor to the overall satisfaction
of council tenants as well, being about three and
one-half times as powerful a predictor as was their
satisfaction with rebates coming as reductions at
source (Table 11). Satisfaction with the local
authority as the source of rebates and potential
satisfaction with the DHSS as the source of SB were
roughly equal to satisfaction with the form of rebates
as predictors of overall satisfaction. Surprisingly, as
in the case of owner-occupiers, their potential
satisfaction with the cash form of SB did not enter in
to explaining their overall satisfaction with rebates.
Tables 12 and 13 present the results of two
regression analyses for private tenants. As was
mentioned at the foot of Table 10, the number of cases
included in a regression analysis is limited to the
number for whom there are complete data for all the
variables to be incorporated. This limitation is very
clearly illustrated by contrasting Tables 12 and 13,
the former involving 42 cases and the latter 20 cases.
Complete data sets on 42 cases were available for only
the three variables of satisfaction with the amount of
rebate, potential satisfaction with the DHSS as the
source of alternative benefit, and satisfaction with
the local authority as the source of rebates. Again, it
was satisfaction with the amount of rebates which
contributed the most to overall satisfaction; this
measure was five times as important towards explaining
overall satisfaction as were attitudes towards the DHSS
as the source of SB. As was the case with council
tenants, satisfaction with the local authority as the
source of the rebates was not important in explaining
the overall satisfaction of this group of 42 private
tenants.
As can be seen by comparing Table 12 with Table
13, the large quantity of missing data on certain
variables prevented the author from using several
measures, unique to private tenants, which may have
been very important in explaining their overall
Table11.PredictorsofOverallSatisf ctionwithRebates:Coun lTen(n=48) PREDICTORVARIABLEMULTIPLERSQUARESQCH NGESI PLBET Satisfactionwithcur-.773.598.598.773.730 rentamountofrebate Satisfactionwith.828.6 6.0 8.515.223 rebateform SatisfactionwithLocal.845.714.028.23.190 Authorityassource ofrebate Potentialsatisfaction.861.742.027-.099-.16 withDHSSassource ofbenefit Variablesnotincludedthequation: -Potentialsatisfactionwiths mamountobenefi ,uicashfor
Table12.PredictorsofOverallSatisfa ti nw thReb tes:Priv eT n n s(n=42) PREDICTORVARIABLEMULT PLESQU RRSQCHANGEIMPLBE A Satisfactionwithcur-.76358.5.7633 rentamountofrebate Potentialsatisfaction.776603020-.296-.144 withDHSSassource ofbenefit Variablesnotincludedthequ tion: -SatisfactionwithLoc lAuthorityasourcereba es
Table13.PredictorsofOverallSatisf ctionwithRebates:Pri eTenan s(n=20) PREDICTORVARIABLEMULTIPLERSQUARESQCH NGESI PLBET Satisfactionwithcur¬ rentamounofrebate Potentialsatisfac ion withDHSSassource ofbenefit Satisfactionwithfreq¬ uencyofrebate Potentialsatisfact on witheeklypaym nt Potentialsatisfaction withpre-paymentSB SatisfactionwithLocal Authorityassource ofrebate Satisfactionwithpo t- paymentallowance.759.5 7.577.7 9.611 .777.604.026-.35-.407 .808.653.048.047.3 3 .832.693.040.118.35 .850.722.029-.4-.284 .869.75.033.11.176 .880.775.019.166-.164 Allvariablesincludedthequation
(640.)
satisfaction. These measures comprised comparisons (1)
of satisfaction with the frequency of rebate/allowance
payments with the weekly supplementary benefit payment
(both benefits coming as cash), and (2) of satisfaction
with the timing of rent allowances (e.g. their coming
just before or at the time of the rent demand notice)
with their satisfaction with receiving supplementary
benefit in small units relatively far in advance which
they would have to save up to pay their rent.
Table 13 presents the results of an analysis which
did employ these variables, but used a much reduced
sample of 20. For this sub-group of private tenants,
satisfaction with the current amount of rebates was
again the most important, but only half again as
important as was their potential satisfaction with
receiving benefit from the DHSS. Their satisfaction
with the frequency of their current allowance payment,
potential satisfaction with a weekly payment of
supplementary benefit and having to save it up were all
of substantial importance in explaining overall
satisfaction. Both their satisfaction with the timing
of their allowances, and their satisfaction with the
local authority as the source of their rebates were
only about one-quarter as important as was their
satisfaction with the amount, and four-tenths as
important as was potential dissatisfaction with the
DHSS as the source of their benefit.
3. Satisfaction with the Contrasting Features of
Rebates and Supplementary Pensions
Rebate Form (Table 14)
As can be seen from Table 14, not a single
pensioner was dissatisfied about the low cash-flow form
of managing to be had on rebates, and only a handful
were ambivalent in their feelings. There were no
differences between owner-occupiers and council
tenants; this question was inappropriate for private
tenants since both rent allowances and SB come as cash
payments.
Supplementary Benefit Form (Table 15)
The results of Table 15 stand in marked contrast
to those of the previous table. When asked how
satisfied they would be with the cash form of
supplementary benefit, over three-quarters indicated
some level of unhappiness with this prospect. Council
tenants were substantially more likely than
owner-occupiers to be unhappy with the cash form of SB;
this difference is probably a simple reflection of the
fact that council tenants' rebates values were over
three times as great as were the rebate values of
owner-occupiers (£11.30 as opposed to £3.60), and that
Table14.Leve sofSatisfactionwithReb eForm(%s) LEVELOFSATISFACTIONTotal VeryAmbivalentVery UnhappyHappy TENURE-3-2-10123 Owner08384210 (n=26) Council064371 0 (n=52) All Tenures06.5416.1 0 (n=78)
Table15.LevelsofPotentialSatisfac onwithBF rm(%s) LEVELOFSATISFACTIONTotal VeryAmbivalentr UnhappyHap y TENURE-3-2-10123 Owner4372960100 (n=26) Council1230682010 (n=52) All Tenures10332010 (n=78)
(643.)
owner-occupiers seemed to be more accustomed to the
high cash-flow style of managing. Because the rebatable
housing costs of tenants are substantially greater than
those of owner-occupiers, one might expect rebates
generally to be more important to tenants than owners.
If this were so, one would expect a stronger
relationship between satisfaction with rebate form and
potential satisfaction with SB form for council tenants
than for owner-occupiers; a correlational analysis
bears this out, showing the correlation for council
tenants to be -0.36 (n=47, p<.01) and the correlation
for owner-occupiers to be -.008 (n=23, ns).
Frequency and Timing of Benefit Payments (Table 16)
There are several issues which concern private
tenants but not owner-occupiers or council tenants. Two
of these issues are the relative frequency and timing
of rent allowance and SB payments. From Table 16 it is
clear that nine-tenths were positively satisfied with
the frequency of their rent allowance payment, be it
fortnightly, monthly or quarterly. This distribution of
responses is probably unrepresentative, since nearly
all the private tenants were living on private housing
estates, renting from the same landlord, and paying
their rent quarterly. Were more receiving allowances
fortnightly or monthly, the distinction between
satisfaction with current frequency and with weekly
payments from supplementary benefit would be blurred,
and supplementary benefit would probably not appear to
be quite as undesirable, at least in this respect. As
it stands, nearly 90% expressed some negative feelings
about receiving SB weekly, but there was no direct
relationship between the two measures of actual
satisfaction with allowance payment frequency and
potential satisfaction with supplementary benefit
payment frequency (r=-.009, n=36, p<0.29).
Generally speaking, the majority of private
tenants were not greatly concerned whether their
allowances came before or after their demand notice.
There would probably not be such a distribution were it
possible to identify the two sub-groups of those who
received the allowances before and those who received
them after their rent payments were due. Regrettably,
this information was collected only sporadically and
such an analysis cannot be performed. From Row D one
would expect that most private tenants would be
ambivalent about getting the benefit in advance. This
finding too is confounded since it is not possible to
distinguish between those private tenants who received
their rent allowances before and those who received
them after they had paid their rent.






































Local Authority as Benefit Source (Table 17)
Table 17 shows that private tenants were
considerably more likely than members of the other two
groups to be very satisfied with receiving their
benefit from the local authority, although not one
respondent from any group expressed any dissatisfaction
with the local authority.
DHSS as Benefit Source (Table 18)
Although the majority of pensioners were
ambivalent or negative about getting benefit from the
DHSS, there was a considerable split between private
tenants, of whom two-fifths would be satisfied to
receive their benefit from the DHSS, and the others, of
whom only about one-eighth would be satisfied. Private
tenants seemed to be rather more concerned with getting
the benefit than with where it came from. That they
were not concerned with the source of benefit was
substantiated by a fairly strong, direct correlation
between current satisfaction with the local authority
as source and potential satisfaction with the DHSS as
source (r=.30, n=42, p<.03).
4. Perceptions of Need (Tables 19-24)
This section examines the relationship between
satisfaction with the amount of rebate and four
measures of perceived need; the issue of how "needy"
pensioners perceived themselves to be will also be
discussed.
The measures of perceived need were the last four
measures taken in the screening interview. In each
case, the pensioner (or pensioners in the case of
married couples) was given a card which had five
statements on it; the interviewer read through each
question and asked the person to reply by selecting the
most appropriate statement.
The four measures were perceptions (1) of the
amount of difficulty they were having making ends meet;
(2) of whether their income exceeded, equalled, or fell
short of their expenses; (3) of how well they were
managing compared to some previous period of their
lives; (4) of how well they were managing compared with
pensioners of the previous generation, such as parents,
aunts and uncles.
As a backdrop to the discussion of the
relationship between perceived levels of need and
satisfaction with the amount of rebates, a description
of pensioners' levels of satisfaction with the amount
of rebate is presented below.
Table17.LevelsofSatisfactionwithcalAuthoritysour efBen fit(% ) LEVELOFSATISFACTIONTotal VeryAmbivalentery UnhappyHap y TENURE-3-2-10123 Owner024403210 (n=25) Council02247100 (n=49) Private0123056200 (n=43) __ Tenures019300
Table18.LevelsofPotentialSatisf ctionwithDHSSsSourfBen i(% ) LEVELOFSATISFACTIONTotal VeryAmbivalentVery UnhappyHappy TENURE-3-2-10123 Owner0165481 0 (n=25) Council1424662100 (n=49) Private214960010 (n=42) All Tenures7154010 (n=l16)
(648.)
As Table 19 shows, about four-fifths of the sample
expressed some level of satisfaction with the amount of
rebate; about one-seventh expressed some level of
dissatisfaction. There were no differences as a
function of tenure.
The common-sense hypothesis was that the level of
satisfaction with the amount of rebate would be
inversely related to the perceived levels of need.
Table 20 illustrates that this was generally the case.
For all tenures combined, each measure was
significantly related to satisfaction with the amount
of rebate in the expected direction. Over all tenures,
the extent to which income exceeded or fell short of
expenses bore the strongest relationship to
satisfaction with the amount; this measure of need was
also the best correlate of satisfaction with the amount
for private tenants.
For owner-occupiers the strongest correlate of
satisfaction with amount was the degree of difficulty
making ends meet; for council tenants it was how well
they perceived they were doing compared to the previous
generation.
Of equal importance to this relationship is the
question of "how needy" was the sample, a question not
of relationships between constructs, but of absolute
levels of perceived "need". Table 21 addresses this
question in terms of the degree of difficulty
pensioners experienced in making ends meet while in
receipt of their rebates. Here it is clear that a
substantial proportion (33%) seemed to have no
difficulty whatsoever making ends meet. Private tenants
were the most likely to state this; owner-occupiers
were the most likely to state that they were having
only a small amount of difficulty; both categories of
tenants were more likely to state that they were
finding it "pretty hard" or "a great struggle" to make
ends meet (24%) than were owner-occupiers (8%).
In terms of pensioners' perceptions of the
discrepancy between their income and expenses (Table
22), nearly a half indicated that the two amounts were
approximately equal, while just under a fifth indicated
that their income was a "wee bit less" than their
expenses. Just over a quarter felt their income was a
little bit greater than their expenses; those
indicating that their income was greatly in excess of
their expenses formed just over one-tenth of the
sample. Private tenants were two to three times more
likely than were owner-occupiers and council tenants to
indicate that their income was a bit less than their
expenses; nearly three-tenths of private tenants fell
into this category.
Table19.Leve sofSatisfactionwithCurrentAmou tfReb e(%s) LEVELOFSATISFACTIONTotal VeryAmbivalentVery UnhappyHap y TENURE-3-2-10123 Owner01262838100 (n=25) Council068434100 (n=50) Private02147385100 (n=44) All Tenures031182963100 (n=l19)















































































Correlationco fficientsinthfi scolumnarinv r dbe a se
thescalevaluesforismeasureweinvert d.
Table21.AmountofDifficultyM ki gEndseet(%s) DEGREEOFDIFFICULTY TENURE1.2345. NoProblemrettyHardAlmostIm¬
possible
Owner31640 (n=26) Council2746160 (n=52) Private4016 (n=45) All Tenures33471550 (n=l23)
Table22.
IncomeiRelationtExpens s(% ) RELATION Incomemuch










As can be seen from Table 23, a substantially
larger percentage of owner-occupiers (58%) than tenants
(46%) were finding it more difficult to manage now than
in the past. Over all tenures combined, just under
one-half (48%) found it harder to manage now than
before, just over a third (36%) found no difference,
and about one-seventh (15%) found it easier to manage
now than before.
An obvious comparison which comes to mind is how
well pensioners thought they were managing as compared
to pensioners of the previous generation. The results
here (Table 24) were fairly consistent across tenure
categories, with only 12% stating that they were only
as well off as or worse off than the previous
generation, 35% that they were a bit better off, and



































































Appendix Bll: Additional Correlations
(657. )
Appendix Bll: Correlations between Behaviour and All VIE




Sig. referent finding out
Having needs met
Having interview at heme








Having interview at heme
Having interview at office








Sig. referent finding out
Giving up the rebate
CORRELATION SIGNIFICANCE
0.226 +
0.342 **
-0.165 +
-0.170 +
0.485
0.386
0.209 +
0.153 +
-0.018 +
-0.086 +
-0.002 +
0.145 +
-0.066 +
-0.059 +
0.182 +
0.254 k
0.247 k
0.265 k
+ = non-significant
* = p<.05
** = p<.005
*** = pc.001
